

PHL 115: Selfhood, Freedom & Diversity

Signature Assignment

Justification for using assessments that are called “exams” as parts of the Signature Assignment.

The Signature Assignment in this course consists of two “exams,” both completed during the scheduled final exam time during finals week. I put “exams” in quotation marks, because these are *not* traditional exams that simply test the retention of information. Instead, they together compose an “authentic assessment” by providing students with an authentic symposium experience.

The first “exam”—the “Team Exam” on pp. 2-21 below—students complete as a team. The team as a whole completes only one “exam,” thus each member of the team has to deliberate with their teammates about how to answer each question. In practice, this makes the assignment more of a group project than an “exam.” The reason I call it a “team exam” is because that way of speaking makes it clear to the students that the whole assignment is done in class, and that each student studying as an individual is the best preparation for the assignment.

The second “exam”—the “Individual Exam” on pp. 22-37 below—students complete as individuals. It includes many of the questions they just went through as a team, which ensures everyone actively participates in the “team exam.” It also includes the personal reflection portion of the signature assignment near the end (see p. 37).

Why is this an “authentic assessment”? In order to answer that question, we need to ask what it means to engage in the discipline of philosophy authentically. Authentic philosophy is debating and conversing with others, giving reasons for one’s positions, with a collective aim toward the truth. That is precisely what the “team exam” requires students to do. Then the “individual exam” is there to ensure that each student engages in the “team exam” and to give each student a chance to do the reflection portion of the signature assignment. Thus, both the “authentic assessment” and the “personal reflection” parts of the signature assignment are included when both the “team exam” and “individual exam” are combined.

Team Name: _____

Each team fills out one exam. The grade on that exam will be the team's grade. Each question is worth 1 point.

Part 1: Human Identity Apart from Society

1. Why, according to Hobbes, is the “natural condition of mankind,” or “state of nature,” a condition of war of each individual with every other individual?

2. What is the main way in which Rousseau’s version of the state of nature differs from Hobbes’ version?

3. Do Hobbes and Rousseau intend the “state of nature” to describe the historical condition of early human beings, before the formation of social groups or governments, or do they intend the “state of nature” to describe what human beings would be like if they were not influenced by the power of their societies and governments?

Pick the best answer.

- A. Hobbes and Rousseau intend the “state of nature” to describe what human beings would be like if they were not influenced by the power of their societies and governments.
- B. Hobbes and Rousseau intend the “state of nature” to describe what human beings would be like if they were not influenced by the power of their societies and governments, AND to describe the historical condition of humans before the formation of social groups or governments.
- C. Hobbes and Rousseau intend the “state of nature” to describe the historical condition of early humans before the formation of social groups or governments.

4. Does the state of nature described by Hobbes accurately match the historical reality of early human beings, which was described in the reading from Charles Taylor? Pick the best answer.

- A. Yes
- B. No

5. Does the state of nature described by Rousseau accurately match the historical reality of early human beings, which was described in the reading from Charles Taylor? Pick the best answer.

- A. Yes
- B. No

6. According to Hobbes, can any action be considered good or bad in the state of nature?
- A. Yes
 - B. No
7. According to Hobbes, can any action be considered right or wrong in the state of nature?
- A. Yes
 - B. No
8. How, according to Hobbes, do groups of humans leave the state of nature? Pick the answer that best articulates Hobbes' view.
- A. They make a contract with one another which sets up a Sovereign power. Each individual person making the contract gives up his or her right to govern him or herself and transfers that right to the Sovereign, so that the Sovereign has the right to govern each individual.
 - B. Each individual makes a contract with the Sovereign, agreeing to follow the laws the Sovereign makes so long as the Sovereign protects their natural rights. Each individual person making the contract gives up his or her right to govern him or herself so long as the Sovereign protects and respects his or her natural rights.
9. According to Hobbes, must the contract that individuals make with one another (often called the “social contract”) in order to establish the Sovereign be a written contract? Pick the answer that best articulates Hobbes' view.
- A. Yes. The contract needs to be written. Historically, the contract has often been called a constitution.
 - B. No. The contract need not be written, and historically has typically not been written. An oral agreement in which each individual takes an oath is sufficient.
 - C. No. The contract need not be written. Even an oral agreement is not necessary. Historically most people have typically only implicitly agreed to the contract.
10. Can the “person” established as the Sovereign be an assembly (i.e., a designated group of individuals)? Or must the “person” established as the Sovereign be a monarch (i.e., one individual)?
- A. The “person” established as the Sovereign can be either a monarch or an assembly.
 - B. The “person” established as the Sovereign can only be a monarch
 - C. The “person” established as the Sovereign can only be an assembly.
11. Hobbes claims that “nothing the Sovereign does can *wrong* any of his subjects, nor ought any of them to accuse him of injustice” (Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 82). **Explain in no more than three sentences, the reasoning behind Hobbes claim that it is impossible for a Sovereign to wrong or do anything unjust to any of its subjects.**
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Hobbes and Rousseau disagree about what the state of nature is like. Their differences have consequences for how they think governments should be organized and for how they think of the relationship between the government and its subjects.

- 12. Does Hobbes think that leaving the state of nature has generally made the human race happier?**
- A. Yes, according to Hobbes, human beings are generally happier in society than in the state of nature.
 - B. No, according to Hobbes, human beings are generally happier in the state of nature than in society.
- 13. Does Rousseau think that leaving the state of nature has generally made the human race happier?**
- A. Yes, according to Rousseau, human beings are generally happier in society than in the state of nature.
 - B. No, according to Rousseau, human beings are generally happier in the state of nature than in society.
- 14. Is there more inequality between people in Hobbes' state of nature than there is in most societies that exist now and have existed so far? Or is there more inequality between people in most societies that exist now and have existed so far than in Hobbes' state of nature?**
- A. There is more inequality in Hobbes' state of nature than in most societies that exist now and have existed so far.
 - B. There is more inequality in most societies that exist now and have existed so far than in Hobbes' state of nature.
- 15. Is there more inequality between people in Rousseau's state of nature than there is in most societies that exist now and have existed so far? Or is there more inequality between people in most societies that exist now and have existed so far than in Rousseau's state of nature?**
- A. There is more inequality in Rousseau's state of nature than in most societies that exist now and have existed so far.
 - B. There is more inequality in most societies that exist now and have existed so far than in Rousseau's state of nature.

Part 2: Human Identity Apart from a Mind-Independent World

- 16. Assume for the sake of argument that you are dreaming that you're in this classroom right now, without really being here. Can you (individual team member) be completely certain that right now, when you look around, you are seeing* the arrangements of colors, shapes, sounds, textures, etc. that appear to be what you usually call "people" and "team members"?** Either answer can count as "correct" for grading purposes.
- A. Yes
 - B. No
- 17. Assume for the sake of argument that you are really in this classroom right now and that it exists independent of you, just as you would think from a commonsense point of view. Can you be completely certain that right now, when you look around, you are seeing the arrangements of colors, shapes, sounds, textures, etc. that appear to be what you usually call "people" and "team members"?** Either answer can count as "correct" for grading purposes.
- A. Yes
 - B. No
- 18. Assume for the sake of argument that your whole life is really a dream that God has made for you to test you, and that upon dying you will wake up from it. Furthermore, assume that you hold a religious belief that claims that this is true. Can you be completely certain that right now, when you look around, you are seeing the arrangements of colors, shapes, sounds, textures, etc. that appear to be what you usually call "people" and "team members"?** Either answer can count as "correct" for grading purposes.
- A. Yes
 - B. No

* By "seeing" I mean having a visual experience, as is done in dreams, hallucinations, etc.

19. Assume for the sake of argument that your whole life is really a dream that God has made for you to test you, and that upon dying you will wake up from it. Furthermore, assume that you hold a religious belief that claims that this is not true. **Can you be completely certain that right now, when you look around, you are seeing the arrangements of colors, shapes, sounds, textures, etc. that appear to be what you usually call “people” and “team members”?** Either answer can count as “correct” for grading purposes.

- A. Yes
- B. No

20. No matter what particular worldview you happen to have, **can you be completely certain that right now, when you look around, you are seeing the arrangements of colors, shapes, sounds, textures, etc. that appear to be what you usually call “people” and “team members”?** Either answer can count as “correct” for grading purposes.

- A. Yes
- B. No

21. Explain why the answer you gave in question 20 is in fact true.

22. Assume for the sake of argument that you are dreaming that you’re in this classroom right now, without really being here. **Can you (individual team member) be completely certain that you really exist* right now, if by “you” is meant the conscious subject of the awareness being experienced right now?** Either answer can count as “correct” for grading purposes.

- A. Yes
- B. No

23. Assume for the sake of argument that you are really in this classroom right now and that it exists independent of you, just as you would think from a commonsense point of view. **Can you be completely certain that you really exist right now, if by “you” is meant the conscious subject of the awareness being experienced right now?** Either answer can count as “correct” for grading purposes.

- A. Yes
- B. No

24. No matter what particular worldview you happen to have (if we exclude from consideration worldviews that explicitly deny that there is any conscious subject of awareness), **can you be completely certain that you really exist right now, if by “you” is meant the conscious subject of the awareness being experienced right now?** Either answer can count as “correct” for grading purposes.

- A. Yes
- B. No

* In this worksheet, I don’t mean “exist” in any specialized sense, e.g., I’m not restricting the term “exists” to “exists as a substance,” “exists as a physical object,” “exists in space and time,” “exists in the ‘real world’” or anything else like that. Rather, I mean “exist” in the broad and common sense meaning of the term.

25. Is the “self” that is simply the subject of the awareness being experienced right now compatible with any possible human worldview, other than worldviews that explicitly deny that there is any subject of awareness?

- A. Yes
- B. No

26. Explain why the answer you gave in question 25 is in fact true.

27. Fill in the blanks in the following formulation of the argument of Elisabeth’s objection to Descartes. This is the objection she presents in her May 6/16 letter to Descartes (pp. 11-12).

- 1. Assume Descartes is right that the soul is an unextended substance (i.e., a being that does not take up space).
- 2. Assume Descartes is right that the body is an extended substance (i.e., a being that does take up space).
- 3. How does the soul move the body?
 - 3.1. It seems that the only way for something, *A*, to move an extended substance, *B*, is:
 - 3.1.1. For *A* to qualify the superficies of the figure of *B* or;
 - 3.1.2. For *A* to _____ *B*.
 - 3.2. Only an extended substance can qualify the superficies or the figure of *B*.
 - 3.3. Only an _____ substance can push *B*.
 - 3.4. Therefore, it seems that an unextended substance cannot move an _____ substance.
 - 3.5. Therefore, it seems that the soul cannot move the body.

28. In Descartes’ June 28 letter, what is his final advice to Elisabeth? Summarize his advice into one sentence:

29. In the end, is Elisabeth or the other major philosophers after Descartes convinced by Descartes’ response?

- A. Yes
- B. No

30. Fill in the blanks below so as to correlate the theory addressing the mind-body problem with the philosopher who came up with it.

Which of the options below describes the occasionalist theory of Nicolas Malebranche?

The occasionalist theory is (write A, B, C, or D here): _____

Which of the options below describes the vitalist materialist theory of Margaret Cavendish?

The vitalist materialist theory is (write A, B, C, or D here): _____

Which of the options below describes the subjective idealist theory of George Berkeley?

The subjective idealist theory is (write A, B, C, or D here): _____

Which of the options below describes the skeptical empiricism of David Hume?

The skeptical empiricist theory is (write A, B, C, or D here): _____

- A. The notion of a material thing is incoherent. All we perceive are various ideas—colors, shapes, textures, sounds, abstract concepts, etc. Since these ideas are all we perceive, literally anything we talk about must be an idea, since we can't talk about things that we don't perceive in any way or aren't aware of in any way. A "material thing" or "physical thing" is supposed to be some reality that exists on its own independent of anyone's perception of it or awareness of it. But on that definition, I can't even think or talk about a "material thing," since I can only think and talk about my ideas. The only reality that exists is ideas or perceptions. To be is to be perceived. God makes sure these perceptions remain coherent and operate in a consistent way. There are no "material things" or "physical things."
- B. Bodies aren't inert or lifeless material, but when arranged in a certain way become living and conscious. There is no problem explaining how consciousness and the body interact, because the bodies of animals simply *are* conscious, living, and perceptive. Consciousness is nothing other than physical things that are organized in such a way as to be conscious, living, and perceptive.
- C. All we perceive are various ideas—colors, shapes, textures, sounds, abstract concepts, etc. Since these ideas are all we perceive, literally anything we talk about must be an idea, since we can't talk about things that we don't perceive in any way or aren't aware of in any way. We can't know or even coherently ask the question of whether there is some "reality" to which the ideas we perceive correspond. We can't know what "really exists"; all we can know are our perceptions. But the fact that we can't know reality isn't a problem. We can continue to live our normal lives and stop worrying about "what really exists."
- D. Consciousness and bodies do not interact with one another. Consciousness and the physical world don't affect one another at all. Nevertheless, the events we perceive do correspond to events in the physical world, because God makes sure that they correspond. For example, when I move my hand, I perceive colors that look like my hand moving back and forth—I don't perceive my physical hand outside of my conscious experience. But God makes my physical hand outside of my conscious experience move whenever I perceive the colors that look like my hand moving. So there is a physical world that matches the world we perceive. Yet our consciousness and our bodies don't interact or affect one another. Instead, God makes sure that the physical world matches up with the world we perceive and *vice versa*.

Part 3: Knowledge without a Mind-Independent World

31. What does the term “mind” refer to as we have been using it in this class and as it is used in modern and contemporary philosophy in general?

- A. The brain
- B. Conscious experience
- C. The activity of understanding

32. What is a mind-independent world? Write your team’s answer in the blank. Do not use the term “mind” in your answer, since that’s the relevant feature of the concept being defined:

A mind-independent world is a world that is independent of _____

For the questions 33-35, assume Kant is correct that we can have no knowledge of a mind-independent world. Instead, we can only have knowledge of the world we experience. Answer each question as Kant would answer it.

33. If all I can know is the world I experience in sense perception, how can I be certain that other people exist?

i. Are other people* possible objects of experience?

- A. Yes
- B. No

ii. Are possible objects of experience subject to the Categories of the Understanding?

- A. Yes
- B. No

iii. Is existence one of the Categories of the Understanding?

- A. Yes
- B. No

iv. Do the Categories of the Understanding apply only in my individual conscious experience, or do they apply in the conscious experience of any embodied self-conscious rational being (i.e., in transcendental consciousness)?

- A. The Categories only apply in my individual conscious experience.
- B. The Categories apply in transcendental consciousness, i.e., in the experience of any embodied self-conscious rational being.

v. Explain why your answer to question iv is better than the alternative answer.

Answer ___ is better than ___ because: _____

vi. If for something to “exist” means for it to be present in the world that we embodied self-conscious rational beings experience, then do other people exist?

- A. Yes
- B. No

vii. If all I can know is the world I experience, but the world I experience is the world that transcendental consciousness experiences (since, at a certain level of description, I am transcendental consciousness), can I be certain that other people exist?

- A. Yes
- B. No

* i.e., the bodies of other people.

- 34.** If all we can know is the world we experience in sense perception, **how can we be certain that mathematics and geometry identify objective truths about the world we experience?**
- i. **Are the sorts of things studied by mathematics and geometry possible objects of experience?**
 - A. Yes
 - B. No
 - ii. **Are the sorts of things studied by mathematics and geometry formal structures (viz., the formal structures of spatial intuition and of the Categories unity and plurality) of the objects of possible experience?**
 - A. Yes
 - B. No
 - iii. **Do formal structures of the objects of possible experience apply only in my individual conscious experience, or do they apply in the conscious experience of any embodied self-conscious rational being (i.e., in transcendental consciousness)?**
 - A. Formal structures of the objects of possible experience apply only in my individual conscious experience.
 - B. Formal structures of the objects of possible experience apply in transcendental consciousness, i.e., in the experience of any embodied self-conscious rational being.
 - iv. **If “objective truths” are the truths that belong to the world that any embodied self-conscious rational being experiences, then do mathematics and geometry identify objective truths about the world we experience, namely, truths about some of the formal structures of that world?**
 - A. Yes
 - B. No
- 35.** If all we can know is the world we experience in sense perception, **how can we be certain that it is possible for the hard sciences (physics, biology, chemistry, etc.) to identify objective truths about the world we experience?**
- i. **Are the sort of things studied by the hard sciences possible objects of experience?**
 - A. Yes
 - B. No
 - ii. **Are the basic concepts that the hard sciences use, such as cause and effect, included the Categories of the Understanding?**
 - A. Yes
 - B. No
 - iii. **Do the Categories of the Understanding apply only in my individual conscious experience, or do they apply in the conscious experience of any embodied self-conscious rational being (i.e., in transcendental consciousness)?**
 - A. The Categories apply only in my individual conscious experience.
 - B. The Categories apply in transcendental consciousness, i.e., in the experience of any embodied self-conscious rational being.
 - iv. **If “objective truths” are the truths that belong to the world that any embodied self-conscious rational being experiences, then is it possible for the hard sciences to identify objective truths about the world we experience?**
 - A. Yes
 - B. No
- 36.** If a “worldview” is a view about the world as it truly is independent of the perspective of embodied rational beings, then, **in every possible worldview, is it possible to know (in the sense Kant specifies) that other people exist* and to gain knowledge through mathematics, geometry, and the hard sciences?**
- A. Yes
 - B. No

* Take “exist” in Kant’s sense, i.e., “existence” is one of the Categories of the Understanding.

- 37.** Kant distinguishes between transcendental consciousness (what we could call the disembedded identity) and empirical consciousness. **Are identity factors such as race, gender, sexuality, class, disability, ethnicity, and nationality aspects of one's identity as transcendental consciousness or of one's identity as an empirical consciousness?**
- A. Identity factors such as race, gender, sexuality, class, disability, ethnicity, and nationality are aspects of one's identity as transcendental consciousness. In other words, they are aspects of one's disembedded identity.
 - B. Identity factors such as race, gender, sexuality, class, disability, ethnicity, and nationality are aspects of one's empirical consciousness or empirical identity.

38. Explain why your answer to question 37 is correct.

Part 4: Freedom and Other People without a Mind-Independent World

- 39.** Does Kant think that all your bodily actions are determined by physical causes?
- A. Yes
 - B. No
- 40.** Does Kant think that some of your bodily actions are freely self-determined (determined by your conscious self rather than by physical causes)?
- A. Yes
 - B. No
- 41.** Are things like intentions, motives, and reasons for action physical objects in the world we experience?
- A. Yes
 - B. No
- 42.** Is stabbing someone in an attempt to kill them a bodily action that can be fully described without reference to non-physical dimensions of experience, such as people's intentions?
- A. Yes
 - B. No
- 43.** Explain how Kant can hold both that our bodily actions are causally determined by physical causes and also that our bodily actions are freely self-determined by our conscious selves.

- 44.** Does the perspective of freedom interpret some of people's bodily actions in terms of concepts like choice, responsibility, intentions, forms of communication, etc.?
- A. Yes
 - B. No

- 45. Does the perspective of freedom make human bodies appear as sites or expressions of free will actualizing itself?**
A. Yes
B. No
- 46. If someone believed that humans really do not have free will, but instead God forces them to do everything they do, would one still have to conceptualize oneself as free in the Kantian sense and act as if one were free in the Kantian sense?**
A. Yes
B. No
- 47. If someone believed that humans really do not have free will, but instead a mind independent physical world determines them to do everything they do, would one still have to conceptualize oneself as free in the Kantian sense and act as if one were free in the Kantian sense?**
A. Yes
B. No
- 48. Regardless of one's worldview, does one still have to conceptualize oneself as free in the Kantian sense and act as if one is free in the Kantian sense?**
A. Yes
B. No

49. Explain why your answer to question 48 is correct.

50. Explain in what sense it is true that you can't "overpower" another person?

51. In order to ask myself "what shall I do?" and articulate cogent answers to that question, would I need to be able to speak (either out loud or silently in my mind)?

- A. Yes
B. No

52. Kantian/Hegelian freedom requires that you are able to consider “cogent” answers to the question “what shall I do?” and give “cogent” reasons for doing one course of action available to you rather than the others available to you. Of the options below, which do you think best captures what it means to give a “cogent” reason for doing one action rather than another?

- A. A “cogent” reason for doing one action rather than another is a reason that makes sense to me but that would be unintelligible to any other person.
- B. A “cogent” reason for doing one action rather than another is a reason that makes sense to me, but may or may not be intelligible to others. In other words, it is possible that a “cogent” reason for action is intelligible to others, but it is also possible that a “cogent” reason for action is unintelligible to any other person.
- C. A “cogent” reason for doing one action rather than another is a reason that makes sense to me AND *would* be intelligible to at least some other people I know (where “people I know” is taken in a wide sense, of “people I am aware of,” not necessarily people I know very well).

53. If you answered A or B in 52, give an example of a reason for doing one action rather than another that would be unintelligible (literally could not be understood as a possible reason for action) to any other person (if Dr. Wiitala can understand the reason for doing the action that you describe, then it’s not unintelligible). If you answered C in 52, then for your answer to 53 write: “We answered C in 52 because we could not come up with an example of a reason for doing one action rather than another that would be unintelligible to every other person.”

54. Assume (as Kantians and Hegelians typically do) that answer C to question 52 is correct. If for me to take the stance of “freedom” requires me to give reasons for doing one action rather than another that make sense to me AND would be intelligible to at least some other people I know, then does my own ability to take the stance of “freedom” depend on people I know and what they would recognize as intelligible reasons for action?

- A. Yes, if my ability to take the stance of “freedom” requires that the reasons I give must not only make sense to me but must also be intelligible to some other people I know, then my own ability to take the stance of “freedom” depends on other people, since the reasons I give must be such that those others would recognize my reasons as intelligible.
- B. No, assuming that answer C in 52 is correct, my own ability to take the stance of “freedom” does not depend on people I know and what they would recognize as intelligible reasons for action.

55. Assume that the “Yes” answer to question 54 is correct. If my ability to take the stance of “freedom” depends on the others I know, since the reasons I give must be such that those others would recognize them as intelligible, then does an individual's ability to take the stance of “freedom” depend on “mutual recognition”?
(There is one correct answer to this question)

- A. Yes
- B. No

Part 5: Ethics and Politics without a Mind-Independent World

- 56.** Hegel thinks that freedom necessarily puts limits on itself. Thus, on his view, being free does not mean acting without any limitations on oneself. Instead, being free means acting such that the limits imposed on one's actions arise from freedom itself—from one's self and one's own actions—rather than from something external to oneself. **Why does Hegel think that freedom necessarily puts limits on itself?** Pick the answer that most closely reflects Hegel's argument as we've been considering it in this Module.
- A. Hegel thinks that freedom necessarily places limits on itself because people need limits. Society couldn't function without rules and limits, and people wouldn't be able to attain happiness outside society. We all want to be free and to do whatever we want. But doing what we want and getting what we want works best if we cooperate with others, which at the very least means not taking away their freedom. If we didn't limit freedom, we would end up in something like Hobbes' state of nature, where no one can do what they want because they are too worried about survival.
 - B. Hegel thinks that freedom necessarily places limits on itself because freedom is a process that ends in an action. But an action is always limited, in the sense that whatever action someone does must be *an action*, as opposed to all the other possible actions one could have done. Freedom begins with a recognition of the unlimited possible actions one could do in one's situation. But freedom is a process that moves from that beginning to the selection and doing of only one of those unlimited possibilities, which is a process of self-limitation.

57. Why does doing a free action require “property” on the broadly Hegelian view?

- 58.** On the broadly Hegelian view, could property enable fully free actions if contracts were impossible? In other words, could one fully express their free will through one's property if exchanging, borrowing, giving, receiving, or letting others make use of one's property were impossible?
- A. Yes
 - B. No

- 59.** Freedom limits itself because it is a process that ends in one action, as opposed to all the actions one could have done. But an action can only occur in a certain kind of context, a context that has a certain sort of structure. For example, an action can only occur—meaning, one can only do an action—if there is something in the world that one experiences that one can identify as one's own. Put differently, I can only do an action if there are things in the world I experience that I can identify as *mine* and that I have power over. Thus, I can only do an action if I have “property,” meaning things that are *mine*. But property itself can only exist in a certain context where certain conditions are met. For example, property can only exist and function as an expression of freedom if it can be exchanged, given, and received. Hence, property requires “contracts.” **What is the next thing that both property and contracts require according to the outline of Hegel's ethical and political framework we've been studying this module?**

Write your answer here: _____

- 60.** Explain why property and contracts can't exist in the world we experience without punishment (i.e., the enforcement of property and contractual rights).

61. Hegel thinks that a form of punishment that respects freedom can only exist in a context where what he calls “morality” exists. **Why does Hegel think that?**

62. According to the broadly Hegelian framework, is it true that property, contract, punishment, and morality can’t actually function in practice outside of the ethical life of the various actual communities (such as family, workplace, state, historically situated culture) to which one belongs?

- A. Yes
- B. No

63. The family or families you are part of provide you with concrete norms and expectations for how you should behave and the sort of person you should be. **Does this mean you should always follow your family’s norms and expectations?**

- A. Yes
- B. No

64. Does Hegel think that being part of a family enhances one’s freedom?

- A. Yes
- B. No

65. Why does fully actualizing freedom require us not only to belong to families but also to the market economy?

66. Why does the market economy require a legal code?

67. A legal code gives the concrete norms and expectations. **Does this mean you should always follow your society’s laws and never break them?**

- A. Yes
- B. No

68. A legal code gives the concrete norms and expectations. **Does this mean that in general and in most situations you should obey your society’s laws and not break them?**

- A. Yes
- B. No

69. Does Hegel think that being part of a law governed society enhances one’s freedom?

- A. Yes
- B. No

70. Why does the legal code require a court system?

71. Why does the legal system require the police, social services, and government agencies?

72. Why does the legal system and government require unions, guilds, businesses, business organizations, and social organizations according to the broadly Hegelian ethical and political framework?

73. Is the “state” the same thing as the “government” on the broadly Hegelian view?

- A. Yes
- B. No

74. What is the “state” on the broadly Hegelian view?

75. Why is “world history” part of the broadly Hegelian ethical and political framework?

76. How do “alternative histories” and the way that oppression and biases contribute to how history is told, and people’s identities are construed, pose a final challenge to the broadly Hegelian ethical and political framework?

- 77. Why is a person who just does whatever they happen to feel like, without regard to rights, morality, or the ethical life of the communities to which she belongs, not acting in a way that is fully free or self-determining in the broadly Hegelian sense?** Pick the answer that is most argumentatively rigorous and most closely reflects Hegel's argument as we've been considering it in this Module.
- Someone who just does whatever they happen to feel like doing is not acting in a way that is fully free or self-determining because by not respecting the rights of others they are not respecting the freedom of others. As a result, they are not respecting freedom itself, and so are not fully free.
 - Someone who just does whatever they happen to feel like doing is not acting in a way that is fully free or self-determining because they are being determined and ruled by whatever feelings they happen to have, instead of by the beliefs, commitments, and rationality that constitutes the core of their identity.
 - Someone who just does whatever they happen to feel like doing is not acting in a way that is fully free or self-determining because they are determining their actions on the basis of their feelings. And their feelings are the core of their identity and selfhood. So in the end by acting on their feelings they are determining themselves, but they are not free because their feelings are determined by their physiology.
- 78. Imagine someone believes that atheism is true. Could one consistently believe in an atheistic worldview* and live and act according to the broadly Hegelian ethical and political framework?**
- Yes
 - No
- 79. Imagine someone believes in a religion called "Basic Theism."[†] According to "Basic Theism" there is a God and he commands us to believe in him and be consistent in our actions. If we do, he will reward us in the afterlife. If we don't, he will punish us. Could one consistently believe in the "Basic Theism" worldview and live and act according to the broadly Hegelian ethical and political framework?**
- Yes
 - No
- 80. Imagine someone believes in a religion called "Morgoth,"[‡] according to which there is a God. But God is not a loving God, according to this religion, but instead a bloodthirsty God. He gives only one command to all humans: murder at least 10 innocent people during your lifetime. If you do that, you will have everlasting pleasure in the afterlife; if not you will experience everlasting pain in the afterlife. Could one consistently believe in the "Morgoth" worldview and live and act according to the broadly Hegelian ethical and political framework?**
- Yes
 - No
- 81. Does your team think that the broadly Hegelian ethical and political framework we've been considering this module could be consistently endorsed and lived by someone regardless of their worldview?** In other words, could it be consistently endorsed and lived by someone in any possible worldview? (By a worldview, I don't mean a moral code, but rather a view about what ultimate reality is like).[§]
- Yes, the broadly Hegelian ethical and political framework can be consistently endorsed and lived by someone regardless of their worldview.
 - Although the broadly Hegelian ethical and political framework could be consistently endorsed and lived by people in a wide and diverse variety of worldviews, it could not be consistently endorsed and lived by someone who held a worldview that was radically anti-rational, anti-freedom, or anti-social, like the "Morgoth" religion.
 - No, the broadly Hegelian ethical and political framework is its own worldview and is incompatible with any other.

* By "atheistic worldview" I mean a worldview in which God does not exist in reality outside of human consciousness.

[†] I made this religion up. As far as I know, there is no such religion, although elements of it are shared by some forms of Judaism, Islam, and Christianity.

[‡] I made this religion up. As far as I know, there is no such religion.

[§] Obviously, someone could hold to an ethical or religious moral code according to which, say, genocide and other violations of abstract right are morally acceptable; and such a person could not consistently endorse the Hegelian framework. So by a "worldview" I don't mean a moral code. Instead, I mean a view about ultimate reality (e.g., whether or not God created the world, whether or not there is some meaning or purpose beyond what humans create, etc.).

Part 6: Religious and Cultural Pluralism: The Function of the Disembedded Subject

82. What kinds of things does Locke call “public goods”? List four of them in the blanks below.

(1) _____

(2) _____

(3) _____

(4) _____

83. According to Locke, what is the purpose of the state (i.e., what is the purpose of what Locke calls the commonwealth)?

- A. The common good of society. The state’s purpose is to make society as a whole as happy, just, and well-functioning as it can be.
- B. Equality and justice. The state’s purpose is to establish justice by making its citizen’s as equal as possible. While complete equality is impossible, the state should strive to make society more and more equal and fair.
- C. Public goods. The state’s purpose is to preserve and promote the public goods of its citizens.
- D. Freedom. The state’s purpose is to enable and actualize the freedom of its citizens.
- E. Peace. The state’s purpose is to provide people a way out of the state of nature in the Hobbesian sense; in other words, a way out of the state of war of all against all.

84. Why doesn’t the authority of the government (i.e., what Locke calls the “civil magistrate”) extend to religious matters?

- A. Religion is concerned with justice to God, whereas the government is concerned with justice to our fellow human beings. Moreover, justice towards God is a right relationship with God, and the government cannot force anyone to have a right relationship with God, because such a relationship is purely internal.
- B. Religion concerns what people believe in their hearts, whereas the government is concerned with public goods. Moreover, the government couldn’t force anyone to believe anything even if it wanted to, because no external force can make anyone believe anything internally in their hearts.

85. Locke talks about the limits of toleration. What is the limit that he identifies?

- A. People, regardless of their religious views, should be protected and tolerated in society, unless they, on the pretense of their religious beliefs, refuse to agree that toleration of other religions is a good thing.
- B. People, regardless of their religious views, should be protected and tolerated in society, unless they, on the pretense of their religious beliefs, attack, destroy, harm, or steal the public goods of another.
- C. People, regardless of their religious views, should be protected and tolerated in society, unless they, on the pretense of their religious beliefs, say hateful things about other religions.

86. Rousseau identifies three different sorts of religion and then identifies what he sees as problems with each of them in relation to the state. What is each sort of religion and what is the problem Rousseau identifies with each?

- (a) The “religion of man.” Give a one sentence description of this kind of religion (you can use Rousseau’s words or your own):

- (b) The “religion of the citizen.” Give a one sentence description of this kind of religion (you can use Rousseau’s words or your own):

What is the problem Rousseau identifies with the “religion of the citizen” in relation to the state?

- (c) The “religion of the priest.” Give a one sentence description of this kind of religion (you can use Rousseau’s words or your own):

What is the problem Rousseau identifies with the “religion of the priest” in relation to the state?

87. Rousseau makes a distinction between civil intolerance and theological intolerance. Which of the options below best describes what he means by that distinction?

- A. Civil intolerance refers to cases where a religion teaches that its beliefs are the only true ones and that people of other religions or worldviews will end up in hell, or something else along those lines. For example, if a religion claimed that salvation was only possible for those who believed in it, that religion would thereby be civilly intolerant. Theological intolerance, on the other hand, refers to cases where the state does not permit the belief in or practice of certain religions. For example, if a state outlawed Mormonism, that state would thereby be theologically intolerant to Mormonism.
- B. Civil intolerance refers to cases where the state does not permit the belief in or practice of certain religions. For example, if a state outlawed Mormonism, that state would thereby be civilly intolerant to Mormonism. Theological intolerance, on the other hand, refers to cases where a religion teaches that its beliefs are the only true ones and that people of other religions or worldviews will end up in hell, or something else along those lines. For example, if a religion claimed that salvation was only possible for those who believed in it, that religion would thereby be theologically intolerant.

88. Should the state civilly tolerate all religions according to Rousseau?

- A. Yes.
B. No.

In order to develop an answer to the question “On what basis can people with radically different worldviews live together peacefully and happily, and work together to achieve shared goals?” John Russon thinks we need to go back to what we all share regardless of our specific worldviews: self-consciousness or an “I”. But he thinks we need to get a little more precise in our understanding of self-consciousness than Descartes or even Kant did. For this purpose, Russon employs some concepts first developed by the early 20th century philosopher, Martin Heidegger—concepts like being-at-home-in-the-world. The questions below are intended to help your team unpack the notions of self-consciousness Russon discusses in section 1a.

89. Russon talks about being-at-home-in-the-world. What does the word “world” mean in the concept of being-at-home-in-the-world?

- A. The totality of existing things.
B. The objects we experience structured by the ways we approach them and the lived significance they have for us.
C. The planet earth.
D. The universe.
E. Reality as it would be even if no rational beings existed.

- 90.** Russon claims that the shared identity of the “we” that is established by social custom “is the real decision-making power behind the actions of the members” (p. 6). **What does he mean by this? Pick the answer that makes Russon’s position the most reasonable.**
- A. The shared social identity sets rather narrow limits to the sort of actions I would seriously consider doing. Out of the unlimited actions I could do in any situation, the social identity will narrow it down to a relevant few. For example, I may decide to have a cup of orange juice or water with breakfast, but I will not even consider (or seriously consider) having a cup of pig blood, since pig blood is not the sort of thing that “we” Americans drink with breakfast.
 - B. The shared social identity really makes all the choices I believe I am making. I, as an individual, don’t really make any choices, rather the shared social identity does. For example, when I decide to have a cup of orange juice with my breakfast instead of a cup of water, I’m not deciding that, my shared social identity is.
- 91. According to Russon, in most cases are the social customs that determine how people live their lives explicitly acknowledged and conceptually understood by those who live according to them?**
- A. Yes.
 - B. No.
- 92. According to Russon, can the social customs that determine how people live their lives be thought of as habits of thinking, acting, and understanding that people develop in order to achieve recognition from others?**
- A. Yes.
 - B. No.

In section 2 of his article, Russon talks about “religion” in a rather broad sense:

...I defined religion as the rituals of mutual recognition in which a community says “so that’s who we are” (11).

[R]eligion [is] those rituals in and through which we primarily establish a confirmed identity as a member of a community, then we see in religion the fundamental sphere in which a world becomes comfortably available for us. It is in the ritual laying out of how to behave—which means how I should act, and how things should be acted upon—that what will count as the obvious and immediate significance of things is established. It is the world made significant through ritual which allows the members of a society—which allows self-conscious agents—to find themselves reflected and confirmed in the stuff of their environment. Thus it is in the phenomenon of religious ritual that we see the fundamental realization of what Heidegger calls “the world” (9-10).

Given this broad sense of “religion,” Russon says:

The phenomena with which my account of religion as rituals of mutual recognition should be linked are those which we generally lump under the term “ethnicity.”

In other words, what he, following Hegel, is calling “religion,” would include things like ethnicity and cultural identity, as well as religions in the narrower sense of the term, such as Islam or Catholicism, etc.

- 93. Given Russon’s definition of “religion,” would everyone who recognizes him or herself as a member of some community or other be “religious”?**
- A. Yes.
 - B. No.

Russon goes on to argue that the beliefs, rituals, and actions of other religions, ethnicities, and cultures, have an “inherent rationality” (12) and seem to be obviously right to those who live according to them, even if to us they seem alien, irrational, crazy, or wrong.

94. Does the claim that all religions, ethnicities, and cultures have an inherent rationality mean that none of the beliefs they put forward and none of the actions they prescribe are irrational?

- A. Yes.
- B. No.

Given that all religions, ethnicities, and cultures have an “inherent rationality,” Russon claims that:

In an ethnically plural society ... our task is to see what a group takes as obvious, and to see this as the key to interpreting its members’ behavior. But to thus interpret means to acknowledge the inherent rationality, and this really means that *we ourselves undergo initiation*: in coming to see the rationality of ethnic rituals, we necessarily find those rituals reflecting back to us our rationality, and they thus become mirrors for our own rational, self-conscious identities, as much as they are mirrors for the original members of the culture. (12)

Making explains this further:

The key to the ethics of addressing the other, then, is that the other cannot remain alien, but it must come to be the case that we recognize ourselves precisely in our act of recognizing that other. We must each come to identify ourselves in the culture of the other: we must learn how to “speak the language.” A politics of ethnic respect would thus be best portrayed as one of ethnic interpretation and initiation. (14)

95. Russon claims that “critique is an essential dimension of our intersubjective life, but the only form of critique which does justice to the human demands of ethnic life is immanent critique: criticism must be something which develops from within the lived ethnic situation itself” (14). What does he mean by “immanent critique” and why does he think that it is the only kind of critique that “does justice to the human demands of ethnic life”?

What he means by “immanent critique” is: _____

96. Russon takes his view about what our attitude and task is in an ethnically, culturally, and religiously plural society to be at odds two alternative attitudes: (1) “objection” and (2) “tolerance.” Why does he think that neither of these are helpful ways to deal with the cultures, ethnicities, and religions of others?

He thinks that “objection” is not a helpful way to critique a culture, ethnicity, or religion that differs from one’s own because:

He thinks that “tolerance” is not a helpful way to relate to a culture, ethnicity, or religion that differs from one’s own because:

- 97.** Consider a case similar to one that happened here in the US. A person, call him Bob, owns a cake shop. A gay couple comes to the shop asking Bob to bake a cake for their wedding. Bob says that he can't in good conscience serve them in that way, because he holds religious beliefs according to which gay marriage is wrong. He doesn't want to participate in an event that he, due to his religious convictions, believes is wrong. The gay couple in response take Bob to court for discriminating against them. **Given how Locke understands the role of society in relation to religion, should Bob have the legal right to refuse to bake a wedding cake for the gay couple?**
- A. Yes. Given Locke's view, in a properly arranged society, Bob would have the legal right to refuse to bake a wedding cake for the gay couple.
 - B. No. Given Locke's view, in a properly arranged society, Bob would not have the legal right to refuse to bake a wedding cake for the gay couple.
- 98.** Consider the case of Bob and the gay couple again. **Given how Rousseau understands the role of society in relation to religion, should Bob have the legal right to refuse to bake a wedding cake for the gay couple?**
- A. Yes. Given Rousseau's view, in a properly arranged society, Bob would have the legal right to refuse to bake a wedding cake for the gay couple.
 - B. No. Given Rousseau's view, in a properly arranged society, Bob would not have the legal right to refuse to bake a wedding cake for the gay couple.
 - C. It depends. A civic religion is needed to solve this conflict in a fair way. The conflict occurs because according to Bob's religion, gay marriage is wrong; while according to the gay couple's religion or worldview, gay marriage is not wrong. There should be a state instituted civic religion that determines who can get married (or that teaches that whatever the state determines on the matter is correct for the people in that country), and anyone who doesn't agree to the civic religion should be banished or forced to comply.
- 99.** Consider the case of Bob and the gay couple again. **Given how Russon understands the way society should relate to religion, ethnicity, and ways of life, should Bob have the legal right to refuse to bake a wedding cake for the gay couple?**
- A. Yes. Given Russon's view, in a properly arranged society, Bob would have the legal right to refuse to bake a wedding cake for the gay couple.
 - B. No. Given Russon's view, in a properly arranged society, Bob would not have the legal right to refuse to bake a wedding cake for the gay couple.
 - C. It depends. Our society needs to have an honest dialogue where it considers both Bob's experience and worldview and gay couples' experiences and worldviews empathetically from the perspectives internal to each. Then, since some decision needs to be made in this case, society should work toward a solution that can as much as possible develop and accommodate the key insights—whatever those are—in each point of view.
- 100.** Comparing Locke's, Rousseau's, and Russon's views on the question of how society should relate to the diversity of religions, ethnicities, ways of life, and worldviews that are present in a society like our own, **which of the three views does your team think is best?** (Take a vote if all teammates don't agree after discussion. Any answer will count as "correct" for grading.)
- A. The tolerance view (Locke's)
 - B. The civic religion view (Rousseau's)
 - C. The multicultural/cross-cultural dialogue view (Russon's)

Your Name: _____

You are permitted two double-sided 8½×11 sheets of hand-written notes for this exam. Each question is worth 1 point, unless otherwise indicated.

Part 1: Human Identity Apart from Society

1. Do Hobbes and Rousseau intend the “state of nature” to describe the historical condition of early human beings, before the formation of social groups or governments, or do they intend the “state of nature” to describe what human beings would be like if they were not influenced by the power of their societies and governments?

Pick the best answer.

- A. Hobbes and Rousseau intend the “state of nature” to describe what human beings would be like if they were not influenced by the power of their societies and governments, AND to describe the historical condition of humans before the formation of social groups or governments.
- B. Hobbes and Rousseau intend the “state of nature” to describe what human beings would be like if they were not influenced by the power of their societies and governments.
- C. Hobbes and Rousseau intend the “state of nature” to describe the historical condition of early humans before the formation of social groups or governments.

2. How, according to Hobbes, do groups of humans leave the state of nature? Pick the answer that best articulates Hobbes’ view.

- A. Each individual makes a contract with the Sovereign, agreeing to follow the laws the Sovereign makes so long as the Sovereign protects their natural rights. Each individual person making the contract gives up his or her right to govern him or herself so long as the Sovereign protects and respects his or her natural rights.
- B. They make a contract with one another which sets up a Sovereign power. Each individual person making the contract gives up his or her right to govern him or herself and transfers that right to the Sovereign, so that the Sovereign has the right to govern each individual.

3. According to Hobbes, must the contract that individuals make with one another (often called the “social contract”) in order to establish the Sovereign be a written contract? Pick the answer that best articulates Hobbes’ view.

- A. No. The contract need not be written, and historically has typically not been written. An oral agreement in which each individual takes an oath is sufficient.
- B. No. The contract need not be written. Even an oral agreement is not necessary. Historically most people have typically only implicitly agreed to the contract.
- C. Yes. The contract needs to be written. Historically, the contract has often been called a constitution.

4. Can the “person” established as the Sovereign be an assembly (i.e., a designated group of individuals)? Or must the “person” established as the Sovereign be a monarch (i.e., one individual)?

- A. The “person” established as the Sovereign can only be a monarch
- B. The “person” established as the Sovereign can only be an assembly.
- C. The “person” established as the Sovereign can be either a monarch or an assembly.

Hobbes and Rousseau disagree about what the state of nature is like. Their differences have consequences for how they think governments should be organized and for how they think of the relationship between the government and its subjects.

5. **Does Hobbes think that leaving the state of nature has generally made the human race happier?**
 - A. Yes, according to Hobbes, human beings are generally happier in society than in the state of nature.
 - B. No, according to Hobbes, human beings are generally happier in the state of nature than in society.
6. **Does Rousseau think that leaving the state of nature has generally made the human race happier?**
 - A. Yes, according to Rousseau, human beings are generally happier in society than in the state of nature.
 - B. No, according to Rousseau, human beings are generally happier in the state of nature than in society.
7. **Is there more inequality between people in Hobbes' state of nature than there is in most societies that exist now and have existed so far? Or is there more inequality between people in most societies that exist now and have existed so far than in Hobbes' state of nature?**
 - A. There is more inequality in most societies that exist now and have existed so far than in Hobbes' state of nature.
 - B. There is more inequality in Hobbes' state of nature than in most societies that exist now and have existed so far.
8. **Is there more inequality between people in Rousseau's state of nature than there is in most societies that exist now and have existed so far? Or is there more inequality between people in most societies that exist now and have existed so far than in Rousseau's state of nature?**
 - A. There is more inequality in most societies that exist now and have existed so far than in Rousseau's state of nature.
 - B. There is more inequality in Rousseau's state of nature than in most societies that exist now and have existed so far.

Part 2: Human Identity Apart from a Mind-Independent World

9. **Is it *possible* that you could be dreaming that you're in this classroom right now, without really being here?**
Either answer can count as "correct" for grading purposes.
 - A. Yes
 - B. No
10. **Is it *possible* that you could be hallucinating that you're in this classroom right now, without really being here?**
Either answer can count as "correct" for grading purposes.
 - A. Yes
 - B. No
11. **Is it *possible* that something could be manipulating your conscious experience* so that you think you have the body you perceive yourself as and are a student at CSU, even though you're really not, and even though CSU doesn't really exist as something outside your imagination?** Either answer can count as "correct" for grading purposes.
 - A. Yes
 - B. No

* What could this "something" manipulating your experience be? Here are some options:

- (1) Perhaps a mad scientist has a brain that he's grown in a jar. He's no making that brain have certain experiences, namely the experiences you're having right now. Perhaps your whole life is this experience that's being simulated in this brain in a jar.
- (2) Perhaps you are in the Matrix, a computer-generated dream-world designed to keep you occupied so that machines can extract energy from your real body (not the body-image you're experiencing), which is in a pod on a human farm.
- (3) Perhaps there is no God. Instead there is a powerful evil demon who has created you. He is creating images and sense experiences for you, but after you die, he will reveal that you were the only existing human being and that your whole life was his cruel joke.
- (4) I could go on and on producing scenarios like these, but hopefully you get the point...

12. Would it be *possible* for you to know what was in fact possible and what was not possible if something like a powerful evil demon were manipulating your conscious experience? Either answer can count as “correct” for grading purposes.
- A. Yes
 - B. No
13. Assume for the sake of argument that you are dreaming that you’re in this classroom right now, without really being here. **Can you be completely certain that right now, when you look around, you are seeing* the arrangements of colors, shapes, sounds, textures, etc. that appear to be what you usually call “people” and “team members”?** Either answer can count as “correct” for grading purposes.
- A. Yes
 - B. No
14. Assume for the sake of argument that you are really in this classroom right now and that it exists independent of you, just as you would think from a commonsense point of view. **Can you be completely certain that right now, when you look around, you are seeing the arrangements of colors, shapes, sounds, textures, etc. that appear to be what you usually call “people” and “team members”?** Either answer can count as “correct” for grading purposes.
- A. Yes
 - B. No
15. Assume for the sake of argument that your whole life is really a dream that God has made for you to test you, and that upon dying you will wake up from it. Furthermore, assume that you hold a religious belief that claims that this is true. **Can you be completely certain that right now, when you look around, you are seeing the arrangements of colors, shapes, sounds, textures, etc. that appear to be what you usually call “people” and “team members”?** Either answer can count as “correct” for grading purposes.
- A. Yes
 - B. No
16. Assume for the sake of argument that your whole life is really a dream that God has made for you to test you, and that upon dying you will wake up from it. Furthermore, assume that you hold a religious belief that claims that this is not true. **Can you be completely certain that right now, when you look around, you are seeing the arrangements of colors, shapes, sounds, textures, etc. that appear to be what you usually call “people” and “team members”?** Either answer can count as “correct” for grading purposes.
- A. Yes
 - B. No
17. No matter what particular worldview you happen to have, **can you be completely certain that right now, when you look around, you are seeing the arrangements of colors, shapes, sounds, textures, etc. that appear to be what you usually call “people” and “team members”?** Either answer can count as “correct” for grading purposes.
- A. Yes
 - B. No
18. Explain why the answer you gave in question 17 is in fact true.

* By “seeing” I mean having a visual experience, as is done in dreams, hallucinations, etc.

19. Assume for the sake of argument that you are dreaming that you're in this classroom right now, without really being here. **Can you be completely certain that you really exist* right now, if by "you" is meant the conscious subject of the awareness being experienced right now?** Either answer can count as "correct" for grading purposes.
- A. Yes
 - B. No
20. Assume for the sake of argument that you are really in this classroom right now and that it exists independent of you, just as you would think from a commonsense point of view. **Can you be completely certain that you really exist right now, if by "you" is meant the conscious subject of the awareness being experienced right now?** Either answer can count as "correct" for grading purposes.
- A. Yes
 - B. No
21. Assume for the sake of argument that your whole life is really a dream that God has made for you to test you, and that upon dying you will wake up from it. Furthermore, assume that you hold a religious belief that claims that this is true. **Can you be completely certain that you really exist right now, if by "you" is meant the conscious subject of the awareness being experienced right now?** Either answer can count as "correct" for grading purposes.
- A. Yes
 - B. No
22. Assume for the sake of argument that your whole life is really a dream that God has made for you to test you, and that upon dying you will wake up from it. Furthermore, assume that you hold a religious belief that claims that this is not true. **Can you be completely certain that you really exist right now, if by "you" is meant the conscious subject of the awareness being experienced right now?** Either answer can count as "correct" for grading purposes.
- A. Yes
 - B. No
23. No matter what particular worldview you happen to have (if we exclude from consideration worldviews that explicitly deny that there is any conscious subject of awareness), **can you be completely certain that you really exist right now, if by "you" is meant the conscious subject of the awareness being experienced right now?** Either answer can count as "correct" for grading purposes.
- A. Yes
 - B. No
24. **Is the "self" that is simply the subject of the awareness being experienced right now compatible with any possible human worldview, other than worldviews that explicitly deny that there is any subject of awareness?**
- A. Yes
 - B. No

* In this worksheet, I don't mean "exist" in any specialized sense, e.g., I'm not restricting the term "exists" to "exists as a substance," "exists as a physical object," "exists in space and time," "exists in the 'real world'" or anything else like that. Rather, I mean "exist" in the broad and common sense meaning of the term.

Part 3: Knowledge without a Mind-Independent World

25. What does the term “mind” refer to as we have been using it in this class and as it is used in modern and contemporary philosophy in general?

- A. The brain
- B. Conscious experience
- C. The activity of understanding

26. What is a mind-independent world? Write your answer in the blank. Do not use the term “mind” in your answer, since that’s the relevant feature of the concept being defined:

A mind-independent world is a world that is independent of _____

For the questions 27-29, assume Kant is correct that we can have no knowledge of a mind-independent world. Instead, we can only have knowledge of the world we experience. Answer each question as Kant would answer it.

27. If all I can know is the world I experience in sense perception, how can I be certain that other people exist?

i. Are other people* possible objects of experience? (3 points)

- A. Yes
- B. No

ii. Are possible objects of experience subject to the Categories of the Understanding?

- A. Yes
- B. No

iii. Is existence one of the Categories of the Understanding?

- A. Yes
- B. No

iv. Do the Categories of the Understanding apply only in my individual conscious experience, or do they apply in the conscious experience of any embodied self-conscious rational being (i.e., in transcendental consciousness)?

- A. The Categories only apply in my individual conscious experience.
- B. The Categories apply in transcendental consciousness, i.e., in the experience of any embodied self-conscious rational being.

v. Explain why your answer to question iv is better than the alternative answer.

Answer ____ is better than ____ because: _____

vi. If for something to “exist” means for it to be present in the world that we embodied self-conscious rational beings experience, then do other people exist?

- A. Yes
- B. No

vii. If all I can know is the world I experience, but the world I experience is the world that transcendental consciousness experiences (since, at a certain level of description, I am transcendental consciousness), can I be certain that other people exist?

- A. Yes
- B. No

* i.e., the bodies of other people.

- 28.** If all we can know is the world we experience in sense perception, **how can we be certain that mathematics and geometry identify objective truths about the world we experience?** (3 points)
- i. **Are the sorts of things studied by mathematics and geometry possible objects of experience?**
 - A. Yes
 - B. No
 - ii. **Are the sorts of things studied by mathematics and geometry formal structures (viz., the formal structures of spatial intuition and of the Categories unity and plurality) of the objects of possible experience?**
 - A. Yes
 - B. No
 - iii. **Do formal structures of the objects of possible experience apply only in my individual conscious experience, or do they apply in the conscious experience of any embodied self-conscious rational being (i.e., in transcendental consciousness)?**
 - A. Formal structures of the objects of possible experience apply only in my individual conscious experience.
 - B. Formal structures of the objects of possible experience apply in transcendental consciousness, i.e., in the experience of any embodied self-conscious rational being.
 - iv. If “objective truths” are the truths that belong to the world that any embodied self-conscious rational being experiences, then **do mathematics and geometry identify objective truths about the world we experience, namely, truths about some of the formal structures of that world?**
 - A. Yes
 - B. No
- 29.** If all we can know is the world we experience in sense perception, **how can we be certain that it is possible for the hard sciences (physics, biology, chemistry, etc.) to identify objective truths about the world we experience?** (2 points)
- i. **Are the sort of things studied by the hard sciences possible objects of experience?**
 - A. Yes
 - B. No
 - ii. **Are the basic concepts that the hard sciences use, such as cause and effect, included the Categories of the Understanding?**
 - A. Yes
 - B. No
 - iii. **Do the Categories of the Understanding apply only in my individual conscious experience, or do they apply in the conscious experience of any embodied self-conscious rational being (i.e., in transcendental consciousness)?**
 - A. The Categories apply only in my individual conscious experience.
 - B. The Categories apply in transcendental consciousness, i.e., in the experience of any embodied self-conscious rational being.
 - iv. If “objective truths” are the truths that belong to the world that any embodied self-conscious rational being experiences, then **is it possible for the hard sciences to identify objective truths about the world we experience?**
 - A. Yes
 - B. No
- 30.** If a “worldview” is a view about the world as it truly is independent of the perspective of embodied rational beings, then, **in every possible worldview, is it possible to know (in the sense Kant specifies) that other people exist* and to gain knowledge through mathematics, geometry, and the hard sciences?**
- A. Yes
 - B. No

* Take “exist” in Kant’s sense, i.e., “existence” is one of the Categories of the Understanding.

Part 4: Freedom and Other People without a Mind-Independent World

- 31. Does Kant think that all your bodily actions are determined by physical causes?**
A. Yes
B. No
- 32. Does Kant think that some of your bodily actions are freely self-determined (determined by your conscious self rather than by physical causes)?**
A. Yes
B. No
- 33. Are things like intentions, motives, and reasons for action physical objects in the world we experience?**
A. Yes
B. No
- 34. Is stabbing someone in an attempt to kill them a bodily action that can be fully described without reference to non-physical dimensions of experience, such as people's intentions?**
A. Yes
B. No
- 35. Does the perspective of freedom interpret some of people's bodily actions in terms of concepts like choice, responsibility, intentions, forms of communication, etc.?**
A. Yes
B. No
- 36. Does the perspective of freedom make human bodies appear as sites or expressions of free will actualizing itself?**
A. Yes
B. No
- 37. If someone believed that humans really do not have free will, but instead God forces them to do everything they do, would one still have to conceptualize oneself as free in the Kantian sense and act as if one were free in the Kantian sense?**
A. Yes
B. No
- 38. If someone believed that humans really do not have free will, but instead a mind independent physical world determines them to do everything they do, would one still have to conceptualize oneself as free in the Kantian sense and act as if one were free in the Kantian sense?**
A. Yes
B. No
- 39. Regardless of one's worldview, does one still have to conceptualize oneself as free in the Kantian sense and act as if one is free in the Kantian sense?**
A. Yes
B. No
- 40. In order to ask myself "what shall I do?" and articulate cogent answers to that question, would I need to be able to speak (either out loud or silently in my mind)?**
A. Yes
B. No

- 41. Kantian/Hegelian freedom requires that you are able to consider “cogent” answers to the question “what shall I do?” and give “cogent” reasons for doing one course of action available to you rather than the others available to you. Of the options below, which do you think best captures what it means to give a “cogent” reason for doing one action rather than another?**
- A “cogent” reason for doing one action rather than another is a reason that makes sense to me AND *would* be intelligible to at least some other people I know (where “people I know” is taken in a wide sense, of “people I am aware of,” not necessarily people I know very well).
 - A “cogent” reason for doing one action rather than another is a reason that makes sense to me but that would be unintelligible to any other person.
 - A “cogent” reason for doing one action rather than another is a reason that makes sense to me, but may or may not be intelligible to others. In other words, it is possible that a “cogent” reason for action is intelligible to others, but it is also possible that a “cogent” reason for action is unintelligible to any other person.
- 42. Assume (as Kantians and Hegelians typically do) that answer A to question 50 is correct. If for me to take the stance of “freedom” requires me to give reasons for doing one action rather than another that make sense to me AND would be intelligible to at least some other people I know, then does my own ability to take the stance of “freedom” depend on people I know and what they would recognize as intelligible reasons for action?**
- Yes, if my ability to take the stance of “freedom” requires that the reasons I give must not only make sense to me but must also be intelligible to some other people I know, then my own ability to take the stance of “freedom” depends on other people, since the reasons I give must be such that those others would recognize my reasons as intelligible.
 - No, assuming that answer A in 50 is correct, my own ability to take the stance of “freedom” does not depend on people I know and what they would recognize as intelligible reasons for action.
- 43. Assume that the “Yes” answer to question 51 is correct. If my ability to take the stance of “freedom” depends on the others I know, since the reasons I give must be such that those others would recognize them as intelligible, then does an individual's ability to take the stance of “freedom” depend on “mutual recognition”?**
- Yes
 - No

Part 5: Ethics and Politics without a Mind-Independent World

- 44. Hegel thinks that freedom necessarily puts limits on itself. Thus, on his view, being free does not mean acting without any limitations on oneself. Instead, being free means acting such that the limits imposed on one’s actions arise from freedom itself—from one’s self and one’s own actions—rather than from something external to oneself. Why does Hegel think that freedom necessarily puts limits on itself? Pick the answer that most closely reflects Hegel’s argument as we’ve been considering it in this Module.**
- Hegel thinks that freedom necessarily places limits on itself because freedom is a process that ends in an action. But an action is always limited, in the sense that whatever action someone does must be *an action*, as opposed to all the other possible actions one could have done. Freedom begins with a recognition of the unlimited possible actions one could do in one’s situation. But freedom is a process that moves from that beginning to the selection and doing of only one of those unlimited possibilities, which is a process of self-limitation.
 - Hegel thinks that freedom necessarily places limits on itself because people need limits. Society couldn’t function without rules and limits, and people wouldn’t be able to attain happiness outside society. We all want to be free and to do whatever we want. But doing what we want and getting what we want works best if we cooperate with others, which at the very least means not taking away their freedom. If we didn’t limit freedom, we would end up in something like Hobbes’ state of nature, where no one can do what they want because they are too worried about survival.

45. On the broadly Hegelian view, could property enable fully free actions if contracts were impossible? In other words, could one fully express their free will through one's property if exchanging, borrowing, giving, receiving, or letting others make use of one's property were impossible?
- A. Yes
 - B. No

46. Freedom limits itself because it is a process that ends in one action, as opposed to all the actions one could have done. But an action can only occur in a certain kind of context, a context that has a certain sort of structure. For example, an action can only occur—meaning, one can only do an action—if there is something in the world that one experiences that one can identify as one's own. Put differently, I can only do an action if there are things in the world I experience that I can identify as *mine* and that I have power over. Thus, I can only do an action if I have “property,” meaning things that are *mine*. But property itself can only exist in a certain context where certain conditions are met. For example, property can only exist and function as an expression of freedom if it can be exchanged, given, and received. Hence, property requires “contracts.” **What is the next thing that both property and contracts require according to the outline of Hegel's ethical and political framework we've been studying this module?**

Write your answer here: _____

47. Explain why property and contracts can't exist in the world we experience without punishment (i.e., the enforcement of property and contractual rights).

48. Hegel thinks that a form of punishment that respects freedom can only exist in a context where what he calls “morality” exists. **Why does Hegel think that?**

49. According to the broadly Hegelian framework, is it true that property, contract, punishment, and morality can't actually function in practice outside of the ethical life of the various actual communities (such as family, workplace, state, historically situated culture) to which one belongs?

- A. Yes
- B. No

50. The family or families you are part of provide you with concrete norms and expectations for how you should behave and the sort of person you should be. **Does this mean you should always follow your family's norms and expectations?**

- A. Yes
- B. No

51. Does Hegel think that being part of a family enhances one's freedom?

- A. Yes
- B. No

52. Why does fully actualizing freedom require us not only to belong to families but also to the market economy?

53. Why does the market economy require a legal code?

54. A legal code gives the concrete norms and expectations. Does this mean you should always follow your society's laws and never break them?

- A. Yes
- B. No

55. A legal code gives the concrete norms and expectations. Does this mean that in general and in most situations you should obey your society's laws and not break them?

- A. Yes
- B. No

56. Does Hegel think that being part of a law governed society enhances one's freedom?

- A. Yes
- B. No

57. Why does the legal code require a court system?

58. Why does the legal system require the police, social services, and government agencies?

59. Why does the legal system and government require unions, guilds, businesses, business organizations, and social organizations according to the broadly Hegelian ethical and political framework?

- 60. Why is a person who just does whatever they happen to feel like, without regard to rights, morality, or the ethical life of the communities to which she belongs, not acting in a way that is fully free or self-determining in the broadly Hegelian sense?** Pick the answer that is most argumentatively rigorous and most closely reflects Hegel's argument as we've been considering it in this Module.
- Someone who just does whatever they happen to feel like doing is not acting in a way that is fully free or self-determining because they are being determined and ruled by whatever feelings they happen to have, instead of by the beliefs, commitments, and rationality that constitutes the core of their identity.
 - Someone who just does whatever they happen to feel like doing is not acting in a way that is fully free or self-determining because by not respecting the rights of others they are not respecting the freedom of others. As a result, they are not respecting freedom itself, and so are not fully free.
 - Someone who just does whatever they happen to feel like doing is not acting in a way that is fully free or self-determining because they are determining their actions on the basis of their feelings. And their feelings are the core of their identity and selfhood. So in the end by acting on their feelings they are determining themselves, but they are not free because their feelings are determined by their physiology.
- 61. Imagine someone believes that atheism is true. Could one consistently believe in an atheistic worldview* and live and act according to the broadly Hegelian ethical and political framework?**
- Yes
 - No
- 62. Imagine someone believes in a religion called "Basic Theism."[†] According to "Basic Theism" there is a God and he commands us to believe in him and be consistent in our actions. If we do, he will reward us in the afterlife. If we don't, he will punish us. Could one consistently believe in the "Basic Theism" worldview and live and act according to the broadly Hegelian ethical and political framework?**
- Yes
 - No
- 63. Imagine someone believes in a religion called "Morgoth,"[‡] according to which there is a God. But God is not a loving God, according to this religion, but instead a bloodthirsty God. He gives only one command to all humans: murder at least 10 innocent people during your lifetime. If you do that, you will have everlasting pleasure in the afterlife; if not you will experience everlasting pain in the afterlife. Could one consistently believe in the "Morgoth" worldview and live and act according to the broadly Hegelian ethical and political framework?**
- Yes
 - No
- 64. Do you think that the broadly Hegelian ethical and political framework we've been considering this module could be consistently endorsed and lived by someone regardless of their worldview?** In other words, could it be consistently endorsed and lived by someone in any possible worldview? (By a worldview, I don't mean a moral code, but rather a view about what ultimate reality is like).[§]
- Yes, the broadly Hegelian ethical and political framework can be consistently endorsed and lived by someone regardless of their worldview.
 - No, the broadly Hegelian ethical and political framework is its own worldview and is incompatible with any other.
 - Although the broadly Hegelian ethical and political framework could be consistently endorsed and lived by people in a wide and diverse variety of worldviews, it could not be consistently endorsed and lived by someone who held a worldview that was radically anti-rational, anti-freedom, or anti-social, like the "Morgoth" religion.

* By "atheistic worldview" I mean a worldview in which God does not exist in reality outside of human consciousness.

[†] I made this religion up. As far as I know, there is no such religion, although elements of it are shared by some forms of Judaism, Islam, and Christianity.

[‡] I made this religion up. As far as I know, there is no such religion.

[§] Obviously, someone could hold to an ethical or religious moral code according to which, say, genocide and other violations of abstract right are morally acceptable; and such a person could not consistently endorse the Hegelian framework. So by a "worldview" I don't mean a moral code. Instead, I mean a view about ultimate reality (e.g., whether or not God created the world, whether or not there is some meaning or purpose beyond what humans create, etc.).

Part 6: Religious and Cultural Pluralism: The Function of the Disembedded Subject

65. What kinds of things does Locke call “public goods”? List four of them in the blanks below. (2 points)

(1) _____

(2) _____

(3) _____

(4) _____

66. What are “public goods”? Locke does not offer a direct answer to this question in the text. Pick the answer that best fits with what he says.

- A. Goods that belong to the state, such as public property, state-run schools, etc.
- B. Goods that it is the state’s job to protect and regulate.

67. According to Locke, what is the purpose of the state (i.e., what is the purpose of what Locke calls the commonwealth)?

- A. The common good of society. The state’s purpose is to make society as a whole as happy, just, and well-functioning as it can be.
- B. Equality and justice. The state’s purpose is to establish justice by making its citizen’s as equal as possible. While complete equality is impossible, the state should strive to make society more and more equal and fair.
- C. Public goods. The state’s purpose is to preserve and promote the public goods of its citizens.
- D. Freedom. The state’s purpose is to enable and actualize the freedom of its citizens.
- E. Peace. The state’s purpose is to provide people a way out of the state of nature in the Hobbesian sense; in other words, a way out of the state of war of all against all.

68. Why doesn’t the authority of the government (i.e., what Locke calls the “civil magistrate”) extend to religious matters?

- A. Religion is concerned with justice to God, whereas the government is concerned with justice to our fellow human beings. Moreover, justice towards God is a right relationship with God, and the government cannot force anyone to have a right relationship with God, because such a relationship is purely internal.
- B. Religion concerns what people believe in their hearts, whereas the government is concerned with public goods. Moreover, the government couldn’t force anyone to believe anything even if it wanted to, because no external force can make anyone believe anything internally in their hearts.

69. Locke talks about the limits of toleration. What is the limit that he identifies?

- A. People, regardless of their religious views, should be protected and tolerated in society, unless they, on the pretense of their religious beliefs, refuse to agree that toleration of other religions is a good thing.
- B. People, regardless of their religious views, should be protected and tolerated in society, unless they, on the pretense of their religious beliefs, attack, destroy, harm, or steal the public goods of another.
- C. People, regardless of their religious views, should be protected and tolerated in society, unless they, on the pretense of their religious beliefs, say hateful things about other religions.

In order to develop an answer to the question “On what basis can people with radically different worldviews live together peacefully and happily, and work together to achieve shared goals?” John Russon thinks we need to go back to what we all share regardless of our specific worldviews: self-consciousness or an “I”. But he thinks we need to get a little more precise in our understanding of self-consciousness than Descartes or even Kant did. For this purpose, Russon employs some concepts first developed by the early 20th century philosopher, Martin Heidegger—concepts like being-at-home-in-the-world. The questions below are intended to help you unpack the notions of self-consciousness Russon discusses in section 1a.

- 70. Russon talks about being-at-home-in-the-world. What does the word “world” mean in the concept of being-at-home-in-the-world?**
- A. The totality of existing things.
 - B. The objects we experience structured by the ways we approach them and the lived significance they have for us.
 - C. The planet earth.
 - D. The universe.
 - E. Reality as it would be even if no rational beings existed.
- 71. Which of the three experiences of self-consciousness is the most fundamental, according to Russon?**
- A. The unreflective being-at-home-in-the-world.
 - B. The stance of “authenticity.”
 - C. The self-reflective and detached “I” that we posit in objectifying reflection.
- 72. Russon claims that the shared identity of the “we” that is established by social custom “is the real decision-making power behind the actions of the members” (p. 6). What does he mean by this? Pick the answer that makes Russon’s position the most reasonable.**
- A. The shared social identity sets rather narrow limits to the sort of actions I would seriously consider doing. Out of the unlimited actions I could do in any situation, the social identity will narrow it down to a relevant few. For example, I may decide to have a cup of orange juice or water with breakfast, but I will not even consider (or seriously consider) having a cup of pig blood, since pig blood is not the sort of thing that “we” Americans drink with breakfast.
 - B. The shared social identity really makes all the choices I believe I am making. I, as an individual, don’t really make any choices, rather the shared social identity does. For example, when I decide to have a cup of orange juice with my breakfast instead of a cup of water, I’m not deciding that, my shared social identity is.
- 73. According to Russon, in most cases are the social customs that determine how people live their lives explicitly acknowledged and conceptually understood by those who live according to them?**
- A. Yes.
 - B. No.
- 74. According to Russon, can the social customs that determine how people live their lives be thought of as habits of thinking, acting, and understanding that people develop in order to achieve recognition from others?**
- A. Yes.
 - B. No.

In section 2 of his article, Russon talks about “religion” in a rather broad sense:

...I defined religion as the rituals of mutual recognition in which a community says “so that’s who we are” (11).

[R]eligion [is] those rituals in and through which we primarily establish a confirmed identity as a member of a community, then we see in religion the fundamental sphere in which a world becomes comfortably available for us. It is in the ritual laying out of how to behave—which means how I should act, and how things should be acted upon—that what will count as the obvious and immediate significance of things is established. It is the world made significant through ritual which allows the members of a society—which allows self-conscious agents—to find themselves reflected and confirmed in the stuff of their environment. Thus it is in the phenomenon of religious ritual that we see the fundamental realization of what Heidegger calls “the world” (9-10).

Given this broad sense of “religion,” Russon says:

The phenomena with which my account of religion as rituals of mutual recognition should be linked are those which we generally lump under the term “ethnicity.”

In other words, what he, following Hegel, is calling “religion,” would include things like ethnicity and cultural identity, as well as religions in the narrower sense of the term, such as Islam or Catholicism, etc.

75. Given Russon’s definition of “religion,” would everyone who recognizes him or herself as a member of some community or other be “religious”?

- A. Yes.
- B. No.

76. Russon claims that “critique is an essential dimension of our intersubjective life, but the only form of critique which does justice to the human demands of ethnic life is immanent critique: criticism must be something which develops from within the lived ethnic situation itself” (14). What does he mean by “immanent critique” and why does he think that it is the only kind of critique that “does justice to the human demands of ethnic life”?

What he means by “immanent critique” is: _____

77. Russon takes his view about what our attitude and task is in an ethnically, culturally, and religiously plural society to be at odds two alternative attitudes: (1) “objection” and (2) “tolerance.” Why does he think that neither of these are helpful ways to deal with the cultures, ethnicities, and religions of others?

He thinks that “objection” is not a helpful way to critique a culture, ethnicity, or religion that differs from one’s own because:

He thinks that “tolerance” is not a helpful way to relate to a culture, ethnicity, or religion that differs from one’s own because:

- 78.** Consider a case similar to one that happened here in the US. A person, call him Bob, owns a cake shop. A gay couple comes to the shop asking Bob to bake a cake for their wedding. Bob says that he can't in good conscience serve them in that way, because he holds religious beliefs according to which gay marriage is wrong. He doesn't want to participate in an event that he, due to his religious convictions, believes is wrong. The gay couple in response take Bob to court for discriminating against them. **Given how Locke understands the role of society in relation to religion, should Bob have the legal right to refuse to bake a wedding cake for the gay couple?**
- Yes. Given Locke's view, in a properly arranged society, Bob would have the legal right to refuse to bake a wedding cake for the gay couple.
 - No. Given Locke's view, in a properly arranged society, Bob would not have the legal right to refuse to bake a wedding cake for the gay couple.
- 79.** Consider the case of Bob and the gay couple again. **Given how Rousseau understands the role of society in relation to religion, should Bob have the legal right to refuse to bake a wedding cake for the gay couple?**
- Yes. Given Rousseau's view, in a properly arranged society, Bob would have the legal right to refuse to bake a wedding cake for the gay couple.
 - No. Given Rousseau's view, in a properly arranged society, Bob would not have the legal right to refuse to bake a wedding cake for the gay couple.
 - It depends. A civic religion is needed to solve this conflict in a fair way. The conflict occurs because according to Bob's religion, gay marriage is wrong; while according to the gay couple's religion or worldview, gay marriage is not wrong. There should be a state instituted civic religion that determines who can get married (or that teaches that whatever the state determines on the matter is correct for the people in that country), and anyone who doesn't agree to the civic religion should be banished or forced to comply.
- 80.** Consider the case of Bob and the gay couple again. **Given how Russon understands the way society should relate to religion, ethnicity, and ways of life, should Bob have the legal right to refuse to bake a wedding cake for the gay couple?**
- Yes. Given Russon's view, in a properly arranged society, Bob would have the legal right to refuse to bake a wedding cake for the gay couple.
 - No. Given Russon's view, in a properly arranged society, Bob would not have the legal right to refuse to bake a wedding cake for the gay couple.
 - It depends. Our society needs to have an honest dialogue where it considers both Bob's experience and worldview and gay couples' experiences and worldviews from the perspectives internal to each. Then, since some decision needs to be made in this case, society should work toward a solution that can as much as possible develop and accommodate the key insights—whatever those are—in each point of view.
- 81.** Comparing Locke's, Rousseau's, and Russon's views on the question of how society should relate to the diversity of religions, ethnicities, ways of life, and worldviews that are present in a society like our own, **which of the three views do you think is best?** (Any answer will count as "correct" for grading.)
- The tolerance view (Locke's)
 - The civic religion view (Rousseau's)
 - The multicultural/cross-cultural dialogue view (Russon's)

