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Ethnicity

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A Conceptual Approach

Daniel Weinberg

Preface

Coinciding with the two hundredth anniversary of the founding of our Nation is a sudden interest in the roots and origins of our people. The decade of 1970 will certainly be remembered for its quest for a better understanding of ourselves and our ethnicity.

Because of its newness as a concept and its complexity, ethnicity is often misunderstood and criticised. It is therefore necessary to objectively analyze its meaning and its role in the development of our individuality and national identity. This difficult task was given to Dr. Daniel Weinberg, a most promising scholar and historian, who has been closely connected with our Ethnic Heritage Studies since its inception in 1972 when Cleveland State University hosted a National Conference on Ethnicity.

In editing this monograph of readings Professor Weinberg selected a number of papers which were presented by noted sociologists, historians and political scientists at the 1972 Cleveland State University Conference including Richard Schermerhorn, Andrew Greeley, Carlton Qualey, Rudolph Vecoli, Joseph Fitzpatrick, Israel Rubin and Ronald Busch.

Without the editorial skills of Professor Weinberg it would have been impossible to concisely cover the broad conceptual aspect while still retaining the necessary depth for a serious analysis of ethnicity. To him my continuing and deepest gratitude.

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Editor's Note

Ethnicity is an exciting, albeit complex and frequently confusing, dimension of American social dynamics. Historiographically, methodologically and analytically, new jargon has appeared and concepts once believed consensually understood are now hotly debated. In order to make this volume as clear and effective a learning tool as possible, I have chosen to present most of the readings in a fashion different from that in which they originally appeared. For some, this involved no more than editing of content; for others, it meant elimination of traditional scholarly footnotes and the addition of a bibliography in place of them; in still other instances, this meant deletion of maps or graphs.

Sophisticated, insightful studies of the United State's ethnocultural experiences are only a recent and, fortunately, rapidly increasing phenomenon. They represent a dramatically different kind of scholarship, unwilling to accept or to continue the perpetuation of what has largely been a myopic, and frequently racist, perception of the nation's development.

Challenging an historical consensus regarding the origins and evolution of American society that asserted the transformation of heterogeneous peoples into a homogeneous community in terms of identity, values and goals, growing numbers of scholars have demanded the recognition of a dynamic, conflict process underlying the country's maturation. This collection of essays not only attempts to illustrate and explain both intellectual frameworks as one of its tasks, but suggests that a pluralistic, multicultural negotiation process (conflict) offers the most useful perspective for understanding America's social history.

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Emerging only in the mid 1950's and early 1960's as a distinct area of scholarly concern, ethnic studies has had an unsympathetic, and mostly neglected, history. The attention of historians, sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists and other humanists and social scientists has traditionally been focused on the "unique Americanness" of America. Captured symbolically by terms such as melting pot, Americanization, "American Dilemma," "immigrant problem," "Negro problem," "new" and "old" immigrants and integration, the nation's multi-cultural character has been, at once, viewed as a malady and celebrated as the socio-cultural richness that nurtured the "Great American Experiment." Like the American people generally, scholars have had extraordinary difficulty in intellectually coping with the diversity of cultures and societies that have, in fact, determined the country's priorities and fostered its growth.

Understanding ethnicity compels its consideration as both a concept and a process, that is, as a theoretical construct and as a system of behavioral and valuative decision-making with which individuals and groups organize life. Only in these terms is ethnicity's separate integrity from nationality, religion, class, etc., discernable and the complexities of its relationships to these same forces revealed. Confronting ethnicity as a determinant influence also requires that its contemporary connotations and frequent misuse be comprehended. All too commonly, ethnic

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and blue-collar, "cracker," racist and conservative are synonymously employed; ethnics condemned as obstacles to "enlightened" social policy; and ethnicity erroneously presumed to denote immigrant behavior, associations and value-orientations. Such simplistic notions only inhibit understanding; in fact, pose useless questions which are incapable of providing insight and clarity.

The essays compiled here examine ethnicity from many perspectives. The authors explore it conceptually–with periodic disagreement–and attempt to come to terms with its impact on American society. They serve as an introduction to this exciting and complex influence on American life. Each author raises serious questions, prods his colleagues to be increasingly sophisticated and precise, and makes a major contribution toward developing adequate methodology and scholarly perceptiveness in the study of ethnicity. The first section–Immigrants, Ethnics, Americans–combines four essays that explore the significance of ethnicity as an intellectual, scholarly tool in the study of America's growth and development. R.A. Schermerhorn begins this section with an investigation of the relationship of ethnicity to cognition and the concomitant behavior that expresses this understanding, or knowledge. Andrew Greeley's essay, which follows, addresses itself to the behavioral and attitudinal influence of ethnicity also, utilizing data compiled by the National Opinion Research Center. For him, the nation's relatively placid development, when contrasted with that of other nation-states, is noteworthy, and he is convinced that the explanation for this lies in understanding both the nature of situations during which people

call on ethnicity in order to cope and the circumstances under which ethnicity effects values, behavior and attitudes.

The two remaining essays examine American immigration and ethnic history. Agreeing on the need for sensitivity to the identities, institutions and communities of America's peoples historically in order to adequately and accurately comprehend the nation's growth, Carlton Qualey and Rudolph J. Vecoli disagree on the meaning and significance of ethnicity for explaining the lives and activities of Americans. For Professor Qualey, the dynamics of the American environment rapidly transformed immigrants into Americans whose behavior and outlooks were a function of the American experience, not European background. For Professor Vecoli, the influence of European experiences was not so transitory and the significance of ethnicity, differently conceived, is greater than Qualey would allow.

Section two–Ethnicity as Concept and Process–broadens the focus in a consideration of the nature and dynamics of ethnic influence on personal and group behavior. The five papers dissect ethnicity conceptually, explore its relationship to, for example, prescribing and proscribing behavior, intergroup relations, and raise the issue of the persistence of ethnicity over time. E.K. Francis and Joseph Fitzpatrick, the first two of this section, concentrate on the ethnic group as their approach to ethnicity. Employing the model of small group sociology as a strategy, Francis emphasizes the dynamics of group entrance and membership on behavior, values and attitudes. Fitzpatrick agrees with Francis on the fundamental significance of the group, and

the sociological functions Francis describes. However, viewing the group as but one compenent of a larger entity, ethnic community, Fitzpatrick provides a broader perspective on ethnicity. Ethnic community as a cultural and affective context within which immigrants confronted a host society that was alien to them is his concern, and he closely scrutinizes community to learn its importance for identity and behavior.

Israel Rubin assesses the ethnic group as a viable context for the individual in coping with the complexities and serious issues of contemporary society. Exploring the origins and nature of ethnic group and inter-ethnic relationships historically, his conclusions- that this "frame" is incapable of satisfying the needs of individuals to any meaningful degree and that the American people, with few exceptions, appear unwilling to make the commitments which make ethnic community and behavior viable–strongly disagree with Francis and Fitzpatrick's analyses. The "new ethnicity," ethnic persistence, dynamics of ethnic group membership in terms of social relationships and political behavior are all approached pessimistically as Rubin questions the future of pluralistic society.

The two papers that follow approach ethnicity in terms of the mechanisms and consequences of identification. Daniel Glaser raises the essential issues of the process of ethnic identification. Discerning what he calls an "ethnic identity pattern," he examines resultant attitudes and behavior in terms of an individual's self-definition, those facets of a self-concept deriving from ethnic group membership, and the impact on identity stemming from inter-ethnic contact. The final study

of this group investigates the nature of ethnicity beyond the first generation and the psycho-cultural-historical process of transmission. Vladimir Nahirny and Joshua Fishman challenge Marcus Lee Hansen's famous three generation cycle and assert a new perspective.

Section three–Amalgamation, Acculturation, Assimilation–approaches ethnicity by examining the relationship of subcultural systems to a host society. Jonathan Schwartzi article introduces this unit by recalling an early 20th Century American idea about what constituted appropriate immigrant attitudes and behavior toward the United States. Focusing on Henry Ford's attempt to literally transform, or "melt," aliens into Americans, Schwartz illustrates both the simple-minded and intolerant perspective of many native-born people toward the complexities of inter-cultural contact situations. Immensely popular as an image, albeit often vaguely and contradictorily defined (see Philip Gleason's excellent discussion, "Melting Pot: Symbol of Fusion or Confusion?," *American Quarterly*, 16 (September, 1964)), the melting pot has been one of the most persistent descriptions of the nation's cultural development in the 20th Century. Stanley Lieberson, author of the second essay, addresses many of the issues regarding the structure of socio-cultural organization and power relationships implicit in Ford's efforts at "Americanization." Attempting to create a societal formula for explaining multi- and inter-cultural contacts, he analyzes three types of experiences, assessing their dynamics to discover determinant factors and the potential for violence, repression and assimilation in each. The next essay explores what the authors believe is a necessary, but

heretofore overlooked, dimension to an alien's entrance into a host society. Broom and Kitsuse focus on the individual and assert that the relationship to the host society-acculturation and ultimately, they suggest, assimilation–is dependent upon "validation." An individual must choose, "make an empirical test," to be acculturated into the mainstream, they assert, and by implication no longer rely on the ethnic group for essential status, identity, norms, etc. Their's is a challenging thesis, one with profound meaning regarding ethnicity as a persistent, fundamental influence on Americans' lives. Walter Hirsch's discussion raises the issue of definition. Historically reviewing the meanings, assigned to assimilation, he identifies where confusion, contradiction and ambiguity arose. Separating assimilation into two components, concept and process, Hirsch asserts a new definition he believes provides needed theoretical precision.

Section four–Ethnic Dynamics in American Society–examines the influence and expressions of ethnicity in politics, economics, and social institutions. Ethnicity's relationship to political and other associational behavior is the concern of Michael Parenti. Criticizing scholars who would limit their study of ethnicity's influence to searching for immigrant behavior, Parenti asserts a dynamic concept of ethnicity and stresses the need for new kinds of thinking and new questions. Ranging from politics to residential patterns to social and religious activities, his assessment is that ethnicity is not only a persistent societal force, but a determinant criteria with which people make choices and define their lives. Ronald Busch acknowledges the significance of ethnicity for political behavior, but his focus is on the

qualitative nature and consequences of ethnic politics. The framework he employs in investigating the character of these politics is one that assesses the issues about which greatest concern is expressed: substantive, socio-economic considerations vs. the pursuit of and demand for recognition. For Busch, the latter defines ethnic politics and, he suggests, the consequences have been costly in allowing unsympathetic and hostile interests to rule. He proposes, also, that a new politics is rapidly emerging, one concomitant to what he perceives as an increasing rate of assimilation and focused on substantive matters. Clearly, the challenges of his analysis are many. Ethnicity's relationship to the ability to achieve desires politically, ethnic politics as a means of manipulating constituencies, co-opting potential opposition, and hiding real issues, the persistence of ethnicity as a political liability, assimilation as the key to achieving and effectively utilizing political power are but some of the serious issues that Busch raises and which must be confronted.

Christen Jonassen adds a new dimension to the influence of ethnicity on behavior. Focusing on the spatial movement of a Norwegian community over many decades, he stresses the critical role of ethnicity in determining locations and maintaining the community's integrity as a cohesive, identifiable entity. His analysis compels investigators to consider far more than the influence of "biotic," or impersonal, natural, and economic forces on mobility. For Jonassen, there must be an awareness of the socio-cultural framework of a community which regulates competition over such things as housing, jobs, status, etc. and influences values and behavior.

The book closes with a very different kind of document than that which composes its bulk. Significant not for its historical breadth, nor for its analytical sophistication, Anthony Celebrezze's personal comments underscore the premises upon which this compilation was developed. Like Mr. Celebrezze, the scholars in this volume and I are convinced that "ours is a nation which must be uniquely aware of that quality which has come to be called ethnicity." It has been a fundamental, essential influence on America's history, molding–often determining–the nature and intensity of behavior in religion, politics, family organization, occupation, education, and community development and character.

Section I: Immigrants, Ethnics, Americans

Ethnicity in the Perspective of the Sociology of Knowledge

R. A. SCHERMERHORN

After the passage of the McCarran Immigration Act, Marya
Mannes burst forth in joyous song:

> The blood that made this nation great
> Will now be tested at the gate
> To see if it deserves to be
> Admitted to democracy.
> Or rather to that small elite
> Whose hemoglobin counts can meet
> Requirements of purity
> Consistent with security
> And with that small and rabid mind
> That thinks itself above mankind. (1959, 87)

This doggerel verse is a deft satire on the kind of people who

somehow regard all newcomers to our country as ethnics but, simultaneously, in some vague way, regard themselves as non-ethnic. A false premise if there ever was one. Everett C. Hughes is entirely correct when he declares that "we are *all* ethnic." (1952, 7n) In fact every human being, regardless of where he lives, or whatever society he belongs to, participates in four social structures, a kinship system, a territorial community, a system of social ranking or stratification, and an ethnic grouping. (Robin Williams, 1964, 355).

> I mean by an ethnic group:
>
> a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry; memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their peoplehood. Examples of such symbolic elements are: kinship patterns, physical contiguity (as in localism or sectionalism), religious affiliation, language or dialect forms, tribal affiliations, nationality, phenotypical features, or any combination of these. (R.A. Schermerhorn, 1970, 12)

On this basis, all the following are ethnic groups: Japanese Americans, the French in Canada, the Flemish in Belgium, the Serbs in Yugoslavia, the Kurds of Syria, the Uzbeks of the Soviet Union, the Mongols of the Peoples Republic of China, the Koreans of Japan, the Parsis of India, the Kikuyu of Kenya, the Yoruba of Nigeria, the Aymara of Bolivia, and the Indians of Fiji. There are times when such a grouping constitutes a nation's majority as in the case of the Mestizos in Mexico whose pride of ancestry induces them to speak grandly of their ethnic group

as "la raza." In nearly all cases, however, ethnic groups are a minority of the population.

What, then, is ethnicity? It is a synthetic term which refers to the fusion of many traits or components that belong to the nature of any ethnic group; thus ethnicity is a composite of shared values, beliefs, norms, tastes, consciousness of kind within the group, shared in-group memories and loyalties, certain structured relationships within the group, and a trend toward continuity by preferential endogamy. (L. Singer, 1962, 423n.11) Each of these traits has its own continuum of greater or lesser salience so that the values may be more or less shared, more or less important, awareness of the group's distinctiveness may be high or low, memories of the group's historical past may be bright or dim, group loyalties conceived as variables that can alter independently which is an important half-truth. The other half, however, is that all of the traits of ethnicity can also vary together; and that there is a threat, real or perceived, to the unity or survival of the group, the salience of all variables will go up concurrently. Conversely under conditions of assured safety and/or acceptance there could very well be little need to feel the need of in-group solidarity for the sake of protection. This would lower the necessity to stress the singular, intimate or exclusive properties of the group. If these suppositions are correct, then both ethnicity and its components are relative to time and place…Assuming that ethnicity varies and changes its nature with alternations in social structures and the climate of opinion, this would mean that to understand it properly requires, *inter alia*, an enquiry belonging to the sociology of knowledge. W.J.H. Sprott defines this mode of investigation as follows:

"The sociology of knowledge…is concerned with the way systems of thought…are conditioned by other social facts." (1954, 141)

My analysis today rests on an assumption about conditions in the United States between the turn of the century and our own year of 1972. I am assuming that the 1960's, particularly the last part of that decade, constitutes a watershed of the twentieth century, so that (to use Sprott's terms) the social fact before the late 1960's constitute one cluster that permits a special set of inferences, while the cluster of social facts *after* the late 1960's requires a different set of inferences whose meaning is now only dimly perceived, though the outlines of its significance become clearer as time goes on. The events of the 1960's to which I refer are sometimes called the Negro revolution, though I suggest that the terms "revolt" or "insurrection" would be closer to common usage. While the Civil War or the War Between the States was the turning point of the nineteenth century in our nation, the black revolt is the critical juncture of the twentieth; it is an interesting but probably not significant coincidence that both these decisive events came in the sixties approximately a hundred years apart.

Although we are still too close to the startling occurrences of the 1960's to make any final judgments about them, I believe that, taken as a whole, they correspond admirably to what Kenneth Boulding calls "thresholds" of social systems. Thus he mentions examples where societies cross certain thresholds of social conditions that precipitate qualitative differences affecting the entire field of human activity. As he puts it:

> In the case of societies, soil erosion, increase in population density in limited agricultural areas, and erosion of ideologies or systems of legitimation are examples of continuous processes which may lead to discontinuous thresholds. On the other hand, discontinuous processes, certain one-shot events profoundly change the subsequent parameters of a social system. (K. Boulding, 1967, 107-8)

Such a threshold or turning point in the on-going life of a society is like a sluice gate for social alternatives and simultaneously does three things: it shuts off some alternatives altogether, narrows other alternatives to smaller compass, and opens up new ones. To put it in the language of athletics, it opens up a whole new ball game. But unlike the athletic metaphor the social conjuncture often changes the rules at the same time.

For the purposes of identification, I shall speak of the black revolt as the "crisis" or the "disruption," synonymously. This will allow us to designate the period of 1900 to the 1960's as the B.C. epoch–before the crisis; in like manner it is possible to call the era after the late 1960's to the present and prospectively to the future as the A.D. era, i.e. after the disruption. A comparison of events and major social trends in the two periods will reveal, I believe, good reasons why "ethnicity" as a term in common usage, was hardly ever heard of in the B.C. era, while people are writing articles and books about it in the A.D. epoch.

I cannot do justice to the contrast between B.C. and A.D. in a brief discussion like this one, but a few highlights will show that America has turned a corner and the future is pregnant with

different possibilities, for good or ill. The B.C. era was one of massive European immigration, two World Wars in Europe, and the spotlight on immigrants and refugees from southern and eastern continental areas. In the A.D. period the immigrant tide has receded with an increased proportion from the Western Hemisphere. During the B.C. epoch there was a pronounced rise of nationalism throughout Europe, partly abetted by American immigrants newly awakened to patriotism for their national homelands. Small wonder, then, that they became known as nationality groups in distinction from other minorities like the Afro-Americans, Mexican Americans, Indians or even the Jews whose nationalistic identification with Israel was a delayed reaction. However, in the A.D. years, the term "nationality group" is largely dropped in favor of the term "ethnics." This cognomen now distinguishes them from the blacks who used to be Negroes. Pluralistic competitive politics helped create the first label while Elijah Mohammed and Malcolm X gave currency to the second.

Another striking contrast separates B.C. from A.D. In the former, the dominant ideology was assimilationism. Popular opinion showed tolerance for European immigrants only when they were willing to give up their language and foreign customs; self-effacement was the price of acceptance. With few exceptions, the newcomers found it expedient to adopt this viewpoint and thus win their eligibility for the title "American." Even the intellectual community, led by Robert Park, viewed assimilation as inevitable in the long run and tacitly gave it approval. The same outlook captured the attitude of Negro leaders who opted for integration as their long-term goal–this

being just one variant of assimilationism. Hardly anyone in the B.C. period questioned this widespread assumption except for a few scattered immigrant leaders, settlement workers and a number of prominent Jewish leaders, the latter denying it more for their own community than for others. However, in our A.D. period the current runs in the opposite direction as cultural pluralism and separatism capture the imagination of countless persons to whom a merger with faceless masses looks increasingly unpromising. Minorities of every kind are now resonating to the claims of the right to be different, authenticity, independence, autonomy, self-determination and self-sufficiency.

What was less obvious at the time, though more visible to us today, is that European immigrants were losing much of their culture at the time when blacks were gaining much of theirs during the B.C. era. Those arriving from Europe had, in each national group, a distinctive ethos on arrival–an ethos gradually lost to the extent that assimilation took hold and a substitute culture tended to replace it. Afro-Americans, on the other hand, forcibly separated from family and friends by their captors, arrived as atomized individuals without cultural ties to reinforce their need for survival. At first they were nothing but a social category without group consciousness or social bonds. But subject to the same fate, as they were, they could not help but react in concert–in the slave revolts, the underground railroad, the clustering into religious groupings, the migrations to cities, the sharing of sentiments in music–in these and many other ways they were gradually forming an ethos of their own. Singer has called this development "ethnogenesis," i.e. "the process

whereby a people, that is an ethnic group, comes into existence."
(L. Singer, 1962, 423)

In the B.C. era, the dominant ideology of Americanization
regarded the process of change among minority groups as a
simple, one-way movement toward a homogeneous set of beings
called Americans. Anything short of that uniform goal would
obviously be deficient, unfinished and incomplete. Those among
the European newcomers who failed to go the full route were
simply dubbed un-American; as for the blacks, Myrdal
articulated what others were thinking when he called American
Negro culture in the 1940's "a distorted development, or a
pathological condition of general American culture." (G.
Myrdal, 1944, 11, 928)

Today in the A.D. epoch, both those of European as well as those
of African descent are vigorously denying such imputations
from the dominant group. White ethnics repudiate the notion
that they are un-American when they cherish and revive the
folk elements from their past or celebrate their culture heroes
who distinguished themselves in the past; and black ethnics
refuse to be intimidated by terms like "exaggerated American"
or "distorted American," as they are awakening to full awareness
of their historic culture-building process and, in a delayed
appreciation of Garvey's gross attempts at autonomy, are re-
thinking their role as an ethnic group. But in our A.D. epoch,
the current stress on cultural pluralism and ethnicity implies a
renascence of an older ethos for those of European descent, but
a budding nascence of a newly formed ethos for the blacks.

When we turn to politics we find a parallel contrast. During

the B.C. period, the European ethnics participated primarily in the local arena through competition for recognition by the party machine. Early arrivals like the Irish took precedence and late comers had to fight their way in. At any rate ethnicity for the voter simplified his choice where issues were complicated or took second place. Recognition politics became the norm, with the development of the balanced slate. And as one political scientist well commented, "For the Irish, Jewish, Italian bright boys who pursue it, politics is a status-conferring occupation… As successful politicians, they can command deference from the greatest capitalists, the toughest union leaders, the oldest of the old families." (J. Reichley, 1959, 104) With the coming of the New Deal, however, the fulcrum of power shifted to the Federal center and the last 30 to 40 years of the B.C. era have been spent in a herculean effort by urban ethnic politicians to come to terms with the new realities. In the meanwhile the black ethnics, flooding the cities as late-comers found their political gains retarded as both their votes and their leaders were coopted by party machines that gave major rewards to others. Paradoxically, however, the blacks thorugh a civil rights organization had brought pressure to bear in Washington even while weak at the municipal level, and through numerous Supreme Court decisions, established legal norms that would result in major gains at all local centers, provided they were enforced. And when such implementation was lacking the blacks took to the streets in new, and to the outsider, frightening forms of unconventional political participation. For those who had regarded voting and the accompanying accomodative politics as the only true forms of politics, such mass demonstrations were a serious threat to national order. However, those who took part

in the marches and parades, inexperienced in conventional forms of politics and even distrustful of voting, could take special delight in what Bayley calls "coercive public protest" (D.H. Bayley, 1962) or Waskow speaks of as "creative disorder" (A .J. Waskow, 1966, 225) since it could be learned by anybody and often brought gains when nothing else did. Often this kind of pressure was put directly upon federal agencies, agencies that did not exist in the early B.C. years. (Litt, 1970, 147-149) Unfortunately the momentum and contagion of this popular activism could not be stopped before it exploded in the riots of Watts, Detroit, Cleveland and Newark. Those acts of violence are the watershed between B.C. and A.D.

They cannot be understood in a purely political context, however. Until we see the convergent economic realities, we overlook a really crucial variable. Historically the European ethnics entered the system when the economy was rapidly expanding and there was demand for unskilled labor. Before the turn of the century, most foreign born from Europe were operatives, manual laborers or domestic servants but by 1950 the occupational level of second generation Americans matched that of the nation as a whole almost exactly. (S.M. Lipset and R. Bendix, 1960, 104n-105n; and E.P. Hutchinson, 1956, 114, 115, 195, 216) Thus the European ethnics accepted equality of opportunity because the system worked for them, even in the depression when the New Deal boosted life chances for organized labor and the homeowner. Since the great majority of the European ethnics were Catholic, John Kane's designation of the religious group as a lower-middle or lower socio-economic income group rising definitely in the system but at a relatively

slow rate (Kane, 1955, 30, quoted in Litt, *op cit.*, 133) is one that seems appropriate. The B.C. period, was therefore, a time of modest but solid economic gains, part of which included a substantial flight to working-class suburbs in the wake of black migration to adjacent areas. In the same historic phase, only a tiny elite among the Negroes advanced with the economy; the great masses have remained at the lowest occupational levels with many losing the little foothold they actually had. Blacks did not enter the urban labor market until it was fairly well preempted by workers from abroad. Though showing some advances in war-time they have not been able to sustain that advance, partly because of widespread discrimination on the part of employers and organized labor and partly for structural reasons as technological changes eliminate unskilled and semiskilled occupations (the very ones that gave European ethnics their start) at the rate of 35,000 a week or nearly two million a year. The economy forges ahead by reason of increased productivity which is a euphemism for job elimination at the bottom levels. This is where the bulk of Negro workers are found. During the 1950's and 60's when the courts and the national congress were enunciating new civil rights gains, federal promises raised the level of black expectations to new heights at a time when income levels were sinking and unemployment growing in the black community. Thus, "the gap between the income of white and Negro workers has been growing steadily greater. In Michigan, for example, the ratio of average Negro income to white income dropped from 87 per cent in 1949 to 76 per cent in 1958, and has continuously deteriorated since that time." (H. Hill, 1965 quoted in N.R. Yetman and C. Hoy Steele, 1971, 455) Unemployment is

regularly twice as high among blacks as among whites and among black youth of approximately high school age it typically reaches 25 per cent or more. (Ibid., 456)

From still another angle, the families below the poverty line in America, a goodly per cent of them black, have less income in proportion to their numbers than they had in the 1930's (P. Roby, 1969) which means that the very poor have been downwardly mobile since that time. And as De Fleur and D'Antonio tell it, "The very fact that the society has preached upward mobility so loudly and so long increases the bitterness and frustration of those who find themselves cut off from the good things upward mobility can bring (though not from the mass media that advertise these good things) and thus contributes to the tendency toward alienation and conflict." (M.L. De Fleur, W.V. D'Antonio and L.B. De Fleur, 1971, 231) It is realities like these that contributed more than their share to ghetto revolts of the 1960's.

Before the B.C. era drew to a close, the European ethnics continued their glacial climb up the mobility ladder with more than half wending their way to the less affluent suburbs, often as a means of escape from the over-increasing tide of blacks moving into adjoining or common areas of residence. Like all recently poor, those of European ancestry were preoccupied with security, with preserving the gains they had won at tremendous cost to their parents and to themselves. What were these gains? Seniority at the plant, a slot for one's son in the construction trades, a job at City Hall, in the civil service, in the city school system, at the fire station, on the police force, a house nearly

paid for, an honorable discharge from the Army and a place of respect in the American Legion or the Knights of Columbus, influential friends in the City Councilor the precinct committeemen, and an informal network of political allies to get things done unobtrusively. To lose any of these would be to slip back–a future too shattering to contemplate. Yet toward the close of the B.C. epoch, many of these gains were seriously threatened, always, it seemed by the blacks who constituted one-fifth of the population of the 50 largest cities by 1960. Not only did the blacks inundate whole neighborhoods in the quest for housing, not only did they displace many older ethnics on city councils and precinct positions, they publicized issues instead of handling practical affairs through the old informal channels. Leap-frogging over the local authorities, they seized the ear of Washington and "Federal funds were used to create new store-front style agencies in the ghettos, staffed with professionals who helped local residents to find jobs or obtain welfare, or deal with school officials…they drew larger numbers of people into the new programs, spreading the federal spoils." (F.F. Piven, 1972, 19)

In the A.D. era, those of European ancestry still left in the central city felt themselves beleaguered even more as Federal dollars were increasingly spent to spur blacks "to make demands on city services" and "Total national Welfare costs rose from about $4 billion to nearly $15 billion in 1970." (Idem)

Perhaps more than any other circumstance, this has triggered a sharp reaction from European ethnics who suffer moral outrage when they remember their own deprivations and struggles.

"Nobody ever gave *us* a handout. We made it on our own." Why can't they be like us?" became a national refrain growing louder and louder until it merged with the chorus of the A.D. period condemning the violence on city streets. Even more poignant came the plaint, "We never got our way by burning down buildings, by using brute force or mob violence. Until we have law and order, nobody will get what he wants." This last was directed equally at street crime growing out of control as poverty deepened in the ghettos and the anodyme of drugs raised the level of thievery to an unprecedented height. Relief rolls, violence and crime became the symbols of the blacks to an increasing number of European ethnics who started buying firearms in preparation for the coming Armageddon.

It was in this overheated atmosphere that the new ethnicity was born. Mass media has been focussed so long on the blacks that those of European extraction had become forgotten men. Ponder what Michael Novak said about the Pole in America:

> Those Poles of Buffalo and Milwaukee–so notoriously taciturn, sullen, nearly speechless. Who has ever understood them?…But where in America is there anywhere a language for voicing what a Christian Pole in this nation feels? He has no Polish culture left him, no Polish tongue. Yet Polish feelings do not go easily into the idiom of happy America, the America of the Anglo-Saxons, and, yes, in the arts, the Jews. (The Jews have long been a culture of the word, accustomed to exile, skilled in scholarship and in reflection. The Christian Poles are largely of peasant origin, free men for hardly more than a hundred years.) Of what shall the man of Buffalo think, on his way to work in the mills. departing from his relatively

> dreary home and street? What roots does he have? What language of the heart is available to him?" (M. Novak, 1971, 44)

It is to answer questions like these, to rescue men like these from hopeless obscurity, and to put them anew in touch with their own histories before they are engulfed by other concerns,…a veritable crusade for recognition of ethnicity has come to life in the A.D. era. Taking a leaf from the new federal politics, white ethnic leaders have made this into a campaign with national repercussions. The goals are both cultural and economic. On the cultural side are conferences like the one we attend today, or the Schweiker and Pucinski bills…passed by Congress to establish "ethnic heritage studies" in the public schools with the aid of federal funds. (H. Isaacs, 1972, 78) On the economic side "the drive is being directed by the National Confederation of American Ethnic Groups, a Washington-based association that claims a membership of 67 groups and 18.6 million individuals…It wants to become the conduit for Federal aid, and it wants white ethnic representation on such national boards as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission." (Wall Street Journal)

As an ideology ethnicity is therefore a response to the rather abrupt changes of the A.D. period. As a reaction it may itself become a causal element in a new national pattern. Interacting with political and economic activities, it contributes a unique element to a converging series of events that make up the formative stage of our A.D. era. At the moment the atmosphere is pregnant with possibilities, much like the physicists critical

mass which can explode, fizz out, or burn steadily in new directions. So in the current scene, ethnicity appears on the knife edge of three possible tendencies, anyone of which may become dominant in the next year or two. I see these trends as polarization, proliferation, or pluralist alliance. These are major alternatives.

Polarization is always a strong probability when the economy falters. And in our paradoxical post-industrial society when the GNP keeps rising while the number of jobs keeps shrinking, rivalry for jobs becomes fierce as it takes on ethnic and racial overtones. Lionel Lokos, a leading writer of European ethnic heritage pictures the way such conflicts can polarize purely on the basis of color when he speaks of a plan to enlarge the number of jobs. He writes:

> If the jobs program is not successful enough, it will arouse the fierce resentment of ghetto residents who will roundly denounce whitey for 'jiving' him again. If the jobs program is too successful, it will arouse the fierce resentment of white workers who will see a black skin as a passport to privilege in the plants and factories…And I am…convinced that the more favoritism that is shown the Negro, the more inevitable this tragic conflict will become. Call them the White Lower-Middle Class. Call them the White Working Class. Give them any name you like, but know that some of them are ready to fight–with a toughness, a fury, a recklessness, and a courage that are a match for the most militant black men in the ghetto." (L. Lokos, 1971, 385, 387)

Those who are too complacent and who misjudge the depth of

hostility already engendered over this issue should read Lokos' cry of alarm. This polarization could expand even more widely. The notion of black power has now spread by contagion to catch fire in the red power of the American Indian and the Chicano power or Chicanismo of the Mexican American. In many cities a confrontation between white ethnics and non-white ethnics over employment opportunities is not entirely a fanciful picture. Until the economy improves at all levels, it is definitely an explosive prospect.

The second possibility is proliferation. This could easily occur…Experience with black studies programs irresistibly raises a great many relevant questions on how such educational experiments actually work. The most critical issue, of course, is making decisions on what leaders or experts will represent each ethnic community and what version of history will be taught in each. Since there are "fiercely contending sub-groups" in each minority, this could very well awaken old factionalisms and stir up new ones. Considering that there are scores of ethnic groups and a goodly number of factions in each, this could result in a bewildering proliferation of hundreds of groups gathered around the federal trough. There is danger that the current search for a new pluralism or a new ethnicity which depolarizes on social issues while repolarizing ethnically will be faced by just such a baffling multiplication of separate view points…In its attempt to by-pass the first alternative it could even make the explosion more likely.

A third possibility is that of a pluralist alliance. The demand for roots and for group identities that mounts like a crescendo

in the A.D. era is not confined to white, black, red or brown ethnics but characterizes them all. Our time of troubles will not yield to Gleichschaltung, to a homogenization of our nation in the name of unity. That was possible in a European setting where the uniformity of language and culture permitted such a dream to exist. But if that was a false dream, even in Europe, it is far more illusory in a nation of nations, a people of peoples such as America has always been. In the face of those real forces that *do* appear to flatten us into leveled-out masses, the old individualism can no longer save us. We *do* need group reinforcement and we *do* need group identity to prevent our, being submerged. This pluralism, whose most creative form is ethnicity, is the first step to sanity. But only the first. If the meaning of ethnicity remains purely intrinsic, if it has no goal beyond itself, if it is exhausted in self-congratulation and bemused nostalgia, it will become like a stagnant pool whose look of outlet condemns it to final pollution. If, however it flows free, or to change the figure, if ethnicity becomes a tool, an agent for larger goals, it can lose its egoistic pretensions and contribute its rich resources to the major needs of a society growing daily more desperate. The confidence, poise and courage that come from a sure sense of one's roots and identity need an outlet worthy of their merit. But it must be an aim big enough to challenge the most hardy spirits. I submit that the goal most likely to enlist the full energies of men in our time is a full-employment economy…Some ethnics, particularly the non-white forces are making revolutionary noises about this. If the European ethnics regard this as a threat and ally themselves with the establishment when, in reality, they have no more than a toe-hold there, they will be letting themselves be used as pawns in a

battle where they find themselves no better off after a presumed victory than they were before. Richard Rubenstein has put his finger on the central issue when he declares:

> If American workingmen…(and here his reference is largely to the European ethnics) are beginning to act in a dangerously racist fashion, this is not because they are *canaille* but because the present economic and political system has failed them as it has failed the blacks–because they feel compelled to defend the little they have against threatening forces, real or fancied. (R. Rubenstein, 1970, 186)

Thus until the poor and the recently poor, the deprived and the partly deprived, those at the bottom of the ladder and those on the first rung can align forces to demand a genuinely redistributive society, the nation will be engulfed by extremism of the right and left in a holocaust of mass destruction. Those who want to avoid Armageddon and have been awakened to a genuine self-respect in their own ethnic heritages can utilize their new-found freedom to make America a land where the sharing of affluence spreads more widely. This sort of pluralistic alliance can replace the old ruling coalitions that now rigidify our entire distributive system. It is a task which all ethnics will find rewarding and it will demand a new political coalition…So the pluralist alliance is a third possibility in the A.D. era. I share with you all the conviction that it is a long shot…

As Ralph Ellison once said, "America is woven of many strands: I would recognize them and let it so remain. Our fate is to

become one, and yet many–this is not prophecy but description."
(Quoted in Dinnerstein and Jaker, 1970, 347)

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The Future of the Ethnic "Revival"

ANDREW GREELEY

I begin with two stories told me recently by professional colleagues. In one instance a friend of a colleague was born in Hungary but had lived in a Western European country for twenty years. Finally he saved enough money to purchase for himself a "second class" citizenship. He summoned all his friends together for a massive celebration of the fact that he was now at last permitted to devote his life's savings toward purchasing his citizenship.

The other story concerned a man born in Czechoslovakia of German and Czech parents. He married a German from the Sudetenland, applied for citizenship in West Germany, and was turned down because he and his wife spoke to one another frequently in Czech.

Most Americans are shocked to the point of disbelief when they hear such stories. We take it for granted that access to citizenship for immigrants is a matter of course in other societies just as it is in our own. In fact, we are reluctant to have people within our borders who do not apply for citizenship while other countries are reluctant to grant it. Other nations jealously guard citizenship; we vigorously insist that everyone becomes a citizen.

Thus little attention is paid in the United States to the plight of the "guest workers" in the Western European social democracies. Whether they be from Africa, Yugoslavia, or Italy, the "guest workers" are permitted to stay for only a brief period of time, are generally not allowed to bring their families, and are vigorously excluded from citizenship. Such practices seem so incredible to Americans that we simply ignore them as if they didn't exist. We are told repeatedly, for example, how "progressive" and "enlightened" the Swedes are, how much we have to learn from them. Yet for all their progress and enlightenment, the Swedes are not about to treat Italian guest workers like anything more than outcasts, who are not especially welcome and surely never permitted to become Swedes.

Like so many other things in American society that are taken for granted, no one has thought it particularly worth while to try to understand why citizenship is so readily accessible in the United States to immigrants when in most other North Atlantic countries citizenship is but rarely conceded to foreigners and then only under the most rigorous circumstances.

As Professor Arthur Mann has suggested to me, the founding

fathers of the United States, political philosophers that they were, were very conscious of the need for an intellectual and cultural base for their new nation. Such a base could not be religious because the society was already denominationally pluralistic: Congregationalist in New England, Quaker in Pennsylvania, Anglican in New York and Virginia, Methodist and Baptist in the South. Nor could the cultural basis for the society be ethnic; even at the time of the Revolutionary War at least half of the population was not Anglo-Saxon. (Most of the non Anglo-Saxon half were Scotch-Irish, German, and black.) Nor could the common basis be an unique cultural heritage, for while Hastings, the Magna Carta, the War of the Roses, and the Glorious Revolution meant something to the Anglo-Saxons, it meant much less, if anything at all, to the non Anglo-Saxon half.

Therefore the founding fathers decided–as the early naturalization laws make clear–that the central core of beliefs that was to create the American nation would consist of certain political principles as contained in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. Citizenship would be granted to the man who was willing to be a "citizen" in the Enlightenment sense of the word, that is to say, a man who committed himself to the political principles of the eighteenth century which were enshrined in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. No one could be excluded from citizenship whatever his religion, his ethnicity, or his heritage so long as he was willing to pledge allegiance to these political principles.

One supposes that Jefferson and Madison would have been

horrified at the thought that within something less than a century forty-five million new immigrants would come to the shores of the United States from allover the world while at the same time the population expanded across the continent. Yet, however grudgingly, the native Americans did indeed admit the immigrants, requiring of them (in theory at least) only that they pledge allegiance to the political system in order to achieve equal rights as citizens. The theory may have been flawed, but it was flawed in practice, not in theoretical statement. The gathering in of the nations to construct the American republic in approximately one century is one of the most extraordinary phenomena of modern history. The incredible thing is not that there has been injustice and violence in the history of the country; it is that the country held together at all.

But let us be clear about the flaws. Neither the blacks nor the American Indians were given an opportunity to become citizens. Orientals were admitted for a time but then excluded. Eastern and Southern Europeans were admitted by the millions, but then the American Republic lost its nerve and departed from its principles of equal access to citizenship to establish discriminatory quota systems to keep the "inferior" peoples of eastern and southern Europe from contaminating the native American stock. German-Americans, whose loyalty to the country ought never to have been questioned in either 1916 or in 1941, were forced to pay a heavy cultural price for being German. Japanese-Americans were herded together in concentration camps during the Second World War. Finally, while in theory it was not required of immigrants that they give up either their own language or their own culture, in practice

the social pressures were so strong that languages were lost and cultures were repressed. One had to do other things besides commit oneself to political democracy in order to be fully accepted as American. No matter what the theory said, the facts of the matter were that names had to be changed; accents hidden, and cultural pasts forgotten. Sometimes even religion had to be denied before American elites were willing to acknowledge that the children and the grandchildren of immigrants were really as American as anyone else.

But the American creed kept us uneasy about these transgressions. The Immigration Act of 1965 eliminated quotas against Orientals and Eastern and Southern Europeans. While injustice against blacks and American Indians remains, practically no one in the society defends such injustice any longer, and major efforts are being made to eliminate it. More recently, in great part as the result of black emphasis on cultural diversity, the country has at last begun to come to terms with the religious, racial, ethnic, and geographic diversity that exists within its boundaries.

The Spanish-speaking may be successful where the Germans and the Poles failed. They may be able to remain bilingual, and in the best expression of the American creed they have every right to. The theory is that one need only subscribe to American political democracy; it does not say that one should speak only English–though it does say, at least implicitly, that one should be able to speak English in addition to whatever other language one chooses. It is problematic that bilingualism can survive in the United States; but at the present point in time, considerable

numbers of Americans are willing to admit that there is nothing "un-American" about bilingualism and that if some groups want it, they have every right to it.

Despite all its flaws, then, the American experiment in pluralism has in many ways been an incredible success. When one looks at the ethnic, religious, and racial conflicts in Indonesia, Ceylon, India, Bengladesh, Iraq, Burma, Cypress, Palestine, Yugoslavia, and Ulster, one is astonished that there has been so little conflict and violence in American society. Despite its large population, its immense geography, and the variegated origins of its citizenry, the United States has had only one civil war, and that was a conflict basically between two Anglo-Saxon groups. Scotch-Irish and Celtic-Irish in the United States get along reasonably well, while in Ulster they still shoot at one another. The United Kingdom may be a far more civilized place than the United States, as many of our self-critics are only too happy to remind us, but that Celt and Saxon are at peace with each other here surely must be considered some sort of progress over the situation in Ulster.

But why, despite its flaws and failures, its mistakes, hesitations, compromises, and imperfections, in the face of all the centrifugal forces that could have torn it apart so easily has the American Republic held together at all? I submit that no one knows. We have been so busy criticizing our failures, so busy comparing ourselves negatively with Sweden and Great Britain that we have not bothered to ask how the United States of America has been able to absorb so much diversity without tearing itself apart.

For we do not have a "melting pot" in Israel Zangwill's sense of the term. Some of the ethnics may have "melted," despite Michael Novak, but large numbers of them have not, and the "melting" does not seem to have noticeably decreased the diversity in the society. On the other hand, neither do we have Horace Kallen's "cultural pluralism," because there is intermarriage and there is one common language. We do not have a "pillarized" society like Ireland or Holland or Belgium or French Canada. There is no such thing as a Polish community or a black community or an Italian community in this country the way there is a Catholic community in the north of Ireland, a Flemish community in Belgium, or a French community in Canada. Geography, social class, religion, politics, profession are not coterminous with nationality. There are Jews who are not particularly rich, Irishmen who are not particularly active politically, Polish Republicans, Italian Protestants, black conservatives–and all in reasonably substantial numbers. If one knows the ethnic background of a person, one can predict with greater or lesser degree of confidence a number of other things about him, but one can be wrong frequently enough to make it obvious that we do not have a mosaic society, or even one remotely approaching a society with impermeable boundaries separating its various ethnic groups.

Save for a minority of people, religion, race, and ethnicity are only a component of identity and do not exhaust it. The pertinent question is not whether we have cultural pluralism in Horace Kallen's sense; the question is, rather, under what sets of circumstance do what kinds of people fall back on their ethnic consciousness and under what sets of circumstance does an

ethnic heritage affect attitudes, values, and behavior? Is ethnicity important when one chooses a wife, a poker partner, a psychiatrist, undertaker, insurance man, construction contractor, priest, political candidate? Are there times when ethnicity influences our behavior when we are not conscious of such influence? Why are the Irish the most politicized of American ethnic groups? Why are the Poles the most likely to vote? Why do the Jews overchoose medicine as a career? Why do Germans overchoose science and engineering? Why do the Irish drink so much? Why do the Jews and Italians drink so little? Why do the Irish have high morale and the Italians low morale? Why do the Irish have a high feeling of political efficacy and the Jews a low feeling on the same scale? The questions are endless and they leave no doubt that ethnicity is still an important factor in American society. Yet correlations between ethnicity on the one hand and attitudes and behavior on the other are all relatively modest, of about the same order of magnitude as social class (although independent of social class). Ethnicity, in other words, is important, but it is not all important.

If neither the melting pot nor the cultural pluralism model is a particularly useful way of looking at American society, then what models do we have available? I would submit that what we have is a society of ethnic groups, and since that is merely another way of stating the problem, I would define an ethnic group as "a collectivity based on presumed common origin, which shapes to some extent the attitudes and behaviors of those who share that origin, and with which certain people may freely choose to identify at certain times of their lives."

The words are all carefully chosen. First, ethnicity is a way of being American. Immigrants did not come as ethnics; they became ethnics on the shores of this country. It scarcely made sense to have "Irish" or "Italian" be an important component of your identity when everyone else in the vicinity was Irish or Italian. One defined oneself in terms of region, province, the town from which one came. Only in this country were there those who were not Irish or not Italian or not Polish or not Norwegian, and here such a form of self-definition distinguished one over against the others in the society. It also provided one with a modality by which one could become part of the society. Only to a minor extent did the ethnic group represent a way of looking back at a previous heritage. It was, more importantly, a way of looking forward to finding one's place in the American heritage. Even concern about national freedom in one's country of origin was justified in terms of its impact on American society. The American Irish, for example, supported the Irish nationalist movements because, it was argued, they would only fully be accepted in the United States when Ireland could be numbered among the rank of free nations. Irish nationalism was a way of being American because it was felt that full Americanism would be denied until Ireland was free.

Similarly, the high level of patriotism among the American ethnic groups–so quickly ridiculed by the young and the radical–can only be understood when it is realized that for most immigrants the right to own property and the right to vote were experienced for the first time in this country. One might be legitimately proud of one's own heritage, but one was under no illusion that the ancestral lands provided more freedom or more

opportunity than was to be found in the United States. Quite the contrary. Gratitude to the United States was a direct result of the assumption that the United States had made it possible for the immigrants to be both free and prosperous. The eastern and southern European Catholics are the most likely to vote of any American ethnic group. In all likelihood it is because they were the ones who were the least likely to have the franchise in the old country. Voting becomes an important way of symbolizing their Americanness; and their ethnicity, from their point of view, is as American as anything else–and frequently more so.

Secondly, our definition insists on the presence of cultural heritage which influences attitudes, values, personality, and behavior even if the people being influenced are unconscious of the impact of the past on the present. The Irish have been in the United States longer than most ethnic groups and are probably least concerned of all the immigrant groups about their ancestral past; they have become in most visible ways quite indistinguishable from middle-class Anglo-Saxons, yet on a wide variety of measures of activity, behavior, attitudes, values, personality, the Irish are profoundly and radically different from other groups in American society. If an uniquely Irish heritage can survive three and sometimes four generations in the United States, there is no reason to think that the other heritages will melt away quickly.

Thirdly, as far as conscious self-definition goes, ethnicity is an option. It is a form of self-definition available for those who choose it, but in the United States, both in theoretical principle and in practical life, no one is compelled to be an ethnic either by

members of his own group or by members of any other group. Of course, the principle is frequently violated. Blacks are judged to be black whether they want to or not; to some extent, it is still impossible to stop being a Jew if one chooses. But clearly the ideal toward which the American creed strains is that every man ought to be free to identify as much as he wants with his past heritage (so long as he is committed to American political democracy) or as free as he wants to reject all conscious ethnic identification. The racial problem will be solved in the United States when "being black"–as a form of self-definition–is an option that a black person is free to exercise or not as he chooses.

Finally, it must be observed that our definition admits of the possibility of considerable pluralism within an ethnic group. Eastern Europeans in the United States, for example, are usually split into two groups, the ones who came before World War II and the ones who came after. The Czech split into three groups, pre-World War II, 1948 refugees, and the 1968 refugees. When one studies diversities within groups, one is tempted to comment that in some cases there is as much pluralism within the groups as there is between them and the rest of society. The ethnic collectivity, then, is constituted by the simple fact that because of the diverse origins of our people, national religious or racial background is a predicate variable, which we may on occasion choose to make an explicit part of our self-definition. How this has come to be and how it all works in practice are research questions to which American social science could well devote considerable time, resources, and energy in the decades ahead.

Within such a context, what is to be said about the current emphasis on "militant ethnicity?"

First of all, the data we have collected at the National Opinion Research Center make it clear that the "militant ethnic" approach will only appeal to some people. With the exception of the nonwhite groups, none of the other religious or nationality groups in American society experience the degree of oppression that would make substantial numbers of them willing to sympathetically cooperate with those whose political and social style is militant. This does not mean that the militant leaders do not have an important role to play; it merely means that they do not speak and in the nature of things cannot and will not speak, for substantial segments (indeed, overwhelming majorities) of the constituencies they may claim.

Second, to the extent that the strategy of militant ethnicity presumes a "pillarized" society, it simply is innacurate in its reading of the social structure of the United States. The society would be pillarized only by such circumstances that the overwhelming majority of Italians, for example, thought of themselves as Italian most of the time and if being Italian became the almost exclusive identity which they chose to predicate of themselves. It may be questioned whether such an extreme form of self-definition would be a good thing, but such a question is purely theoretical, because no serious scrutiny of American society as it exists presently could possibly give any indication that this kind of exclusivist self-definition is very likely. Militant leaders may raise somewhat the level of ethnic consciousness, and this may be all to the good; they may

promote greater pride in the heritage, and this is certainly good; they may occasionally mobilize political pressure, and whether that is good or bad depends upon which direction the pressure is applied; they may be able to put together coalitions that have some impact on improving the quality of life in the city, and no one would deny the importance of that goal. But militant ethnic leaders will not turn the United States into a mosaic society, and to the extent that they think they can, they merely deceive themselves.

Finally, if militant ethnicity means that Anglo-Saxon Protestants are scapegoated as the new inkblot of American societal ills, then militant ethnicity is un-American. WASP's (a term I no longer use because of the pejorative connotations that have recently been attached to it) are no more appropriate an inkblot than is blacks or Jews or Slavs or Italians or anyone else. Furthermore, to lump all Anglo-Saxon Protestants, whether they be from Massachusetts, Tennessee, Texas, or California, under one category is to engage in intolerable oversimplification.

Then what is one to think of the ethnic revival?

Perhaps the first thing that ought to be observed is that there is no such thing as an ethnic revival. The ethnic groups are out there where they always have been–in the northwest side of Chicago, in Hamtramck, in South Boston, in Queens, the Bronx, Staten Island. There is no particular research evidence that they are any more militant or outraged, or that they feel any more oppressed than they did in the past. What we have instead of an ethnic revival is an arrival of consciousness of ethnicity. We have become conscious not of the ethnics themselves but of

their more outspoken leaders and of the journalists and scholars whose business it is to monitor American culture. If there is an ethnic revival at all, it is among us: we have once again discovered that there is diversity in American society. While it is admirable that we have rediscovered this diversity, one might pause to wonder why it took us so long.

And which way will the ethnic revival go? I would suggest that there are two things that will happen. We must first understand both the various ethnic traditions that make up American society and also the processes, the protocols, the rituals, the implicit "modus vivendi" by which these groups have managed to coexist without major violence and conflict for a sustained period of time. That only one major sociological study has been done on the American Poles–W.I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki's Polish Peasant in Europe and America–is astonishing. That that book was written more than fifty years ago is even more astonishing. Ignorance of the various ethnic traditions in the United States is an incredible piece of social scientific irresponsibility.

But in addition to understanding ourselves and each other, we must, I think, also enjoy the diversity of cultural heritages. Enjoyment should include more than just periodic visits to ethnic restaurants, as admirable and enjoyable as such gustatory tourist trips may be. We are all richer because the Jewish literary, cultural, and comic tradition has been shared with the rest of the country, but there are other riches of cultural heritage locked up in the eastern and southern European ghettos that still exist in

American cities.[1] These ethnic heritages are priceless resources for our country. That the rest of us have been uninterested in them and that we have, perhaps without realizing it, put pressure on those who possess such heritages to forget them is an unconscionable waste. Such waste must come to an end.

The day may come when those who are most affluent and hence have the most freedom of choice about where to live will deliberately and consciously choose to live in communities where there is a maximum of racial, religious, nationality, and cultural diversity. They will argue, it is to be hoped, that by providing an opportunity for their children to grow up amidst such diversity they are providing an educational experience more important than college. It will mean that Americans will have to acknowledge not merely that they have something to learn from the Jews and the blacks (and many elite Americans are ready to admit that now) but that they also have something to learn from the Poles. the Italians, the Slovaks, Lithuanians. Hungarians, Armenians, Crimean Tartars. Russian Germans. and even (heaven save us all) from the Irish.

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1. And a ghetto is a ghetto even if it is only fifty or sixty percent of one ethnic group.

Ethnicity and History

CARLTON QUALEY

The historian of ethnic groups in the United States has usually started as a historian of emigration from a foreign country or of immigration to the United States. Much of the literature of the field of ethnic history has therefore to do with backgrounds of the groups in the United States. Frequently immigration history and ethnic history are combined in the same volume. The author goes back to the homeland to ascertain the reasons for emigration, takes his emigrants across the ocean, traces them to their various areas of settlement, and seeks to determine the degree of their adjustment to the new environment. The latter aspect has been called acculturation and assimilation. Much of the literature of the field of ethnic history has been by Americans. Only lately have historians abroad awakened to this important aspect of world history, especially in the Scandinavian countries but also in Great Britain, Ireland, the Low Countries, West Germany and Italy. Under United Nations auspices, studies

of world migrations have been made. New perspectives are therefore coming into view. The movement, distribution, settlement, resettlement, adjustment, group life, intergroup relationships, and persistence of ethnicity of each of the population groups have become a world phenomenon and must be studied as such.

The approach of the historian to ethnic groups is necessarily different from that of other disciplines, for it incorporates them all. The primary difference lies in the factor of time. The historian is concerned with process, with change, with persistent indeterminacy, and with the necessity of continual rewriting. There can be no fixed model for any society or group. Experience with historical data has taught the historian to be eternally vigilant and skeptical. Experience has also taught him not to exclude anything, nor to overlook any possible explanation. As new sciences, such as psychoanalysis, have come forward, the historian has had to find out what the new fields have to offer. It is with these cautions as to the historian's method that I venture to make some observations on the study of ethnic groups.

The historian's experience in the study of ethnic groups in the United States leads him to skepticism as to the permanence of group identities. He finds pluralistic nationalism a questionable concept while observing at the same time that cultural pluralism has been a universal phenomenon which has been a positive rather than a negative factor in the development of any people. He finds sociological models interesting but unconvincing, as for example "the European peasant" or another writer's

"primordial ties of the peasant commune," in characterizing permanent qualities of any group. Historical investigations have not supported such models.

For over three centuries America was virtually an open society. Anyone could come or be brought. The only requirement was acceptance of English common law which, after 1776, modified by state and Federal constitutional practice, became American common law. There has been a good deal of continuity of legal practice from the colonial period to the present. This was true of the reception of new citizens. Naturalization was about as easy as could be found anywhere in the world. As population spread, broached the Appalachian barriers, flooded out over the Old Northwest, the Old Southwest and South, the Middle West, the Pacific Northwest, the Pacific Coast, and finally the mountains and the Great Plains, the immigrants became amalgamated with the native-born in a vast army of occupation. The movement was like an enormous flood, with heavy flows here, trickles there, mountain barriers and headlands turning directions and containing settlement. Lands, jobs in the new factories, mercantile enterprises, professional services, transportation, growth of cities–in these and countless other occupations the immigrants took as great a part as did the native-born. In fact, a great many of the native-born were second or later generation immigrant stocks. Which brings me to a major interpretation: that immigrants, after a brief interval of adjustment on arrival, became part of the American population and should be called migrants along with the other peoples already here. They were no longer immigrants. All the forces that operated on native-born and previous arrivals influenced the erstwhile immigrants.

To think of these people as immigrants is inaccurate. They were Americans seeking adjustment to new environments and new people…

As Frederick Jackson Turner long ago suggested, American history in this view becomes a vast, heterogeneous, incredibly complex process of inter-action and inter-mixing of varieties of national and racial groups, these in turn being moulded by the physical and geographic conditions of any particular area of settlement and life. The dynamics of this vast process were primarily economic: lands, jobs, law, management, privilege. It was a market economy, governed by the rules of the market. Many profited; many were exploited; many could not adjust to the increasingly rapid technological and social changes.

To these circumstances must be added a further consideration: most of the immigrants to America did not come with any strong notions as to nationality. There was little ethnic self-consciousness except in localities. Much of the nationalism of ethnic groups was an American development. Most of these people were villagers, with attachment to a village or district. They were not Norwegians but Bergenser; not Germans but Wurtemberger; not Irish but from County Cork; not Italians but Neapolitans. Nineteenth century nationalist movements in Europe were of the middle and upper classes; they did not much affect the farming classes. When this is realized, the basis for ethnic grouping becomes even more unreliable. One gets down to small district loyalties, local dialects, and narrow horizons.

The one thing that attracted people together was similarity of language. Even though the local dialect might be different from

others to the point of almost sounding like a foreign language, if the roots of the language were the same the people from one district of the homeland could communicate with those from another district. Gradually the terminology became generalized into major ethnic language groupings. The immigrant found that he was an Italian or a Pole or a Swede. Newspapers in the homeland literary language came out and had the effect of homogenizing the local languages. The church sermons, the parochial school instruction, the language used in the stores and the coffee shops–all tended to have a unifying effect. Soon came the burial societies, the fraternal societies, the singing groups, the athletic societies, the insurance organizations and ultimately the political clubs. Eventually, homeland political movements sought funds from relatives and acquaintances in America, and the sense of loyalty to a nationality became solidified. A new sense of ethnic pride arose, not unlike the chauvinistic nationalisms plaguing Europe, and antagonisms toward other ethnic groups developed as each became involved in whatever was the current quarrel abroad. American ethnicity was in many respects quite an artificial creation.

Still another factor created these ethnic loyalties and sense of being different from other Americans. There was a long interval between colonial immigration and the huge influx of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Between 1775 and 1840, the number of immigrants was relatively small. Several generations of "old stock" Americans intervene between the colonial and later immigrations. By the time of the mass immigration of Irish, Germans, Scandinavians, and the later Slavs, Italians, Jews, Poles and others, there had developed a certain degree of self-

conscious "Americanism," expressed in the first crop of histories of the United States, new geographies, newly formulated ideals by Jefferson, Emerson, and Whitman, and a new sense of nationalism expressed by Jackson and Webster. The great ideals of the age of enlightenment were being brought into reality by a new American people. De Tocqueville expressed it in his panegyric to the *American Democracy*. The old stock Americans were mainly white, Protestant, northern European, and devoted to the English common law. They conceived of America as an inherited land and of themselves as a chosen people. When new people came it was expected that they would learn from old stockers and would gradually conform to the model established by the founding fathers.

When in fact the first large immigration in the nineteenth century consisted of poverty-stricken, Catholic Irish, followed by masses of Germans, half of whom were Catholic, old stockers became alarmed, and the nativist "Know Nothing" movement of the 1850's came
briefly to mar the welcome accorded the newcomers. Later in the century, when large numbers of Italians, Jews, and other eastern Europeans came with seemingly alien creeds, the American Protective Association, and in 1894 the Immigration Restriction League, sought to shut the doors against them. It was feared that America was being engulfed by dangerous and inferior peoples. A new racism developed which glorified the Nordic peoples and regarded the peoples of the Mediterranean and of central and eastern Europe as inferior.

Alongside all of this old stockism was the old problem of the

blacks. In a spate of idealistic reform, the old stockers of the North had helped to free the blacks of the South, but the coming of countless numbers of strange immigrants caused the New Englanders and others to re-examine their attitude toward the blacks as well. When white supremacy was restored to the South by 1877, these old stock reformers acquiesced in a new set of institutions that kept the blacks in a subordinate condition until the mid-twentieth century. In fact some of the nineteenth century immigrants joined the older stockers in these attitudes. Nativism has been a major factor in creating ethnic self-consciousness. Only gradually have these prejudices shown signs of wearing away.

Some of the ethnic groups were gradually eroded by amalgamation into the mainstreams of American life and thought of themselves primarily as Americans with only small regard to any ethnic heritage. In fact, large numbers of persons had such a mixed heritage that it would take a skilled genealogist to disentangle the strains. Other groups, with different reasons for each group, continued to feel themselves excluded from full equality and opportunity: the blacks, the Chinese; the Japanese; Mexicans; American Indians; and certain of the white ethnic elements of the population. In reality, it would be only a matter of time before these would follow the paths of earlier groups to full integration in the American population. If they were not to do so, we could become another Austria-Hungary. The main motifs of American idealism have, however, been against such a development.

It is at this point that your historian should point out some of the

dangers as well as the acceptable features of ethnicity. First the positive aspects.

The coming of millions of Europeans, Latin-Americans, Asiatics and Africans to America brought a tremendously rich variety of cultures and customs. To list all the nationalities, localities, districts, provinces, cities, towns, villages, sects, races and linguistic varieties would take all day. It is a kaleidescopic scene that one observes as one studies the vast folk migrations. There was nothing like it before in the world's history. At least 50,000,000 came in the century after 1815, and this does not count the huge importation of slaves and the white immigration of the colonial period. It is not surprising that early-comers felt as though they were being engulfed. But the country was so huge, its resources so enormous, and its potentialities so great that there seemed to be room for all. America was a vast undeveloped area. To millions it was the Biblical New Canaan. To investors it was a bonanza land. To land-starved farmers it was the end of the rainbow. To hundreds of thousands its wages surpassed imagination, even though the wages might really be low. To frustrated heads of families it meant a future after all for the children. To religiously persecuted–the Mormons, the Jews and others–America was the new Zion. To political refugees here was a new experimental laboratory. To the established classes of Europe, America was a dangerous threat, and they favored a Southern victory in the American Civil War. For America embodied all the ideals that had been expressed in the Renaissance and the Reformation, the Age of the Enlightenment and the Romantic era. That many did not find America the land

of their dreams was inevitable. The fact that millions did find a new life in America seemed more impressive.

It must be kept in mind that for thousands of these people, the coming to America was not their first move. They had tried other "greener pastures." Thousands of Irish annually crossed the Irish Sea to work in Great Britain; other thousands of Poles annually worked on the Junker estates of eastern Germany; thousands of Southern Italians migrated annually to harvest fields in France and Spain or to the industrial cities of the Rhineland. The assertion of one historian that the immigrants mainly came from the peasant heart of Europe without previous movement does not hold up well under scholarly examination. Large numbers had never been peasants. Large numbers had moved once or several times. The real fact is that a comparison of conditions at home with the opportunities believed to be found in America, despite the dangers of the voyage, made the decision to emigrate almost compulsory. Had they found a destination of equal promise closer to home, they would undoubtedly have gone there. In fact, as many moved into the cities of Europe as emigrated. It was not American liberty that these people wanted but economic opportunity. It was in most cases not religious freedom they sought, but a place to follow their particular beliefs. It was not to set up a new society that they came, but to preserve the old. A good deal of present-day ethnicity derives from this conservatism.

But to stay with the positive aspects, when these millions arrived in America, their first stop was rarely their last. Even the pauperized Irish, after a few years, joined in the restless

movement of the American people in search of new opportunities. Mobility has been a prime characteristic of the American population, and the immigrants joined older stock Americans in moving to new frontiers and new cities. New lands, new railroads, new mining areas, new industrial centers–these were the lodestones. Despite the grossest kind of exploitation in many instances, there was the opportunity to move: and move they did. Only slowly did they settle into more or less permanent communities. Some congregated with people of their own language but a great many scattered and became unidentifiable as belonging to any ethnic group. The cultural heritage usually lasted through the first and second generations, but began to lose ground in the third generations and after. The key to the survival lay in the preservation of the language. As long as a new supply of immigrants came into any ethnic community, the language tended to be preserved longer. There are numerous examples of this in Cleveland. Where no newcomers reinforced its use, the language tended to die. This is characteristic of the Scandinavian communities of the upper middle west. The major factors in the loss of language were the public schools and the requirements of doing business. The younger generation found the old language embarrassing and irksome. Their schoolmates ridiculed them as foreigners. By the fourth generation, much of the use of the foreign language in a great many ethnic groups had disappeared. This was of course a great tragedy, for the rich literature of each culture was thereby shut off to the newer generation. They were culturally deprived. With the decline of the use of the language came the gradual death of the foreign language newspapers of the United States. Where once there were hundreds, with dozens for each

group, there are now only a handful. Gradually also the churches dropped use of the foreign language as the older generation died and the younger generation could not understand. However, the death of the language took a long time, and during that time a rich immigrant-American or ethnic-American literature came into being: newspapers, periodicals, novels, dramas, poetry, songs. Such great epics as O.E. Rolvaag's *Giants in the Earth* came out of the use of a foreign language in a new land. Each ethnic group has its library of publications as a treasure house of cultural enrichment.

To this literary treasure must of course be added the incredibly varied folk art: painting, sculpture, architecture, dress design, and food preparation. One need only go to any ethnic group museum today to find ample documentation for the generalization that the immigrants enriched America culturally. On national or church festival days these inherited folk arts are brought forth, and we are privileged to revel in the rich colors and imaginative designs.

The immigrants brought even more substantive assets, chief of which were new technologies: in mining (especially the Cornish), in engineering (the Germans, Scandinavians, Italians), in the needle trades (the English and Jewish), and an almost infinite variety of agricultural skills. There were few technical schools in America until late in the nineteenth century. It was in many cases graduates of European technical high schools who supplied the skilled knowledge for the new American industrial system.

One hesitates to fall into the "contributions" error in dealing

with ethnic groups, for that would involve an almost endless list of items and persons and would really only prove that all immigrants were worthwhile to remind ourselves that these millions of people were not all the same, that they brought distinctive customs and cultures, that they varied greatly in political, economic and religious heritage, and that many of them, like all peoples, were perhaps not the best of citizens. They were people who wanted to improve their condition.

There are, however, negative aspects of ethnicity, and one must draw attention to them even though they are highly controversial. The principal negative features of ethnicity come under the headings of economic, political, religious, chauvinism, romanticism, and the emigre syndrome. Under economic there is the primary problem of exclusive housing communities. Anyone familiar with racial problems in the United States knows that ethnic areas have been centers of resistance to racial balance in housing. It is equally well known that ethnic groups are organized to exert political pressure and legal obstruction to prevent low cost housing from being constructed. Exclusion of blacks from labor unions is another example. This is not to say that ethnic groups are the ones guilty of these practices, but they have been rather conspicuous.

The national political parties have for a long time had nationality committees, set up to appeal for votes to ethnic groups by appealing to their interests and prejudices. In addition, ethnic groups have been organized, especially in some cities, to have a great deal of power at the polls. I have in mind such situations as the Irish in Boston, the Italians and Jews in New York, the Poles

in Milwaukee, and others. When ethnic groups lend themselves to this kind of activity, they tend to fractionize American society and to give an artificial longevity to any ethnic group involved. Participation in American democratic processes is greatly to be encouraged, but not for the purpose of perpetuating ethnic differences. Rather than such activities it would better behoove the ethnic groups to get together with others to seek means of cooperation in solving America's social problems.

It is notorious in this Judeo-Christian nation that the churches have been centers of segregation. This has been true not only of the white churches but also in reverse of the black. It is a matter of record that churches with strong ethnic concentrations have been racially exclusive. It seems that it is all right for an Oriental to be admitted, perhaps because of the missionary traditions, but not for a black or a West Indian. On a recent television panel there appeared three black clergymen to discuss racism in the churches: a Presbyterian, a Roman Catholic, and a black Jew. All testified that they would be unwelcome in most white churches. The churches must search their own consciences, but ethnic groups need to be especially vigilant to avoid this type of discrimination, for they themselves can suffer the same treatment.

A common complaint against ethnic groups comes under the heading of chauvinism. This means excessive pride in one's nationality, a sense of superiority over other groups, and a tendency to belligerent assertion of group privileges and so-called rights. Manifestations are to be found in the group literature, the group programs, in lack of cooperation with

others, and continuous self-admiration. Arrogance and uncritical adherence to the group values and purposes seem to characterize chauvinism.

Under the heading of romanticism one may place those who seek to make permanent, and even separate their group identities. Some black organizations have advocated separation of the black community and the formation of a black state. There have been white ethnic groups that have sought a separatist nirvana. Such unrealistic romanticism is not only self-defeating but it gets no one anywhere. We live in a shrinking world and an increasingly associative society. Separatism is obsolete and unworkable.

The last negative aspect I will mention is not a new phenomenon. It occurred strikingly among German-Americans with the arrival of the Forty-Eighters. This is the assumption of leadership in ethnic groups of recent intellectual emigres. By recent I mean since World War II. These probably well-intentioned individuals seem to wish to revive in ethnic-Americans loyalty to old-country values and aspirations. They fail to realize that there is a large generation gap–sometimes several generations–between themselves and the members of the groups to which they appeal and for which they presume to speak. It is perhaps difficult for them to understand the degree to which members of ethnic groups have shifted toward American values and practices.

Enough has been said to illustrate the dangers inherent in any set of attitudes that will cause a group to set itself apart from others…We are proud of our particular ancestry and are happy

to be associated with so many different ancestries. We are not a melting pot, nor are we really a national-pluralistic society, and certainly not a multi-national nation. We are a people of a great many and very mixed strains. We all subscribe to certain basic American beliefs: that each individual has the right to fulfillment to the limit of his or her abilities; that each person has the constitutional right to full civil liberties; that each of us under our constitution is entitled to the full protection of the laws, regardless of condition; and that we are each of us living in an experimental democracy which has not yet reached the ideals of the Declaration of Independence. In such a society, beset as we are with countless economic, political , and social problems, it would seem to me important to stress essential questions involving the dignity and brotherhood of man, and those elements of our society which are constructive, to those things which are good and beautiful, and to eschew those things which promote suspicion or a sense of superiority or a sense of being alien.

In my many years of study of ethnic groups, I have found them to be fascinating varieties of human experience and a very important part of our history. I would like them to continue to be the part of our history. I would like them to continue to be the vital and constructive elements of American life that they have been, for the most part, during their existence in the United States.

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European Americans: From Immigrants to Ethnics

RUDOLPH VECOLI

Ethnicity has exercised a persistent and pervasive influence upon American history. Americans have traditionally defined themselves and others as members of ethnocultural groups. On the basis of their origins, national, racial, religious and regional, they have shared with "their own kind" a sense of a common heritage and collective destiny. Ethnic cultures have sustained patterns of values, attitudes, and behaviors which have differentiated various segments of the population. The resulting ethnic pluralism has profoundly affected all aspects of American

life. Religion, politics, social mobility, even the conduct of foreign affairs, have reflected this extraordinary diversity of ethnic identities.

A series of migrations, internal as well as external, brought together peoples of various cultural, linguistic, racial and religious backgrounds. The peopling of this continent by transoceanic migration has gone on for over four hundred years. The original inhabitants, the true native Americans, were gradually displaced and dispossessed by successive waves of immigrants. They came from allover the world, Africans by the millions, brought to this land in chains, Asiatics by the hundreds of thousands, and others from countries to the north and south and from the islands of the Caribbean. But the vast majority came from Europe. In the greatest population movement in human history, some thirty-five million Europeans immigrated to the United States in the century after 1830. This fact determined the basic character of American society; it was to be predominantly Caucasian, Christian and Western.

The study of immigration history involves not only the processes of physical migration, but the long-range consequences of this mingling of peoples as well. Despite its importance, the European immigration has been relatively neglected by American historians until recent decades. The reason appears to have been the general acceptance of an assimilationist ideology by scholar and laymen alike. The "Melting Pot," it was assumed, would transform the foreigners into indistinguishable Americans in a generation or two at most. Bemused by the alleged uniqueness of the American character and institutions, historians

turned to environmental explanations. The frontier, material abundance, or mobility, rather than Old World influences, determined the values and behavior of the American people. In this light, immigration appeared to be an ephemeral episode.[1]

These assimilationist assumptions have been called into question by the "rediscovery of ethnicity" in recent years. White ethnic groups, as well as blacks, Indians and Hispanic Americans, have demonstrated an unanticipated longevity. This "New Pluralism" has inspired historians and others to explore the ethnic dimension of American life in the past as well as the present. As a consequence we are in the midst of a renaissance of immigration history. A rich and growing literature awaits the student of European American ethnic groups, one which is enlivened by divergent interpretations and differing methodologies.

We Stand on Their Shoulders

The writing of immigration history was initiated by a handful of scholars a half century ago when the field was less fashionable than it is today. Their thorough and scrupulous scholarship rescued the subject from the partisan concerns of the advocates of immigration restriction and the filiopietists.[2] The major works

1. For a fuller exposition of this argument see Rudolph J. Vecoli, "Ethnicity: A Neglected Dimension of American History," in Herbert J. Bass, ed., *The State of American History* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970), 70-88, and Moses Rischin, "Beyond the Great Divide: Immigration and the Last Frontier," *Journal of American History*, 55 (June, 1968). 42-53.
2. An excellent account of the early period of immigration historiography is Edward N. Saveth, *American Historians and European Immigrants, 1875-1925* (New York; Columbia University Press, 1948).

of these historians remain essential reading for the serious student of the European immigration.

Among these pioneers, Marcus Lee Hansen advanced the most comprehensive interpretation of the Atlantic migration considered as a whole.[3] Viewing emigration as a basic force in European history, Hansen emphasized the underlying demographic, economic, and social causes which transcended political boundaries. Although sensitive to the "pull" of European conditions as of equal importance. Hansen also traced the transatlantic routes of commerce which provided ready-made paths for the westward bound emigrants.

In his volume of essays, *The Immigrant in American History*,[4] Hansen integrated the story of immigration with certain major themes, such as the westward movement, political democracy and Puritanism. Viewing the immigrants as "carriers of culture," he focused on the interaction between their heritage and the American environment. Rather than a threat to American democracy, Hansen thought the immigrants had exercised a basically conservative and stabilizing influence. Stressing their receptivity to American values, he declared that, "they were Americans before they landed." Reflecting his own rural origins as well as the influence of his mentor, Frederick Jackson Turner, Hansen's writings dealt with the Midwestern agrarian rather than the Eastern urban phase of the immigrant experience.[5]

3. *The Atlantic Migration, 1607-1860, A History of the Continuing Settlement of the United States* (edited with a foreword by Arthur M. Schlesinger) (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940).
4. (edited with a foreword by Arthur M. Schlesinger) (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940).
5. On the influences which shaped Hansen's view of American history see

Hansen's perspective was shared by his contemporaries who contributed solid studies dealing with specific immigrant groups. Theodore C. Blegen wrote extensively on the Norwegians, his major work being a two volume history which vividly depicts the Old World conditions as well as American experience of the immigrants.[6] Blegen was particularly skillful in locating and exploiting "America letters," emigrant ballads, and other documents in reconstructing the everyday lives of common folk. His colleague, George M. Stephenson, wrote with equal mastery of the Swedish immigration. *The Religious Aspects of the Swedish Immigrations*,[7] is a cultural and social as well as institutional history of the Swedish American churches. In 1926, Stephenson published the first general history of American immigration,[8] one which dealt with the role of the immigrant in the political development of the United States. Meanwhile Carl Wittke established himself as the historian of the German Americans; among his studies, those of the "Forty-eighters" and the German language press in America are particularly noteworthy.[9] Wittke was also the author of a survey

Allan H. Spear, "Marcus Lee Hansen and the Historiography of Immigration," *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, 44 (Summer, 1961), 258-268.

6. Norwegian Migration to America, Vol. I, 1825-1860; Vol. II. *The American Transition* (Northfield. Minn: Norwegian-American Historical Association, 1931-1940).

7. *The Religious Aspects of Swedish Immigrations; a Study of Immigrant Churches* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1932).

8. *A History of American Immigration, 1820-1924* (Boston: Ginn, 1926).

9. *Refugees of Revolution, The German Forty-Eighters in America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1952); *The German Language Press in America (*Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1957).

of immigration history, *We Who Built America*.[10] Viewing the central motif of American history as "the impact of successive immigrant tides upon a New World environment," Wittke's history was a descriptive rather than interpretive account of the various nationalities comprising these tides. In the tradition of Turner, these historians like Hansen conceived of immigration as the interaction between European culture and American geography.

Oscar Handlin, *Boston's Immigrants* (1941) marked a new departure in immigration history.[11] Handlin's theme was one of acculturation, the mutual impact of Irish Catholics and Yankee Protestants in a seaboard city. Through adaptation to the stern conditions of urban life, the Irish created their own ethnic community. Unable and unwilling to assimilate the Irish, Boston became a divided city. Wedding immigration history and urban history, *Boston's Immigrants* served as a model for the coming generation of historians. Robert Ernst's study of immigrant groups in New York City was another early example of this new genre of ethnic history.[12] Ernst skillfully delineated the interplay of the various nationalities in the culture, politics, economy and other aspects of urban life.

10. *We Who Built America: the Saga of the Immigrant* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1939).
11. *Boston's Immigrants: a Study in Acculturation,* Vol. 50, Harvard Historical Studies (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941; rev. and enlarged ed., New York: Atheneum, 1970).
12. *Immigrant Life in New York City, 1825-1863* (New York: King's Crown Press, 1949). An early essay calling for this approach to ethnic history is Caroline F. Ware, "Cultural Groups in the United States," in Ware, ed., *The Cultural Approach to History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940).

Handlin has written prolifically on the subject of immigration and ethnicity. His major work, *The Uprooted,* depicts the effects of migration upon the immigrants themselves.[13] "The history of immigration," he observed, "is a history of alienation and its consequences." Torn from a traditional peasant community, Handlin's immigrant became an estranged individual without meaningful ties to his fellow men. In dramatic prose, Handlin tells of the breakup of European rural society, the flight from disaster, the horrors of the voyage, and the anxieties of life in a strange land. Though the newcomer seeks to regain his lost community by creating ethnic institutions, he fails to escape from his alienated condition. This grim interpretation of the immigrant experience has had a profound influence, but the question has been raised whether Handlin's immigrant was indeed typical of the many different groups represented in the European immigration.[14]

In subsequent writings, Handlin portrayed American society as a mosaic of competing ethnic and racial groups.[15] Despite the resulting prejudice and conflict, Handlin judged pluralism to be a positive value. By providing a focus for personal identity as well as a vehicle for collective activity, ethnic groups served as a bulwark of liberty against the centralizing and dehumanizing tendencies of modern technocratic society.

13. *The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migrations that Made the American People* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1951).
14. Rudolph J. Vecoli, "Contadini in Chicago; A Critique of The Uprooted," *Journal of American History*, 51 (December, 1964), 404-417.
15. *The American People in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954); "Historical Perspectives on the American Ethnic Group," *Ethnic Groups in American Life, Daedalus* (Spring, 1961), 220-232.

New General Interpretations

Traditionally Americans viewed immigration as a single-minded flight from the "Old World" to the "Land of Opportunity." Hansen first noted that the immigration to the United States was to be understood as much in terms of European conditions and that it was a part of a much more complex population movement. These insights have been further developed in the writings of Brinley Thomas and Frank Thistlethwaite. In his *Migration and Economic Growth*, Thomas offered a more sophisticated interpretation of the dynamics of nineteenth century European migration.[16] Rather than being a simple reflex to the American business cycle, he analyzed the flow of labor and capital within the Atlantic economy in response to business fluctuations on both sides of the ocean. Thomas also stressed the push factor of the "Malthusian Devil," the frontier of surplus population which moved from west to east across Europe in the nineteenth century. Rather than being pulled by American opportunity, huge fragments of the European population were expelled by societies which could not absorb their labor. As the European countries industrialized, internal migrations became alternatives to overseas movements. Thomas also noted the changing character of emigration in response to altered technological and labor conditions in the United States.

In a seminal paper, Thistlethwaite declared that the European migrations must be understood in terms of the transformation

16. *Migration and Economic Growth; a Study of Great Britain and the Atlantic Economy,* National Institute of Economic and Social Research, Economic and Social Studies XII (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1954).

of European society in the nineteenth century.[17] The impact of the demographic and industrial revolutions dislodged vast numbers of people from their ancestral homes and sent them wandering over the face of the earth. Thistlethwaite elaborated upon the complex patterns of movement within Europe and between Europe and other continents. While the majority of overseas migrants did come to the United States, Argentina, Brazil and Canada were also receiving heavy immigrations. The high incidence of repatriation, perhaps a third of all immigrants to the United States, was another aspect of the migratory pattern commented upon by Thistlethwaite. Rather than viewing the immigrants as an anonymous, nondescript mass, Thistlethwaite called for the study of the specific characteristics and peculiar migratory patterns of particular occupational and village groupings.

The realization that the United States was not unique as a host society has stimulated interest in the comparative study of immigration history. Louis Harfz, *The Founding of New Societies* is a pioneering work in this field.[18] Its thesis is that the character of the "new societies" created by European migrations was determined by the stage of historical development of the mother country at the time of mass exodus. These "fragments" removed from the stream of European history thus retained and

17. "Migration from Europe Overseas in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," XIe Congrès International des Sciences Historiques, Stockholm 1960, *Rapports*, *V: Histoire Contemporaine* (Göteborg-Stockholm- Uppsala: Almquist & Wiksell, 1960), 32-60. Reprinted in Herbert Moller, ed., *Population Movements in Modern European History* (New York: Macmillan, 1964), 73-92.
18. *The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada, and Australia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964).

reinforced their original ideological cast. In a series of essays, the thesis is applied to the United States, French Canada, South Africa, Australia and Brazil.

The Hartz thesis is utilized by John Higham in his provocative essay which places immigration history in a comparative setting.[19] Rather than being immigrants, the original colonists, Higham contends, constituted a "charter group" which set the initial character of the society and the terms upon which later arrivals were admitted. To this dominant core culture newcomers have been progressively assimilated. Higham contrasts the limited impact of the immigration upon American society as compared with Argentina or Brazil. One factor, he suggests, accounting for this difference was the tremendous variety among the immigrants to the United States while the immigration to Latin America was concentrated in a few nationalities. Thus the cultural diversity of American ethnic groups diluted their impact and hastened their assimilation. With Nathan Glazer, Higham views the mass immigration as disruptive of the established American culture and contributing to the emergence of a mass culture.[20]

Several general histories of American immigration which incorporate the more recent findings have appeared since 1960. Maldwyn Allen Jones in an admirably concise and literate volume surveyed this "greatest folk-migration in human

19. "Immigration," in Comer Vann Woodward, ed., *The Comparative Approach to American History* (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 91-105.
20. Nathan Glazer, "The Immigrant Groups and American Culture," *Yale Review*, 48 (March, 1959), 382-397.

history."[21] Acknowledging his debt to Hansen, Handlin, Higham, and others, Jones sought "to tell briefly the story of American immigration from the planting of Virginia to the present." Rejecting traditional distinctions between "colonists" and "immigrants" and "old immigrants" and "New immigrants", Jones, while mindful of the changes taking place in both those who came and in the country which received them, stressed the fundamental sameness of the immigrant and his experience. "As a social process," Jones concluded, "immigration has shown little variation throughout American history."

A more recent work by Philip Taylor focuses more narrowly upon the century of mass emigration, 1830-1930.[22] Its point-of-view is primarily that from the European side of the Atlantic. Though acknowledging "the attracting force of America's economic opportunities and of its free institutions," the volume describes in detail the disruptive forces at work in Europe which stimulated the impulse to emigrate. Though drawing upon the work of others, Taylor brings to bear much fresh material in his discussion of the emigration business and its regulation, the conditions of the journey, and the recruitment of emigrants. Briefer discussion is reserved for the working and living conditions of the immigrants in America, nativism and immigration legislation, and the evolution of ethnic communities. The merit of this volume lies not so much in new interpretations as in the richness of its factual rendering of the subject.

21. *American Inmigration,* The Chicago History of American Civilization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).
22. *The Distant Magnet, European Emigration to the U.S.A.* (New York: Harper & Row, 971).

Immigration and ethnicity are major themes in Rowland Berthoff's interpretive social history, *An Unsettled People*.[23] Berthoff projects a cycle of historical development, "From adequate order through a period of excessive disorder and back again toward some satisfactory order," as the paradigm of American history. In this scheme, the massive influx of foreigners joined with intense internal mobility contributed to the general social disorder of nineteenth century America. In a search for community, new social groups were formed, mainly along ethnic lines. Thus ethnic consciousness became a source of identification of self and others, one which was expressed in institutional patterns such as jobs and housing. Reform, including efforts to exclude or Americanize the immigrants, represents for Berthoff an attempt to bring social order out of chaos.

European Backgrounds and Reactions

Since Hansen's general discussion in *The Atlantic Migration,* the European backgrounds of the emigration have been the subject of a number of specialized studies. Wilbur Shepperson, *British Emigration to North America* deals with a variety of colonization projects in the Victorian era.[24] He traces the issue of emigration as it is debated in the press and in state councils, among humanitarians and trade unionists. Was it a panacea or a pandora? Shepperson's account of various ill-fated schemes

23. *An Unsettled People: Social Order and Disorder in American History* (New York: Harper &Row, 1971). See also Berthoff's article "The American Social Order: A Conservative Hypothesis," *American Historical Review*, 65 (April, 1960), 495-514.
24. *British Emigration to North America: Projects and Opinions in the Early Victorian Period* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957).

suggests that for many it was a pandora. In a perceptive essay, Charlotte Erickson analyzes the agrarian myth which lured English emigrants, fleeing from the disruptive effects of the industrial revolution, to the American "Garden of the World."[25] Cecil Woodham-Smith has written a vivid account of the Irish potato famine and of the mass exodus it triggered.[26] The impact upon Irish society and culture of the American emigration is the subject of a monogrpah by Arnold Schrier.[27] The official and press reaction to the population drain, its effects on Irish agriculture, and the cultural-folkloristic reaction (including the development of the "American wake") to the mass exodus are recounted. The "constructive opposition" to the Swedish emigration has been described by Franklin Scott.[28]

Mack Walker has authored a thorough study of the German emigration of the nineteenth century.[29] Rather than being of one piece the Auswanderung affected the various regions of Germany at different times. Walker analyzes the interplay of population growth, land tenure, technical innovations, and state policy in determining the rates and directions of the outward

25. "Agrarian Myths of English Immigrants," in O. Fritiof Ander, ed., *In the Trek of the Inmigrants,* Augustana Library Publications No. 31 (Rock Island, Ill.: Augustana College Library, 1964), 59-80.
26. *The Great Hunger, Ireland 1845-1849* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962). See also Oliver MacDonagh, "Irish Emigration to the United States of America and the British Colonies during the Famine," in Robert Dudley Edwards and T. Desmond Williams, eds., *The Great Famine: Studies in Irish History, 1845-1852* (Dublin: Irish Conmittee of Historical Sciences, Browne and Nolan, 1956).
27. *Ireland and the American Emigration, 1850-1900* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958).
28. "Sweden's Constructive Opposition to Emigration," *Journal of Modern History*, 37 (Sept., 1965), 307-335.
29. *Germany and the Emigration* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).

movement. John S. MacDonald has argued that the differential rates of emigration among the various regions of Italy are related to the various patterns of land ownership and to the resulting ethos of the peasantry.[30] In areas where landownership was widely distributed and an individualistic outlook prevailed, emigration rates were highest; while in those areas characterized by large estates and collective forms of action on the part of agricultural laborers, emigration rates were lowest. Depending on the character of the rural social structure then, militant working-class organization and migration were alternative responses of the cultivators to poverty.

Historians have also been interested in the American influences which filtered back to the homeland through the emigration process. In their article on "The Immigrant and the American Image in Europe, 1860-1914," Merle Curti and Kendall Burr emphasized the role of emigration promotional literature, as well as "America letters," as media through which information and misinformation regarding the United States reached the common folk.[31] Ingrid Semmingsen explored similar influences at work, particularly in Norway, finding that the "America letters" and the returned emigrants were often the agents of change, introducing new ideas regarding agricultural methods, politics and social relationships.[32] However, she observed that, as in

30. "Agricultural Organization, Migration and Labour Militancy in Rural Italy," *Economic History Review*, 16 (August, 1963); "Italy's Social Structure and Emigration," *Occidente*, 12 (Sept.-Oct., 1956), 437-456.
31. *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 37 (Sept., 1950), 203-230.
32. "Emigration and the Image of America in Europe," in Henry Steele Commager, ed., *Immigration and American History: Essays in Honor of Theodore C. Blegen* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1961), 26-54.

the case of the Irish, the conservative milieu in some countries was not receptive to impulses from America. Shrier's study confirmed that the "returned Yank" had little impact upon Ireland; American money, he concluded, was more important than the repatriate in effecting changes in Irish society.[33]

Since perhaps as many as a third of the immigrants returned to their homelands, the phenomenon of repatriation is important in evaluating the significance of the transatlantic migration for both the United States and Europe. Theodore Saloutos was a trailbreaker in this field with his study of returned Greek-Americans.[34] Primarily through interviews, Saloutos studied a group of repatriates, analyzing their motives and attitudes, their readjustment and status in the Old Country. While many were well-to-do, he found an ambivalence in their feelings toward both Greece and America, as well as a generally negative attitude toward the repatriates on the part of other Greeks. Saloutos has also written a useful summary article on the repatriation in the twentieth century.[35] In a volume suggestively entitled *Emigration and Disenchantment*, Shepperson sketched the portraits of some seventy-five English returnees.[36] While he found great diversity among them, his general conclusion was that those Britons who had migrated to escape change were disillusioned by their failure to find stability in America. Another study by Shepperson deals with the return of British

33. *Ireland and the American Emigration.*
34. *They Remember America; the Story of the Repatriated Greek-Americans* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1956).
35. "Exodus U.S.A." in Ander, *In the Trek of the Immigrants*, 197-218.
36. *Emigration and Disenchantment: Portraits of Englishmen Repatriated from the United States* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1965).

working class immigrants.[37] The heavy return migration of the Italians has been the subject of studies by George R. Gilkey[38] and Francesco Cerase.[39] Gilkey found that the *americani* with their new ideas and dollars had a disruptive effect upon their native villages, but did not effect basic changes in the oppressive conditions of southern Italy. A similar conclusion was arrived at by Cerase: "Their reabsorption into the life of the community has had no consequence of innovation on the economic or political patterns of behavior in the community itself." Other studies of repatriation are needed to fill out this dimension of the history of the Atlantic migration.

The Making of Americans

The making of Americans has been a basic theme in the writing of American immigration history. What was to be the significance of this "foreign invasion" for the emerging American nationality? Was America a "Melting Pot" in which all diverse elements would be fused into a new human type or was it a mosaic composed of distinct ethnic groups? These issues have long been debated, and the echoes of these debates resound in the writings of historians and social scientists. The ideologies are themselves a part of the history of immigration, since they shaped attitudes and public policies. Philip Gleason's article, "The Melting Pot: Symbol of Fusion or Confusion?",

37. "British Backtrailers: Working-Class Immigrants Return," in Ander, *In the Trek of the Immigrants*, 179-196.
38. "The United States and Italy: Migration and Repatriation," *Journal of Developing Areas*, 2 (Oct., 1967), 23-36.
39. "Nostalgia or Disenchantment: Considerations on Return Migration," in Silvano M. Tomasi and Madeline H. Engel, eds., *The Italian Experience in the United States* (Staten Island, N. Y.: Center for Migration Studies, 1970), 217-238.

traced the changing content, use and meaning of this metaphor.[40] In his work, *Assimilation in American Life*, Milton Gordon summarized three contending ideologies of ethnic group relations; Anglo-Conformity; the Melting Pot; and Cultural Pluralism.[41] Gordon then offered his own theory of assimilation, one which envisioned the persistence of structural pluralism, in terms of inter-personal relations, along with a pervasive cultural assimilation in terms of language, manners, values, etc. Seeking to explain the "religious revival" of the 1950's, Will Herberg proposed the concept of the "triple Melting Pot" as an explanatory hypothesis.[42] While rejecting ethnic definitions, the grandchildren of the immigrants were manifesting the phenomenon of "third generation return" by affirming their identities as Protestants, Catholics, or Jews.

Other writers impressed by the persistence of ethnic groups have offered theories to explain the continuing pluralistic character of America. In their influential work, *Beyond the Melting Pot*, Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan declared: "The point about the melting pot is that it did not happen."[43] Based on an analysis of five ethnic groups in New York City, the authors found that ethnicity pervaded all spheres of life. The explanation they suggested was that ethnic groups were not only a source

40. *American Quarterly*, 16 (Spring, 1964), 20-46. See also Marian C. McKenna, "The Melting Pot: Comparative Observations in the United States and Canada," *Sociology and Social Research*, 53 (July, 1969), 433-447.
41. *Assimilation in the American Life The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).
42. *Protestant, Catholic, Jew, and Essay in American Religious Sociology* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1955).
43. *Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians and Irish of New York City* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1963).

of individual identity, they had also become interest groups by which persons sought to defend or advance their position in society.

In his groundbreaking study, *Language Loyalty in America,* Joshua Fishman advanced the theme of cultural maintenance as a neglected aspect of ethnic history.[44] Contrary to the notion that the immigrants gladly shed their native heritage, Fishman argued that they made strenuous efforts to sustain their cultures and languages. Detailed studies of the German, French Canadian, Spanish, and Ukrainian groups document their resistance to pressures for total cultural assimilation. Despite the steady inroads of "de-ethnization", Fishman demonstrated that the immigrants' struggles to keep alive their native tongues and cultures is a vital and neglected aspect of American social history.

A contrary view has been advanced by Timothy L. Smith.[45] Rather than being victims of a coercive Americanization policy, Smith has depicted the immigrants as eagerly pursuing assimilation as a means of advancing their fortunes and those of their children. Espousing Hansen's dictum that "they were Americans before they landed," Smith contends that the newcomers shared with the natives basic values of hard work, thrift, and individual ambition. Advocating "new approaches," Smith has chosen to stress "assimilation, both cultural and

44. Fishman, *et al., Language Loyalty in the United States; The Maintenance and Perpetuation of Non-English Mother Tongues by American Ethnic and Religious Groups,* Janua Linguarum, Series Maior, 21 (The Haugue: Mouton, 1966).
45. "New Approaches to the History of Immigration in Twentieth Century America," *American Historical Review,* 71 (July, 1966), 1265-1279.

structural, rather than ethnic exclusiveness" as the key to understanding immigration history.

Nativism and Immigration Policy

While the response of native Americans to immigrants ranged from cordial to hostile, it has been xenophobia which has attracted the most attention from historians. An early and still useful work in this vein is Ray Allen Billington, *The Protestant Crusade, 1800-1860.*[46] Focusing on the intense anti-Catholic sentiment of the ante-bellum years, Billington interpreted the antipathy toward the Irish and Germans as stemming primarily from deep-seated religious prejudice. While noting ethnic rivalries over jobs and politics, the volume concentrates on the manifestations of anti-Catholicism ranging from literary slander to physical violence. A psychological interpretation has since been forwarded by David Brion Davis.[47] Viewing nativism as stemming from fear of internal subversion, Davis attributed this conspiratorial mentality to the insecurities engendered by "bewildering social change." In his analysis of anti-Catholic, anti-Mason and anti-Mormon literature, Davis found that all shared a common rhetoric and view of reality. Richard Hofstadter has found this fear of conspiracy, which he styled "the paranoid style of American politics," recurring in time of stress.[48]

46. *The Protestant Crusade, 1800-1860: A Study of the Origins of American Nativism (*New York: MacMillan, 1938).
47. "Some Themes of Counter-Subversion: An Analysis of Anti-Masonic, Anti-Catholic, and Anti-Mormon Literature," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 47 (Sept., 1960), 205-224.
48. *The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965).

The major work on nativism in post-Civil War America, John Higham, *Strangers in the Land*, also espouses a psychological interpretation.[49] Defining nativism as a form of nationalism, Higham identified three major ideologies of xenophobia: anti-Catholicism; anti-radicalism; and racialism. During periods of national well-being, nativist fears declined, but with a crisis of confidence brought on by economic depression and war, hostility toward foreigners welled up again. While the threat was viewed at various times as Popery, anarchism and racial degeneracy, all of these phobias fueled the ultimately successful drive for immigration restriction. Higham has had the rare satisfaction of being his own revisionist. Taking a second look at nativism, he pointed out that intergroup conflict could profitably be analyzed from a sociological perspective.[50] The "status rivalries" among ethnic groups in their competitive quest for power and place resulted in recurring friction and hostility. E. Digby Baltzell applied Higham's analysis in his interpretation of the emergence of a "Protestant Establishment."[51] Threatened by the rise of new groups, particularly the Jews, the American upper class responded with exclusionary practices based on ethnic and social prejudice. Baltzell describes in detail the development of an ideological defense of caste and of institutions to defend caste priveleges by the WASP aristocracy.

Nativism has also been the subject of specialized studies dealing with particular facets of the phenomenon. Barbara M. Solomon

49. *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925* (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1955).
50. "Another Look at Nativism," *Catholic Historical Review*, 44 (July, 1958), 147-158.
51. *The Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy & Caste in America* (New York: Random House, 1964).

analyzed the role of New England Brahmins in developing a rationale for immigration restriction based on an ideology of race.[52] Focusing on the history of the Immigration Restriction League, she found its roots in the anxieties caused by the changes which were undermining the New England way of life. A parallel study by Charlotte Erickson contends that the opposition of organized labor to the southern and eastern European immigration was inspired by racial prejudice rather than real economic competition.[53] In her definitive study of the contract labor controversy, Erickson demonstrates convincingly that by the 1880's few immigrants were coming to America under formal labor contracts. From the debate on the Foran Act on, race prejudice rather than practical considerations determined the views of American labor leaders on the immigration question.

The resurgence of anti-Catholicism in the 1890's and its primary manifestation, the American Protective Association, have been described by Donald L. Kinzer.[54] Fear of the Roman Catholic Church and of its alleged political ambitions caused Protestants to rally to the APA. Seeking to deprive the Church of new recruits and votes, the APA advocated immigration restriction as well as a stiffening of naturalization requirements. Robert K. Murray's *Red Scare* is a study of the post-World War I hysteria

52. *Ancestors and Immigrants. A Changing New England Tradition* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956).
53. *American Industry and the European Immigrant, 1860-1885* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).
54. *An Episode in Anti-Catholicism: The American Protective Association* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964).

regarding an anticipated radical uprising in the United States.[55]
Fears of Bolshevism fed by labor strikes and general social
unrest created a mood in which official and vigilante violence
directed against radicals and aliens was generally applauded.

In a psychological interpretation of the "Red Scare," Stanley
Coben located its sources in the insecurity caused by the social
and economic dislocations of the postwar years.[56] Seeking to
eradicate "foreign" threats to American institutions and values,
the nativists raised the standard of "One Hundred Percent
Americanism." The development and enforcement of federal
policies concerning immigrant radicals have been thoroughly
examined by William Preston, Jr.[57] His study is severely critical
of the federal government because of the frequent violations of
civil rights and injuries inflicted upon persons who were. often
innocent of any wrong.

The development of American immigration policy to the
enactment of the restrictive legislation of the 1920's can best
be followed in Highman, *Strangers in the Land*. Higham has
also written a brief summary essay on the subject.[58] The story
of American immigration policy from 1924-1952 has been told
by Robert A. Divine.[59] A dispassionate legislative history, the

55. *Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria* (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1955).)
56. "A Study in Nativism: The American Red Scare of 1919-1920," *Political
Science Quarterly*, 79 (March, 1964), 52-75.
57. *Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903-1933*
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963).
58. "American Immigration Policy in Historical Perspective," *Law and
Contemporary Problems*, 21 (Spring, 1956), 213-235.
59. *American Immigration Policy, 1924-1952*, Yale Historical Publications
Miscellany 66 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957). Useful for its
detailed summaries of legislation, even though heavily biased in favor of

study traces Congressional and executive policymaking from the enactment of the national origins statute to the passage of the McCarran Act. While recording lobbying activities and public debate on specific issues, its perspective is that of Capitol Hill and the White House.

The efforts by public and private agencies to facilitate the adjustment and assimilation of the immigrants have been little studied. Edward Hartmann, *The Movement to Americanize the Immigrant*, focuses on the governmental and voluntary programs during the period of World War 1.[60] Although inspired by the wartime zeal for national unity, not all of the attention paid to the foreign born was coercive or mean-spirited. The teaching of the English language and "American ideals" was a primary activity, but there were also sympathetic attempts to safeguard the immigrants from economic exploitation and to assist them to achieve a better life. Another perspective on the Americanization movement is provided by Gerd Korman's account of the response of industrial management to its polyglot labor force.[61] Moved by considerations of improved efficiency and productivity, enlightened industrialists introduced welfare and safety programs in their factories. To these were added during the First World War Americanization classes for the immigrant workers. Under this regime of "benevolent paternalism", as Korman describes it, a group of safety and

restriction, is Marion T. Bennett, *American Immigration Policies, A History* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1963).

60. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948).

61. *Industrialization, Immigranta, and Americanizers: The View from Milwaukee, 1866-1921* (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1967). This volume also includes much information regarding economic and social conditions of immigrant groups in Milwaukee.

welfare experts emerged as agents of social control. A recent article on the Illinois Immigrants' Protective League by Robert L. Buroker also emphasizes the role of professional social workers animated by a vision of an efficient, harmonious social order.[62]

A particular episode in the history of American immigration policy has been the subject of several books in recent years. The policy pursued by the United States with respect to Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany has been examined critically by Henry L. Feingold[63] and David S. Wyman.[64] Both studies agree that a combination of factors, bureaucratic inertia, congressional opposition, public indifference and anti-Semitism, prevented any effective response to the plight of the Jews. While critical of Franklin D. Roosevelt for not doing more, the authors recognize that the domestic political climate appears to have made any intercession by the United States impossible.

There were the fortunate few who did escape from the tyranny of Hitler and Mussolini and who found refuge in America. Among them were many of Europe's most brilliant scholars, scientists and artists. Their story is told with grace and authority by Laura Fermi, herself one of them, in *Illustrious Immigrants*.[65] The

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62. "From Voluntary Association to Welfare State: The Illinois Immigrants' Protective League, 1906-1926," *Journal of American History*, 58 (Dec., 1971), 643-660.

63. *The Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Administration and the Holocaust, 1938-1945* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1970).

64. *Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis 1938-1941* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 1968). Yet another account is Arthur D. Morse, *While Six Million Died* (New York: Random House, 1968).

65. *Illustrious Immigrants: The Intellectual Migration from Europe, 1930-41* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).

impact of this intellectual migration is the subject of *Perspectives in American History* (1968).[66] Chapters by various contributors, some of them participants in the migration, detail the extraordinary influence exerted by this band of *emigres* upon the arts and sciences in America.

Studies of Particular Ethnic Groups

By its very nature, immigration history lends itself to studies of particular ethnic groups. The "America fever" struck the various countries of Europe at different times; the arriving immigrants sharing a common language, culture, and sometimes religion formed ethnic communities in the United States. The histories of single ethnic groups tend to follow a common pattern; they begin by examining the causes of the emigration in the Old Country; they trace the routes of migration and patterns of settlement; and conclude with a discussion of the social, economic and cultural adjustments to American conditions. Such single group studies have the merit of permitting the analysis of the migrant experience in depth, but they are open to the criticism that they neglect the common aspects of that experience which transcend ethnic differences.

Although studies of the British in colonial America abound, historians have only recently taken note of the large emigration from the British Isles in the nineteenth century. Rowland T. Berthoff has written about the English, Scots, Welsh and

66. Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn, eds., *The Intellectual Migration: Europe and America, 1930-1960, Perspectives in American History*, Vol. 2; published by the Charles Warren Center for Studies in American History (Cambridge, 1968).

Ulstermen, who came to man America's burgeoning industries.[67] Their occupational and cultural skills facilitated their economic and social assimilation. Yet Berthoff points out the difficulties they sometimes experienced, as well as their retention of particular identities and customs. From their hostile encounters with the American Irish emerged a sense of their common British identity. Frank Thistlethwaite has also described the cultural continuity in the communities of British merchants and artisans.[68] The potters who migrated from the Five Towns of Staffordshire carried on their traditional way of life as well as their craft in Trenton, New Jersey and East Liverpool, Ohio. The role of British immigrants in the American labor movement has been traced by Clifton K. Yearley, Jr.[69] Following the careers of some fifty labor leaders of British origins, Yearley found their Chartist and trade union experience an important influence during the formative period of labor organization in America.

The British agrarian immigration has received less attention. Wilbur Shepperson described the establishment of various agricultural settlements,[70] while Charlotte Erickson has studied the expectations of those British immigrants who sought in America a pastoral Utopia.[71] *Prairie Albion* by Charles Boewe

67. *British Immigrants in Industrial America, 1790-1950* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953).
68. *The Anglo-American Connection in the Early Nineteenth Century* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1959); "The Atlantic Migration of the Pottery Industry," *Economic History Review*, 2nd Series, 11 (Dec., 1958), 264-278.
69. *Britons in American Labor: A History of the Influence of the United Kingdom Immigrants on American Labor 1820-1914,* The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science Series LXXV, no. 17 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1957).
70. *British Emigration to North America.*
71. "Agrarian Myths of English Immigrants."

tells the story of an early English settlement in Illinois.[72] The migration of British Mormon converts to Utah is the subject of P.A.M. Taylor, *Expectations Westward*.[73] The study concentrates on the Mormon proselytizing, the planned emigration and the journey, rather than on the immigrants' settlements in Utah. Recently the ethnic minorities within the British emigration have found their historians. Edward G. Hartmann celebrates the achievements of the Welsh,[74] while A.L. Rowse performs the same function for the Cornish.[75]

The Catholic Irish immigration has been the subject of a separate and extensive historical scholarship. Carl Wittke, *The Irish in America*, is the most thorough treatment of the subject.[76] Individual chapters deal with the Irish and the Church, politics, business, etc. More interpretive and provocative are the works by George W. Potter[77] and William V. Shannon.[78] The harsh urban conditions the Irish encountered and their successful adaptation are depicted by Oscar Handlin, Robert Ernst, and Earl F. Niehaus for Boston, New York and New Orleans, respectively.[79] James P. Shannon, *Catholic Colonization on the*

72. *Prairie Albion: An English Settlement in Pioneer Illinois* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1962).

73. *Expectations Westward: The Mormons and the Emigration of their British Converts in the Nineteenth Century* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966).

74. *Americans from Wales* (Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1967). On the Welsh see also Alan Conway, ed., *The Welsh in America: Letters from the Immigrants* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1961).

75. *The Cornish in America* (London: Macmillan, 1969).

76. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956).

77. *To the Golden Door: The Story of the Irish in Ireland and America* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960).

78. *The American Irish* (New York: Macmillan, 1963).

79. Handlin, *Boston's Immigrants*: Ernst, *Immigrant Life in New York City*:

Western Frontier recounts the largely unsuccessful efforts of the Church to settle the Irish immigrants on farms in Minnesota.[80]

The Irish reputation for violence was reinforced by the mayhem allegedly committed by the Molly Mcguires. Wayne G. Broehl, Jr., has interpreted the pattern of violence in the Pennsylvania anthracite fields as an expression of the heritage of secret societies and terrorist tactics brought over by the Irish miners.[81] The American Irish were also involved in the long struggle to free Erin from British rule. The origins and character of Irish-American nationalism are the subject of an astute study by Thomas N. Brown.[82] The nationalist movement served as a school for the Irish in which they cultivated an appetite and aptitude for politics which made them a force in American public life. Brian Jenkins has reexamined the episode of the Fenian Brotherhood, particularly in terms of its effect upon Anglo-American relations.[83] The policies of Woodrow Wilson with respect to Ireland and the reactions of Irish Americans have been analyzed in articles by William M. Leary, John B. Duff, and Joseph P. O'Grady.[84]

Neihaus, *The Irish in New Orleans, 1800-1860* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965).

80. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957).
81. *The Molly Maguires* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).
82. *Irish-American Nationalism, 1870-1890* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1966).
83. *Fenians and Anglo-American Relations during Reconstruction* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969).
84. John B. Duff, "The Versailles Treaty and the Irish Americans." *Journal of American History*, 55 (Dec., 1968), 582-598; William M. Leary, "Woodrow Wilson, Irish Americans, and the Election of 1916," *Journal of American History*, 54 (June, 1967), 54-72; Joseph P. O'Grady, "The Irish," in O'Grady, ed., *The Immigrant's Influence on Wilson's Peace Policies* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967), 56-84.

Although the Germans figured as the largest element in the nineteenth century immigration, the historical literature dealing with them is quite slim. John A. Hawgood, The *Tragedy of German-America* remains the only general overview of the subject.[85] Accounts of the Germans in New York, Chicago and Milwaukee can be found in the works by Ernst, Bessie Pierce and Bayard Still.[86] The Germans of New Orleans are the subject of a monograph by Joseph F. Nau,[87] while the Cincinnati Germans have been studied by G.A. Dobbert.[88] Despite the fact that many Germans entered agriculture, there has been little written about their rural settlements. Terry G. Jordon has studied the relative success of the Germans as farmers in Texas,[89] and Hildegarde Binder Johnson has analyzed the pattern of German settlement in the Midwest.[90]

Carl Wittke's writings are a major contribution to an

85. *The Tragedy of German-America; the Germans in the United States of America during the Nineteenth Century--and After* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1940).
86. Ernst, *Immigrant Life in New York City*; Bessie L. Pierce, *A History of Chicago* (3 vols.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1937- 1957); Bayrd Still, *Milwaukee* (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin Press, 1948).
87. *The German People of New Orleans, 1850-1900* (Leiden: Brill, 1958).
88. "German-Americans Between New and Old Fatherland, 1870-1914," *American Quarterly*, 19 (Winter. 1967), 663-680; "The Cincinnati Germans, 870-192; Disintegration of an Immigrant Community," *Bulletin of the Cincinnati Historical Society*, 23 (Oct., 1965), 229-242; "The 'Zinzinnati' in Cincinnati," Idem., 22 (Oct., 1964), 209-220.
89. *German Seed in Texas Soil: Immigrant Farmers in Nineteenth Century Texas* (Austin Texas: University of Texas Press, 1966).
90. "The location of German Immigrants in the Middle West," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 61 (March, 1951), 1-41; "The Distribution of the German Pioneer Population in Minnesota," *Rural Sociology*, 6 (March , 1941), 16-34; "Factors Influencing the Distribution of the German Pioneer Population in Minnesota," *Agricultural History*, 19 (January, 1945), 39-57.

understanding of various aspects of the German immigration. His study of the German "Forty-Eighters" describes the influence and careers of these political refugees who served as "the cultural leaven and the spiritual yeast for the whole German element."[91] Wittke's history of the German language press in America, a definitive treatment of the subject, concludes that the newspapers served both as instruments of cultural maintenance and as agencies of Americanization.[92] The role of German Americans in the Catholic Church has been assessed by Colman J. Barry.[93] Focusing upon the "Cahenslyism" controversy of the late nineteenth century, Barry dissected the ethnic rivalries between the Irish and the Germans. Another valuable study of the German American Catholics is Philip Gleason's history of the Central-Verein a national federation of German-American Catholic societies.[94] Gleason interprets the involvement of the Central-Verein in social reform as a "creative response to a critical phase of the process of assimilation." Utilizing quantitative methods, Frederick L. Luebke traced the changing patterns of political behavior of German-Americans in Nebraska in the closing decades of the nineteenth century.[95] Ethnocultural rather than economic issues had the major impact upon voting patterns, and political behavior reflected the diversity, particularly religious, among the Germans. Of the other

91. *Refugees of Revolution.*
92. *The German-Language Press in America*.
93. *The Catholic Church and German Americans* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1953).
94. *The Conservative Reformers: German-American Catholics and the Social Order* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968): "An Immigrant Group's Interest in Progressive Reform: The Case of the German-American Catholics," *American Historical Review*, 73 (Dec., 1967), 367-379.
95. *Immigrants and Politics: The Germans of Nebraska 1880-1900* (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1969).

Germanic groups, the Dutch immigrants have been the subject of a comprehensive history by Henry S. Lucas.[96]

While reference is commonly made to the Scandinavian immigration, its historiography is compartmentalized within national lines. William Mulder's excellent study of the Mormon migration is an exception in that it encompasses Danes, Norwegians, and Swedes.[97] Some 30,000 Scandinavian converts, the greater part from Denmark, came to Utah between 1850 and 1905. Mulder discusses the factors causing the emigration, as well as the pioneering life of the immigrants in the "New Zion."

The Norwegian Americans have been particularly fortunate in their historians. Blegen's two volumes remain the classic work on the Norwegian immigration.[98] Carlton C. Qualey's analysis of Norwegian settlement patterns is also a study of enduring value.[99] The volume and character of the Norwegian emigration are succinctly summarized in an article by Ingrid Semmingsen.[100] Einar Haugen's linguistic history of the Norwegian Americans is an impressive work of scholarship.[101]

96. *Netherlanders in America: Dutch Immigration to the United States and Canada, 1789-1950* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1955). Lucas has also edited Dutch Immigrant Memoirs and Related Writings (2 vols.; Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1955).
97. *Homeward to Zion: The Mormon Migration from Scandinavia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957).
98. *Norwegian Migration to America.*
99. *Norwegian Settlement in the United States* (Northfield, Minn.: Norwegian American Historical Association, 1938).
100. "Norwegian Emigration in the Nineteenth Century," *Scandinavian Economic History Review,* 8 (1960), 150-160.
101. *The Norwegian Language in America* (2 vols.; Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1953).

Two volumes by Kenneth G. Bjork add yet other dimensions to Norwegian American history. *Saga in Steel and Concrete* is a thorough study of Norwegian immigrant engineers and architects and of their contributions to American technology,[102] while *West of the Great Divide* tells the story of the Norwegians who settled on the Pacific Coast.[103] The history of the Lutheran Church among the Norwegian Americans is fully presented by E. Clifford Nelson and Eugene L. Fevold.[104]

By contrast, the Swedish immigration has been little studied until recent years. Stephenson's work is a notable exception.[105] James I. Dowie has written about Swedish pioneering on the sodhouse frontier.[106] He has also coedited with Ernest M. Espelie a volume of essays which discuss various facets of Swedish American life.[107] A monograph by Finis Herbert Capp analyzes the attitudes of the Swedish-American press toward the foreign policy of the United States, finding there a propensity for isolationism and conservatism.[108]

102. *Saga in Steel and Concrete; Norwegian Engineers in America* (Northfield, Minn.: Norwegian American Historical Association, 1947).
103. *West of the Great Divide: Norwegian Migration to the Pacific Coast, 1847-1893* (Northfield, Minn.: Norwegian-American Historical Association, 1958).
104. *The Lutheran Church among Norwegian-Americans; a History of the Evangelical Lutheran Church* (2 vols.; Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1960).
105. *The Religious Aspects of Swedish Immigrations.*
106. *Prairie Grass Dividing* (Rock Island, Ill.: Augustana Historical Society, 1959).
107. *The Swedish Immigrant Community in Transition: Essays in Honor of Dr. Conrad Bergendoff* (Rock Island, Ill.: Augustana Historical Society, 1963).
108. *From Isolationism to Involvement: The Swedish Immigrant Press in America, 1914-1945* (Chicago: Swedish Pioneer Historical Society, 1966).

Three major works on the Swedish immigration, all by Swedish historians, were published in 1971. Lars Ljungmark's meticulous study of the post-Civil War efforts to promote emigration from Sweden to Minnesota concludes that these schemes were largely unproductive.[109] Breaking with the rural emphasis of previous writings, Ulf Beijbom has written an important study of the Swedes in nineteenth century Chicago.[110] Beijbom exploited manuscript census records, church lists, and city directories for his analysis of demographic and social patterns. An equally valuable work by Sture Lindmark focuses upon the maintenance phenomenon among Swedes in the Midwest for the years 1914-1932.[111] Analyzing the activities of ethnic churches, organizations, and press, Lindmark concluded that contrary to prevailing opinion the Swedes nourished a strong desire "to preserve their national identity, their cultural heritage, and their institutions."

The Finnish immigration, set apart by cultural and linguistic differences, has had its own distinctive history. The most comprehensive study is A. William Hoglund, *Finnish Immigrants in America, 1880-1920.*[112] Reviewing the development of Finnish American organizations, Hoglund's thesis is that the immigrants sought a better life through

109. *For Sale-Minnesota: Organized Promotion of Scandinavian Immigration, 1866-1873,* Studia Historica Gothoburgensia XIII (Stockholm: Scandinavian University Books, 1971).
110. *Swedes in Chicago: A Demographic and Social Study of the 1846-1880 Immigration*, Studia Historica Upsaliensia XXXVII (Uppsala, Sweden: Scandinavian University Books, 1971).
111. *Swedish America 1914-1932: Studies in Ethnicity with Emphasis on Illinois and Minnesota*, Studia Historica Upsaliensia XXXVII (Uppsala, Sweden: Scandinavian University Books, 1971).
112. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1960).

collective effort rather than individual enterprise. A history of the Finns in Wisconsin, by John I. Kolehmainen and George W. Hill, supports this conclusion.[113]

Since the emigration from Denmark was the smallest among the Scandinavian countries, it is to be expected that its history should also be the least studied. Paul C. Nyholm, *The Americanization of the Danish Lutheran Churches,* has been the one substantial work available.[114] A recent volume by Kristian Hvidt offers a detailed analysis of the emigration from Denmark prior to 1914.[115] Based largely on computer-processed data, the study provides a profile of the socio-economic characteristics of the Danish emigrants. Hvidt also investigates the "international system of emigrant promotion" established by shipping companies which he concludes served as a vital link between the "push" and "pull" factors.

The literature on the Jews in America, while voluminous, tends to be sociological rather than historical. No comprehensive history of the Jewish immigration has been written, although the surveys by Oscar Handlin and Rufus Learsi are useful.[116] Nathan Glazer, *American Judaism* is a brilliant synthesis of religious and ethnic history.[117] Since American Jews have been predominantly

113. *Haven in the Woods: The Story of the Finns in Wisconsin* (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1965).
114. (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1963).
115. *Flugten til Amerika eller Drivkraefter i masseudvandringen fra Danmark 1868-1914,* Jysk Selskab for Historie 22 (Arhaus, Denmark: Universitetsforlaget, 1971). For an English summary see pp. 490-526.
116. Handlin, *Adventure in Freedom: Three Hundred Years of Jewish Life in America* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954); Learsi, *The Jews in America: a History* (Cleveland: World, 1954).
117. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957).

urbanities, studies tend to take the form of histories of particular communities. Less attention has been given to the early German immigration, but Bertram Wallace Korn has written about the Jews in antebellum New Orleans.[118] Moses Rischin, *The Promised City*[119] delineates the encounter between New York City and the East European conditions of urban life, the Jews created a new consciousness and institutional network to cope with this new environment. The search for community is also the theme of Arthur Goren's history of the Kehillah experiment.[120] Although it ultimately failed, this was a significant attempt to transplant this European communal organization in order to sustain Jewish life on American soil. Allon Schoener, *Portal to America: the Lower East Side 1870-1925* brings to life the panorama of immigrant life through photographs and documents.[121] Other Jewish communities have been written about by competent historians: Buffalo by Selig Adler and Thomas E. Connolly; Milwaukee by Louis J. Swichkow and Lloyd P. Gartner; Los Angeles by Max Vorspan and Gartner; and Rochester by Stuart E. Rosenberg.[122] A history of agricultural

118. *The Early Jews of New Orleans* (Waltham, Mass.: American Jewish Historical Society, 1969). See also by Korn, *American Jewry and the Civil War* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1951).
119. *The Promised City: New York's Jews, 1870-1914* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962).
120. *New York Jews and the Quest for Community: The Kehillah Experiment, 1908-1922* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).
121. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967).
122. Adler and Connolly, *From Arabat to Suburbia: The History of the Jewish Community of Buffalo* (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1960); Swichkow and Gartner, *The History of the Jews of Milwaukee* (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1963); Vorspan and Gartner, *History of the Jews of Los Angeles* (San Marino, Cal.: Huntington Library, 1970); Rosenberg, *The Jewish Community in Rochester, 1843-1925* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954).

settlements in New Jersey by Joseph Brandes, tells the story of the efforts to transform Jewish immigrants into farmers.[123] Brandes traces the evolution of these communities from 1882 to the present.

The role of the Jewish immigrants in the American labor movement has received less attention than it deserves. An important work by Elias Tcherikower and others, *The Early Jewish Labor Movement in the United States*, is particularly valuable for its descriptions of sweatshop conditions and labor organization in the garment industry.[124] A useful introductory work is Melech Epstein, *Jewish Labor in USA, 1882-1952*.[125] Two interpretive articles on the Jewish labor movement have been authored by Hyman Berman and Moses Rischin.[126]

Antisemitism, treated in passing by many of the previously mentioned works, has generated considerable scholarly discussion. Historians have debated its sources and causes: was it rooted in Christian theology or racist ideology? was it a rural or urban phenomenon? was it an expression of status rivalries or economic conflict? Charles Herbert Stember, *Jews in the Mind of America*, presents essays from a variety of historical and sociological perspectives as well as an analysis of a quarter

123. *Immigrants to Freedom: Jewish Communities in Rural New Jersey Since 1882* (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1971).
124. Trans. and rev. by Aaron Antonovsky (New York: Yivo Institute for Jewish Research, 1961).
125. Melech Epstein, *Jewish Labor in U.S.A.: An Industrial, Political, and Cultural History of the Jewish Labor Movement* (2 vols.; New York: Trade Union Sponsoring Committee, 1950-53).
126. Berman, "A Cursory View of the Jewish Labor Movement; an Historiographical Survey," *American Jewish Historical Quarterly*, 52 (Dec., 1962), 79-97; Rischin, "The Jewish Labor Movement in America: a Social Interpretation," *Labor History*, 4 (Fall, 1963), 227-247.

century of survey data.[127] In several articles, John Higham has contended that anti-semitism in America can best be understood as stemming from status rivalries such as those which resulted from the social climbing of newly wealthy Jews in the Gilded Age.[128] Much attention has centered on the issue of the alleged antisemitism of the Populists. Richard Hofstadter initiated the controversy by identifying an antisemitic strain in the Populist psyche. Among others, Norman Pollack and Walter T.K. Nugent have taken exception to this interpretation, while Irwin Unger and Leonard Dinnerstein have supported it.[129] Dinnerstein's history of the Leo Frank case provides a full account of this southern outburst of antisemitism.[130]

The eastern and southern European groups, those of the so-called "new immigration," have only in recent years begun to be the subject of historical study. The Italians, although second in numbers only to the Germans in the post-colonial immigration, were virtually ignored in earlier writings. In 1971 two general histories of the Italian Americans appeared. That by Luciano J. Iorizzo and Salvatore Mondello is a brief survey which treats various phases of the Italian immigration in knowledgeable

127. (New York: Basic Books, 1966).
128. "Anti-Semitism in the Gilded Age: A Reinterpretation," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 43 (March, 1957), 559-578: "Social Discrimination Against Jews in America, 1830-1930," *Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society*, 47 (Sept., 1957), 1-33.
129. Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform from Bryan to F.D.R.* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955); Unger, *The Greenback Era* (Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 1964); Pollack, "The Myth of Populist Anti-Semitism," *American Historical Review*, 63 (Oct., 1962), 76-80; Nugent, *The Tolerant Populists* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).
130. *The Leo Frank Case* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968). Dinnerstein has also edited *Antisemitism in the United States,* American Problem Series (New York: Holt, Rhinehart, and Winston, 1971).

fashion.[131] A more ambitious study is Alexander DeConde, *Half Bitter, Half Sweet,* which takes as its subject the full sweep of relationships between Italy and the United States from colonial times to the present.[132] Cultural, literary, and diplomatic contacts, as well as migration, are woven skillfully into a synthesis of Italian American history. Both volumes emphasize the intense prejudice which the Italians encountered as well as their efforts to transcend that barrier. A useful collection of articles dealing with various aspects of the Italian experience in America has been edited by Silvano M. Tomasi and Madeline H. Engel.[133]

Though city dwellers like the Jews, the urban communities of the Italians have been the subject of few studies. Rudolph J. Vecoli and Humbert S. Nelli have both written about the Italians in Chicago. Vecoli stressed the continuing influence of Old World culture in the lives of the immigrants,[134] while Nelli argued that the Italians achieved rapid assimilation and upward mobility.[135] The successful adjustment of the Italians in the trans-Mississippi West is the theme of Andrew F. Rolle, *The Immigrant Upraised*.[136] Rolle describes the agricultural settlements of Italians in the western states; otherwise little

131. *The Italian-Americans* (New York: Twayne, 1971).
132. *Half Bitter, Half Sweet an Excursion into Italian American History* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971).
133. *The Italian Experience in the United States* (Staten Island, N.Y.: Center for Migration Studies, 1970).
134. "Contadini in Chicago."
135. *Italians in Chicago, 1880-1930: a Study in Ethnic Mobility* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).
136. *The Immigrant Upraised: Italian Adventurers and Colonists in an Expanding America* (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968).

attention has been paid to these immigrants in rural surroundings. An exception is Robert L. Brandfonls study of the employment of Italian labor in the cotton plantations of the Mississippi Delta.[137]

The clash of religio-cultural traditions resulting from the encounter between the Italian immigrants and the American Catholic Church has been described by Vecoli,[138] while Tomasi has emphasized the role of the national parish as a nucleus for the formation of Italian American communities.[139] The coming of age of the Italians in the politics of New York City is a theme of Arthur Mannis splendid biography of Fiorello LaGuardia.[140] The story of LaGuardia's successor, Vito Marcentonio, as the spokesman for the Italians of East Harlem, has been told by Salvatore LaGumina.[141] In his excellent study of the American response to the rise of Mussolini, John P. Diggins interprets the pro-Fascist attitude of most Italian Americans as an expression

137. *Cotton Kingdom of the New South: A History of the Yazoo Mississippi Delta from Reconstruction to the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); "The End of Immigration to the Cotton Fields," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 50 (March, 1964), 591-611.
138. "Prelates and Peasants: Italian Immigrants and the Catholic Church," *Journal of Social History*, 2 (Spring, 1969), 217-268.
139. "The Ethnic Church and the Integration of Italian Immigrants in the United States," in Tomasi and Engels, eds., *The Italian Experience*, 163-193.
140. *La Guardia: A Fighter Against His Times: 1882-1933* (Philadelpia: Lippincott, 1959); *La Guardia Comes to Power, 1933* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1965).
141. Vito Marcantonio, *The People's Politician* (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/ Hunt, 1969).

of ethnic pride rather than political ideology.[142] Diggins has also written about the Italian American opposition to *Il Duce*.

The role of the Italians in the American labor movement has been analyzed by Edwin Fenton.[143] Fenton concluded that the Italians were just as susceptible to organization as other nationalities given favorable conditions in their particular occupations. Nonetheless, Italians were often viewed as wagecutters by American workers and their coming sometimes incited a hostile reception. Herbert G. Gutman has written a full account of an early episode of labor violence directed against the Italians.[144] The striking differences in the part played by Italian immigrants in the labor movements of Argentina, Brazil, and the United States have been studied by Samuel L. Baily.[145] In a study of the Italian immigrant family, Virginia Vans McLaughlin noted the manner in which cultural values conditioned the employment patterns of wives and daughters.[146]

Among the stereotypes of the Italian immigrant was that of the violent anarchist. It was vindicated for some by the trial

142. *Mussolini and Fascism: The View from America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972); "The Italo-American Anti-Fascist Opposition," *Journal of American History*, 54 (Dec., 1967), 579-598.
143. "Italian Immigrants in the Stoneworkers' Union," *Labor History*, 3 (Spring, 1962), 188-207; "Italians in the Labor Movement," *Pennsylvania History*, 26 (April, 1959), 133-148.
144. "The Buena Vista Affair, 1874-1875," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 88 (July, 1964), 251-293.
145. "The Italians and the Development of Organized Labor in Argentina, Brazil, and the United States, 1880-1914," *Journal of Social History*, 3 (Winter, 1969), 123-134; "Italians and Organized Labor in the United States and Argentina: 1880-1910," in Tomasi and Engels, eds., *The Italian Experience*, 111-124.
146. "Patterns of Work and Family Organization: Buffalo's Italians," *Journal of Social History*, 5 (Fall, 1971), 299-314.

and conviction of Sacco and Vanzetti. Almost a half century after their execution the battle of the books over their guilt or innocence continues. Among recent writers, David Felix[147] argues for the prosecution and Herbert B. Ehrmann[148] for the defense, while Francis Russell[149] contends that Vanzetti was innocent, but Sacco guilty. Another source of prejudice against the Italians has been the enduring belief in their involvement in secret criminal organizations. Long dominated by journalistic writings, the subject has recently been dealt with in a solid work of scholarship by Joseph L. Albini.[150] Rather than being an importation from Sicily, Albini holds that the history of organized crime in the United States long antedated the coming of the Italians. The participation of Italian Americans and other ethnic elements in criminal activities was to be understood in terms of the limited opportunities open to such groups for legitimate careers. These are essentially the conclusions of other recent studies.[151]

Historians have hardly begun to study the Slavic immigration. No general work encompassing this vast subject has yet been attempted. Certain aspects of the history of Slavic immigrants

147. *Protest: Sacco-Vanzetti and the Intellectuals* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1965).
148. *The Case That Will Not Die: Commonwealth vs. Sacco and Vanzetti* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969).
149. *Tragedy in Dedham; the Story of the Sacco-Vanzetti Case* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962).
150. *The American Mafia: Genesis of a Legend* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1971).
151. Humbert S. Nelli, "Italians and Crime in Chicago: the Formative Years, 1890-1920," *American Journal of Sociology*, 74 (Jan., 1969), 373-391; Luciano J. Iorizzo, ed., *An Inquiry into Organized Crime* (New York: American Italian Historical Association, Proceedings of the Third Annual Conference, 1970).

have been explored by Victor R. Greene. *The Slavic Community on Strike* emphasizes the militant participation of Polish, Slovak, and Lithuanian miners in the labor struggles in anthracite.[152] Greene has also analyzed the relationship between the origins of ethnic consciousness and religious faith among the Polish immigrants.[153]

Among the few studies dealing with particular Slavic groups, Joseph A. Wytrwal, *America's Polish Heritage* is a general history, most useful for its description of the Polish ethnic organizations.[154] A similar work is Gerold G. Govorchin, *Americans from Yugoslavia*, which describes the causes of the emigration as well as the achievements of the South Slav immigrants.[155] George J. Prpic, *The Croatians in America*, is a comprehensive history of this Slavic group.[156] Among the non-Slavic peoples of the Balkans, only the Greeks have been the subjects of a full-scale history. In a deeply researched work, Theodore Saloutos has written an authoritative account of the Greeks in America.[157] While following the economic and social lot of the immigrants, Saloutos stresses the continuing involvement of the Greeks with developments in their homeland and the resulting controversies which often rent the Greek

152. *The Slavic Community on Strike: Immigrant Labor in Pennsylvania Anthracite* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968).
153. "For God and Country: The Origins of Slavic Catholic Self-Consciousness in America," *Church History*, 35 (Dec., 1966), 446-460.
154. *America's Polish Heritage: a Social History of the Poles in America* (Detroit: Endurance Press, 1961). See also by Wytrwal, *Poles in American History and Tradition* (Detroit: Endurance Press, 1969).
155. (Gainesville, Fla.: University of Florida Press. 1961).
156. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1971) .
157. *The Greeks in the United States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).

American communities. The struggle between Hellenism and Americanism subsided as the Greeks overcame early obstacles of poverty and prejudice to achieve respectability and well-being.

Topical Studies

While the bulk of the writings in immigration history deal with specific ethnic groups, a growing literature addresses itself to issues which encompass two or more groups. Surprisingly few efforts have been made to write the ethnic history of particular states. One of these is Rudolph J. Vecoli, *The People of New Jersey,* which delineates the successive tides of migration into the Garden State and the persistent ethnic influences on religion, politics, and other spheres of life.[158] Wilbur S. Shepperson, *Restless Strangers,* portrays the extraordinary mix of Nevada's population during the early years and its reflection in Nevada literature.[159] Other studies have focused upon certain cities. In addition to the works by Handlin and Ernst, Donald B. Cole describes the changing ethnic composition of Lawrence Massachusetts, over the course of three-quarters of a century.[160] The concepts of the "immigrant cycle" and the "immigrants' search for security" are the synthetic themes which unify Cole's account of life and work in this mill town.

The question of social mobility in America has attracted the attention of an increasing number of historians. Armed with

158. The New Jersey Historical Series (Princeton: D.Van Nostrand, 1965).
159. *Restless Strangers: Nevada's Immigrants and their Interpreters* (Reno, Nev.: University of Nevada Press, 1970).
160. *Immigrant City: Lawrence, Massachusetts, 1845-1921* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1963).

the methodology of quantitative analysis, they have attempted to measure mobility in terms of such variables as occupation, property ownership, and education. The populations analyzed invariably include a variety of immigrant groups and the differentials in mobility among them become one of the phenomena noted if not explained.

In *The Making of an American Community*, Merle Curti sought to test the Turner thesis regarding the democratizing influence of the frontier by the intensive study of a Wisconsin county.[161] Changes in property ownership, office holding, intermarriage, and other socioeconomic characteristics were computed over the course of several decades. Curti concluded that in Trempeleau County at least the frontier did make for a diffusion of economic and political power among the various ethnic groups. But the evidence for Turner's assertion that the frontier was a crucible in which "the immigrants were Americanized, liberated, and fused into a mixed race," was at best inconclusive.

Stephan Thernstrom's study of social mobility among Irish unskilled laborers and their sons in Newburyport, Massachusetts, discovered little upward occupational mobility for either generation.[162] Thernstrom, however, noted a significant increase in property ownership which he concluded validated the mobility ideology for these workers. In his later studies of occupational mobility in Boston, Thernstrom found that there were dramatic differences not only between

161. *The Making of an American Community: a Case Study of Democracy in a Frontier County* (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1959).
162. *Poverty and Progress: Social Mobility in a Nineteenth Century City* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).

immigrants and natives, but among newcomers of different nationalities as well.[163] While the British and the Jews scored a significant rise in occupational status, the Irish and the Italians tended to lag behind. Such differences among various ethnic groups were also discerned by Clyde Griffen in his study of Poughkeepsie.[164]

A new sensitivity to group difference has also inspired an ethnocultural analysis of American political history. A critical review of this literature is presented in an article by Robert P. Swierenga.[165] Samuel Lubell, *The Future of American Politics,* pioneered the ethnic interpretation in this study of recent political developments.[166] In a volume on Massachusetts politics in the 1920's, J. Joseph Hutchmacher stressed the role of changing loyalties of immigrants groups in bringing about a political realignment in the Bay State.[167] A leading proponent of the ethnocultural approach, Lee Benson, in his reassessment of "the concept of Jacksonian democracy," concluded that ethnicity was more closely related to party affiliation than was economic class.[168] Benson ventured the proposition that "at least since

163. "Immigrants and WASPs: Ethnic Differences in Occupational Mobility in Boston, 1890-1940," in Stephan Thernstrom and Richard Sennett, eds., *Nineteenth Century Cities Essays in the New Urban History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), 125-164.
164. "Workers Divided: The Effect of Craft and Ethnic Differences in Poughkeepsie, New York, 1850-1880," in Thernstrom and Sennett, eds., *Nineteenth Century Cities*, 49-97.
165. "Ethnocultural Political Analysis: a New Approach to American Ethnic Studies," *Journal of American Studies*, 5 (April, 1971), 59-79.
166. (New York: Harper, 1952).
167. *Massachusetts People and Politics, 1919-1933* (Cambridge: Harvard Universlty Press, 1959).
168. *The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy: New York as a Test Case* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).

the 1820's… ethnic and religious differences have tended to be relatively more important sources of political differences." Study of ethnic influences upon political behavior has also been called for by Samuel P. Hays.[169]

Students of Benson and Hays as well as other have pursued the ethnocultural analysis of political history in recent years. Several works which exemplify this approach are Michael Holt's study of the formation of the Republican Party in Pittsburgh, Paul Kleppner's analysis of midwestern politics in the second half of the nineteenth century, John M. Allswang's history of ethnic politics in Chicago, and Frederick C. Luebke's investigation of the politics of Nebraska Germans.[170] All employ a social analysis of political behavior and all agree on the importance of ethnoreligious identity as a determinant of voting patterns. A specific issue, the influence of the immigrant vote in the election of 1860, has been the subject of numerous articles; these have been compiled in a volume edited by Luebke.[171]

While the impact of Old Country issues on immigrant communities is discussed in many of the studies previously mentioned, the only general treatment of the relationship between ethnic groups and American foreign policy is Louis

169. "The Social Analysis of American Political History, 1880-1920," *Political Science Quarterly*, 80 (Sept., 1965), 373-394; "History as Human Behavior," *Iowa Journal of History*, 58 (July, 1960), 193-206.
170. Holt, *Forging a Majority: the Formation of the Republican Party in Pittsburgh, 1848-1860* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969); Kleppner, *The Cross of Culture: A Social Analysis of Midwestern Politics, 1850-1900* (New York: Free Press, 1970); Allswang, *A House for All People, 1890-1936* (Lexington, Kty.: University of Kentucky Press, 1971); Luebke, *Immigrants and Politics.*
171. *Ethnic Voters and the Election of Lincoln* (Lincoln, Nev.: University of Nebraska Press, 1971).

Gerson, *The Hyphenate in Recent American Politics and Diplomacy*.[172] Focusing on the periods of the world wars and the "Cold War," Gerson describes the efforts of immigrant lobbies to influence the conduct of American foreign relations. These activities are more thoroughly examined for the World War I period in Joseph P. O'Grady, ed., *The Immigrant's Influence on Wilson's Peace Policies*.[173] Essays are devoted to the activities of the various nationalities which tried to promote their homeland's cause, but the overall conclusion is that the immigrants had little influence on Wilson's decisions regarding the peace settlement.

As yet little effort has been made to deal with the religious dimension of the immigrant experience in a collective fashion. Will Herberg briefly reviewed the history of the three major immigrant religions as background for his thesis that the religious revival of the 1950's was caused by an affirmation of religious identity on the part of the third generation.[174] Herberg viewed the assimilation process as culminating in a "triple melting pot" of religious communities. Historians of Catholicism in America have by and large accepted this view of the Church as an agency for the assimilation of immigrants into a de-ethnicized Catholic population. The concept of a Catholic "melting pot" has been challenged by Harold J. Abramson.[175] Noting the persistence of distinctive ethnic styles of religious behavior among American Catholics, Abramson sought an

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172. (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1964).
173. O'Grady, ed., *The Immigrant's Influence*.
174. *Protestant, Catholic, Jew*.
175. "Ethnic Diversity within Catholicism: A Comparative Analysis of Contemporary and Historical Religion," *Journal of Social History*, 4 (Summer, 1971), 359-388. See also Vecoli, "Prelates and Peasants."

explanation through a comparative analysis of the backgrounds of six ethnic groups. He concluded that societal competition among different religio-cultural traditions in the country of origin "is a positive correlate of the degree of religio-ethnic activity and consciousness." The concept of societal competition was utilized by Timothy L. Smith to explain the development of sectarianism not only among, but also within, immigrant nationalities.[176] Citing the example of the Finns and other groups, Smith concluded that the immigrant denomination, competing with other religious and non-religious organizations for members, became an ethnic sect. In a more recent article, Smith has argued that the immigrants from central and southern Europe brought with them traditions of lay initiative and responsibility which facilitated their adaptation to the religious voluntarism of America.[177] Further, the national ethno-religious organizations formed to unite scattered congregations fit the American pattern of denominational pluralism. Rather than the clash of dissimilar religio-cultural traditions, Smith finds in the religious history of the immigrant groups a confirmation "of the social consensus of which the nation's religious institutions are but one facet."

Smith has pressed his thesis of a broad social consensus among newcomers and native Americans in his discussion of immigrant social aspirations and American education.[178] The value system

176. "Religious Denominations as Ethnic Communities: A Regional Case Study," *Church History*; 35 (June, 1966), 1-20.
177. "Lay Initiative in the Religious Life of American Immigrants, 1880-1950," in Tamara K. Hareven, ed., *Anonymous Americans* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971).
178. "Immigrant Social Aspirations and American Education, 1880-1930," in *American Quarterly*, 21 (Fall, 1964), 523-543.

of the immigrants, he asserts, centered on their aspirations for money, education, and respectability, goals consonant with the "Protestant Ethic." Education also served the immigrant's need to create a new structure of family and communal life and their search for a new ethnic identity. These aspirations, according to Smith, "account for the immense success of the public school system, particularly at the secondary level, in drawing the mass of working-class children into its embrace."

A quite different assessment of the relationship between the American educational system and the children of the, immigrants has been advanced by David K. Cohen[179] and Colin Greer.[180] Basing their studies on historical evidence of school performance, Both concluded that more important than the differences in educational achievement as between native and immigrant children were the differences among children of various ethnic origins. While Scandinavian, British, German, and Jewish youngsters tended to be as successful in school as those of native parentage, the children of non-Jewish central and southern European immigrants had much higher rates of failure. On every index of educational attainment, children from these nationalities fared much worse than the others. While recognizing the influence of cultural differences on motivation and aptitude, both Cohen and Greer suggest that the problem may have been "the inability of public education to overcome

179. "Immigrants and the Schools," *Review of Educational Research*, 40 (Feb., 1970), 13-27. See also Mary Fabian Matthews, "The Role of the Public Schools in the Assimilation of the Italian Immigrant Child in New York City, 1900-1914," in Tomasi and Engels, eds., *The Italian Experience*, 124-142.
180. *The Great School Legend: A Revisionist Interpretation of American Public Education* (New York: Basic Books, 1972).

the educational consequences of family poverty, and to recognize the legitimacy of working class and ethnic cultures."

Conclusion

Clearly the historical literature on European Americans is rich in variety and high in quality. Yet as this review has demonstrated, there are many gaps in our knowledge, many questions unanswered, and many issues undecided. This is not the place to itemize these lacunae, but one can mention the most glaring deficiencies. The eastern, central and southern European immigrations with the few exceptions noted are *terra incognita*. Even for better known groups such as the Germans, further studies of the patterns of adjustment, particularly of the internal development of ethnic communities, are needed. Little is known about the interaction of ethnic and racial groups in various geographical and institutional settings. Community, mobility, and political behavior studies should be extended to medium sized cities and small towns. The history of the immigrant family and the immigrant woman remain to be written. The impact of mass immigration upon the educational system, the churches, the political system, and popular culture, all deserve further investigation. Aside from the nativist response, the reception of the immigration, particularly the role of voluntary agencies which sought to assist the newcomers, has been insufficiently studied.

Recent writings have advanced challenging hypotheses regarding the relationship between immigration and societal development in the United States. Additional studies must provide the data for testing these concepts. Much research which

addresses itself to these questions is now in progress. The scholarship of this decade will surely yield answers to many of these questions and will undoubtedly raise as many new ones.

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Section II: Ethnicity as Concept and Process

The Nature of the Ethnic Group

E. K. FRANCIS

Abstract

In search of a common denominator for nation, race, nationality, people, the ethnic type of cumulative groups is construed as a device of further sociological research. The ethnic group appears as a subtype of the *Gemeinschaft,* which is formed by the transposition of characteristics from the primary face-to-face group to formation, as well as other conditions necessarily present in the early stages, may change without affecting its identity.

Friedrich Meinecke, in his book *Weltburgertum und Nationalstaat,*[1] has put his finger on a difference in concepts which distinguished Western and Central European thought on the phenomenon of the nation. Meinecke was mostly concerned with the political and historical implications of this difference

1. Munchen and Berlin: R. Oldenbourg, 1919.

117

when he set the idea of *Staatsnation* against that of *Kulturnation*. But his dichotomy indicates more than that; namely, two scientific approaches to a distinctive category of social facts; two sociologies, as it were; two philosophies of society. based on different sets of attitudes and scales of values.

This was almost forty years ago. But even today we find that the prevailing trend of thought differs among students of society who have grown up under German influence and those who are working in the Anglo-Saxon scientific climate. The latter put their main emphasis either on the political implications of nation or on the psychological and historical genesis of nationalism. Now, nationalism, taken either as a psychological or as a historical phenomenon, is not identical with the social fact called "a nation." It is, however, significant that probably the most thoroughgoing essay on the nation which has been published in the English language not only bears the title *Nationalism*[2] but gives as one of the characteristics of nation the following: "The idea of a common government whether as a reality in the present or past, or as an aspiration of the future."[3]

The other class of Continental sociologists have tended to separate the concept of nation from that of the state; they also have emphasized the ontological and phenomenological analysis of nation rather than a genetical interpretation. Thus we find among them a great number of book titles, such as *Nation und*

2. *Nationalism: A Report by a Study Group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs* (London, 1939); similarly: Carlton J. H. Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism* (New York, 1926). John Oakesmith, on the other hand, gave his book the title, *Race and Nationality* (New York, 1919).
3. *Nationalism,* p. xx.

Staat,[4] *Nation und Nationalität,*[5] *Volk und Nation,*[6] and *Das eigenstandige Volk.*[7] It is significant that the French Sociologist J.T. Delos of Lille divides his recent publication on *La Nation*[8] into two volumes: the first, *Sociologie de la nation,* and the second, *Le Nationalisme et l'ordre de droit.*

There is, however, general agreement that the modern nation signifies a definite stage of social organization which is limited not only in time but also in space. As E.H. Carr has pointed out, nation is not a definable and clearly recognizable entity but "is confined to certain periods of history and to certain parts of the world."[9] "Today," he continues, "–in the most nation-conscious of all epoches–it would still probably be fair to say that a large numerical majority of the population of the world feel no allegiance to any nation."[10] It is of secondary importance whether we hold that nations sprang into existence with the waning of the Middle Ages, with the absolute monarchies of the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, or with the French Revolution. As the Chatham House report suggests, "a good case can be made for each of these views, which are indeed only incompatible so long as the term 'nation' is assumed to be used in each case in an identical sense."[11] For the present purpose we may adopt Carr's procedure, which distinguishes three stages of nationalism, apart from a fourth–the present one.

4. Ignaz Seipel (Vienna, 1916).
5. Friedrich Hertz (Karlsruhe, 1927).
6. F. J. Neumann (Leipzig, 1888).
7. M. H. Boehm (Gottingen, 1932).
8. *Le Probleme de la civilisation: la nation* (2 vols. Montreal, 1944) .
9. *Nationalism and After* (London, 1945).
10. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
11. *Nationalism,* p. 5.

In the first period the national unit was identified with the person of the sovereign, the absolute monarch. As Carr recalls: "Louis XIV thought that the French nation 'resided wholly in the person of the King'"[12] The second period is characterized by the democratization of the nation, which eventually was considered as a corporate personality centered around the *bourgeoisie*. Eventually the nineteenth century brought the socialization of the nation by including the masses of the people. This resulted in the social service state, which claims the absolute loyalty of the whole people to a nation as the instrument of collective interests and ambitions. This description, however, seems to be correct only if we consider Western society in general. The fact is that in many countries, particularly in Germany and in the Slavic regions east of it, the first-named stage seems to be missing. Neither the German princes nor the emperor ever succeeded in creating nation-states in the same sense in which France or England became a nation-state. They did not appeal to national sentiments but to patriotic sentiments. The *Vaterland*, not the *Nation*, was here the central idea of absolutism. Thus, students of the history of nationalism in these parts of Europe have emphasized the transition, which started in the latter part of the eighteenth century, from dynastic and territorial patriotism to nationalism in the modern sense. The Bohemian revivalists of that time, who were backed by the Bohemian aristocracy, originally propagated Bohemian patriotism against Hapsburg patriotism. Only with the spread of the ideas of romanticism and the French Revolution was Bohemian patriotism transformed into a Czech (ethnic) nationalism.

12. *Op. cit.*, p. 2.

The different ways in which national ideology has become foremost in the minds of Europeans east and west of the Rhine has apparently determined their sociological theories. Since there were no clearly defined nations in the Western sense, German and Slavic authors were moved to seek symbols for the entity of nation in a common language or in the biological concept of the race. Although in the nineteenth century nationalism in central Europe traversed approximately the same stages which Carr describes as the second and third periods, the idea remained alive that *Kultur* and *Rasse* indicate some more basic social fact than *Staat* and *Staatsnation* or, in other words, that *Staat* and *Staatsnation* are nothing but the ephemeral manifestations of human groups which are always present in society; the Volk, these scholars maintain, is a basic form of social organization, even *the* basic form, while nation and nation-states are the result of a historical process and may disappear without affecting the existence of *Völker*.

This concept of *Volk* or *narod* cannot be symbolized adequately by any commonly used English word, such as "race," "people," or "nation." Now, in the field of the social sciences it is often a helpful methodological device to adopt the most colorless term to indicate an elusive or difficult social fact. Pareto aptly used algebraic symbols. In order to find out whether the Continental concept of *Volk* is a legitimate one, we propose to use the term "ethnic group" to describe it. This phrase coincides philologically with the French *groupe ethnique* and with the German *Volksgruppe*. Moreover, the Greek describe with *ethnos* about the same social unit, which is called in other languages *people, popolo, peuple, Volk, narod*. Finally, the term "group"

is being used by many sociologists as the *genus proximum* in defining the various types of plurality patterns.[13]

In trying to clarify our hypothetical category, "ethnic group," we find it easier to say what it is not than what it is. An ethnic group is not a race, if we take race in the anthropological sense as a group of people with common physical characteristics. Moreover, an ethnic group is not a nation, if we understand nation to mean a society united under a common government or an aggregation of individuals united by political ties as well as by common language or common territory or common race or common tradition or any combination thereof. Our problem becomes more difficult if we wish to distinguish ethnic group from such phenomena as a definite local or regional community, a patriarchical family, a clan, and similar face-to-face groups. However, this is a problem that occurs with every attempt at a classification, be it of social or of physical facts.

If we adopt for the moment Ferdinand Tonnies' typological

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13. The term "ethnic" has been adopted by some American authors in a much narrower sense. L. Warner and L. Srole have proposed the following definition: "The term ethnic refers to any individual who considers himself, or is considered, to be a member of a group with a foreign culture and who participates in the activities of the group. Ethnics may be either of foreign or native birth" (*The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups* 1945, p. 28). Here the main emphasis is given to the individual, while the sociological aspect is almost lost. Moreover, undue distinction is made between minority and majority groups, although both seem to belong basically to the same type of plurality patterns. Cf. also the article "Ethnic Community" in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*. We need not emphasize that in this context "ethnic group" is not limited to ethnic fragments and minorities within a larger culture. In our terminology not only the French-Canadians or the Pennsylvania Dutch would be ethnic groups but also the French of France or the Irish in Ireland.

dichotomy, *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*,[14] we would have to classify an ethnic group as a rather pure type of *Gemeinschaft*. We will recall that, according to Tonnies, a group of the association type is based on a definite purpose, although not necessarily on *ad hoc* contractual agreements. It is a means by which the individual attains his own ends. In a community the parties are treated and act as a unit of solidarity. Institutional sanctions, if present, are concerned rather with attitudes than with specific acts. While groups of the community type always live in relatively local as well as social and mental segregation from other groups, such local, social, and mental barriers to social contact, exchange, and circulation are absent in associations. Based on emotional bonds and endowed with a homogeneous cultural heritage, the community aims at the preservation of the group. Based on rational, contractual bonds and endowed with a heterogeneous social heritage, the association aims at the preservation of the individual. In the language of Freud, a community can be said to be derived mainly from subconscious experiences, while an association is derived from direct knowledge.

Culture is usually regarded as a fundamental factor of an ethnic group. However, the concept of culture is as elusive and contradictory as that of the ethnic group itself. The words *Kultur*, *culture*, appear to mean almost the opposite of what English speakers understand by "culture." While to them civilization usually refers to the late phases or to a superior stage of cultural development, to Continental students *Kultur* is essentially

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14. *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (1887). For a discussion of this concept see Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (1937).

different from civilization. According to them, civilization is a means to an end. Culture is an end in itself; it includes folkways and mores and their manifestations in art and artifact which, persisting through tradition, characterize a human group.[15] While civilization spreads and accumulates through cross-fertilization and diffusion, culture tends to produce itself indefinitely.[16] We may say that every ethnic group has a distinctive culture, but a common culture pattern does not necessarily constitute an ethnic group. The peasants of all times and regions, for instance, show more or less identical culture traits. Yet they do not form a social group at all, still less an ethnic group. They belong to the same culture *type*, not to the same culture *group*.[17] An ethnic group may also modify and change its culture without losing its identity.

Every group is defined by social interrelationship. All social relations presuppose contacts and communication. Language is one of the most important means of communication between human persons. Thus, we may say that face-to-face relationship is essential in preliterate societies only, but in literate societies the language spoken by the members of an ethnic group must at least be intelligible without much difficulty to all of them. Nevertheless, there seems to be a limit in size beyond which intimate relationship cannot be maintained when ties become too spurious and weak to uphold the existence of the group.

Racial affinity, too, has been associated with the ethnic group.

15. Cf. Robert Redfield, *The Folk Culture of Yucatan* (Chicago, 1941), p. 132.
16. Cf. E. Faris, *The Nature of Human Nature....* (New York, 1937), p. 3.
17. Cf. E.K. Francis, "The Personality Type of the Peasant according to Hesiod's *Works and Days*," *Rural Sociology*, X, No. 3 (1945) 275-94.

Now, ethnic groups usually are endogamous; marriages with members of the outgroup are frequently tabooed. However, the laws of genetics do not suggest that inbreeding alone, without selection, results in homogeneous racial strains. How far selection operates in ethnic groups remains largely a controversial matter. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the composition of hereditary traits varies from one ethnic group to another. More significant than the real racial composition is an assumed common descent. Awareness of blood relationship and kinship seems to strengthen the ties between the members of a group. And yet the actual genetic composition is apparently irrelevant; for instance, family names follow either the patrilineal or, more rarely, the matrilineal sequence, and only occasionally both. The device of myths to establish a common ancestry for an ethnic group is a very ancient one. At all times man seems to have tampered with the mystery of biological heredity.

Physical and mental traits, which are really or only supposedly based on heredity and common descent, influence social behavior in yet another sense. Community or difference of objective characteristics affects human behavior in various ways. Physical traits, being obvious and usually indelible, lend themselves–even if they have gone unnoticed for a long time–readily to rationalizations of attitudes of sympathy and antipathy. Conflict situations, whether between ethnic groups or individuals, often–and not only since Hitler–hinge, as it were, on racial characteristics. The same is probably true of sympathetic sentiments and we-feeling.

Since humans are spatial entities, the attribution of a territory to ethnic groups is actually only a corollary to local affinity and size which we have discussed before. The only distinction of an ethnic group seems to lie in the exclusiveness with which it usually occupies a definite space. Finally, there is the time factor. Since an ethnic group is based on an elementary feeling of solidarity, we must suppose that mutual adjustment has been achieved over a considerable length of time and that the memory of having possibly belonged to another system of social relationships must have been obliterated.

The we-feeling present in the members of any group of the community type is, of course, also a characteristic of the ethnic group. We would not have introduced it expressedly if it did not offer a key to the distinction which we proposed to make between ethnic group and nation. Delos suggests that the transition from ethnic group to nation is characterized by *la passage de la communauté de conscience à la conscience de former une communauté*.[18] The phrase cannot be translated literally without conjuring up great confusion. Since Delos himself uses *conscience de "nous"* to describe the same phenomenon, we may translate *communauté de conscience* with "we-feeling." The ethnic group, he continues, is *une reálite objective,* although there is no *conscience réflexe*. Two elements transform the ethnic group into a nation: (1) the knowledge of forming an original entity and (2), the value attached to this fact, *Elle se manifeste par la volonté de perpétuer la vie commune*.[19] Consequently, *une nation est un peuple /sic!/ qui*

18. *Op. cit.*, I, 93.
19. *Ibid.*

prend conscience de lui-même selon ce que l'historie l'a fait; il se replie donc sur soi et sur son passé; ce qu'il aime, c'est lui-même tel qu'il se connaît ou se figure être.[20] We thus seem to have arrived at a certain solution. Nationalism, the sentiment of forming a community and the will to perpetuate it by–as we would add–political devices, is indeed the prerequisite. But it apparently presupposes another social fact. To describe it Delos uses the term *groupe ethnique*, although, in one place at least, he inadvertently substitutes the word *peuple*.

If sentiment and will are the factors which transform the ethnic group into a nation, the question arises: Which are the constitutional factors of the ethnic group itself?

There are a number of characteristics widely ascribed to the ethnic group: common language, folkways and mores, attitudes and standards, territory, descent, history, and, we may now add, common government. In fact, we know that the subjection of a group of people to a common political organization may directly, or, more often, indirectly by imposition of common laws, religion, language, feeling of loyalty, etc., not only forge together different ethnic elements into a new ethnic group but also divide an ethnic group or deliberately alter its structure, culture, and character. This, however, does not answer our question, for upon closer inspection it appears that two or more distinct ethnic groups may share in common certain characteristics, such as language, descent, religion. On the other hand, many ethnic groups are obviously not at all homogeneous as to their descent or religion, for instance.[21] Still worse, the

20. *Ibid.*, p. 94.
21. Cf. Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York, 1944), chap. i.

differences in the general culture pattern of different social strata within all the more developed and complex ethnic groups are very marked. It may even be doubtful whether the peasant culture in one ethnic group is not more closely related to the peasant culture in another than to urban culture in the same ethnic group. Thus, we cannot define the ethnic group as a plurality pattern which is characterized by a distinct language, culture, territory, religion, and so on.

It was exactly the attempt to reach a conclusion as to the nature of the ethnic group , inductively, by analyzing objective characteristics of concrete social facts of this kind, which so far has defied the ingenuity of a long series of writers of treatises dealing with our problem. The main reason for this failure must be sought in the fact that the essentially dynamic character of ethnic groups has been largely neglected, for these may represent different stages of development. It may well be the case that factors which have contributed to the formation of an ethnic group will lose their significance–once a certain degree of group coherence has been reached–or will be, later on, replaced by other factors not present in the beginning but contributing to the preservation of the group. In order to decide the issue it would be necessary to analyze the genesis of a great number of existing ethnic groups. Unfortunately, the origins of most ethnic groups lie in the distant and uncertain past. Dubious guesswork alone is our guide in their analysis. The emergence of new ethnic groups in the New world, however, offers more reliable material for the study of our problem. It should be possible from available historical sources to reconstruct their genesis in such a way as to reach definite conclusions. What seems clear even on the basis

of our limited knowledge is that it is too early yet to reach any definite conclusions.

Here we find, for example, sectarian groups which show all the traits and typical behavior of ethnic groups,[22] although, originally, they were joined together from various ethnic elements under the impact of a distinct religious persuasion and church organization and not on the basis of a distinct language, territory, and so on. Moreover, some of them have in the meantime undergone numerous schisms and religious splits which nevertheless have left untouched their identity and coherence. On the other hand, the major ethnic groups which have sprung up in the Americas seem to have been formed not so much by religion as by politics and geography. It should be possible to reconstruct from the available historical sources their genesis in such a way that definite generalizations could be reached. Yet even on the ground of our limited knowledge it becomes clear that, generally speaking, the stages of development traversed by ethnic groups are: expansion–fission–new combination. The factors which condition fission and new combination, however, appear to vary from case to case.

The thought suggests itself to us that allegiance to some external object is the most essential single factor in the formation or revival of ethnic groups. But the object of allegiance shifts from period to period, from country to country. It may be a monarch, a

22. In his study on Group Settlement in western Canada, C.A. Dawson subsumed--and to our opinion correctly--under the heading "Ethnic Communities" not only the French Canadians but also the Doukhobors, Mormons, or Mennonites (cf. Canadian Frontiers of Settlement, ed. W.A. Mackintosh and W.L.G. Joerg, Vol. VII 1936).

religion, language and literature, other forms of a higher culture, a political ideology centered around some type of government, a class, a "race." The type of catalyst apparently changes, as culture and the interests and ideas of man change–but, it seems, there always is a catalyst necessary to join the elements together into an ethnic group.

Delos suggests that a social fact is a relationship that unites a person to other persons not directly but by the mediation of another term, which he calls *l'objet*, because it is exterior to the *sujets individuels,* the persons whom it puts into a relationship.[23] According to him, all institutions and all groups present this triad: person–object–person. If Delos' position is correct, the element which we have called figuratively a catalyst seems to coincide with his *objet extraindividuel et extérieur.* Yet this object, he maintains, is an element common to all social facts. Should we, therefore, rather choose the type of objects as a principle of classification? Religious groups would be those which have religion as an "object"; culture groups, those which have culture as their "object"–and so on. Which specific object, however, shall we attribute to an ethnic group? And why does a religious group, under certain conditions, behave exactly as any ethnic group? We even may ask ourselves whether the ideologies and we-feelings which constitute the formative forces in a nation are typologically different from those which constitute the formative forces in a religious group. Hans Kohn said that "today…nationalism is the most universal religion of all times."[24] This statement, though exaggerated in a measure, tends

23. *Op. cit.*, p. 164.
24. Introduction to *National Consciousness*, by (Walter Sulzbach, Washington, D.C., n.d.), p. iv.

to defy any attempt to classify the phenomena under discussion according to "objects." An ethnic group, if we understand Delos rightly, would almost be identical with a nation which has not yet become fully conscious of itself. Would this not be, so to say, a definition *ex post facto*? Or is ethnic group a more universal, perhaps the most universal; fact of human society, while all other social facts are arrived at by way of elimination?

We hesitate to draw any definite conclusions from the few reflections presented in this paper. But we may state tentatively the following propositions as a working hypothesis for further investigation:

1. In their usual connotation the words "nation," "race," "nationality," "people," "religious group," etc., do not indicate any valid and definite categories of sociological classification. Neither do they describe *entia realia* in the philosophical sense, if such exist at all, or even definite types of social facts which would be useful for sociological generalizations.

2. The term "ethnic group," however, seems to be valuable to describe a variation of the community type. This subtype deserves a special name and formulation because it includes a considerable number of phenomena which are of practical interest to various social sciences. The basic type of the community includes many other phenomena such as the family, caste, or residential community. Nevertheless, we believe it is possible to distinguish them from the ethnic group. While the family or residential community is unable to satisfy all the basic societal needs of human nature, the ethnic group not only

permits a high degree of self-sufficiency and segregation but tends to enforce and preserve it.

On the other hand, the ethnic group is not so much dependent on face-to-face relationship as other types of communities. We find that the pattern of social interaction which is characteristic of the primary group permits its extension under certain conditions to a larger, locally less well-defined, and culturally less homogeneous group. We may, for instance, think of a peasant village as an ideal primary group. Now, under certain conditions, the we-feeling of this community can be made to include the natives of a valley or of a wider region, even a whole country. Thus, a larger, but secondary, group is being formed which presents most of the characteristics originally attached to the primary group. In this way, we may say, the ethnic group is the most inclusive, cumulative, and realistic type of secondary community.

3. The catalyst, or principal factor, which brings about such an extension of we-feeling is a mental process based on abstraction and hypostatical transposition of characteristics from the primary to the secondary group.[25] We may say that every ethnic group presupposes an ideology, however vague and unreflective it may be. The followers of a new religion, for instance, are moved by the overriding value they attach to their faith to withdraw their we-feeling from the nonbelieving members of their original community and to extend it to all fellow-believers. Since human nature seems to crave a pattern of social interaction

25. It is significant that in L. von Wiese (ed. Howard Becker), *Systematic Sociology* (1932), the following classification of plurality patterns is suggested: crowds, groups *abstract* collectivities.

which is of the community type, the wish and will become effective to substitute a community of all fellow-believers for the original community. In the same way, a national ideology tends to substitute or to widen a pre-existing community.[26]

4. All ethnic groups behave in the same typical manner, regardless of whether the underlying ideologies hinge on religious, political, cultural, racial, or other characteristics and regardless of whether these characteristics are real or fictitious. Once an ethnic group is well integrated it makes little difference whether these characteristics are real or fictitious. Once an ethnic group is well integrated it makes little difference whether the underlying ideology is rationally disproved; for, by then, the community has become real, that is, a social fact, and it will find new rationalizations for its coherence, if ever its ideological basis should be challenged.

5. It is quite likely that the quest for "objective" characteristics by which one concrete ethnic group could be distinguished from any other is futile. But there are certain elements that must be present or which must be deliberately created in the early stages of its genesis, such as a distinctive territory, some sort

26. "The German ideal of the *Volksgemeinschaft*... apparently is an attempt to reduce the complex social unit of a modern nation to the status of a primary group. The unreflective and instinctive participation of every individual of the 'group mind,' the intimacy of social interaction among all its members, the self-understood cooperation and complete community of purpose that is characteristic of a primary group, is being claimed for the totality of the *Volk*. However the same concept underlies other collectivistic ideologies." In the Marxian ideal of the classless society "we find the traits immanent in a primary group extended to a larger unit, in fact to the largest social unit which is conceivable" (E.K. Francis, "Progress and Golden Age," *Dalhousie Review*, XXV, No. 4 1946, 460-61).

of distinctive political organization, a common language, a common scale of values. Yet, once the ethnic group has reached a certain maturity, the elements which have conditioned it in the beginning may disappear, change, or be supplanted by others, without affecting its coherence and the *communauté de conscience* among its members. The dissolution of a community is brought about not so much by the loss of external characteristics as by the collision of conflicting values, solidarities, and loyalties.

6. Finally, no individual group, which is always a singular and unrepeatable phenomenon, will ever coincide with that type of plurality pattern which we have described as an ethnic group. As is the case with every other type, it will be quite legitimate to state that some concrete social group is an ethnic group to a lesser or greater degree. It appears that the modern nation belongs in the category of ethnic groups just as much as the religious communities of other stages of history. It is the result of deliberate political action by which all the ethnic groups that pre-exist within the actual or visualized territory of a state are molded into a new unit of we-feeling, into a new more or less homogeneous ethnic group.

In the preceding discussion we have been experimenting with a hypothetical sociological category which we thought could cover a number of phenomena popularly classed together. We have ventured to construe the ethnic type of cumulative groups as a device of sociological research, and we have proposed to term it "ethnic group." Whether this is a useful device can be ascertained only by operating with it for some time and by

applying it experimentally to a considerable number of concrete cases.

University of Manitoba

The Importance of "Community" in the Process of Immigrant Assimilation

JOSEPH FITZPATRICK

In studies of the experience of migrating people, the process of assimilation has been given consistent attention. In more recent studies the importance of the immigrant "community" in the process of assimilation has been emphasized. The present paper is an attempt to examine the concept of community as it is understood in these studies; to indicate the usefulness of the concept of community in the analysis of the process of assimilation; and to clarify the concept in relation to further studies of the immigrant community.

Part I: Assimilation and Community

Assimilation.

The concept of assimilation has had a variety of meanings.[1] It is not necessary to delay on them here. In the present paper, assimilation will be used in a simple and unsophisticated sense as the process in which people who can be identified as belonging to the same culture, move into the area of a culture foreign to their own and gradually adopt the way of life of the new culture. According to current theories of assimilation, this process consists of two main stages, cultural assimilation and social assimilation. This distinction had been implied in earlier studies, but S.N. Eisenstadt[2] succeeded in developing a sharply defined concept of each stage. According to Eisenstadt, *cultural assimilation* consists of the adoption of those values, norms, patterns of behavior and expectations without which a person is incapable of functioning with minimum effectiveness in a society. These are called the "universals" of a culture. Without them, one cannot survive in a culture. *Social assimilation* consists of the absorption of the newcomers into the primary groups of the host society, into face-to-face interaction as accepted members of the social groups of the host society in a range of activities from clubs to courtship and marriage. Social assimilation implies that two cultural groups no longer exist, but only one. Milton Gordon[3] uses the same distinction, but speaks of complete absorption as "structural assimilation." During the first stages of the process of assimilation a situation of multiple

1. Milton Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), Ch. 3 "The Nature of Assimilation" has a good review of the various meanings of the concept.
2. S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Absorption of Immigrants*, (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955).
3. Milton Gordon, *Op. cit.*

cultures[4] exists. Apart from the essential values and behavior patterns which are shared, a wide range of distinct cultural values and behavior patterns exist side by side. The relationship between the two cultures in a situation of multiple cultures varies greatly from one of domination of one culture by the other; hostility of one to the other; indifference or acceptance.

Community.

The meaning of community can be presented in descriptive terms, the way in which it would come to one's attention when empirically observed. It signifies a group of people who follow a way of life or patterns of behavior which mark them out as different from people of another society, or from other people in the larger society in which they live or to which they have come. They are people who have generally come from the same place, or who are identified with the particular locality where they now live or to which they have come. They speak the same language, probably have the same religious beliefs. They tend to "stick together," to help and support each other. They have expectations of loyalty one to the other and methods of social control.

The literature on the concept of community is extensive. George A. Hillary[5] attempted to synthesize the definitions of the concept and published the result of his efforts in an excellent article on

4. The term multiple cultures is used here to avoid a confusion with the term "cultural pluralism." This latter is generally used to express a situation in which the second culture is accepted, and given the freedom to exist as a distinct culture in the host society.
5. George A. Hillary, "Definitions of Community: Areas of Agreement," *Rural Sociology*, 20 (1955), 111-23.

which the present paper relies heavily. This will be indicated specifically later on. Many of the definitions of community rely on the well known definition of Robert MacIver. MacIver[6] defined community (a) physically by reference to a specific geographical area; and (b) socially and psychologically by what he called "community sentiment." This latter provides the basis for group solidarity: (i) *role-feeling*, the awareness of a definite set of roles to fulfill in the group; (ii) *we-feeling*, a sense of belonging to *this* community, of sharing its customs and traditions, its total unique culture; (iii) *dependency-feeling*, the perception of the community as a necessary condition of one s life, as a "refuge from the solitude and fears that accompany that individual isolation so characteristic of our modern life."[7]

MacIver insisted that both conditions, a territorial base and a community sentiment are necessary for community. In brief, "The mark of a community is that one's life *may* be lived wholly within it."[8]

This quality of relationships which MacIver defines as community has been expressed in a number of ways by other writers. Toenmes used the concepts of *Gemeinschaft* in contrast to *Gesellschaft* in which community (gemeinschaft) was perceived as a quality of human relations which are indeliberate on the part of individuals and proceed from the mere observable fact that men live together. In this concept of community, the fact of "groupness" is prior to the awareness of any specific

6. R. MacIver & C. Page, *Society, an Introductory Analysis* (New York: Rinehart, 1949, Ch. 1 and 12).
7. *Ibid*., p. 293.
8. *Ibid*., p. 9.

or specialized functions. Community (gemeinschaft) is distinct from association (gesellschaft). In the latter, actions are deliberately chosen in relation to goals or ends. This concept of community is evidently what Henry Sumner Maine sought to express in the term "status" in contrast to "contract " (association). Durkheim used the concept "mechanic solidarity" in contrast to "organic solidarity" (association). Talcott Parsons[9] uses a number of "pattern variables" to express the quality of human relationships which take place in community; relationships which are particularistic rather than universalistic; diffuse rather than functionally specific; in which status is ascribed rather than achieved; are affective rather than affectively neutral; ego-oriented rather than collectivity-oriented. In other words, the relationships expressed by the concept "community" are a basic pattern of relationships found in men's social life. They differ from another basic pattern of relationships expressed in the concept "association."

In the community type of grouping,[10] it is indicated that we find evidence of sentiment and identification. The individuals have mutual concern for each other as values in themselves, and are not seen as functionaries of a higher social organization. The internal mechanism of social control is normative and of the reciprocal reaction type. The associations are informal and repressive in nature. The pattern of interaction does not give rise to status positions and their corresponding role expectations, especially statuses, in which authority inheres. If authority is

9. Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951).
10. The following paragraphs are based on Hillary, *Op. cit.*

manifest in community organization, it assumes the character of personal leadership.

It is within the community that an individual is comfortable and secure. It satisfies his need for recognition and acceptance. Within it he can reevaluate, mold and integrate the values of the higher society. His avenues of interaction are predictable. They are basically cooperative, short-lived, and not necessarily directed toward higher goals. If community functions arise, they come about because of this organization and not as a starting point. Briefly, it is defined by Timasheff as the social group in which the group is prior to the function.

Assimilation and Community.

The existence of a strong community among immigrant people and its importance in the process of assimilation has long been recognized. The emphasis in Eisenstadt and Gordon on the distinct social group which assimilates culturally while it retains its distinct social identity is another way of indicating the central role of the immigrant community. "One integrates from a position of strength, not from a position of weakness" is a frequently quoted remark. The general position is stated in a previous article by the present author.[11] He says that if people are torn too rapidly away from the traditional cultural framework of their lives, and thrown too quickly as strangers into a cultural environment which is unfamiliar, the danger of social disorganization is very great. They need the traditional social group in which they are at home, in which they find their

11. Jos. P. Fitzpatrick, "The Integration of Puerto Ricans," *Thought*, XXX (Autumn, 1955), pp. 402-20.

psychological satisfaction and security, in order to move with confidence toward interaction with the larger society. The immigrant community is the beachhead from which they move with strength. Florence Kluckhohn's[12] study of the ethnic groups in the Boston area discovered that those families in which emotional "illness" had occurred were families in which the close ties with kin and family had broken down, whereas the emotionally "healthy" families were those in which the close family and kinship ties had remained strong. Abraham Weinberg's[13] study of immigrants to Israel concluded that man cannot be of good mental and physical health in the midst of widespread associational activity (gesellschaft) unless he finds some way of perpetuating the satisfactions of community (gemeinschaft). Weinberg found that primary groups were essential, and, for immigrants this is generally the community of friends and kin. Eugene Litwak[14] presents evidence that, even in migration within the nation, the extended kinship ties play an important role in enabling the migrating family to adjust successfully to the new environment. The consistent findings of studies of immigrants indicate the strength which these close family relationships give to migrating groups. This network of relationships would be called the immigrant community.

Part II: Clarification of Concept

This review of the concept of community and of the significance

12. Florence Kluckhohn, "Family Diagnosis: Variations in the Basic Values of Family Systems," *Social Casework*, 39 (March, 1958), pp. 63-73.
13. Abraham Weinberg, *Migration and Belonging* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961).
14. Eugene Litwak, "Geographic Mobility and Extended Family Cohesion," *American Sociological Review*, 25:3 (June, 1960).

of the community in the process of assimilation still leaves a great deal of obscurity in the use of the concept for the study of immigrant groups. Sometimes widely scattered, at different stages of assimilation, with different interests and leaders, the community of immigrants is not always easy to discover. Therefore the second part of this paper will seek to clarify the concept particularly in view of its use in the study of immigrant communities.

Identification of Community.

The first major problem is the problem of identifying the active reality which is a community. In the case of immigrants, it is not the larger society; it is a sub-culture in the culture of the larger society. There is agreement that the basic elements of the community are the conscious sharing of common ends, norms and means, which gives the group a "consciousness of kind," an awareness of bonds of membership which constitute their unity. It is also widely agreed that interaction as a primary group is required. And since this generally cannot take place at too great a distance, some kind of area limits are necessary to define a community. Thus, area, primary group interaction, and consciousness of kind in the possession of common ends, norms, and means appear to be indicators of community. John F. Cuber[15] and Arnold Green suggest that area is not as important

15. "...The 'communality' is an interest circle characterized by the special nearness of members whose places of residence may be widely separated...Its members belong...because they share like interests, ranging from the ephemeral to the relatively permanent. They meet together whenever they find it convenient...." John Cuber, Sociology, fifth edit. (New York: Appleton, Century, Crofts, 1963), p. 437. Green states: "A community is a cluster of people, living within a continuous small area, who share a common way of life. A community is a local

as interaction which is now possible beyond the range of local areas. And Maurice Stein states that "…a spatial neighborhood may have no significant meaning…true communal congeniality may exist between people scattered throughout a city…"[16] He stresses as the basis of community a "configuration of values and a set of institutional patterns," a definite "social identity" and primary group ties and primary relations, with emphasis on the individual as an end in himself. Granted that primary group relations may possibly transcend local areas with modern communication, most scholars find that the geographical referent is important.

Therefore the definition of community must begin with the identification of a social group, a group of interacting individuals who have a consciousness of kind in the possession of common ends, norms and means; the definition must indicate the relationship of this group to area. In many cases, it appears that area may simply be a pattern of physical symbols which enable members of the community more easily to identify themselves. This problem of identity is the problem of "boundaries"; what shall I take as community?

Conrad Arensberg and Solon T. Kimball[17] present an excellent model for the identification of a community in the

territorial group." But Green then demonstrates that common interests and shared ways of life in the modern world are shifting "from local place to large horizontal organizations that transcend community." Arnold Green, *Sociology*, fourth edit. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 274.

16. Maurice Stein, *Eclipse of Community* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 112.
17. Conrad Arensberg and Solon T. Kimball, *Culture and Community* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964).

anthropological tradition. They point out that it must first be a culture, a set of interrelated institutions; it must have some geographical referent, i.e. the institutional arrangements must express themselves in some kind of settlement pattern; finally, it must have some relationship with the cultural worlds outside itself; how is it linked to the larger society? A cultural group, in a geographical setting, with a particular set of relationships with the larger society–these become the guiding norms to identify a community.

Arensberg and Kimball then state four questions which must be answered before community can be studied on either a theoretical or empirical level: 1) Representativeness: what aggregate should be chosen as representing a culture? What aggregate is a community? 2) Boundaries: what limits does the investigator set? How self-sufficient must the aggregate be to be a community? How self-contained? 3) Inclusiveness: how complete must the community be? To what extent must the totality of institutions be present in it? 4) Cohesiveness: How united must the group be? To what extent must conflict and factions be excluded?

The model of Arensberg and Kimball is proposed for the study of large communities, in a sense, settlements. A more useful definition on the level of smaller communities is the definition of a "minority-group community" which Robin Williams adopted from a dissertation of Robert B. Johnson.[18] Speaking of community, he says: "The core elements are a history, a territorial base, a clustering of primary institutions, a set of

18. Robert B. Johnson, *The Nature of the Minority Community*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 1955.

functional relationships with a dominant or majority community and a special frequency of social interaction within the minority community."

In view of these definitions and models, a study of community must first determine the "boundaries" of community (what makes this particular aggregate a community); its relationship to a geographical area, and its links with the larger society.

Boundaries.

As indicated above, the variables that basically make a social group a community are the ends, norms, attitudes, and values, which give a particular form or style to the interaction of its members. A search for such a group would be the first step identifying a community. Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Strodbeck[19] have developed a method of studying groups according to value orientations toward five crucial problems of human life. On the basis of these they find they can identify groups, contrast them, and indicate the kinds of difficulties which will be involved as the group shifts from one set of value orientations to another. The five human problems and the value orientations are as follows:[20]

19. Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Strodtbeck, *Variations in Value Orientations* (Elmsford, N.Y.: Row, Peterson & Co., 1961).
20. *Ibid*., p. 12.

ORIENTATION	POSTULATED	RANGE OF	VARIABLES
Human nature	Evil	Neutral-mixture of good and evil	Good
Man-nature	mutable immutable subjugation of nature	mutable immutable harmony with nature	mutable immutable mastery over nature
Time	Past	Present	Future
Activity	Being	Being-in-becoming	Doing
Relational	Lineality	Collaterality	Individualism

The book presents a carefully worked out method of studying these basic orientations by which the members of a community could be identified.

In an impressive study of an Italian community on the West End of Beacon Hill, Boston, Herbert Gans[21] was able to distinguish various sub-cultures in the "Urban Village" on the basis of different attitudes and values. These would have great value in the study of any poor class group, although the range of use is limited since they relate to lower class cultures rather than the entire range of cultural levels which one may have occasion to study. It is important to note that Gans, in defining the sub-community of which he writes, states that: "The basis of adult life is peer group solidarity…membership in the group is based primarily on kinship. Brothers, sisters, cousins (and

21. Herbert J. Gans, *The Urban Villagers* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1962).

their spouses) are the core. Godparents and single individuals are also included, the latter because of the sympathy of the Italians for the unattached individual, a role little valued in their culture. Neighbors can be included."[22] "…people must be relatively compatible in terms of background, interests, and attitudes."[23]

Gans also ties in a number of institutions with community; namely, the church, the parochial school, formal social, political and civic organizations and some commercial establishments.[24] To the "Urban Villagers" the organizations and institutions that constitute the community are an accepted part of life, since their functions are frequently an auxiliary to those of the peer society.[25]

Interaction within this cultural framework produces a type of social-sub-system with its own structures and dynamics. This notion of sub-system is an important tool of analysis, and it is very helpful when applied in the study of the solidarity of the immigrant community (*system maintenance*) and the relationship of the community to the larger society (*systematic linkage*.) Change and conflict as well as control and organization can also be analyzed in the context of system. The community as a subsystem, therefore, is more extensive than a teenage gang, for example, which would be a social group but hardly a community. Community as a subsystem focusses around such primary institutions as family, religion, recreation. A totally self-

22. *Ibid*., p. 74.
23. *Ibid*., p. 76.
24. *Ibid*., p. 105.
25. *Ibid*., p. 120.

sufficient community would be a society. A primitive community might be so self-enclosed and self-sufficient as to form an independent society; but towns, urban villages and immigrant neighborhoods or communities generally cannot be.

Geographical Referent.

Actually what Gans calls the organizations and institutions of the community are what Arensberg and Kimball mean when they speak of a "geographical referent." They are tangible entities into which the lives of the community members are enmeshed, and which give to the members check points as it were of their own identity. They can localize, "who they are." The referents, as described by Fried,[26] were an extension of home in which various parts are delineated on the basis of a sense of belonging. A sense of spatial identity, Fried insists, is fundamental to human functioning. Prior to being relocated from Boston's West End redevelopment area, most residents experienced profound satisfaction from living in the area. Their satisfaction derived in large part from the close associations maintained among the local places. In turn, people and places provided the framework for personal and social integration.

Therefore, this second indicator involves a knowledge of the neighborhood and those features of the neighborhood which are the tangible points of identity for a group. A church, a store, a club, even a street corner, a place of work, whatever these may be, if they are the spatial context for the social life of a group of

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26. Marc Fried, "Grieving for a Lost Home," in *The Urban Condition*, Leonard J. Duhl (ed.) Cf. also, Marc Fried and Peggy Gleicher, "Some Sources of Satisfaction in an Urban Slum," *Journal of American Institute of Planners*, 27 (1961), 305-315.

people, they become important. Their loss or sudden change can seriously affect the existence of the community.

Links with the Larger Community.

The third important variable to investigate is the linkage of the community with the larger society or community. In a study of cultural assimilation, this is particularly important because this will represent the channels through which contacts will develop; ideas, attitudes and values come to be known, then shared or rejected; the possibilities for primary group interaction develop.

The basic links are *occupation, the education of children,* and *political action.* Occupation operates on a number of levels. A person may be working in a place where most or all of the other employees are of his same subcultural group; he may even be working in an establishment owned and operated by one of his own subculture. In this sense, occupation may provide a very weak link with the larger community. However, to the extent to which he is working for an employer who belongs to the larger society, or with employees who are not of his own community, employment becomes an effective link with the larger world.

Education is the major socializing institution which communicates to the children, of immigrants or not, the culture of the United States. It is the process of education which guarantees eventual assimilation. Therefore, in terms of an immigrant community, education may be dysfunctional. By socializing the children in a culture different from that of their parents, education runs the risk of creating division in the home

between parent and child and thus may tend to disrupt the solidarity of the community of the first generation.

Political action brings the community into immediate participation in the organized life of the larger society. Immigrants may participate as a recognizable block, with their own strength and power; or they may join with other groups. In any event they are engaged in the action proper to the larger society as a whole. They gain power for themselves, or for the political group of which they are a part, when they reach a point where those in political power can no longer afford to disregard them.

Two final points may be introduced here: the relationship of conflict to the community, and the role of the intellectuals. Conflict outside the community often serves to strengthen the community;[27] it has a boundary-maintaining function, unless it reaches an intensity at which it becomes destructive to the smaller community. Therefore, the study of conflict becomes an important means of determining the strength of the community; it also enables one to analyze the relationship of the community to the larger society. It is very likely that conflict which originated in a desire to contain the smaller community may become the most significant factor in giving the community the strength it needs to integrate rapidly.

27. Cf. Ralf Dahrendorf, "Toward a Theory of Social Conflict," in Amitai Etzioni and Eva Etzioni (eds.) *Social Change* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1956); also, Michael Duffy, *Cultural Assimilation Viewed as a Process of Structural Change Involving Conflict*, unpublished paper, Fordham University, January, 1966; also Diane Wagner, *Assimilation, Growth and Conflict*, unpublished paper, Fordham University, January, 1966.

A second aspect of conflict is more difficult to cope with, namely, the presence of conflict within the community itself. The investigator must make a decision whether to define the community in terms of the common and harmonious possession of common values and attitudes, or whether to admit the presence of conflict within the community. If conflict is to be admitted in the community to be studied, the function of this conflict must be explored: does it tend to strengthen or weaken the community in question?

The second point refers to the elite or the intellectuals. Gordon presents the theory that the intellectuals constitute a community of their own.[28] They, more than any others, transcend the community of race or ethnic group and constitute a community of their own. marginal to that of their origins, and founded on the values, attitudes, and objectives they have as intellectuals. On the other hand, it has been the elite who traditionally have shown the capacity to build the bridge between their own community and that of the larger society. Therefore, the study of the elite must analyze the extent to which the elite have established a community relationship with intellectuals of their own kind in the larger society; and the extent to which the elite mediate the integration of their community of origin with the larger society.

Summary

This paper accepts the position that the relationships expressed in the concept "community" play a decisive role in the process of cultural assimilation. There is evidence that the immigrant community is the beachhead into the new society. It provides

28. Milton Gordon, *Op. cit.*, pp. 224-232.

for the immigrant a base of security, peace, and psycho-social satisfaction while he learns to adjust to the new and strange world into which he has come. Had he no such basis of security, the too sudden exposure to a strange culture could be an upsetting shock. The immigrant community is the basis of familiar relationships and interaction which give him an identity and the security of living according to familiar patterns among familiar people.

Useful as the concept of community has been, however, it is still marked by numerous obscurities which impede its more effective use in the analysis of the process of assimilation. The clarifications suggested above are certainly not definitive. They are attempts to make the concept more precise so that its application to the study of immigrant communities may be more fruitful. If the boundaries of the community can be more sharply identified by using some of the more recent methods of studying cultural differences; if the geographical referents can be specified, and the links with the larger community more accurately defined, it should be possible to indicate more clearly the functions of the immigrant community in the process of assimilation.

Ethnicity and Cultural Pluralism

ISRAEL RUBIN

Introduction

For the purpose of this discussion, I shall assume the validity of data–both systematic and impressionistic–that indicate a fairly recent change in the United States, from the erstwhile emphasis on melting all immigrants into a culturally homogeneous nation as soon as feasible, to acceptance, even preference, for cultural pluralism. The fact that a great deal of controversy still surrounds the subject, calls for more refined analysis. It is to this end that this essay is oriented. It is necessary to recognize that we are dealing with two dimensions, a normative one in which our inquiry revolves around the question whether or not pluralism is desirable, and a social-realistic one in which we focus on the problem of whether the actual trend seems to be in the direction of an ethnically pluralistic society. Though related,

these are two distinct questions and require separate treatment. I shall proceed accordingly.

The Value Dimension: Melting Pot or Pluralism?

The change in our value system toward a more favorable stance vis-a-vis cultural diversity is relatively easy to follow. The components of this process are rather familiar and need to be reviewed here but briefly. Embarrassing as it may be to contemplate that before Hitler even emerged on the horizon, Americans had embraced (albeit in mild form) racist norms that later became the cornerstone of Nazism; the fact itself is barely deniable. The quota system instituted in the 20's to govern U.S. immigration policy was clearly based on Gobineau's and Chamberlain's theories that postulate the superiority of Nordic peoples.[1] To be sure, there was a liberal variant of the value of assimilation in which desirability of quick assimilation was viewed in terms of superiority of Western culture and of opportunity for upward mobility.[2] It was the liberal variant that

1. Gobineau, Joseph A., *comte* de. *The Inequality of Human Races*, tr. A. Collins. New York: H. Fertig, 1967. Chamberlain, Houston S. *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, tr. John Lees. New York: John Lane C., 1914. The quota system intended, quite openly, not only to reduce the flow of immigrants to this country, but to retain the ethno-racial balance and, specifically, not to let the "inferior" stock from eastern Europe pollute the high quality of the American population which was believed to be a result of the dominance of "superior" Northwest Europeans. There is a mountain of literature on the subject, both documentary and scholarly. For an adequate summary, cf. William S. Bernard, ed., *American Immigration Policy: A Reappraisal*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950, esp. ch. 2--"The Quota System"

2. In my own discipline, sociology, we can find an excellent example in Robert E. Park, the proponent of the well-known race-relations- cycle theory. Park can by no stretch of the imagination be labelled a racist and, yet, he often speaks in glowing terms about our "civilization" and its superiority over simpler cultures. As many students have pointed out, his

became the philosophical basis for the Americanization legacy handed to the public schools and settlement houses. However, the presence of the liberal version, instead of detracting us from recognizing the racist foundation of assimilationism, ought to emphasize the magnitude of the sentiment that prevailed in the United States between the two world wars. In a period that saw an American president become the champion of European nationalities' right to political independence, the presence in this country of a large unassimilated immigrant population that was culturally remote from the dominant WASP strain, must have appeared to be such a threat to nationhood that the goal of quick assimilation attracted wide support, producing in the process the curious phenomenon of liberal intolerance.

Around World War II, the situation changed radically. Aside from the fact that both reduced immigration and the instruments created for the materialization of the melting-pot ideal effectively reduced the proportion of foreigners to natives, thus considerably lessening the concern with the former, an international factor entered the picture. German behavior during the War shocked the Western world into realization of where

entire theory which postulates the inevitability of complete amalgamation of minorities is obviously colored by his positive valuation of such amalgamation. Often the line between the biologically oriented racist and the culturally oriented liberal assimilationist is quite thin. For example, Park the liberal seemingly yearned not merely for cultural assimilation but also for biological amalgamation. Conversely many of the earlier racists acknowledged the primacy of culture. See, for example, John J. Commons, *Races and Immigrants in America*. New York: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1967 (first published in 1907), who speaks matter-of-factly about "superior" and "inferior" races, also manages to acknowledge that "backwardness" is often confused with "inferiority" (pp. 208 and ff.), thus pleading for a greater emphasis on cultural assimilation than on biological amalgamation.

feelings of ethno-racial superiority might lead. The United States
played a leading part in the struggle against Hitler's Germany
and, to boot, emerged from the struggle in the partially self-
chosen role of leader of the "free world," a role obviously
incompatible with the theory and practice of ethnic intolerance
at home. During the same period, developments in the social
sciences, especially cultural anthropology, alerted us to the
objectively unfounded nature of our ethnocentric attitude toward
technically less developed cultures. Finally, our difficulties in
areas such as race-relations and education underlined the
inadequacy of some of our basic institutional structures, thus
suggesting that a pluralistic setting that contains many
alternatives may ultimately prove healthier than a sociocultural
monolith.

Of course, assimilation has not disappeared as a value. Oddly
enough, old-school liberals are today the most vigorous
defenders of the earlier value, though they added a new
argument to the old benevolent concern for the immigrants'
welfare. Pointing to both black racism among Afros and the
equally aggressive reaction among some white ethnics, these
liberals admonish us not to allow our enthusiasm for "ethnic
virtues" render us blind to "ethnic poisons."[3] The logic of this
line of argument simply escapes me. If the tendency toward
aggressive ethnocentrism that often accompanies ethnic identity
justifies opposition to maintenance of ethnic identity, then why
stop with ethnicity? What about religion and *its* poisonous side?
Shall we therefore strive toward the elimination of religious

3. Harold R. Isaacs, "The New Pluralists," *Commentary* 53:3 (March,
   1972), pp. 75-82.

pluralism? And why stop even here? Why not extend the argument toward all sub-cultural divisions along class, regional, and a host of other lines? Ultimately, consistency would demand that we carry this reasoning to the international scene, where intercultural hostility is at the root of all wars. The obvious solution is to make all mankind accept one culture, preferably ours, I assume. This frame of mind reminds one of Eliezer Steinbarg's fable "The Awakening of the Forest" in which the new revolutionary fox proclaims that wearing of horns should be prohibited because of their offensive quality. Since then, the wolf really loves sheep. He merely wishes to remove their offensive-looking horns and it is not his fault that in the process he happens to destroy them.[4]

Thus, in spite of these liberal remnants of an earlier age, it seems safe to assume that the intellectual shift toward pluralism as a norm constitutes change toward a more humanistic appreciation of cultural diversity, a change that is virtually inevitable in the light of both social and intellectual developments.

Social Reality: Is Ethnic Pluralism Probable?

It is a different story when it comes to the matter of recent grassroot interest in ethnic identity. What does this new interest actually mean? What sentiments does it express? Simple schema will obviously not do. Should we, for example, wish to view the phenomenon as a mere counterpart of the liberalizing winds that found expression in the new value of pluralism, we run afoul of some facts that stare us in the face. Can we in all

4. Eliezer Stejnbarg, *Mesolim I.* Cernauti (Czernowitz, Romania), 1932, pp. 176-177.

honesty stick the "liberal" label on, say, Slovaks who attempt to stir up sympathy for Tiso's World War II period Nazi regime just because during that period Slovakia was nominally independent? Or, can we conceivably read liberal humanism into the vile antisemitism of the Leslie Campbells and LeRoy Joneses in the Black camp or the shady activities of the Jewish Defense League? Let me hasten to add that we find ourselves in similar difficulty if we try to reverse the label and view the current mood as a reactionary manifestation. One can just as easily produce evidence to the contrary. The point to be made is that the phenomenon we are observing appears, upon analysis, to be fairly complex and that if we are to comprehend it, simple characterization will just not serve our purpose.

When ideologies fail to provide an explanation for human behavior, sociologists often rediscover the principle that one of the founding fathers of American sociology has taught us at the beginning of this century, namely, that "the first task of life is to live. Men begin with acts, not thoughts."[5] I suggest that in our quest for an understanding of the current interest in ethnicity we concentrate our search on social and individual needs, rather than ideologies, that are likely to be at the root of this interest.

In the literature on ethnicity the problem of "community" is frequently mentioned,[6] a problem that I wish to explore further. Suggestions are offered to the effect that ethnic consciousness constitutes a search for community, a search for identity with

5. William G. Sumner, *Folkways*. New York: Dover Publications, 1959, p. 2.
6. See, for example, Richard Koln, "Ethnicity in Society and Community," in Otto Feinstein, ed., *Ethnic Groups in the City: Culture, Institutions, and Power*. Indianapolis: D.C. Heath and Co., 1971, pp. 57-77.

a social entity smaller than society as a whole. So far so good. But what about the nature of the need or needs that underlie this quest? Why should a citizen not be satisfied, with his identity as an "American"? Further, assuming we can isolate the underlying need, does the ethnic entity appear to be capable of satisfying that need? Without answers to these questions we are not even able to speculate about the prospects for the future of ethnicity in a society like that of the United States of America.

In a previous publication[7]

7. I. Rubin, "Function and Structure of Community: Conceptual and Theoretical Analysis," *International Review of Community Development*, n. 21-22 (1969), pp. 111-122. I outlined a conceptual approach to the subject. The gist of that argument is as follows: If we accept Durkheim's premise that "a society composed of an infinite number of unorganized individuals…constitutes a veritable sociological monstrosity," we are led to the conclusion that structures mediating between the individual and the larger society–communities–are necessary in order to prevent alienation. I have further argued that in order for a given social organization to serve as an effective community it ought to possess five characteristics. First, it must be a concrete organization, as a mere "community of interest" is not likely to eliminate a sense of alienation. Second, it should be intermediate in size, large enough to convey a sense of significance, yet small enough to enable individual members to recognize personally at least a significant number of fellow members. Third, the organization should provide a setting for extensive social interaction of both the primary (congeniality) and secondary (business) varieties. Without a measure of congeniality it might be difficult for a member to develop a sense of identification with the organization, whereas without transacting some important business, an organization can hardly be expected to provide for its members a feeling of meaningful incorporation into the larger society. Fourth, growing out of the point just made, the organization in question must be in an institutional area considered important by the standards of culture. Thus, a religious organization can serve as community within a culture that considers religion important, an occupational association, where occupation is significant, and so on. Fifth and last, stability on both individual and organizational levels seems to be essential; neither an ad

To begin with, it seems plausible to suggest that the recent surge of ethnic sentiment–regardless of whether the cementing ideology in a given case happens to be liberal, conservative, or reactionary-constitutes a search for community. Ethnicity is, after all, a nonterritorial dimension. Ethnic organizations need not be territorially bounded and thus should be capable of providing for mobile modern man a relatively stable communal structure, one immune to the shattering forces of industrial society that play havoc with neighborhoods and towns.

Furthermore, the ethnic entity would appear to possess most of the necessary ingredients. The ethnic club is a concrete organization. It is usually of the "right" size. It, further, provides for both congenial primary interaction and secondary activity, especially in the important area of politics where ethnic organizations tend to be active. It has also at least the potentiality of stability, since the individual who identifies strongly with his ethnic group would normally do so for life, while the continued presence of sufficient numbers of ethnics ought to enable organizational stability. Finally, the just mentioned tendency to be politically active would seem to place the ethnic organization

hoc organization nor one in which individuals belong but for short terms is likely to provide a vital link between individual and society. Finally, while recognizing what is essential, we come to realize what is not. Most importantly, territorial boundary does not appear to be a necessary ingredient. In fact, analysis of both the above-mentioned sketch and a variety of available data, suggest that the mobile conditions of modern life have rendered the locality-based community ineffective and that, therefore, modern man is in the process of finding substitute communities in such structures as professional and business associations. When we approach the subject of ethnicity with the above in mind, we gain some insights into the nature of the phenomenon, at the same time that we are led to serious doubts about the prospect for long-range persistence of large-scale ethnic identity in our midst.

in an important institutional area, if not the most important one from our point of view, considering that the political process reaches to the very heart of the alienation problem.

However, as we tackle the problem of prospects for the future, we find ourselves in need of deeper analysis, the kind that would allow us a glance into the dynamics of the situation. Such analysis leads to some searching questions concerning the extent of validity of the above model. When we talk about future prospects, we are raising a qualitative as well as a quantitative question (even if we assume that we have settled the normative problem and reached some consensus on the desirability, or at least tolerability, of cultural pluralism). In addition to asking whether the ethnic frame of reference appears to be theoretically capable of functioning as community, we are also interested in the problem whether a large segment of the population is likely to retain a strong ethnic identity and thus search for community in ethnicity rather than (or perhaps in addition to), say, the occupational sphere. The qualitative and quantitative dimensions are, of course, inseparable. For in order to offer plausible speculation on the quantity, we need to re-examine the quality of the structure, to what degree it really meets the necessary qualifications for attracting large segments of the population. When we thus take a second look at ethnicity, it seems that its qualifications to serve as community leave much to be desired.

The ethnic frame appears especially vulnerable in the dimension of institutional importance. True, politics is very important, but is ethnic identity? Politics can be played through a variety of

organizational structures. Clearly, in order for one to choose the ethnic club as his political medium, he must first and foremost have a strong ethnic identity; otherwise he is likely to prefer some alternative framework (religion or occupation, for example) in which he has a greater interest. Thus, we can argue that the primary emphasis on politics as such of ethnic organizations in the United States may be a weakness rather than an asset. A true ethnic community would need to have as its central focus the preservation of ethnic culture, rather than the election or appointment of ethnics to public office. Of course, preservation of ethnicity and the right to be different often requires political activity. However, this is of secondary importance and ought, logically, to be confined to defensive purposes, to instances where the leveling forces of the surrounding society and culture threaten either the right to be different or the right of those who are different to gain equal access to, say, jobs. The problem of primacy of focus is a critical one in this case, for without a strong desire to retain cultural difference, it makes little sense to exert political clout for gaining the right to be different. As for the struggle to have a few ethnics in public office, I agree with those who regard this as a mere symbolic issue that has little substance.[8]

Viewed this way, realistic conjecture about the future requires a shift in the focus of inquiry, from examining the theoretical capability of the ethnic organization to serve as community, to

8. Professor Ronald Busch of the Political Science Department of Cleveland State University expressed this view in a paper entitled "Ethnic Assimilation vs. Cultural Pluralism: Some Political Implications," that he presented at the same conference in which an earlier version of this paper was read.

questioning the likelihood that a large number of individuals will choose to relate to the larger society via ethnic organizations.

At this juncture we need to pause for a moment and reflect on the nature of ethnic identity and its persistence over time. The way I understand it, a continuous identification with an ethnic entity entails positive valuation of that entity's culture. Needless to say that I have in mind "culture" in the social scientific sense, the important components of which are basic values and behavior patterns. Promoters of ethnic culture in this country have too often dealt with what is popularly called "culture," i.e., the fine arts and/or culinary habits. It is my contention that eating sausage, or appreciating Mickiewicz, without concurrent commitment to basic Polish values and behavior distinctly different from that of the surrounding society, should not be mistaken for a Polish identity of any significance.

By its very nature, remaining distinctly different from the majority, often requires sacrifice. An individual who wishes to hold on to differences must, therefore, feel so strongly about his chosen preference that he be willing to accept occasional hardships and feel that what he gets in return is well-worth the price he pays. This, I repeat, is in the nature of things, not merely an outcome of official policy. Of course, the values and policies of the host society may raise or lower lithe price" of being different, but it cannot wipe it out. An Amish parent may win the right to educate his children according to the tenets of his faith, but the necessity to forego the benefits of a tractor or an insurance policy are dictated by Amish values. An Orthodox Jew may force an employer to grant him the right to be absent

from work on Saturdays, but it is Jewish Orthodoxy, not external antagonism, that forces its bearers to purchase higher-priced kosher food products or to close their stores and shops on Saturdays. I find it difficult to think of any true cultural distinction that does not impose some limitation.

Furthermore, the cost of being different increases if the difference is to be perpetuated over generations. The latter requires a massive investment of money and effort to build effective educational and communal structures for the socialization of the young in the minority culture and their insulation from the assimilating currents of the majority culture.

This view of the nature of sub-cultural identity adds a new dimension to our question concerning the likelihood of large-scale ethnic pluralism in our society. Our question must be rephrased to read, in essence: what are the prospects for wide segments of our population choosing their ethnic origin as a framework for community, considering that this involves a commitment to important cultural elements that are different from the larger culture and a concomitant willingness to pay the price of being different?

From the vantage point of those of us who advocate cultural pluralism, the answer does not seem to be very encouraging. We should not mistake the recent flurry of ethnic activity for a genuine quest for community via ethnicity. Nowhere on the present scene is there any indication of large-scale efforts in behalf of genuine cultural distinction along ethnic lines.[9] To

9. Most of the recent data cited in support of the continued viability of ethnicity here (and which has come to my attention) deals with some

be sure, some such attempts are being made. However, these are few and far between. Even among the two most notable exceptions, the Black and Jewish aggregates, where the quest for continued sub-cultural identity seems to be most widespread, one has the impression that when we dig underneath the surface we are likely to find considerably less substance than is apparent on first impression. On the Jewish scene with which I am personally familiar, only a small minority holds on to culturally sanctioned behavior patterns that are visibly different from those of the surrounding urban middle-class to which Jews overwhelmingly belong. I have the impression that the same is true on the Black scene (though, admittedly, my impression here is formed on the basis of considerably less experience).

The Black and Jewish cases bring to mind one more important problem that needs clarification. A decade ago, Milton Gordon[10] drew our attention to the necessity of distinguishing between cultural assimilation and structural amalgamation. He pointed especially to the case of American Jews, who are overwhelmingly assimilated culturally but for a variety of reasons restrict their primary group interaction to their fellow Jews. This appears also to be the case with most Blacks in this country who are assimilated culturally but segregated

continuation of structural separation and some persistence of attitudinal differences between descendants of various ethnic aggregates. Cf., for example, N. Glazer and D.P. Moynihan's study of the New York City scene (*Beyond the Melting Pot*. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1963) and A. Greeley's summary of his survey of five Catholic minorities ("Ethnicity as an Influence on Behavior," in Otto Feinstein, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 3-16). All this, I submit, does not add up to a viable ethnic identity that can serve as a basis for community.

10. Gordon, Milton M. *Assimilation in American Life*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964.

structurally. From our perspective, several points need to be made in this connection. First, while a plausible argument can be made for the right to remain structurally segregated, such segregation does not yield what we perceive to be the main benefits of cultural pluralism, namely, enrichment of the quality of social life through furnishing a variety of accepted cultural responses. Then, there is the question of how durable sheer structural segregation is likely to be. If we look at both of our above-mentioned examples, we cannot miss the obvious fact that in both cases external factors are largely responsible for the phenomenon. Thus, while no one can claim certainty, it is a fair guess that voluntary opting for segregation in spite of cultural assimilation is not likely to last beyond the vanishing point of anti-Black racism in the case of Blacks, and anti-semitism as well as Arab-Israeli hostility in the Jewish case. True, these external factors are not about to disappear tomorrow, and it may well be that a prolonged period of forced structural segregation may produce some new forms of sub-cultural varieties. However, it seems to me at least a bit awkward to build quasi-utopian projections of cultural pluralism on the hope for continued inter-ethnic hostility.

In sum, assuming a liberal-humanistic value premise, it seems difficult to defend an assimilationist position, short of proposing that the only road to elimination of hostility that results from culture difference–whether within a given political entity or worldwide– is to impose cultural homogeneity. Also, if one considers a number of problems such as the ones we face in the realm of education, one may plausibly argue that these problems result, at least in part, from being stuck in a rut created by

imposed homogeneity, and that, therefore, the availability of cultural variety is bound to be beneficial.

However, desirability ought not to be confused with actual probability. Meaningful ethnic identity would seem to require commitment to distinct important values and a concomitant readiness to invest resources and effort on behalf of their preservation. This does not seem to be characteristic of the current scene. Rather, we are witnessing a variety of mere structural divisions maintained largely by present as well as memories of past external hostility. Thus, while the ethnic frame may potentially serve as community in a mobile society in which localities are becoming increasingly incapable of mediating between individual and society, it is not likely to serve that need on a very large scale once hostility from without has ceased or become sufficiently subdued. On the other hand, smaller pockets of unassimilated minorities appear likely to persist. One hopes that enlightened societies will be sophisticated enough to, not only tolerate, but actually encourage genuine expressions of the quest for cultural alternatives, without worrying either about occasional friction or lack of full participation that inevitably accompany genuine value difference. After all, not only have we not worked out formulae for total cultural homogeneity and assurance of full participation on the part of every sub-aggregate of a complex society (or world), but such formulae appear to a social scientist to lie in the realm of fanciful illusion.

Dynamics of Ethnic Identification

DANIEL GLASER

The study of race relations and of national and religious minorities has largely focused upon dominant group prejudice against minorities. This interest is illustrated by the development and application of race prejudice, ethnocentrism and social distance questionnaires, as well as by other methods of investigation of prejudiced personalities and discriminatory behavior. Much less attention has been given to the orientations of minority group members toward members of dominant groups, although there have been a few investigations, impressionistic essays, and quasi-anthropological accounts of minority group sub-cultures and personality types. The reconceptualization presented here grew out of an attempt to analyze the orientations of minority group members, but this led

to a single theoretical framework applicable to analysis of the orientations of minority *and* dominant group members.

One might justify use of a single conceptual model to analyze all parties in inter-ethnic relationships by an interest in conceptual parsimony or by the fact that science grows (and also, at times, is retarded) through reconceptualization of its problems. An additional justification may be that use of a single paradigm for analyzing all roles in emotion-laden interaction promotes affective neutrality in the analyst. In the field of ethnic group relations sociologists readily deviate from the primary scientific objectives of describing and explaining social phenomena in favor of justifying preestablished normative positions. While the latter interest is bound to affect the selection of problems for investigation, its possible influence in distorting perception and interpretation is well known.

Ethnic Identification and Orientation

In this discussion, "ethnic group" refers to racial, national or religious groups. "Ethnic identification" refers to a person's use of racial, national or religious terms to identify himself, and thereby, to relate himself to others. "Ethnic orientation" refers to those features of a person's feelings and action towards others which are a function of the ethnic category by which he identifies them. Ethnic identification and orientation are seen as two aspects of a single behavioral complex to be called "ethnic identification pattern" (or, more briefly, "identification pattern").

Ethnic categories provide a universalistic frame of reference for ordering social relationships. However, ethnic categories vary in

specificity and diffuseness, as well as in affective arousal. They also denote overlapping and sometimes alternative ascriptions for one individual, such as White, Nordic, German, Bavarian, Christian and Catholic; or White, American and Jewish. In addition, they include ascription by negative identities, as non-Jew, non-Russian and non-Negro. A person may have a different identification pattern for each ethnic identity which he may ascribe to himself or to others, and each ascription alternative may have a different salience at different moments.

In hypotheses set forth there regarding the dynamics of ethnic identification, three components are distinguished in the identification pattern: "ethnic ideology," "association preferences," and "feelings aroused by ethnic contacts."

The term "ethnic ideology" is applied to all ideas and images which ascribe attributes to particular ethnic groups. Every person is seen as having an ideology for each of the distinct ethnic identities which may be ascribed to him or which he may ascribe to others. These ideologies vary from systematic ideas about the relative superiority, inferiority or equality of particular ethnic groups (including formulations in terms of biology, history or theology) to vaguely formulated quasi-aesthetic opinions and stereotyped images. They also may consist of clutters of inconsistent and disorganized ideas about out-groups, called "ethnocentric ideology" by Levinson, in which the out-groups are not distinguished from each other with much specificity.[1]

1. Cf. T.W. Adorno *et al.*, *The Authoritarian Personality,* New York: Harper, 1950, Ch. IV.

The phrase "association preferences" designates tendencies to avoid association with persons of particular ethnic identities and to seek to limit association to persons of other ethnic identities, *in so far* as association is not a function of factors independent of ethnic preference. Theoretically, we are concerned with the variance in inter-personal association which can be accounted for by ethnic orientations, and it is admitted that this may often be difficult to determine precisely. As will be seen in our analysis, we conceive of much (if not most) interaction as a function of institutional and situational phenomena which are independent of the ethnic association preference of the participants. We are concerned with the process by which a person's total interaction experience alters his association preferences.

The third component of ethnic identification patterns consists of the totality of feelings which distinguish a person's experiences in contact with other persons whom he categorizes as of a particular ethnic identity. Feelings with which we may be concerned include hostility, fear, disgust, envy, affection, respect, vague uneasiness or complete indifference (that is, the absence of affect arousal on the basis of ethnic identity). These feelings, of course, vary in different situations with respect to anyone ethnic group, since such feelings also are aroused by inter-personal status ascriptions, achievement orientations, empathy and interaction processes independent of ethnic orientations. Although feelings are the ultimate referents of many concepts central to behavioral science theories, they are difficult to distinguish precisely into specific categories because they are highly variable and purely private experiences. The

feelings of a research subject are known operationally only through his verbal recall or an observer's imputation, neither of which is precise, although modern techniques for objectifying such observation may increase their specificity, reliability and presumed validity.[2] Part of our analysis is concerned with ways in which feelings which are a function of influences other than ethnic orientation alter subsequent feelings aroused by ethnic contacts.

An Identification Pattern Continuum

The first general hypothesis of our analysis is as follows: *When a person's ethnic identification pattern with respect to any one of his ethnic identities is stable, all three components of this pattern converge in what may be conceived as their location on a continuum which ranges from a completely "segregating" pattern at one extreme to a completely "assimilated" pattern at the other, with "marginal" and "desegregating" patterns between these two extremes.* An outline of this continuum is provided by Figure 1.

Figure 1. An Outline of the Hypothesized Ethnic Identification Pattern Continuum, Indicating Interrelations Between Components When Identification Pattern Is Stable

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2. More valid and reliable measures of grossly classified feeling states may, of course, be procured from physiological data. Cf. Robert E. Rankin and Donald T. Campbell, "Galvanic Skin Response to Negro and White Experimenters," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 51, (July, 1955), pp. 30-33.

	Identification	Pattern Components	
Points on the Continuum	Ethnic Ideology	Association Preferences	Feelings Aroused by Ethnic Contacts
Segregating (e.g., dominant group bigot; minority group chauvinist).	Autonomous ethnocentric ideology; assumed superiority of own identity.	Prefers members of own group.	Feelings of security, adequacy and affection with own group; easily provoked to hostility, disgust and/or fear with out-groups.
Marginal (e.g., dominant group member inconsistent in "accepting" minority group members; minority group member inconsistent in identifying himself with "his" group).	Pluralistic objective, but often uncertain and ambivalent in valuation of minority identities.	Inconsistent; a function of anticipated consequences in each situation.	Frequent anxiety, fear of being unaccepted in any group.

Desegregating (e.g., militant apostate or expatriate from dominant group; minority group member consistently seeking to avoid being identified with segregating members of his group).	Autonomous low valuation of his ascribed identity; ideology supporting preference for more inclusive identity (e. g., "all Americans," "humanity").	Will suffer considerable disadvantage, if necessary, to avoid exclusive association with his ascribed group.	Sense of righteousness, but self-conscious wariness to avoid non-acceptance, with out-groups; easily provoked to hostility and/or disgust with segregating persons of any group.
Assimilated (persons who rarely, if ever, consciously differentiate self and others by ethnic categories as basis for differential treatment of others).	Primary ethnic identification with "all humanity"; therapeutic orientation toward all ethnocentric persons.	No preferences along ethnic lines.	All reactions on a purely personal basis, or on basis of non-ethnic group orientations, rather than on basis of ethnic identification.
Sequences of Identification Change:	<———————— Reflexive Conversion		————————> Ideological Conversion

The following is a brief description of persons classifiable at separate points on the identification pattern continuum. It should be noted that most individuals may be in intermediate positions,

that is, between any adjacent pair of the four points which will be described.

a. S*egregating*. The extreme segregating individual conceives of himself as distinctly differentiated from other members of his society by virtue of the particular racial, national or religious identity which he ascribes to himself. He is highly conscious and proud of this identity and may have a highly ramified ethnocentric ideology in which his group appears to be superior on the basis of theological, historical, biological or other considerations. He is likely to develop intense counter-hostility towards those whom he conceives as hostile to his group. (If he has paranoid personality traits, this may be expressed in delusions of persecution by an ethnic group.) He makes a conscious effort to confine his friendships, marriage and other intimate associations to members of his own group. The polar segregating individual is highly autonomous in valuing his ethnic identity as an end in itself, in that he will assert and strive to maintain this distinct identity even when it leads to social, economic or other disadvantages. Case studies from students suggest that this pattern is particularly frequent in Jewish and Christian fundamentalist religious groups, and in some first and second generation Central European national minorities, as well as among "200 per cent Americans" who look down on all "foreigners."

b. *Marginal.* The marginal individual is inconsistent and uncertain in his racial, national or religious identification pattern. He sometimes manifests segregating traits and sometimes shows "desegregating" traits. Ideologically he favors

a pluralistic society in which he can feel identified with several ethnic groups. Practically, he makes some effort to avoid a particular ethnic identity when he is in groups in which this identity might limit his acceptance. By comparison with the segregating individual he seems uncertain and "other-directed" in identifying himself. He is likely to be frequently conscious of the problem of deciding which identity is the most appropriate to promote for himself in a given time and place, and he may have guilt feelings and fears of discovery as a result of duplicity and inconsistency in identifying himself to others. Thus, ethnic identity may be a source of anxiety of the marginal individual, and of psychological "insecurity" (in Plant's sense).[3] This pattern seems highly frequent among Negroes at nonsegregated universities, among non-religious Jews, and among dominant group members in close business or professional association with members of minority groups.[4]

c. *Desegregating.* The stable desegregating individual consciously seeks to avoid a particular racial, national or religious identity which may be ascribed to him by others, or which he himself may formerly have made. He is likely to be critical of all segregating persons, especially those of his "own"

3. James S. Plant, *Personality and the Cultural Pattern,* New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1937, pp. 11 ff.
4. The classic description of this pattern is E.V. Stonequist, *The Marginal Man,* New York: Scribners, 1937. Our "marginal" is closest to the "ambivalent" Jewish sub-type distinguished in the much broader reference assigned to "marginal man" by A. Antonovsky in "Toward a Redefinition of the 'Marginal Man' Concept," *Social Forces,* 35 (October, 1956), pp. 57-62. Marginality of middle-class Negroes in northern communities is vividly indicated in E. Franklin Frazier, "The Negro Middle Class and Desegregation," *Social Problems,* 4 (April, 1957), pp. 291-301.

ascribed ethnic identity, and he shares out-group prejudices towards them. This is what Lewin called "self hatred" in Jews, and it also is encountered frequently in the Negro middle and upper classes and in American-born Orientals not living in homogeneous ethnic communities.[5] A similar desegregating pattern is found in rebellious children of "old American" families which have found a niche for themselves in "Bohemian" or other cosmopolitan circles as well as in militant apostates and expatriates from religious and national groups. Our student case studies suggest that such persons often are more regretful than angry when prejudiced persons ascribe to them the ethnic identity which they wish to shed. While the desegregating individual avoids prejudiced persons, and thus may be acutely conscious of the ethnic identity of others, it should be stressed that, unlike the marginal individual, the desegregating person is autonomous in the valuation he attaches to shedding narrow identities. This is indicated by the fact that he will forego marked economic or social opportunities if they are dependent on his assuming what he considers an exclusive identity. In the words of the segregating members of his ascribed group the desegregating individual "goes out of his way" not to be identified with his "own" group.

d. *Assimilated*. The pure assimilated person is an ideal-typical conception formed by extrapolating our continuum to its extreme, but rarely encountered empirically except with respect to the most diffuse ethnic identities (e .g., "Nordic"), although the American Creed may be interpreted as implying that an

5. Kurt Lewin, "Self Hatred Among Jews," *Contemporary Jewish Record*, 4 (June, 1941), pp. 219-232. Cf. E.F. Frazier, *Black Bourgeoisis*, Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1957, pp. 226-228.

assimilated pattern is ideal. The polar assimilated person only reacts on an individual basis towards others, or on the basis of non-ethnic categories. He has only a therapeutic orientation towards persons who single him out ethnically for prejudicial treatment, and he has neither a hostile attitude nor ethnocentric pride in regarding the group with which they identify him. Many people seem to be assimilated with respect to an ethnic group when it is not salient to them, but often reveal another identification pattern when situations arise in which they are in competition or conflict with persons of an out-group, or when they themselves are singled out on the basis of an ethnic identity. By the standard sociological definitions of assimilation, a person is not fully assimilated if he is conscious of trying to be assimilated: in the latter case, we would consider him "desegreating." However, as Znaniecki has suggested regarding nationalism, only the desegregating person's deliberate promotion of what could be called an anti-ethnocentrism ideology can lead to the stable elimination of ethnic orientations.[6] This brings us to further hypotheses.

Dynamics of Ethnic Identification

Our second general hypothesis is: *Change in a person's identification pattern occurs in accordance with the continuum described above.* This means that a person cannot change from a segregating to an assimilated identification pattern without first becoming marginal and then desegregating. However, change can occur in either direction on the continuum. Change from desegregating to marginal to segregating is common.

6. Florian Znaniecki, *Modern Nationalities*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1952, Ch. 7.

A corollary of this second hypothesis is that change in the separate components of identification pattern also occurs in accordance with our continuum. As our next hypothesis indicates, we expect this corollary to be more rigorously and consistently valid than the hypothesis from which it is derived. This is because we do not assume simultaneous change in all components of a person's identification pattern, but rather that some components lag behind others when the pattern is changing. It will be recalled, however, that our first hypothesis is that all three components tend to converge at the same point on the continuum during any period when the identification pattern is stable.

Our third general hypothesis refers to the sequence in which separate components change when an ethnic identification pattern is unstable, namely: *Change in an identification pattern tends to occur in one of two sequences, as follows: the first sequence, which we call "reflexive conversion," involves first, a change of feelings aroused by contact with persons of a particular ethnic identity, then a change in association preferences, and lastly, a change in ideology the alternative sequence, which we call "ideological conversion," involves a change in ideology first, then a change in association preferences, and lastly, a change in feelings aroused by contact with persons of a particular ethnic identity.*

Reflexive conversion begins with any inter-ethnic association in which persons accept status ascriptions and interaction processes incongruent with those which could be anticipated from their ethnic identification patterns. One increasingly frequent

example in our schools, industries and armed forces, is that of prejudiced whites who conform to institutionally prescribed standards of subordination of equalitarian cooperation on the basis of rank when interacting with Negroes as individuals in institutionalized positions. A second example, different in certain respects but analogous from the standpoint of our hypothesis, is that of Jewish and Gentile youths who develop marginal or desegregating identification patterns with respect to their ethnic identities during their high school years in communities where Jews and Gentiles are intermingled, but who readily conform to the different behavior expectations which they encounter in segregated fraternities, sororities and religious foundations at major universities.

As Rose and others have pointed out, the explanation for conforming behavior which violates prior ethnic orientations is to be found in "legal, economic, political and social structural forces."[7] However, because of what Turner has called "reflexive role taking"[8] in interpersonal interaction, such conforming behavior may induce reflexive conversion which changes ethnic orientations. Feelings are empathized on the basis of the relationships which the participants have to each other as a result of their personalities and their positions in social systems. Thus, because of events which are independent of a subject's ethnic identification patterns, a change may occur in what we have called the third component of his identification pattern, the

7. Arnold Rose, "Intergroup Relations vs. Prejudice," *Social Problems*, 4 (October, 1956), p. 176.
8. Ralph H. Turner, "Role-Taking, Role Standpoint, and Reference-Group Behavior," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXI (January, 1956), pp. 316-328.

feelings distinguishing his experience in contact with persons of a particular ethnic identity. Several studies have documented how segregating persons of both minority and dominant groups may become more at ease and experience more friendly feelings with out-group members after interaction in situations structured to promote equalitarian relationships and cooperation.[9] Conversely, there is evidence suggesting that persons may be aroused to feelings of hostility or disgust in association with ethnic groups as a result of unfavorable structuring of their experience with these groups.[10]

For association preferences to change as a result of change in the feelings experienced in contact with members of a particular ethnic group, there must be generalization from this experience. This process has been dealt with by psychologists in terms of stimulus generalization, enhancement of contrast and other learning principles, notably by Campbell.[11] While this may seem to be purely a psychological problem, sociologists have indicated complexities not taken into account by the more abstract psychological formulations. Lohman and Reitzes have shown that the same white individuals may have favorable

9. See, for example, D.M. Wilner, R.P. Walkley and S.W. Cook, *Human Relations in Interracial Housing*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955; I. and E. Division, "Opinions About Negro Infantry Platoons in White Companies of Seven Divisions," in G.E. Swanson, J.M. Newcomb and E.L. Hartley (eds.), *Readings in Social Psychology*, Rev. Ed., New York: Holt, 1952, pp. 502-506.
10. E.g., A.B. Riddleberger and A.B. Motz, "Prejudice and Perception," *American Journal of Sociology*, 62 (March, 1957), pp. 498-503.
11. Donald T. Campbell, "Enhancement of Contrast as Composite Habit," J*ournal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 53 (November, 1956), pp. 350-355; and "A Demonstration of Bias in Estimates of Negro Ability," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 51 (November, 1955), pp. 585-588.

orientations towards Negroes at a workplace which has long been successfully integrated, yet be hostile in a neighborhood where presence of the Negroes is defined as a threat to the monetary and "social" value of their home.[12] This suggests that change in association preference is situation-linked when it develops reflexively from feeling experience, and that feelings are a function of the way in which situations are defined. The Cornell studies of inter-ethnic contact[13] and reports on the development of emotions in race riots, lynchings and other collective behavior suggest that where ethnic orientations are not rigidly structured by culture, the definition of the situation and feelings aroused there may change rapidly on the basis of subtle cues and circular reactions. A corollary of our hypothesis on the two conversion processes is that a change in association preferences may change ideologies, but also, that a change in ideology may change association preferences. A deduction from the foregoing is that a person's ethnic association preferences become relatively autonomous and independent of situations only when these preferences develop from stable ideological convictions. If sociological and anthropological study, for example, makes for firm ethnic tolerance, it is through ideological conversion.

Ideologies, of course, are the words and images by which we justify our behavior. As C. Wright Mills and George A. Kelly have so cogently stated, such words are not "mere"

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12. J.D. Lohman and D.C. Reitzes, "Deliberately Organized Groups and Racial Behavior," *American Sociological Review*, 19 (June, 1954), pp. 342-344.

13. M.L. Kohn and R.M. Williams, "Situational Patterning in Intergroup Relations," *American Sociological Review*, 21 (April, 1956), pp. 164-174.

rationalizations, but rationalizations essential to voluntaristic (as opposed to reflexive) action.[14] Since ideologies are acquired in communication, they can be considered part of one's cultural heritage. But like so much of modern normative culture, the ethnic ideologies which most persons encounter are not uniform. Divergent formulations of ethnic norms are communicated in Western society, and inconsistencies exist between formulations on various levels of generality, such as those which Myrdal called "the American dilemma." Situations repeatedly arise in which people are faced with the need to make a decision as to the policy which they should pursue in interacting with persons whom they identify ethnically. In order to decide they communicate with themselves and seek communication with others so as to formulate a justification for a course of action. Individual decision habits and the urgency of the need for a decision, of course, determine the range of such communication, that is, whether one makes a "snap" or a "considered" judgment. Vivid illustrations of such search for justification for a decision in an ethnic relations dilemma are presented by Kohn and Williams, who summarize reports of researchers assigned to "eavesdrop" on waitresses and bartenders deciding how to cope with Negro patrons in establishments where Negro patronage is not customary.[15]

Change in ideology can occur as the last stage in reflexive conversion, but only when an individual rationalizes the fact that his feelings in interaction with members of particular ethnic

14. C.W. Mills, "Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive," *American Sociological Review*, 5 (December, 1940), pp. 904-913; G.A. Kelly, *The Psychology of Personal Constructs*, New York: Norton, 1955.
15. *Op cit.*

groups and his association preferences have become inconsistent with his prior ideology. It has been observed that people can maintain behavior and have experiences inconsistent with their ideologies for long periods through failure to define persons contradicting an ethnic stereotype as instances of the class of persons which have been stereotyped.[16] Apparently a person alters his ideology on the basis of such inconsistency only when he must communicate with himself due to confrontation by challenges or dilemmas. We have the impression that the change in ideology which follows recognition of inconsistency generally is one of qualification rather than of metamorphosis, although one qualification may sometimes lead to another until considerable change occurs. Thus the initially prejudiced white may first admit that Joe, his co-worker, is an exception to the Negro stereotype, then that Negroes are all right in the plant but he wouldn't want them as neighbors, and finally, that they're good neighbors but he wouldn't want one for a son-in-law.

Ideological conversion, as a change in a subject's entire ethnic identification pattern, begins with the persuasive communication of new ideas and images regarding an ethnic group. This communication may occur independently of any experience in interaction with the ethnic group to which the ideologies refer, as has been shown in studies of the acquisition of ethnic prejudices by children.[17] Evidence about reduction of prejudice by

16. M.N. Richter, Jr., "The Conceptual Mechanism of Stereotyping," *American Sociological Review*, 21 (October, 1956), pp. 568-571.
17. E.g.: E.L. Horowitz, "Development of Attitude Toward Negroes," *Archives of Psychology*, 1936, No. 194, adapted in G.E. Swanson, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 491-501; W.B. Brookover and J.B. Holland, "An Inquiry Into the Meaning of Minority Group Attitude Expressions," *American Sociological Review*, 17 (April, 1952), pp. 196-202.

classroom or other communication is not consistent, although one presumes that some ideological change in some persons is achieved by some teachers, ministers and others. At any rate, the studies on verbal acquisition of prejudice by children suggest that if a person's ideas about a particular ethnic group change, favorably or unfavorably, his association preferences change also, if no other influences or circumstances inhibit ready increase or decrease of inter-ethnic association. They also indicate that change in ideological conception of an ethnic group evokes anticipatory feelings, that is, a favorable or unfavorable affective set at the initiation of contact with members of the group, thus changing the third component of identification pattern. It should be noted that these effects of anticipatory orientations may be apparent only at the initiation of inter-ethnic contact, since they may be offset by subsequent reflexive conversion.

Resistance and Counter-Change

When ideological conversion leads to new inter-ethnic contact, consequences of such contact unanticipated in the ethnic ideology frequently result in reflexive conversion in opposition to the ideological conversion. For example, the dominant group youth, ideologically convinced that he should radically oppose segregating practices with respect to a minority group, may experience uneasiness or unpleasantness in contact with the minority group members. This may be due to cultural differences, status differences and, possibly, to segregating identification patterns in the minority group.

Findings that efforts to change ethnic ideology by

communication are frequently ineffective may be results of social, economic or political circumstances which prevent any drastic change in the pattern of the subject's interaction with various ethnic groups; ideological change which is initiated may be offset by reflexive conversion back to the status quo. Sometimes, however, ideological change is so powerful as to override all other influences patterning inter-ethnic transactions. Thus the emanation of a hostile ideology towards Jews in Nazi Germany and towards Japanese in the United States after the attack on Pearl Harbor was so intense that many dominant group members in the two countries deliberately and markedly changed what had been amicable relationships with members of these minorities. With termination of extensive equalitarian interaction, the hostility and disgust aroused by ideological conversion could not be changed reflexively.

Almost by definition, a segregating ideology is one which makes for resistance to change. Studies of the effectiveness of alternative methods of reducing prejudice suggest that segregating persons are reflexively converted to more marginal or desegregating orientations *only* by contact with out-group members who strikingly contradict stereotypes, and *only* if prolonged intimate equalitarian interaction with such out-group members is strongly promoted or enforced by institutional arrangements. One reason for the ineffectiveness of lesser efforts to initiate reflexive conversion may be that the segregating person approaches out-group members hypercritically, especially if the out-group member is perceived in a potentially competing status position. Both in the latter circumstances, and also, where the out-group member is seen in a low status

position, the segregating person is likely either to avoid interaction, or to approach the interaction with a set which will impede its being an experience different from that which he anticipates.

Ideological conversion of a strongly segregating person also is difficult, since he is likely to be selective in his reception and interpretation of symbolic communication. For the segregating person who happens to have paranoid personality tendencies or deep-seated feelings of insecurity (as in the so-called "authoritarian" personality), his delusions of persecution may find expression in scapegoating out-groups, or he may achieve a sense of security through identification with in-groups. Under these conditions one would expect especially strong resistance to perceptions which would initiate either reflexive or ideological conversion. The theoretical possibility of conversion in these cases, however, even without basic personality change, is suggested by the observation that such personality disturbances often are served by non-ethnic objects of hostility. It should be stressed that ethnic ideologies are culturally transmitted. Hence, their acceptance by a person must be a function of the extent to which they have been communicated to him, and his relationship to the sources of communication, as well as a function of the extent to which they serve his personality needs. This is illustrated, of course, by the prevalence of different ethnic ideologies in different cultural regions and sub-regions.

The post-war reversal of our wartime orientation towards the Japanese has been dramatic, especially in the military occupation of Japan. Here apparently a change from a

segregating to a desegregating "official" American ideology towards the Japanese was reinforced by reflexive conversion, as social structural forces promoted intimate contact and interdependence between our troops and the Japanese. Contrastingly, in the late war years and immediate post-war years in Europe, circumstances promoted reflexive conversion which opposed and largely negated official efforts to convert our troops ideologically to a desegregating orientation towards the French and British and a segregating orientation towards Germans.[18]

It is likely that two additional factors making for resistance to change in ethnic identification pattern are relative reinforcement and relative investment in an existing and in alternative identification patterns. "Reinforcement" is used here in its psychological learning theory sense; it includes both primary and secondary reinforcement to refer to the number of times and the priority and intensity with which a particular set of habits is favorably promoted in a subject's experience. "Investment" is used here in a manner analogous to the way in which it is employed in the analysis of occupational choice.[19] It refers collectively to the valued social relations, respect of reference groups, economic and other rewards, and various valued

18. See D. Glaser, "The Sentiments of American Soldiers Abroad Towards Europeans," *American Journal of Sociology*, 51 (March, 1946), pp. 433-438; D. Glaser, "A Study of Relations Between British and American Enlisted Men at SHAEF," unpublished Master's dissertation, University of Chicago, 1947.
19. H.S. Becker and J.W. Carper, "The Development of Identification with an Occupation," *American Journal of Sociology*, 61 (January, 1956), pp. 289-298.

opportunities. which an individual conceives as dependent upon his maintenance of a particular identification pattern.

Investment sometimes is difficult to distinguish from reinforcement, but it is conceived of here as the more conscious of the two phenomena. Reinforcement probably is a factor in reflexive conversion, but investment is a factor in ideological conversion. Investment is conceived as creating ambivalence in the acceptance of new ideas, that is, preventing consistent endorsement of new ideas and disavowal of prior beliefs. In situations where a subject has prolonged interaction with persons of different ethnic identity and identification pattern, investment encourages marginality in his ethnic identification pattern. This phenomenon is readily observed in second and third generation descendants of Jewish and other immigrants, who are more assimilated than their parents and grandparents. These children and grandchildren become marginal with respect to the identity which their ancestors ascribed to them, in that they try, on the one hand, to behave in ways which will not alienate their more segregating older relatives, and on the other hand, they are reflexively and ideologically influenced towards desegregation by their social and professional life with peers of diverse ethnic identity and identification pattern.

Validity

A social psychological analysis of ethnic relations has been presented which attempts to integrate parsimoniously many discrete and earlier observations. It is believed that this analysis comprehends most firmly established social psychological knowledge on inter-ethnic relationships, particularly the major

findings on dynamics of anti-minority prejudice, as well as available data on minority group behavior. Change in ethnic orientations was interpreted in terms of two processes of conversion which encompass and interrelate reflexive and voluntaristic action. Models of this type are needed for the solution of a broader theoretical problem of the behavioral sciences: the claim that most prevailing theory rests on either a purely reflexive or a completely rational image of man, both of which are likely to be invalid.

It is recognized that in reducing the complexities and variations of ethnic prejudice, discrimination and self-conception, in both minority and dominant group members, to a single continuum with three component variables and two change sequences, we create a somewhat oversimplified image of the interpretative interaction actually conducted by any specific persons in inter-ethnic relationships. Moreover, simultaneous reflexive and ideological conversion processes, in the same or opposing directions, in the continuous interaction and role-taking of everyday life, complicate analysis into the component processes delineated here. Errors and difficulties of these types may be the price of induction in every study of nature. If our generalizations can be shown to have high validity, however, they may provide what Blumer has called "stabilized patterns of interpretation."[20] By making us aware of certain tendencies to regularity in human behavior, the latter may facilitate new observations of deviation from general patterns on the basis of which the generalizations may be revised.

20. H. Blumer, "Sociological Analysis and the 'Variable'," *American Sociological Review*, 21 (December, 1956), pp. 689-690.

The formulations presented here were developed gradually over several years, but crystallized from the analysis of some 350 student papers entitled "The Development of X's Prejudice" or "X's Conception of His Minority Group Identity." In these papers, "X" was the student himself or another person about whom he chose to write. Other discussions have also been drawn upon for support at various points. Yet, in Pierce's sense, these operations have more or less adequately validated our definitions, although not our hypotheses.[21] We have found cases illustrating each pattern type and each conversion process, but we have not been able to institute the quantitative controls on observation which could more rigorously test the implication that the relationships hypothesized do not merely exist, but strongly predominate in inter-ethnic relationships.

We could perhaps feel confident that our interpretation has nearly universal validity, since no negative cases were encountered. There is a real danger that our hypotheses, however, like many others in the behavioral sciences, are not readily contradicted by case data. This is because any case report covers such a minute fraction of a subject's total life experience, and so many aspects of experience are relevant to our hypotheses, that the experience selected for interpretation may unwittingly be limited to that which supports theoretical expectations. For example, when a personal document describes a subject in a manner which suggests that all components of identification pattern are at the same point on the continuum, one considers this as support for our first hypothesis, but if

21. Cf. A. Pierce, "Empiricism and the Social Sciences," *American Sociological Review*, 21 (April, 1956), pp. 135-137.

inconsistency is found in the components, one seeks to trace conversion processes, classifies the case as of marginal identification pattern, or deplores the missing details in the case document. Despite such deficiencies, it may be argued that no other conceptualization of the social psychological aspects of ethnic group relationships is more adequately supported by evidence, for no other interpretation is as comprehensive and as interconnected conceptually in accounting for data in this field, and no conceptualization approaching this one in breadth has been much more rigorously validated.[22]

Inasmuch as data on human behavior are always fragmentary, and are selected on the basis of implicit or explicit theory which dictates what is deemed significant in total experience, the major value of our conceptualization may be its utility in sensitizing students and practitioners in the field of ethnic group relations to both minority and dominant group aspects of problem situations, and to both reflexive reactions and symbolic communication. This promotion of a wider range of attention, especially concerning minority roles, may make it a useful supplement to Merton's discrimination-prejudice typology of dominant group orientations as a paradigm for social action, particularly in manipulating situations of inter-personal contact across ethnic lines.[23] The crucial test, from the standpoint of applied science,

22. Cf. R.H. Turner, "The Quest for Universals in Sociological Research," *American Sociological Review*, 18 (December, 1953), pp. 604-611; H. Hyman and P. Sheatsley, "Methodological Critique" in R. Christie and M. Jahoda, *Studies in the scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality,"* Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1954, pp. 50-196.
23. Robert K. Merton, "Discrimination and the American Creed" in R.M. MacIver, ed., *Discrimination and National Policy*, New York: Harpers, 1949, pp. 99-126. Merton's "Prejudiced Discriminator or...All-Weather Illiberal," of course, is our "Segregating" bigot, while his "Unprejudiced

will be whether such focussing of attention contributes to more accurate prediction and control of problem phenomena.

A more adequate test of our hypotheses would result from highly reliable questionnaires or observation procedures which indicated the possibility of scaling subjects on each component of the identification pattern continuum. If scalability were demonstrated, administration of such scaling instruments to a panel sample of subjects on several successive occasions could reveal whether these components tend to be identical in position on the conceived continuum when all components are stable. It could also show the sequence of change. The major value of such research would lie in the possibility of its yielding unanticipated results, necessitating revision of our hypotheses. In addition, such instruments would permit one to relate change in identification pattern to other data, such as circumstances of inter-ethnic interaction.

Non-Discriminator or All-Weather Liberal" seems to cover all of the "Desegregating" to "Assimilated" segment of our continuum. His intervening "Fair-Weather" types resemble our "Marginal" members of dominant groups. His incisive analysis of the functions and fallacies of these types when coping with minority problems may be usefully supplemented by differentiation of minority group orientations and strategies. Our processual conceptualization may facilitate interrelationship of the orientations of each ethnic group in a problem situation.

American Immigrant Groups: Ethnic Identification and the Problem of Generations

VLADIMIR NAHIRNY AND JOSHUA FISHMAN

A half century of inquiry and discussion on American immigrant groups "has given currency to a handful of such concepts as 'Anglo- conformity', 'cultural pluralism', 'the third generation interest', 'behavioural assimilation' and 'structural assimilation'. This essay attempts to take another look at ethnic identification and ethnic continuity in the United States in the hope that this meagre arsenal of commonly accepted formulations can be enriched. Its vantage point will be a recently completed study of language maintenance among immigrant groups in which several topics in the sociology of language were explored at the nationwide, community and family levels of analysis.

Basic to this essay is the view that the erosion of ethnicity and ethnic identity experienced by most (but not all) American ethnic groups takes place in the course of three generations; it involves, in other words, the immigrant fathers, their sons and their grandsons. Contrary to the widely prevalent opinion that there ensues some kind of a return to the fold of ethnicity, whenever any immigrant group reaches the third generation stage of its development, we hold that the ethnic heritage, including the ethnic mother tongue, usually ceases to play any viable role in the life of the third generation….

It has been long thought that the generational conflict between immigrant fathers and their sons represents the first major blow to the continuity of ethnic groups and their cultures in the United States. On the one hand, it has been observed that most immigrant fathers desperately tried to instill in their sons their own (i.e. the fathers') love for and allegiance to the ethnic heritage; on the other hand, most of the sons of these immigrant fathers were found determined to forget everything–the mother tongue that left (or was rumoured to leave) so many traces in their speech, the 'strange' customs that they were forced to practice at home, in church, or even in more public places, etc. In many a case, as Marcus Lee Hansen observed, 'Nothing was more Yankee than a Yankeeized person of foreign descent.' How general this revolt might have been is only of minor concern here; what deserves careful scrutiny is the limited extent to which most immigrant fathers could ever have led any of their sons to appreciate or to identify with ethnicity in the same manner as they themselves did. To those immigrant fathers of pre-World War I days who were of rural background, ethnicity

represented a particular way of life inseparably bound up with the daily round of activities within the village community. On the whole, this way of life was steeped in intimacy and immediacy to such an extent that both the human and nonhuman worlds within it were highly individualized and scarcely transferable….

Consonant with the character of this primeval world was ethnicity, since it was equally rendered immanent and parochial. Folk songs and folk costumes, local festivities and dialects–all these and other elements of ethnicity–possessed idiosyncratic characteristics within this milieu. Where trained linguists distinguished only several regional dialects, peasant immigrants readily recognized many differentiating features between their own local speech and that current a few miles away from their native village. And it was precisely this parochial tongue–the speech of their kin and dear ones, rather than the national language, that the peasant immigrants appeared to have been attached to….So abiding was this particularized attachment to ethnicity among some that the very establishment of 'national' ethnic organizations in the United States was considerably hindered by it….

The point made above deserves additional attention if only because *ethnic identification* has been commonly defined as 'a person's use of racial, national or religious terms to identify himself, and thereby, to relate himself to others'. These national terms or general categories allegedly provide a universalistic framework for ordering social relationships. *Ethnic orientation,* therefore, has been defined as 'those features of a person's

feeling and action towards others which are a function of the ethnic category by which he identifies himself.' To appreciate the difficulty posed by such definitions of ethnic identification and orientation, it may suffice to note that many peasant immigrants-be they of Finnish, Italian, Lithuanian, Norwegian, Slovak, Ukrainian or even of Polish or German origins–were hardly responsive to such comprehensive categories. The very mode of orientation toward ethnicity largely barred most immigrant fathers from being sensitive to general ethnic categories. Being an outgrowth of past personal experience, the ethnic identification of the immigrant fathers constituted something deeply subjective and concrete; that is to say. it was hardly externalized or expressed in general symbolic terms. So much was this the case that many of them were simply ignorant of their national identity….But what is salient in this context is not so much whether peasant immigrants were aware of the existence of appropriate ethnic categories (some of them undoubtedly were) as the extent to which any of their attitudes and actions were a function of their identification with such categories. It may be argued that the establishment of so many ethnic organizations and churches by the immigrant fathers was directly expressive of their ethnic consciousness and solidarity. Yet, it is known that the first ethnic organizations and churches of well-nigh all immigrant groups were set up along local rather than along national ethnic lines. The very patterns of chain migration and settlement largely proceeded along such parochial lines. Some two hundred and fifty present-day Ukrainian organizations in the United States and Canada are still based on such parochial loyalties and attachments. Membership in mutual benefit societies in the 'Little Italies' tended to be almost

exclusively based on *companilismo* (local loyalty). Norwegian-American *bygdelags* provide an additional illustration of this same phenomenon….The first immigrant organizations partook of the nature of communal reunions; indeed, they provided immigrants with an ersatz framework within which they did and could recreate their common past experience–from speaking and hearing their dialect to singing and dancing local folk songs and dances. It was not a response to national symbols that made most immigrants band together, but a highly particularized response to many facets of their very concrete and delimited former ways of life….To the extent, then, that immigrant fathers from a given 'country of origin' were primarily sensitive and responsive to such local pasts, they possessed *many different ethnic pasts* rather than *one national past*….

Sheer human sentiment was involved in the establishment of many immigrant organizations, and their primary function in this country was to foster friendly ties among former neighbours and, thereby, to keep alive the local customs and precious personal memories of their ancestral homes….

Personal experience and memory underlay this mode of identification with an attachment to ethnicity and ethnic traditions. To dismiss this as a lachrymose nostalgia for a bygone past and as nothing but another instance of *Schwaermerei* is simply to disregard the significance of concrete experiences for the continuity of personal identity….

In view of the foregoing it is certainly appropriate to suggest that the immigrant fathers could scarcely transmit to their sons this kind of mnemonic orientation toward ethnicity, even when

they genuinely tried to inculcate the *mores maiorum* of their ancestors. By listening to the stories told by parents or by studying ethnically related geography and history, the sons were able, at best, to respond to certain generalized attributes of the old country–be they Norwegian fjords, Finnish lakes, or Lithuanian forests. But what bearing could such acquaintance with ethnicity have on that special relationship which links the family or the individual from generation to generation? Too radical a break in the actual life patterns of generations had made the personal and concrete experiences of the immigrant fathers inaccessible to the sons. For the fathers, the 'old ways' survived as *realities*, since they continued to link them meaningfully to the ancestral past as well as to the community of their immigrant contemporaries. For the sons, in turn, they stood (at best) for *ideals* to be *appreciated and cherished*. Whereas the immigrant fathers accepted ethnicity as a way of life and, to that extent, as a living tradition, the sons viewed it increasingly as the 'dead hand of the past' which they were taught to hold dear to and respect in their childhood years. Partly influenced by the dominant de-ethnicized society (with its stress on cultural novelty and on social inclusiveness), the sons turned before long to a wholesale purging of that past which they came to consider as reflecting archaic survivals. As a result, those elements of traditional ethnicity to which their parents were so intensely attached, and which were so strikingly different from those found in the dominant society, were cast off and, with time, replaced by supposedly less superstitious practices of the dominant society….

The observations made above underscore the most important

difference in ethnic orientation between fathers and sons. While the sons treated ethnicity as something to be evaluated, manipulated or even dispensed with at will, the fathers still continued to live by it and, in the process of doing so, imperceptibly but necessarily changed and modified it. In the case of the fathers, ethnicity retained the basic mark of any genuine tradition. In the case of the sons, it simply ceased being a complete pattern of daily life.

It is impossible to assess how many and precisely what elements of ethnicity were considered by the sons as unworthy of retention. The mother tongue was certainly one of them, since there is convincing evidence to show that in many instances the sons even vehemently disapproved of teaching it to their own children in ethnic schools. Differences in this respect existed from one ethnic group to another and certainly from one second generation individual to another. There is hardly any doubt, however, that the attitude of many sons verged on outright nihilism; that is, they tended to dismiss their respective ethnic heritages *in toto*, either by equating them with ignorance and superstition, or by equating them with poverty and backwardness….To appreciate the tragic predicament in which some of the sons found themselves, it suffices to point out that the more intensely they despised their ethnic heritage the more conscious they were of their ethnic identity. The more ashamed they were of this past, and even of their parents, the more they were aware of their ethnic background. For it should be kept in mind that by suppressing ethnicity the sons also rebelled against parts of themselves….

What was the nature of the sons' ethnic identification if, at the same time, they scoffed at their own ethnic heritage? In what ways did the sons relate themselves to their fathers if they disparaged or despised many personal attributes possessed by their fathers? How did the sons identify themselves with their respective ethnic groups if they were bent on eliminating the very ties that bound them to these groups?…

One suggestive way of approaching the problem raised above is to hypothesize that the ethnic orientation of the sons did not need to be expressed only via the acceptance of such obvious and specific strains of the ancestral heritage as folk customs and traditions. Rather, it might have been expressible via identification with selected and quite abstract values and ideals that ostensibly symbolized the ancestral heritage. Drawing mainly, though not exclusively, upon Jewish sources, the few illustrations that follow should further clarify this peculiar mode of orientation toward ethnicity.

In two symposia dealing with American-Jewish intellectuals, published in *Contemporary Jewish Records* and *Commentary* one central and recurrent theme is readily discernible. The editor of *Commentary* somewhat tauntingly summarized this theme as follows:

> Believing…that the essence of Judaism is the struggle for universal justice and human brotherhood, these young intellectuals assert over and over again that anyone who fights for this ideal is to that degree more Jewish than a man who merely observes the rituals or identifies himself with the Jewish community.

Some of the participants in the two symposia go so far as to claim that the more thoroughly one divests oneself from ancestral tradition the more one reaffirms the 'essence of Judaism', i.e. the more qualified one becomes to play the role of spokesman for 'rational social change' or for a 'rationally organized democratic world society unfettered by parochial traditions and superstition'. Even more, the very estrangement from ancestral tradition was proclaimed to be a virtue in that it fostered.

> …a critical sense out of role of detachment; it is, if you will, the assumption of the role of prophet…the one of whom the Hebrew assayist Akhad Ha-am has written: '…he is a man of truth! He sees life as it is with a view unwarped by subjective feelings; and he tells you what he sees just as he sees it, unaffected by irrelevant considerations!'

It is only too evident that this kind of Judaism, so eagerly embraced by Some sons, was not received from their natural fathers through a process of transmission from generation to generation. It may be traced to the most diverse sources–to Amos and Maimonides, to Marx and Trotsky, or even to Hess and Buber–but hardly to the Jewishness of the Torah-centered *shtetl* of their own fathers and mothers….

It would be of little value to inquire whether any of these conceptions of Judaism are historically valid. What is certain is the fact that the French, Greeks, Poles, Czechs, Norwegians, Hungarians, indeed, well-nigh all ethnic groups, have unearthed in their collective pasts analogous values and ideals….

Students of American ethnic groups disagree among themselves as to whether the *creators* of this kind of past are recruited from among the educated immigrant fathers, their sons, or grandsons. Some suggest that the sons could hardly be history-minded since they were much too touchy about their foreign background. On the other hand, the grandsons, much more secure in their Americanness, displayed an increasing interest and pride in their ethnic origins. But what is significant in this context is not so much the generational composition of the authors as the peculiar affinity between this highly selected and transmuted past and the touchy attitude evinced by the sons and daughters of immigrants toward the heritage of their close ancestors–their own fathers and mothers–made them prone to fall back upon the heritage of remote ancestors-from Pericles to Marx, from Columbus to Kosciusko. Similarly, the sons' hyphenated status predisposed them to define their ethnic ancestry in terms of a bilateral rule of descent, selectively American on one side and selectively ethnic on the other. These considerations strongly suggest first of all that the immigrant sons sought to disavow those tangible elements of traditional ethnicity to which they had been directly exposed in their parental homes. They indicate, secondly, that the more determined they were to be weaned from those aspects of ethnicity which had been transmitted to them by their natural fathers, the more inclined they were to embrace the *intangible* values attributed to the distant past of their adopted fathers. The more predisposed they were to equate the heritage of their own fathers with ignorance and provinciality the more readily they identified themselves with those ethnically related values which somehow transcended the actual heritage of their fathers. Such a mode of orientation toward ethnicity required neither attachment

to nor personal involvement in the parental heritage….In all these instances the mode of identification seems to be characteristically ambivalent, since it allows the individuals to pride themselves on their connection with national or social collectivities in *abstracto* and also despise and be ashamed of their association with these same people in *concreto*.

While estranged from the parental heritage, the sons, nevertheless, remained more conscious of their ethnic identity than were their immigrant fathers. For the ethnic identity of the fathers was so much taken for granted and accepted implicitly that they were scarcely explicitly conscious of it. On the other hand, the marginality of the sons made them acutely self-conscious and also highly sensitive to it; especially when passing through adolescence. Some of them became more 'Yankeeized' than the Yankees themselves; others turned into more ardent ethnics than their immigrant fathers had ever been….

Viewed in the light of the foregoing analysis, it should become apparent why traditional ethnicity–and the mother tongue in particular–was made virtually inaccessible to the daily life of the generation of grandsons. Of course, to the extent that the grandsons continued to be involved in ethnic organizations they could not but remain exposed to organizationally sustained vestiges of ethnicity. But such exposure was obviously selective, intermittent and limited only to narrowly circumscribed segments of life. The generational discontinuity between the formative experiences and the dominant environments of most immigrant fathers and sons rendered the family ineffecitve as

an agency for the transmission of traditional ethnicity. So pronounced was this generational gap that by the time the sons reached adolescence the immigrant family had become transformed into two linguistic sub-groups segregated along generational lines. The grandsons literally became outsiders to their ancestral heritage, even though many of them attended churches and schools established by the immigrant fathers. By then the ethnic mother tongue had come to resemble another foreign language which one studied in school as a required subject. There was no doubt about the national identity of the grandsons–they were simply Americans of one particular (if not of mixed) ethnic ancestry. Neither was there any trace left of the 'wounded identity' of the sons, for in contrast to the sons, the grandsons had never experienced the full brunt of marginality. The grandsons neither sought to disavow nor rushed to embrace their ethnic past. Increasingly it came to approximate an object of cognitive orientation, something that the grandsons had to study in order to acquire 'knowledge about ' it and in order to 'appreciate' it. But such knowledge and appreciation is usually kept within reasonable bounds and need have little or no relevance to daily life–from the selection of spouses to personal and organizational associations.

Concluding Remarks

In this essay we have explored the generational shift in ethnic identification. By doing so we hope to have shown how much remains to be accomplished in the way of clarifying the relevant dimensions of ethnic identification. More substantively, however, we have been primarily concerned with specifying the

differences in the mode of orientation toward ethnicity between the immigrant fathers, their sons and their grandsons. A case has also been made for the contention that the very disengagement of the sons from the ethnic heritage resulted from their heightened ethnic sensitivity. Thus we came to a somewhat paradoxical conclusion that despite acculturation, as reflected in the abandonment of the ethnic mother tongue and many other ethnic patterns of behaviour-the sons continued to remain acutely conscious of their ethnic identity. It is likely that under different social conditions more of these same acculturated sons might have embraced ethnicity as a cause.

New York and Manchester.

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Section III: Amalgamation, Acculturation, Assimilation

Henry Ford's Melting Pot

JONATHAN SCHWARTZ

In his characteristic gift for self-advertisement, Henry Ford once remarked: "I am more a manufacturer of men than of automobiles." This paper is a study of the Ford Motor Company's efforts at remaking the immigrants who came to Highland Park in the 1910s to work on the world's largest and (I am told) fastest assembly line. I shall examine the Company's Americanization programs and I shall also describe how these programs were experienced by one of the many ethnic groups that found its way to Highland Park during this period: the Armenian refugees. This paper, then, is a study of the theory and practice of the melting pot in its hottest and most active phase, the period of the First World War.

The idea for this paper first occurred to me when I visited a retired UAW members' picnic at Belle Isle in September, 1963. I went to the picnic with my father-in-law, a retired Armenian

Ford worker, and was introduced to a community with a distinct history that reached back to the early days of the assembly line–retired rank and file members of Local 600, and proud of their union. But these men had worked at Ford twenty and thirty years before they had a union, and it was their initial contact with Detroit and the Ford Motor Company that drew my attention. The only way to discover this history was to talk with the members of the community, and since that afternoon at Belle Isle I have visited several coffee houses and other picnic tables at Palmer Park. Always I was able to gain entry to the groups of Armenian men through a member of my wife's family, either my father-in-law or my grandfather-in-law. I found very soon that while almost every Armenian man who came to Detroit had worked at Ford, not all of them remained Ford workers to the time of the UAW. Some had escaped, some were laid off. Those who were able to stick it out at Ford up to the days of the UAW organizing drive, tended to continue at Ford until retirement, with a UAW pension. Occupational differentiation did not result in any discernible contrasts of attitude or values among the Armenian men. The men who left the assembly line to start a shoe repair business or a grocery store did not consider their new trade in the terms of upward mobility and the fulfillment of the American dream. Establishing a business in Highland Park was a means, perhaps the only means, of establishing a permanent Armenian community. It was also a way of acknowledging the permanence of the Armenian community. Rather than being assimilated and "Americanized," the Armenians who came to Detroit, and worked at Ford's at least for a time, built a rather stable and autonomous ethnic community. The surviving founders of the early Armenian community in Detroit still meet

regularly and informally in the coffee houses and clubs and, when weather permits, at the picnic tables of Palmer Park. The categories in which much sociological phenomena are cast simply do not fit the experience of the men I met and spoke with. Henry Ford's dream of the great melting pot never happened, fortunately, and the sociological constructs which are derived from the melting pot image–assimilation, acculturation, upward mobility–do not fully describe what did occur among ethnic groups.

In January, 1914, came the announcement of the $5.00 a day wage from the Ford Motor Company in Highland Park. Thousands of men appeared at the factory gates seeking a daily wage that in many cases doubled what was the standard rate for assembly line workers. So turbulent was the scene outside the Ford Company that the Highland Park fire department turned hoses on the men to dampen and freeze their enthusiasm. Behind the dramatic episode at the plant gates was a systematic program of the Ford Motor Company to Americanize the foreign workers. The Ford Profit-Sharing Plan was the theory which "justified" the $5.00 a day wage, and the Company created two agencies to implement the plan. First was the Ford English School and second was the Ford Sociological Department. In no other large American manufacturing firm was the "melting pot" idea so completely institutionalized.

The Ford English School sought to instruct the foreign born in basic English speech and writing. But like most of Ford's actions, a moral and even a religious impulse seemed to be at work. To teach English also meant to discourage the use of

native languages. To teach English meant also to Americanize, and the Ford Company pursued its aim with missionary zeal. A contemporary spokesman for the company described and explained the functioning of the Ford English School.

> For their (i.e., the workers') intellectual improvement we have provided, among other things, the Ford English School. This is a school for foreigners in our employ, the enrollment averages about 2,000. The pupils are grouped in classes of about 25 to a class. The teachers are volunteers from the office and factory. There are over one hundred and sixty of them. Each class meets twice a week, and the session lasts about one hour and a half. Attendance is virtually compulsory. If a man declines to go to school, the advantages of the training are carefully explained to him. If he still hesitates, he is laid off and given a chance for uninterrupted meditation and reconsideration. He seldom fails to change his mind.
>
> There are over 50 nationalities in the factory and there may be as many nationalities in each class as there are men present, for we make no attempt to group them according to language and race. The fact is we prefer that classes be mixed as to race and country, *for our one great aim is to impress these men that the are, or should be, Americans, and that former racial, national, and linguistic differences are to be forgotten. (My emphasis.)*[1]

To further impress upon the students in the Ford English School the fact that they were being remade into Americans, the administration of the school designed a unique graduation

1. Henry Ford Museum, Archives. Accession 293, Marquis Papers, "The Ford Profit-Sharing Plan," pp. 11-12.

ceremony. Again I quote from the text in the archives of the Ford Motor Company:

> Not long ago this school graduated over 500 men. Commencement exercises were held in the largest hall in the city. On the stage was represented an immigrant ship. In front of it was a huge melting pot. Down the gang plank came the members of the class dressed in their national garbs and carrying luggage such as they carried when they landed in this country. Down they poured into the Ford melting pot and disappeared. Then the teachers began to stir the contents of the pot with long ladles. Presently the pot began to boil over and out came the men dressed in their best American clothes and waving American flags.[2]

The melting pot doctrine found a perfect ritual in this graduation ceremony, but if that ritual meant one thing to the ministers, it probably had different meanings to the members of the flock. The symbolic transformation of the foreigner inside the melting pot into a flag waving American, may have been convincing to the teacher of the school, but it hardly touched the students. Ethnic communities survived the melting pot to the point where one can ask: *was* there in fact a melting pot? save in the minds of its creators? Changing clothes does not remake the man. Acquiring the basic skills in English, moreover, does not transform the immigrant worker into an American.

We may now ask how the other agency of the Ford Motor Company's "melting pot," the Sociological Department, attempted to reshape the men who worked in the plant. The

2. *Ibid*.

$5.00 a day was to be paid only to those Ford workers who were deserving of it. The Ford Sociological Department sent investigators to visit the workers' homes, and if an employee met certain standards of behavior and habits, he would receive the $5.00 wage. Otherwise he would have to wait until he passed. Alan Nevins, in his monumental history of the Ford Motor Company gives a compact description of the Sociological Department's method:

> Each investigator, equipped with a car, a driver, and an interpreter, was assigned a district in Detroit, mapped to contain a due proportion of Ford workers and if possible, a limited number of language groups. The subjects for inquiry made up a formidable list. Naturally, each worker was expected to furnish information on his marital status, the number of dependents and their ages, and his nationality, religion, and (if alien) prospects of citizenship. In addition, light was sought on his economic position. Did he own his home? If so, how large was the mortgage? If he rented a domicile, what did he pay? Was he in debt, and to whom? How much money had he saved, and where did he keep it? Did he carry life insurance, and at what premiums? His social outlook and mode of living also came under scrutiny. His health? His doctor? His recreations? The investigator meanwhile looked about sharply, if unobtrusively, so that he could report on 'habits,' 'home condition,' and 'neighborhood.' Before he left a given family, he knew whether its diet was adequate; whether it took in boarders–an evil practice which he was to discourage; and whether money was being sent abroad. All this information and more was placed on blue and white

> forms. The Sociological Department was nothing if not thorough.[3]

Unfortunately, for my research, the written reports of the investigators are not preserved in the archives of the Ford Motor Company. I would have liked to make these descriptions as concrete as that of the Ford English School's graduation ritual. I have spoken with several Armenian men who remember the investigators. One recalls having photographs taken of his living room and bedroom. Several Armenians mentioned one of their brothers who failed to pass the inspection. He was living at the time in a rooming house in Delray. He didn't receive the $5.00 a day. Eventually this man quit Ford and started a grocery store in Highland Park.

The investigators from the Ford Sociology Department cooperated on occasion with the Police Department, helping to correct their employees' bad habits. S.S. Marquis cited a letter from Detroit Police Commissioner:

> The Commissioner of police declared that the work done by the Company had 'decreased in number the cases against your employees,' and that the work done by the Sociological Department 'very materially improved the housing conditions in this community, resulting in many thousands of men becoming better and more dependable citizens.[4]

3. Alan Nevins. *Ford: The Times, The Man, The Company*, 3 volumes (New York, 1954) Vol. 1, p. 554.
4. S.S. Marquis. *Henry Ford: An Interpretation*, (1923).

One of the ways in which the Ford Sociological Department justified its moral and financial supervision of the workers was its claim to protect the employees against ethnic swindlers, who, the company said, frequently cheated their own people. John R. Lee, the first director of the Sociological Department, described how the Ford Company helped to "liberate" the foreign workers from ethnic exploitation:

> We have actually found in Detroit petty empires existing. For instance, we know it to be true that when a group of Rumanians, we will say, arrive in New York, in some way or other they are shipped to Detroit and the knowledge of their coming imparted to someone in our city, who meets them at the station and who confiscates the party, so to speak, persuades them to live in quarters selected for them, to buy their merchandise in markets other than their own choosing and to live unto themselves and apart from the wholesome environment of the city, so that the instigators of all this may benefit through rentals and large profits on food, wearing apparel, etc.
>
> Of course, it is to the interest of such men that these foreigners shall know nothing of the English language, of American ways and customs, or of local values, as these are the things which would liberate them from the bondage (and it is nothing more or less) under which they have unconsciously been placed.[5]

Though the actual reports of the Ford Sociological Department investigators are not contained in the archives of the Henry Ford Museum, there is a printed statistical analysis of the findings

5. John R. Lee. "The So-Called Profit-Sharing System in the Ford Plant," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 65 (May, 1916), pp. 305-6.

of the investigators for the year 1916. It is interesting that the classification of employees is by ethnic origin. Thus we have a way of comparing the different ethnic groups behavior in Detroit, but only from the criteria used by the Ford Sociological Department. Of its 40,903 employees, 16,457 were native Americans, though separate categories are given for "Negroes" (106) and American Indians (33). The Ford Company lists 58 different nationalities in its employ. There are twenty-four nationalities with at least 100 employees. They are as follows:

1. American	16,457	13. Lithuanian	541
2. Polish	7,525	14. Scottish	480
3. Italian	1,954	15. Serbian	456
4. Canadian	1,819	16. Armenian	437
5. Rumanian	1,750	17. Irish	399
6. Jewish	1,437	18. Ruthenian	368
7. German	1,360	19. Greek	281
8. Russian	1,160	20. Bohemian	240
9. English	1,159	21. Swedish	166
10. Hungarian	690	22. Croatian	159
11. Austrian	573	23. Finnish	106
12. Syrian	555	24. Negro	106

The method in which the Ford Sociological Department represented "nationality" is, of course, highly misleading. This method reflects the mechanistic views of the department towards ethnicity. The category of "American" which heads the list tells only that this group is white and native. It says little or nothing of its ethnic or regional

background. One can assume that this group of "Americans" included a fairly large proportion of second and third generation immigrants. When we examine the behavior of this group of Americans by the investigators from the Sociological Department, it does not appear that the Americans were particularly good in their behavior or prudent in their habits. In other words, the Americans in this employ of the Ford Motor Company are not to be taken as examples to be followed by the foreign born. The ideal of American in the Americanization program is not, therefore, a folk or ethnic pattern. The idea of American is a norm, a moral standard, which was set and enforced as much as possible by the administration of the Ford Motor Company. If we were stunned at the concreteness of the Ford English School's graduation ceremony of the melting pot, we ought to be stunned also at the abstractness of the Ford Sociological Department's standards of behavior. The investigators judged the employees "habits" as "good," "fair," and "poor," and statistics in these terms were compiled for each of the fifty-eight ethnic groups. No explanation of what constitutes good, fair, and poor habits is given. However, by talking with at least one ethnic group, we can gather what type of thing the Sociological Department had in mind. Gambling apparently

was a "poor" habit–almost universal, but definitely to be discouraged. Saving in a bank was a "good" habit. The investigators urged the worker to start a savings account with the wages that he might otherwise have gambled. Living in a rooming house was not as "good" as buying a home. Living in an ethnic community was not as "good" as living in the wholesome environment of nondescript Detroit. It seems on reflection that the ideal of the Ford Sociological Department was a purely impersonal world, a world of interchangeable men who would operate like interchangeable parts of a machine. The "melting pot" at Ford's was an assembly line.

If we turn to the Sociological Department's statistical summary of the 437 Armenian Ford workers in 1916, we would see that at least from the standpoint of the Ford Motor Company, this relatively small nationality was well on its way to being melted down into the American society. By nearly all of its standards of behavior and good habits, the Armenians were being assimilated and Americanized. Only four Armenians of the entire number were found unable to speak English. Those Armenian workers who have savings accounts in Detroit banks held savings that were more than double those of the average employee. Armenians, moreover, were taking out life insurance policies at about the average rate. A smaller number of the Armenians than the average were married and had families, but this fact only testifies to the circumstances of the Armenian immigration to

the United States. Armenian men immigrated, without families, and generally preceded by five or ten years the immigration of women. Young Armenian women often lived in orphanages in Armenia, for the earlier Turkish massacres were aimed at the male population. The women remained in orphanages until they received the money for passage to America. In Detroit the Armenian workers lived in rooming houses and shared the cooking and housework. They spent their leisure hours in the coffee houses and parks as they do to this day. According to the Ford investigators the habits of the Armenian workers were "good" or "fair." They had the mode of behavior which marked them as dependable. Thus, the Armenians resembled in several respects the "norms" established by the Sociological Department.

The statistical portrait of the Armenian Ford workers hardly tells the real history of this group. The early immigrants were saving their wages at a higher rate in order to buy passage back to their native land. These men had left Armenia to avoid being drafted into the Turkish army. The World War and the subsequent massacres by the Turks in a sense sealed the fate of the Armenians who had already come to America. After 1915 there was no going back to Armenia. Rather, it became imperative to bring the survivors to the United States. Hence the powerful motive for saving among Armenian Ford workers. While the Ford Sociological Department viewed savings as "good" because it showed the character of restraint in an individual, we can see that the act of saving money can also represent a collective and not merely an individual will. The Armenian Ford workers saved money in order to create an

Armenian community, not to individuate themselves in the American society. Similarly, as I mentioned at the opening of this paper, the reasons for starting a business in Highland Park were primarily those of building a solid economic base for the growing Armenian community. If an Armenian Ford worker quit Ford to start a business, it was not to separate himself from his fellow Armenians but to better cement his bonds with them. The business often served the Armenian neighborhood. We ought not to mistake these ethnic aspirations, as attempts to realize the "American dream." For these several hundred Armenian men at Ford, the awesome consciousness of the survivor was far more persuasive and real than the American fantasy of the self-made man.

We must move ever closer to particular cases, away from the abstract profiles of the Ford Sociological Department. The historian who does research through conversations–oral history–has to develop a different temperament from that of the researcher in archives. In the archives one does a rapid interrogation of the materials at his desk, sorting through and discarding an immense number of documents. We usually know what we are after; and when we find it, there is the joy of discovery, a drink at the fountain, and the copying of the text in the notebook. While listening to old workers telling about the early days on the assembly line, the historian cannot be in a hurry, nor can he pounce upon the evidence when he hears it coming from the lips of his informers. The Armenian men I spoke with, or listened to, could not quite figure out why I was asking them all those questions. Sometimes they referred me to authorities or to experts on Armenian history. I never took their

advice. I considered the men in the coffee houses the best experts on their own history, although they did not regard what they had done as historically significant. I rather think otherwise.

The men did not arrive in America as whole communities with a definite social organization. It took nearly two decades to establish Armenian organizations, like the church, in Detroit. The men arrived in this city after spending about two or three years moving from job to job in the United States. These wanderings are remarkable. One man recalls arriving in New York in 1907, making his way to Providence, Rhode Island, then and now an Armenian center in the U.S., and then up to Island Falls, Maine, where he worked in a shoe factory. Laid off from this job, he lived alone in the Maine woods for several months, hunting deer. Hearing of other Armenians in Pennsylvania and Missouri, he made his way to both places, always asking for other Armenians en route–not simply using a grape vine, but *making* a grape vine. Harry M. came to Detroit three years after landing in New York. He lived and worked briefly in Delray, and then got a job at Ford's in Highland Park in the gear cutting department. In 1910, he was the third Armenian to be hired at Ford. He recalls how Ford used to take walks through the plant, something like a general reviewing his troops. He came up to Harry at the lathe and pulled his long dark hair, smiling and saying, "I wish my hair were like that." None of the later Armenian workers remembers such a buoyant Henry Ford. Harry recalls the passionate feelings pro and con toward Henry Ford among both immigrants and natives. One worker who called his dog "Ford," was attacked in a restaurant by a Ford loyalist. When a fight broke out, the man with the dog was

arrested and fined for creating a disturbance. The loyalist was released.

Episodes such as these reveal better than any statistics the character of the factory city in those days; this character combined the explosiveness of frontier America and the harsh discipline of the assembly line. Ford himself personified these traits, but they were traits which could not be transmitted to all who came to work at Ford's factory. My informants in the Armenian community tell me that when an Armenian arrived in Detroit needing work, one of the Armenian Ford workers would give that man's name to his foreman, and the foreman would pass the name to the employment officers, who might then call the name in the waiting room, ask the man a few questions, and assign him to a department where he was needed. In this way, the Ford company managed, informally, to keep some distribution of ethnic groups. Favoritism, and sometimes bribery, could also get a man a job. No Armenian man from these early days ever remembers being promoted into a high post in the company. Nor did other ethnic groups rise in the ranks of the Ford management.

From what I can gather from the small number of former Ford workers I spoke with, the very early days at Ford in Highland Park were quite different from the late nineteen-tens, and particularly the twenties after the Rouge Plant was built.

Ethnicity is very much a part of the industrial and labor history of Detroit. Too often historians like to keep their categories separated from one another. The economic historian looks at the manufacturing firm; the labor historian looks at the local union;

the ethnic historian looks at a particular nationality. But history does not live in the categories of scholarship. The social history of modern times cannot be placed in neat compartments. Rather, we can discover our history at those junctions or intersections where we, as people with distinct history, meet head on with institutions like schools and factories.

I hope that my little research into the Armenian workers who worked at Fords' in Highland Park can be seen as an example of the kind of historiography which reveals the character of our society.

Taken from: Feinstein, Otto, editor. *Ethnic groups in the City: Culture, Institutions and Power*. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 197l.

A Societal Theory of Race and Ethnic Relations

STANLEY LIEBERSON

This paper seeks to present a rudimentary theory of the development of race and ethnic relations that systematically accounts for differences between societies in such divergent consequences of contact as racial nationalism and warfare, assimilation and fusion, and extinction. It postulates that the critical problem on a societal level in racial or ethnic contact is initially each population's maintenance and development of a social order compatible with its ways of life prior to contact. The crux of any cycle must, therefore, deal with political, social, and economic institutions….

Although we accept this institutional approach, the thesis presented here is that knowledge of' the nature of one group's domination over another in the political, social, and economic

spheres is a necessary but insufficient prerequisite for predicting or interpreting the final and intermediate stages of racial and ethnic contact. Rather, institutional factors are considered in terms of a distinction between two major types of contact situations: contacts involving subordination of an indigenous population by a migrant group, for example, Negro-white relations in South Africa; and contacts involving subordination of a migrant population by an indigenous racial or ethnic group, for example, Japanese migrants to the United States.

After considering the societal issues inherent in racial and ethnic contact, the distinction developed between migrant and indigenous superordination will be utilized in examining each of the following dimensions of race relations: political and economic control, multiple ethnic contacts, conflict and assimilation. The terms "race" and "ethnic" are used interchangeably.

Differences Inherent In Contact

Most situations of ethnic contact involve at least one indigenous group and at least one group migrating to the area. The only exception at the initial point in contact would be the settlement of an uninhabited area by two or more groups. By "indigenous" is meant not necessarily the aborigines, but rather a population sufficiently established in an area so as to possess the institutions and demographic capacity for maintaining some minimal form of social order through generations. Thus a given spatial area may have different indigenous groups through time. For example, the indigenous population of Australia is presently largely white and primarily of British origin, although the

Tasmanoids and Australoids were once in possession of the area. A similar racial shift may be observed in the populations indigenous to the United States.

Restricting discussion to the simplest of contact situations, i.e., involving one migrant and one established population, we can generally observe sharp differences in their social organization at the time of contact. The indigenous population has an established and presumably stable organization prior to the arrival of migrants, i.e., government, economic activities adapted to the environment and the existing techniques of resource utilization, kinship, stratification, and religious systems. On the basis of a long series of migration studies, we may be reasonably certain that the social order of a migrant population's homeland is not wholly transferred to their new settlement. Migrants are required to make at least some institutional adaptations and innovations in view of the presence of an indigenous population, the demographic selectivity of migration, and differences in habitat.

For example, recent post-war migrations from Italy and the Netherlands indicate considerable selectivity in age and sex from the total populations of these countries. Nearly half of 30,000 males leaving the Netherlands in 1955 were between 20 and 39 years of age whereas only one quarter of the male population was of these ages. Similarly, over 40,000 males in this age range accounted for somewhat more than half of Italy's male emigrants in 1951, although they comprise roughly 30 per cent of the male population of Italy. In both countries, male emigrants exceed females in absolute numbers as well as in

comparison with the sex ratios of their nation. That these cases are far from extreme can be illustrated with Oriental migration data. In 1920, for example, there were 38,000 foreign born Chinese adult males in the United States, but only 2,000 females of the same group.

In addition to these demographic shifts, the new physical and biological conditions of existence require the revision and creation of social institutions if the social order known in the old country is to be approximated and if the migrants are to survive. The migration of eastern and southern European peasants around the turn of the century to urban industrial centers of the United States provides a well-documented case of radical changes in occupational pursuits as well as the creation of a number of institutions in response to the new conditions of urban life, e.g., mutual aid societies, national churches, and financial institutions.

In short, when two populations begin to occupy the same habitat but do not share a single order, each group endeavors to maintain the political and economic conditions that are at least compatible with the institutions existing before contact. These conditions for the maintenance of institutions can not only differ for the two groups in contact, but are often conflicting. European contacts with the American Indian, for example, led to the decimation of the latter's sources of sustenance and disrupted religious and tribal forms of organization. With respect to a population's efforts to maintain its social institutions, we may therefore assume that the presence of another ethnic group is an important part of the environment. Further, if groups in contact differ in

their capacity to impose changes on the other group, then we may expect to find one group "superordinate" and the other population "subordinate" in maintaining or developing a suitable environment.

It is here that efforts at a single cycle of race and ethnic relations must fail. For it is necessary to introduce a distinction in the nature or form of subordination before attempting to predict whether conflict or relatively harmonious assimilation will develop. As we shall shortly show, the race relations cycle in areas where the migrant group is superordinate and indigenous group subordinate differs sharply from the stages in societies composed of a superordinate indigenous group and subordinate migrants.

Political And Economic Control

Emphasis is placed herein on economic and political dominance since it is assumed that control of these institutions will be instrumental in establishing a suitable milieu for at least the population's own social institutions, e.g., educational, religious, and kinship, as well as control of such major cultural artifacts as language.

Migrant Superordination. When the population migrating to a new contact situation is superior in technology (particularly weapons) and more tightly organized than the indigenous group, the necessary conditions for maintaining the migrants' political and economic institutions are usually imposed on the indigenous population. Warfare, under such circumstances, often occurs early in the contacts between the two groups as the migrants

begin to interfere with the natives' established order. There is frequently conflict even if the initial contact was friendly. Price, for example, has observed the following consequences of white invasion and subordination of the indigenous populations of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States:

> During an opening period of pioneer invasion on moving frontiers the whites decimated the natives with their diseases; occupied their lands by seizure or by pseudo-purchase; slaughtered those who resisted; intensified tribal warfare by supplying white weapons; ridiculed and disrupted native religions, society and culture, and generally reduced the unhappy peoples to a state of despondency under which they neither desired to live, nor to have children to undergo similar conditions….

In addition to bringing about these demographic and economic upheavals, the superordinate migrants frequently create political entities that are not at all coterminous with the boundaries existing during the indigenous populations' supremacy prior to contact. For example, the British and Boers in southern Africa carved out political states that included areas previously under the control of separate and often warring groups. Indeed, European alliances with feuding tribes were often used as a fulcrum for the territorial expansion of whites into southern Africa. The bifurcation of tribes into two nations and the migrations of groups across newly created national boundaries are both consequences of the somewhat arbitrary nature of the political entities created in regions of migrant superordination. This incorporation of diverse indigenous populations into a single territorial unit under the dominance of a migrant group

has considerable importance for later developments in this type of racial and ethnic contact.

Indigenous Superordination. When a population migrates to a subordinate position considerably less conflict occurs in the early stages. The movements of many European and Oriental populations to political, economic, and social subordination in the United States were not converted into warfare, nationalism, or long-term conflict. Clearly, the occasional labor and racial strife marking the history of immigration of the United States is not on the same level as the efforts to expel or revolutionize the social order. American Negroes, one of the most persistently subordinated migrant groups in the country, never responded in significant numbers to the encouragement of migration to Liberia. The single important large-scale nationalistic effort, Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association, never actually led to mass emigration of Negroes. By contrast, the indigenous American Indians fought long and hard to preserve control over their habitat.

In interpreting differences in the effects of migrant and indigenous subordination, the migrants must be considered in the context of the options available to the group. Irish migrants to the United States in the 1840·s, for example, although clearly subordinate to native whites of other origins, fared better economically than if they had remained in their mother country. Further, the option of returning to the homeland often exists for populations migrating to subordinate situations. Jerome reports that net migration to the United States between the midyears of 1907 and 1923 equalled roughly 65 per cent of gross

immigration. This indicates that immigrant dissatisfaction with subordination or other conditions of contact can often be resolved by withdrawal from the area. Recently subordinated indigenous groups, by contrast, are perhaps less apt to leave their habitat so readily.

Finally, when contacts between racial and ethnic groups are under the control of the indigenous population, threats of demographic and institutional imbalance are reduced since the superordinate populations can limit the numbers and groups entering. For example, when Oriental migration to the United States threatened whites, sharp cuts were executed in the quotas. Similar events may be noted with respect to the decline of immigration from the so-called "new" sources of eastern and southern Europe. Whether a group exercises its control over immigration far before it is actually under threat is, of course, not germane to the point that immigrant restriction provides a mechanism whereby potential conflict is prevented.

In summary, groups differ in the conditions necessary for maintaining their respective social orders. In areas where the migrant group is dominant, frequently the indigenous population suffers sharp numerical declines and their economic and political institutions are seriously undermined. Conflict often accompanies the establishment of migrant superordination. Subordinate indigenous populations generally have no alternative location and do not control the numbers of new ethnic populations admitted into their area. By contrast, when the indigenous population dominates the political and economic conditions, the migrant group is introduced into the economy

of the indigenous population. Although subordinate in their new habitat, the migrants may fare better than if they remained in their homeland. Hence their subordination occurs without great conflict. In addition, the migrants usually have the option of returning to their homeland and the indigenous population controls the number of new immigrants in the area.

Multiple Ethnic Contacts

Although the introduction of a third major ethnic or racial group frequently occurs in both types of societies distinguished here, there are significant differences between conditions in habitats under indigenous domination and areas where a migrant population is superordinate. Chinese and Indian migrants, for example, were often welcomed by whites in areas where large indigenous populations were suppressed, but these migrants were restricted in the white mother country. Consideration of the causes and consequences of multiethnic contacts is therefore made in terms of the two types of racial and ethnic contact.

Migrant Superordination. In societies where the migrant population is superordinate, it is often necessary to introduce new immigrant groups to fill the niches created in the revised economy of the area. The subordinate indigenous population frequently fails, at first, to participate in the new economic and political order introduced by migrants. For example, because of the numerical decline of Fijians after contact with whites and their unsatisfactory work habits, approximately 60,000 persons migrated from India to the sugar plantations of Fiji under the indenture system between 1879 and 1916. For similar reasons, as well as the demise of slavery, large numbers of Indians were

also introduced to such areas of indigenous subordination as Mauritius, British Guiana, Trinidad, and Natal. The descendents of these migrants comprise the largest single ethnic group in several of these areas.

McKenzie, after observing the negligible participation of the subordinated indigenous populations of Alaska, Hawaii, and Malaya in contrast to the large numbers of Chinese, Indian, and other Oriental immigrants, offers the following interpretation:

> The indigenous peoples of many of the frontier zones of modern industrialism are surrounded by their own web of culture and their own economic structure. Consequently they are slow to take part in the new economy especially as unskilled laborers. It is the individual who is widely removed from his native habitat that is most adaptable to the conditions imposed by capitalism in frontier regions. Imported labor cannot so easily escape to its home village when conditions are distasteful as can the local population.

Similarly, the Indians of the United States played a minor role in the new economic activities introduced by white settlers and, further, were not used successfully as slaves. Frazier reports that Negro slaves were utilized in the West Indies and Brazil after unsuccessful efforts to enslave the indigenous Indian populations. Large numbers of Asiatic Indians were brought to South Africa as indentured laborers to work in the railways, mines, and plantations introduced by whites.

This migration of workers into areas where the indigenous population was either unable or insufficient to work in the newly

created economic activities was also marked by a considerable flow back to the home country. For example, nearly 3.5 million Indians left the Madras Presidency for overseas between 1903 and 1912, but close to 3 million returned during this same period. However, as we observed earlier, large numbers remained overseas and formed major ethnic populations in a number of countries. Current difficulties of the ten million Chinese in Southeast Asia are in large part due to their settlement in societies where the indigenous populations were subordinate.

Indigenous Superordination. We have observed that in situations of indigenous superordination the call for new immigrants from other ethnic and racial populations is limited in a manner that prevents the indigenous group's loss of political and economic control. Under such conditions, no single different ethnic or racial population is sufficiently large in number or strength to challenge the supremacy of the indigenous population.

After whites attained dominance in Hawaii, that land provided a classic case of the substitution of one ethnic group after another during a period when large numbers of immigrants were needed for the newly created and expanding plantation economy. According to Lind, the shifts from Chinese to Japanese and Portuguese immigrants and the later shifts to Puerto Rican, Korean, Spanish, Russian, and Phillipine sources for the plantation laborers were due to conscious efforts to prevent any single group from obtaining too much power. Similarly, the exclusion of Chinese from the United States mainland

stimulated the migration of the Japanese and, in turn, the later exclusion of Japanese led to increased migration from Mexico.

In brief, groups migrating to situations of multiple ethnic contact are thus subordinate in both types of contact situations. However, in societies where whites are superordinate but do not settle as an indigenous population, other racial and ethnic groups are admitted in large numbers and largely in accordance with economic needs of the revised economy of the habitat. By contrast, when a dominant migrant group later becomes indigenous, in the sense that the area becomes one of permanent settlement through generations for the group, migrant populations from new racial and ethnic stocks are restricted in number and source.

Conflict and Assimilation

From a comparison of the surge of racial nationalism and open warfare in parts of Africa and Asia or the retreat of superordinate migrants from the former Dutch East Indies and French Indo-China, on the one hand, with the fusion of populations in many nations of western Europe or the "cultural pluralism" of the United States and Switzerland, on the other, one must conclude that neither conflict nor assimilation is an inevitable outcome of racial and ethnic contact. Our distinction, however, between two classes of race and ethnic relations is directly relevant to consideration of which of these alternatives different populations in contact will take. In societies where the indigenous population at the initial contact is subordinate, warfare and nationalism often–although not always-develops later in the cycle of relations. By contrast, relations between

migrants and indigenous populations that are subordinate and superordinate, respectively, are generally without long-term conflict.

Migrant Superordination. Through time, the subordinated indigenous population begins to participate in the economy introduced by the migrant group and, frequently, a concomitant disruption of previous forms of social and economic organization takes place. This, in turn, has significant implications for the development of both nationalism and a greater sense of racial unity. In many African states, where Negroes were subdivided into ethnic groups prior to contact with whites, the racial unity of the African was created by the occupation of their habitat by white invaders. The categorical subordination of Africans by whites as well as the dissolution and decay of previous tribal and ethnic forms of organization are responsible for the creation of racial consciousness among the indigenous populations. As the indigenous group becomes increasingly incorporated within the larger system, both the saliency of their subordinate position and its significance increase. No alternative exists for the bulk of the native population other than the destruction or revision of the institutions of political, economic, and social subordination.

Further, it appears that considerable conflict occurs in those areas where the migrants are not simply superordinate, but where they themselves have also become, in a sense, indigenous by maintaining an established population through generations. In Table 1, for example, one can observe how sharply the white populations of Algeria and the Union of South Africa differ

from those in nine other African countries with respect to the per cent born in the country of settlement. Thus, two among the eleven African countries for which such data were available are outstanding with respect to both racial turmoil and the high proportion of whites born in the country. To be sure, other factors operate to influence the nature of racial and ethnic relations. However, these data strongly support our suggestions with respect to the significance of differences between indigenous and migrant forms of contact. Thus where the migrant population becomes established in the new area, it is all the more difficult for the indigenous subordinate group to change the social order.

Table 1. Nativity of the White Populations of Selected African Countries, Circa 1950

Country	Per Cent of Whites Born in Country
Algeria	79.8
Basutoland	37.4
Bechuanaland	39.5
Morocco[a]	37.1[c]
Northern Rhodesia	17.7
Southern Rhodesia	31.5
South West Africa[b]	45.1
Swaziland	41.2
Tanganyika	47.6
Uganda	43.8
Union of South Africa	89.7

Source: United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 1956, Table 5.
[a]Former French zone.
[b]Excluding Walvis Bay.
[c]Persons born in former Spanish zone or in Tangier are included as native.
Note: Other non-indigenous groups included when necessary breakdown by race is not given.

Additionally, where the formerly subordinate indigenous population has become dominant through the expulsion of the superordinate group, the situation faced by nationalities introduced to the area under earlier conditions of migrant superordination changes radically. For example, as we noted

earlier, Chinese were welcomed in many parts of Southeast Asia where the newly subordinated indigenous populations were unable or unwilling to fill the economic niches created by the white invaders. However, after whites were expelled and the indigenous populations obtained political mastery, the gates to further Chinese immigration were fairly well closed and there has been increasing interference with the Chinese already present. In Indonesia, where Chinese immigration had been encouraged under Dutch domain, the newly created indigenous government allows only token immigration and has formulated a series of laws and measures designed to interfere with and reduce Chinese commercial activities. Thompson and Adloff observe that,

> Since the war, the Chinese have been subjected to increasingly restrictive measures throughout Southeast Asia, but the severity and effectiveness of these has varied with the degree to which the native nationalists are in control of their countries and feel their national existence threatened by the Chinese.

Indigenous Superordination. By contrast, difficulties between subordinate migrants and an already dominant indigenous population occur within the context of a consensual form of government, economy, and social institutions. However confused and uncertain may be the concept of assimilation and its application in operational terms, it is important to note that assimilation is essentially a very different phenomenon in the two types of societies distinguished here.

Where populations migrate to situations of subordination, the

issue has generally been with respect to the migrants' capacity and willingness to become an integral part of the on-going social order. For example, this has largely been the case in the United States where the issue of "new" vs. "old" immigrant groups hinged on the alleged inferiorities of the former. The occasional flurries of violence under this form of contact have been generally initiated by the dominant indigenous group and with respect to such threats against the social order as the cheap labor competition of Orientals in the west coast, the nativist fears of Irish Catholic political domination of Boston in the nineteenth century, or the desecration of sacred principles of Mexican "zoot-suiters" in Los Angeles.

The conditions faced by subordinate migrants in Australia and Canada after the creation of indigenous white societies in these areas are similar to that of the United States; that is, limited and sporadic conflict, and great emphasis on the assimilation of migrants. Striking and significant contrasts to the general pattern of subordinant immigrant assimilation in these societies, however, are provided by the differences between the assimilation of Italian and German immigrants in Australia as well as the position of French Canadians in eastern Canada.

French Canadians have maintained their language and other major cultural and social attributes whereas nineteenth and twentieth century immigrants are in process of merging into the predominantly English-speaking Canadian society. Although broader problems of territorial segregation are involved, the critical difference between French Canadians and later groups is that the former had an established society in the new habitat

prior to the British conquest of Canada and were thus largely able to maintain their social and cultural unity without significant additional migration from France….

Thus the consequences of racial and ethnic contact may also be examined in terms of the two types of superordinate-subordinate contact situations considered. For the most part, subordinate migrants appear to be more rapidly assimilated than are subordinate indigenous populations. Further, the subordinate migrant group is generally under greater pressure to assimilate, at least in the gross sense of "assimilation" such as language, than are subordinate indigenous populations. In addition, warfare or racial nationalism–when it does occur–tends to be in societies where the indigenous population is subordinate. If the indigenous movement succeeds, the economic and political position of racial and ethnic populations introduced to the area under migrant dominance may become tenuous….

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The Validation of Acculturation: A Condition to Ethnic Assimilation

LEONARD BROOM AND JOHN KITSUSE

The effective utilization of the acculturational approach to the study of ethnic minorities has been impeded by the lack of a clear formulation of the relation between acculturation and the significant social forces making for and retarding assimilation. In this paper we shall sketch out an approach which may clarify the inherent problems and indicate a potentially fruitful line of inquiry. It is our judgment that the student of this problem should study intensively *the ways* that the acculturated patterns of behavior are used by the groups undergoing change and *the contexts* in which they are used.

The social significance of the acculturation of ethnic groups

cannot be understood as a process of the accumulation of specific cultural elements. There comes a point in the acculturation of an ethnic group in an open society, such as America, when its members have acquired enough of the new cultural apparatus to behave efficiently within the adopted system. They then have the alternatives of maintaining a peripheral position in the social order or venturing the risks and rewards of validating their acculturation. Validation is the empirical test of the individual's achieved acculturation. It must occur in interethnic situations where the latent mobility of the individual, unprotected by his group or the immunities of cultural incompetence, is assessed.

The process of validation is not, however, an even one in the sense that acculturation is validated once-and-for-all, any more than acculturation is in the experience of a person a simple progression to a point of completion. Critical choices and traumatic experiences may figure importantly for one person, whereas for another the course may be a relatively steady one. An individual who is reared in a locality with a predominantly nonethnic population validates his acculturation continually in the spheres of activities appropriate to his age-sex status. As an adult, if he is to consolidate his earlier validations, he must validate his acculturation in other spheres, particularly the economic one.

A large part of the acculturational experience of the members of an ethnic group may be circumscribed by the ethnic community. Such experience does not validate acculturation and indeed may have the long-run effect of retarding the validation of

acculturation and the eventual assimilation of many members of the group. The validation of acculturation must take place in the host society (not the ethnic community), and the individual must be divested of the immunities, as well as the impediments, which are properties of ethnicity.

When ethnic communities persist beyond the early immigrant stages, they contain a number of individuals with varying degrees of acculturation. The organizations and institutions of the ethnic community change, and some of them take on the essential characteristics of the institutional forms of the large society. These may be designated *parallel ethnic institutions*. Parallel ethnic institutions may be significant for the acculturational process in at least three respects:

1. They ameliorate the stresses of interethnic situations and provide contexts of acculturation under relatively permissive conditions. Ecological segregation and discriminatory restrictions upon social participation emphasize the functional importance of ethnic institutions. For those who are spatially isolated from the ethnic community and thus faced with greater exposure to the stresses of interethnic interaction, ethnic institutions provide avenues for withdrawal and retrenchment.

2. They provide criteria of acculturation for the less acculturated and more isolated members of the ethnic group. These criteria almost always are selective of the dominant cultural forms. The selectivity is in part a reflection of the socially differentiated position of

the group in the society. It is also conditioned by the cultural congruence of the two systems.

3.   They legitimize the status system of the ethnic community in which we expect to find transplanted important aspects of the stratification criteria of the dominant society. Acculturation, when used for status differentiation within the ethnic community, tends toward the elaboration of formal culture. (Discussion of this interesting problem must be deferred to another time.) But acculturation acquired for intraethnic prestige value may obscure or impair the instrumental significance of acculturation for the adjustment of the ethnic group to the dominant society. The ethnic community is a relatively safe place in which acculturated forms may be tried out, and interaction with the dominant group may be rehearsed. But it is in interethnic situations that acculturation is validated as an instrument of adjustment, the ethnic individual's level of acculturation is tested, and the distance he must yet travel to assimilation is measured.

To explore this problem further we shall take the case of the Japanese Americans. (Cf. Caudill 1952; Embree 1941.) The rapid acculturation of the Japanese population in America and Hawaii and its adjustment to the dominant society has frequently been remarked upon. Considering the apparent gap between the American and Japanese cultures and the differences between the English and Japanese languages, the speed of this acculturation is doubly notable. It is not appropriate to review here the reasons

for this adaptation–an achievement perhaps rarely equaled in the history of human migration. We should observe, however, that great differences in manifest cultural characteristics need not be accompanied by an equal difference in the less tangible aspects of culture and society–those aspects related to valuations, motivations, and the like. Indeed, it may be hypothesized that the American and Japanese cultures are quite similar in the emphasis placed upon societal instruments, e.g., formal education (Broom and Shevky 1952). The rapidity of Japanese acculturation has been aided by generally good access to formal education.

The speed of Japanese acculturation has· produced within the population individuals varying widely in their degree of acculturation. Abrupt termination of immigration from Japan created the following situation: a native-born (*Nisei*) population with an intermediate to high level of acculturation standing beside an immigrant population (*Issei*) with low to intermediate acculturation. "The *Nisei* problem," the repeated concern of the Japanese community in the United States for the past thirty years, is an expression of this cultural cleavage. Part of this minority group has been brought with great rapidity to the very brink of assimilation. The extent to which the chasm will be bridged is dependent upon the ability of these highly acculturated individuals to validate their acculturation in the context of the large society. To what extent will they be able to surmount racial impediments, on the one hand, and the cohesive and isolating forces of ethnic separatism, on the other?

For any racially visible group, assimilation is impeded by the

strong bars to racial crossing in the United States. Under these conditions full acculturation is not accompanied by the rewards of full acceptance by the society, at least not immediately. It is quite possible, indeed probable, that in a period of a few generations the small population of Japanese Americans will be absorbed into the white population. This does not enter into our discussion, however, and we need only note that the validation of acculturation is for this group impaired and retarded by the societal regulations of racial exclusion.

The validation of their acculturation before the war was largely limited to highly institutionalized settings and relations. The success of the *Nisei* in the public schools and in school clubs and teams is a manifestation of this. On the other hand, informal association with *hakujin* (Caucasians) was limited. The *Nisei* peer group elaborated their own institutions, which were sometimes adaptations of Japanese forms such as the Buddhist church, but more commonly were adaptations of American forms like the Japanese American Citizens League and numerous age-graded, sexually differentiated social clubs. Even in organizations such as the Buddhist church, which might naively be assumed to be agents of cultural conservatism, there rapidly emerged a set of forms and associations for *Nisei*, indistinguishable from their equivalents in the Protestant churches of middle-class white communities. Within these ethnically circumscribed associations the *Nisei* played acculturated roles, which in interethnic situations would have required more aggressive self-confidence than they were able to marshal. In the ethnic peer groups the *Nisei* found support for new standards and definitions of behavior, which were sources

of intergenerational conflict in the family and community. We note in passing that the participation of *Nisei* females in interethnic groups demanded less acculturation and was less threatening to their position in the ethnic group as well as in the dominant society than was the case for the *Nisei* male. While females could participate passively, the male role demanded an aggressiveness which made him highly vulnerable. Consequently, interethnic participation among *Nisei* males required a degree of acculturation and security which few *Nisei* had achieved before the war.

In the processes of economic adjustment, the Japanese had concentrated their activities in a few occupations (small-scale business in ethnic enclaves, contract gardening, domestic service, fishing) and had achieved a most important role in the production and distribution of truck garden crops. However, many *Nisei* who graduated from high school in the early 1930's, encouraged by the high value given to education in the Japanese culture, chose college education as an alternative to entering ethnic-defined occupations. A college degree offered no guarantee of securing the white-collar jobs to which the *Nisei* as a group aspired, and the incongruity of college graduates taking employment in produce markets, gardening routes, and small shops, with scant prospects of advancement, led to a growing pessimism in the Japanese population. The flow of *Nisei* into ethnically defined occupations had important consequences for the group's adjustment to the society at large, for it affected the character of interethnic participation and reduced the volume of interaction in the important area of economic activity.

The political participation of the Japanese population was limited and immature because discriminatory legislation against the Japanese denied *Issei* the rights of citizenship. Consequently, it remained for the *Nisei* to assume political leadership in mediating the group's relations with the dominant society. The extreme vulnerability of the population in a historically anti-Japanese region defined an ethnic-centered, defensive political strategy, emphasizing selective group participation in the political institutions of the society. Opportunities for participation in dominant political organizations were consequently limited to the race leaders and then at the level of the ward worker.

The generally permissive orientation of the Japanese culture toward religion presented a favorable condition for the acceptance of and participation in the dominant religious institutions. The number of Christians in the Japanese population nearly equaled that of Buddhists. However, the dominant religious institutions provided few opportunities for the validation of acculturated religious forms. As early as 1900 the Methodist Church, the denomination with the largest number of Japanese members, instituted a program which effectively segregated the activities of the Japanese. The occasional "inter-racial" meetings which were conducted between *Nisei* and Caucasian youth groups were designed for group rather than individual interaction and underscored the separation from Caucasian churches.

The Japanese family in America rarely participated as a unit in the larger society. We have already noted how the differential

participation of its members in the dominant institutions created a wide range of acculturation in the population. Within the ethnic enclaves the family represented a major conservative influence, and in most families acculturation of the *Nisei* was accompanied by conflict. Community and institutional supports, so essential to the maintenance of the Japanese family system in Japan, became less effective as the *Nisei* carried their acculturative influences into the family (cf. Miyamoto 1939). The patriarchal family pattern was consequently attacked from within and without, and the traditional authority and dependency relationships were placed under stress (Masuoka 1938, 1944).

Acculturation is viewed here as directed toward the ultimate assimilation of the ethnic individual in American society. Access to participation in the dominant institutions is a precondition for the validation of acculturation and consequently for assimilation. But access to the dominant society is limited by diverse factors which create stress in interethnic situations, provide for the prolonged survival of parallel ethnic institutions, and result in deferring the validation of acculturation.

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Assimilation as Concept and as Process

WALTER HIRSCH

The purpose of this paper is a comparison of the concepts of assimilation as defined by several American sociologists in the last two decades with the actual process of assimilation. It is assumed that the referent of the concept should be descriptively and operationally congruent with the process.

This analysis will involve the discussion of three main points regarding assimilation: (1) differences in definitions of the concept; (2) differences in definitions of kindred concepts, viz., accommodation, acculturation, adaptation, adjustment and amalgamation, and the consequent effects on the definition of assimilation; (3) differences between the definitions of the concept and the actual process of assimilation.

Assimilation as Concept

A. Two decades ago Sarah E. Simons considered assimilation "that process of adjustment and accommodation which occurs between the members of different races, if their contact is prolonged and if the necessary psychic conditions are present. The result is group homogeneity to a greater or less degree. Figuratively speaking, it is the process by which the aggregation of peoples is changed from a mere mechanical mixture into a chemical compound."[1]

B. According to Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, assimilation is one of the four major categories of social behavior, the others being conflict, competition, and accommodation. It is "a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments and attitudes of other persons or groups, and by sharing their experience and history are incorporated with them in a common cultural life."[2]

C. Kimball Young accepts the previous definition but prefaces it by a supplementary one according to which assimilation is "the common sharing and fusing of folkways and mores, of laws and all the other features of two or more distinctive cultures by people who have come into direct relations with each other."[3]

D. Finally, H.G. Duncan defines assimilation as follows: "a process, for the most part conscious, by which individuals and

1. "Social Assimilation," *American Journal of Sociology*, VI, 791.
2. *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924), p. 735.
3. *Introductory Sociology* (New York: American Book Co., 1939), p. 495.

groups come to have sentiments and attitudes similar to those held by other persons or groups in regard to a particular value at a given time."[4]

These four definitions were chosen because each contains a special emphasis that needs further analysis. We must now raise the question of whether differences of definition are mainly semantic, i.e., due to use of different verbal symbols for the same process, or whether they result from a description of altogether different processes. In this connection it may be pointed out that these definitions are highly descriptive, not only of one process but of a number of processes, mechanisms, and end results.

We turn now to an analysis of the definitions.

1. It is not certain whether by "interpenetration and fusion" Park and Burgess are referring to persons or to culture elements, or to both. At any rate, these terms need further definition. "Fusion" (or amalgamation) is generally used to describe a biological process, i.e., interbreeding of members of different racial groups. An actual physical fusion of persons is obviously impossible, except as realized in their offspring. The other possibility is that Park and Burgess use fusion in reference to culture elements, as Young does. This will be more fully discussed in No. 4 below.

"Adjustment" and "accommodation" have specific connotations which they did not have at the time Simons used them. Adjustment is a generic term referring to the "adaptation of the organism to social environment."[5] "Accommodation refers to

4. "A Study in the Process of Assimilation," *Publications* of the American Sociological Society, XXIII, 184-7.
5. Kimball Young, "Adjustment," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, I, 438-9.

functional changes which take place in the habits and customs of persons and groups, and which are socially rather than biologically transmitted."[6] For Park and Burgess accommodation is a more rapid and revolutionary change, often a "social mutation" as exemplified by conversion, while assimilation is a gradual process. Young differentiates the two as follows: "If persons or groups strike a truce but do not intermarry or fuse their cultures, we call this accommodation. If they intermarry and fuse their cultures, we speak of it as biological amalgamation and cultural assimilation."[7]

2. The *agents* in this process are either persons or groups. The latter are defined more specifically as cultures by Young and as races by Simons.[8] Park and Burgess' definition is sufficiently elastic to conceive of assimilation as taking place within an in-group. Thus, the term might refer to the socialization of the child.[9] However, judging from the descriptive material offered, assimilation is meant to refer to interaction between members of two different national or cultural groups–usually the former.

3. Assimilation is "for the most part *conscious*" for Duncan, but Park and Burgess regard it as "the outcome of unreflective responses to a series of new experiences,"[10] in contrast to accommodation. It seems that the same process is called "assimilation" by Duncan and "accommodation" by Park and

6. E.W. Burgess, "Accommodation," *ibid*., pp. 403-4.
7. *Introductory Sociology*, p. 452.
8. By "races," Simons means ethnic groups, following Gumplowicz.
9. Some writers use the concept in that sense. Cf. Ogburn & Nimkoff, *Sociology* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1940), p. 383.
10. *Op. cit*., p. 736.

Burgess–a fact which will be borne out by subsequent discussion.

4. What are the *mechanisms* of assimilation? According to all but Duncan, assimilation involves the "sharing," "acquisition," and "fusing" of the memories, sentiments, attitudes, history, and experience of others. It is not made clear through what psychological processes
one can share the memories or acquire the history of a person or group with an entirely different experiential background. Duncan is more cautious and seems more realistic in speaking of the acquisition of "sentiments and attitudes *similar* to those held by others *in regard to a particular value at a given time*." For Duncan complete assimilation is impossible within one generation.

5. The *result* of this process is described by Simons as a change in the aggregation of people from a "mere mechanical mixture into a chemical compound." This is an unfortunate analogy, but we must remember that Simons wrote over twenty years ago. Park, however, makes some extremely valuable observations in his discussion of "homogeneity in cosmopolitan groups. " It is "a superficial uniformity , a homogeneity in manner and fashion, associated with relatively profound differences in individual opinions, sentiments, and beliefs."[11] If we can classify our society as cosmopolitan, it would appear that assimilation, as previously defined by the same authors, cannot take place in our society! For, according to Park and Burgess, the basis of solidarity today is not like-mindedness, but "concurrent action"

11. *Ibid*., p. 758.

as Sumner termed it. This seems an inadvertent admission that Park and Burgess' definition of assimilation operates *in vacuo* as far as our society is concerned. Park goes even further and makes assimilation a purely objective state, calling it a "function of visibility: As soon as an immigrant exhibits no longer the marks which identify him as a member of an alien group he acquires by that fact the actual if not the legal status of a native."[12] What has happened to the sharing of sentiments and acquisition of memories of others?"

Thus, we find a curious contradiction even within the concept of a single student of the problem. This is not surprising. The definition of assimilation is linked unconsciously with a concept of community as a function of likemindedness in the minds of Park and Burgess. In the meantime they have espoused a new concept of community, but the concept of assimilation is lagging behind the new concept of community. If communal solidarity is based not on the homogeneity of units but on the functional integration of heterogeneous units , i.e., on the *modus vivendi,* the theory of assimilation as a result of sharing of memories and attitudes does not hold. It cannot be applied to a society where differentiation exists with social mobility, for it would demand that all social groups have the same attitudes and sentiments. Thus, a minority group like the Negroes would have to regard themselves as they are regarded by the socially superior whites. Such a situation may exist in a caste society. One occasionally finds such quasi-masochistic attitudes among minority groups in our society, but they are the exception rather than the rule.

12. "Assimllation," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, I, 281-3.

Thus, according to Park and Burgess' observations, Duncan's relativistic position would be the only correct one. Assimilation does not mean the acquisition of the same, but of *similar* attitudes, and only in regard to a particular value at a given time. In short, assimilation refers to not one process, but to a *number of processes involved in becoming a community member*. These processes differ infinitely, according to the nature of the particular community, of those who are to be assimilated, and various other factors, all of which will be discussed in Section II.

If we define assimilation loosely and provisionally as the process of becoming a member of a community, the problem of definition becomes acute again. We shall define a community as an aggregation of people who are made dependent on each other by enduring common material and psychological needs and who are conscious of their interdependence.

From that point of view assimilation is a matter of social ethics and social policy. Assimilation as an objective concept is non-existent at present; rather it is a reflection of various notions of "Americanization." Thus, we find in Park and Burgess a change from the quasi-coercive notion of "likemindedness" to the liberalistic notion of cultural variation. Henry P. Fairchild, who has a different idea of Americanization, defines assimilation as lithe process by which a nationality preserves its unity while admitting representatives of outside nationalities."[13] Simons distinguishes two "methods" of assimilation: the "coercive-aristocratic," as practiced in Tsarist Russia, and the

13. *The Melting Pot Mistake* (New York: Little, Brown, 1926), p. 136.

"tolerant-democratic," found in the United States. This latter is the "genuine" method of assimilation.[14] An undertone of condescension is evident in the attitudes towards immigrants, not only on the part of professional Americanizers but also of sociologists. "We must deal as a wise physician deals with a soul-sick people for whose trouble we have no responsibility but who have become an integral part of our lives," says H.A. Miller."[15]

In fine, assimilation is not defined as that which exists, but as that which ought or ought not to exist. *The ethical imperative is linked integrally with the concept of assimilation* in the cases of the writers which were analyzed.

Having drawn these conclusions, the burden rests on us of investigating the actual processes involved in what we have defined as assimilation for heuristic purposes.

Assimilation as Process

The "factors" involved in assimilation may be schematically pictured as follows:

A. *The experience-world of the assimilant.*

    1. Cultural conditioning.

    2. Personal-social conditioning.[16]

14. *Loc. cit.*, pp. 812-13.
15. *Races, Nations, and Classes* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1924), p. 197.
16. This concept was coined by Kimball Young in order to distinguish traits that are not necessarily common to the culture as a whole, but are the result of personal interaction, mainly that of parents with their children. Cf. Young, *Personality and Problems of Adjustment* (New York: Crofts,

B. The situation of transition.

    1. The objective characteristics of the assimilant and his family (age, occupation, income, schooling, health, etc.) at the time of transition between two communities.

    2. Attitudes.
        a. Concerning his migration.
        b. Class or group consciousness.
        c. Life goals.

    3. Chance factors: traumatic or euphoric experiences.

C. *The nature of the new community.*

    1. Size and function: Is the community a real or a pseudo-community?

    2. Attitudes toward newcomers in general and toward specific classes of newcomers (occupational, ethnic).

    3. Presence of vertical mobility.
        a. Economic opportunities.
        b. Opportunities for social contact and participation.

These "factors" cannot be quantitatively measured, nor can one generalize about their qualitative power in a field situation. A certain "factor" may work for or against assimilation, as the case may be. Generalization and prediction is made even more difficult by the fact that *personal, subcultural conditioning often transcends cultural conditioning*. This statement needs to be elaborated.

1940), pp. 132-36.

Personality types have often been identified with cultural and national groups, and these scientifically doubtful categorizations are still being practiced. Thus Park wrote in 1928: "Most, if not all, the characteristics of the Jew, certainly his pre-eminence as a trader and his keen intellectual interest, his sophistication, his idealism and lack of historic sense, are the characteristics of the city man, the man who ranges wisely, lives preferably in a hotel–in short, the cosmopolite."[17]

Park wrote this in an effort to establish the emancipated Jew as the ideal type of "marginal man," which itself is another ideal type. The definition seems to have been culled from the pages of Werner Sombart's *Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben*[18] of which Sombart's colleague Lujo Brentano said that it was "one of the most disheartening products of German scientific research." Simmel's ideal type of the "stranger" shows similar characteristics. He possesses objectivity, confidence, freedom from convention. The relations he enters into are "abstract," i.e., based on specific material interests rather than on feelings of communality of consciousness of kind.[19] This type of stranger, like the marginal man, is characteristic of only a certain segment of strangers or migrants. Patently an entire ethnic group cannot be classified as an ideal type of an ideal type of stranger.

The second question we must raise is, what is a culture group? The answer may be found fairly easily in a primitive society, although the homogeneity of primitive societies has been much

17. "Migration and the Marginal Man," *American Journal of Sociology* (May, 1928), p. 892.
18. Leipzig, 1911.
19. Simmel's concept of the stranger is summarized in Margaret Wood, *The Stranger* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1934).

overstressed. In a modern "cosmopolitan" society, the problem is much more complicated. No individual participates fully in all aspects of a culture, a culture which is, moreover, full of ambivalences and contradictory patterns. Linton distinguishes the following categories of culture elements: "*Universals*, which are common to all sane, adult members of the society; *specialties*, which are shared by the members of certain socially recognized categories of individuals but which are not shared by the total population; and *alternatives*, which are shared by certain individuals but which are not common to all the members of the society or even to all the members of the society or even to all the members of the socially recognized categories."[20]

Thus, in speaking of "culture groups" we must be wary of assuming homogeneity. Curiously enough, this fact was recognized by a *literateur*, Ludwig Lewisohn, before many sociologists recognized its importance. He wrote: "The very existence of an Americanization movement…shows…a discord, a prematureness….Americanization means, of course, assimilation. But that is an empty concept, a mere cry of rage and tyranny, until the question is answered which would never be asked were the answer ripe: Assimilation to what? To what homogeneous culture?"[21]

The following "field situation" is a case in point regarding homogeneity. In the summer of 1939, the writer spent four weeks at a voluntary work camp, containing Americans and European refugees of both sexes, aged 16-22. They were mostly students of upper middle class background. The camp was

20. *The Study of Man* (New York: Appleton Century, 1936), pp. 272-4.
21. *Up Stream* (New York. 1922), pp. 123. 235.

managed by a director (a refugee), a staff (preponderantly American), and an elected campers' council (mixed). Several interesting situations developed.

> Several of the decisions made by the councilor by the group as a whole, such as the establishment of a curfew, were disregarded by natives and refugees alike. Participation in discussion of these decisions and the problems they raised was extremely active. The most discussed problem was that of setting-up exercises. On this issue the camp split into two sections, which the writer shall label the "utilitarian" and the "communal." The first group argued thus: "The benefits resulting from setting-up exercises are purely personal. The group as a whole is not harmed by the absence of individuals from this activity, and consequently participation should be optional."
>
> The second, or "communal," group argued as follows: "One of the chief functions of this activity lies in its communal nature. The material benefits accruing to each individual are inconsequential and irrelevant; the fact that the group starts the day all together is most important. Therefore, the activity should be compulsory."
>
> The issue was finally compromised in favor of optional exercises, since both parties agreed that it was useless to legislate a feeling of community into existence if it could not arise spontaneously.

In regard to our problem, it is significant that membership in these two opposing groups was about evenly divided among natives and refugees. Offhand it may be assumed that most of the Americans would belong to the utilitarian-anarchistic school, and most of the Europeans to the communal-compulsive.

Actually, there was no such cleavage. Some of the Americans had been influenced by the work camp philosophy, which originated in Europe and consequently stressed the importance of communal action. Some of the refugees, on the other hand, rebelled consciously against any kind of compulsion, even if democratically established, maintaining that the United States was supposed to be a "free country." Other motives were undoubtedly basically personal, being based on dislike of the person who conducted the exercises, a sense of physical inferiority, and laziness. What is important here, however, is not the motivation but the manner in which it was rationalized.

Although this "experiment" does not prove anything conclusively, it contains evidence that in at least one particular life situation "special ties," "alternatives," and personal-social conditioning cut across cultural "universals" in the behavior of a fairly homogeneous group. It may be argued that the opposition of certain refugees to compulsion was a direct reaction to their European experience, an example of irradiation. This hypothesis is not borne out by the writer's observations. G.W. Allport and associates come to similar conclusions in their study of refugees, based on interviews and analysis of autobiographies. These authors stress the "pull of the familiar" in the refugees' experience when they are confronted with new situations, as well as the "enduring consistency of personality." "Outstanding are the victim's adherence to familiar scenes and activities and their persistence towards established goals."[22]

In the definitions of assimilation which we have analyzed, there

22. G.W. Allport, Bruner, and Jandorf, "Personality Under Social Catastrophe," *Character and Personality* (Sept., 1941), pp. 1-22.

has been no mention of the basic personality structure as a factor in assimilation. In some respects this personality structure may be a direct product of the universal culture pattern, but, as Linton points out, "It must be kept clearly in mind that a basic personality structure is an abstraction and derivative of culture. It is a long step from the employment of such a concept in cultural studies to the equation of the basic personality structure of any society with the personal character of individuals who compose that society."[23]

Conclusions

An attempt has been made in this paper to point out the absence of an objective concept of assimilation, to provisionally establish assimilation as the process of becoming a member of a community, and to analyze that process. The writer's definition of assimilation is, of course, loose and provisional, perhaps even tautological. But the writer is of the opinion that it is preferable to evolve a concept from the analysis of a process in operation to creating a concept which is based on judgments of how a process is to take place. If objectivity is essential for intelligent social action, the sociologist must surely be concerned with the ways in which human beings act, regardless of whether their actions can be classified under this or that heading.

Taken from *Social Forces,* 21 (October, 1942), 35-39.
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23. Abraham Kardiner and Ralph Linton, *The Individual and His Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), p. XIII.

Section IV: Ethnic Dynamics in American Society

Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification

MICHAEL PARENTI

A question that has puzzled students of ethnic politics can be stated as follows: in the face of increasing assimilation why do ethnics continue to vote as ethnics with about the same frequency as in earlier decades?…

Part of the reason for the persistence of ethnic voting may rest in the political system itself. Rather than being a purely dependent variable, the political system, i.e., party, precinct workers, candidates, elections, patronage, etc., continues to rely upon ethnic strategies such as those extended to accommodate the claims of newly-arrived ethnic middle-class leadership; as a

mediator and mobilizer of minority symbols and interests, the political system must be taken into account.

Raymond Wolfinger suggests several further explanations, which may be briefly summarized as follows: (a) "Family-political identification." Voting studies show that as many as four-fifths of all voters maintain the same party identification as did their parents, a continuity which is not merely a reflection of similar life conditions but is in part ascribable to the independent influence of primary group relations. (b) "Critical elections theory." The emergence of highly salient ethnic candidates and issues may cause a dramatic realignment so that a particular party becomes the repository of ethnic loyalty even after the ethnically salient candidate and issues have passed. (c) "Historical after-effects." Partisan affiliations, as Key and Munger have demonstrated for Indiana, persist generations after the reasons for their emergence have ceased to be politically relevant. Thus "even when ethnic salience has faded, …. its political effects will remain." (d) "Militant core-city residue." The ethnic community may retain a group awareness despite a growing class heterogeneity because the assimilationist-minded will advance to the suburbs while those among the upwardly mobile who choose to stay in the ethnic city settlements are more likely to be the most strongly in-group oriented….

Yet, after all is said and done, I cannot free myself from the suspicion that perhaps a false problem has been created which can best be resolved by applying certain analytic and theoretical distinctions, supported by data that extend beyond the usual voting studies. If, in fact, it can be demonstrated that

assimilation is not taking place, then the assimilation theory as propounded by Robert Dahl, along with Wolfinger's alternate explanations are somewhat beside the point. And the question, why do ethnics continue to vote as ethnics despite increasing assimilation, becomes the wrong one to ask–because the answer may simply be that minorities are not assimilating….

The confusion rests, I submit, in the failure–common to many of us political scientists, and even to some sociologists and anthropologists–to make a conceptual distinction between "acculturation" and "assimilation." The distinction is crucial in reading correct meaning into our data and in guiding us to fruitful theoretical conclusions. For while it is established that ethnics have accommodated themselves to American styles and customs (acculturation) by the second generation, and while perhaps they may enjoy increased occupational and geography mobility, it is not at all clear that they are incorporating themselves into the structural identificational-group relations of the dominant society (assimilation). On close examination we find that the term "assimilation," as commonly used, refers to a multiplicity of cultural, social and identificational processes which need closer scrutiny.

I. Acculturation and Assimilation

At the outset, it is necessary, as Talcott Parsons and others have urged, to distinguish between *cultural* and *social* systems: the cultural is the system of beliefs, values, norms, practices, symbols and ideas (science, art, artifacts, language, law and learning included); the social is the system of interrelations and associations among individuals and groups. Thus a church,

family, club, informal friendship group, or formal organization, etc., composed of individuals interracting in some kind of context involving roles and statuses are part of the *social* system, or one might say, represent particular sub-societal systems within the society; while the beliefs, symbols, and practices mediated and adhered to by members of the church, family, club, etc., are part of the *cultural* system or sub-cultural systems within the total culture. By abstracting two analytically distinct sets of components from the same concrete phenomena we are able to observe that, although there may often be an important interraction, the order of relationships and the actions and conditions within one are independent of those in the other. Attention to this independence increases analytical precision.

What was considered as one general process becomes a multifaceted configuration of processes. And if it can be said that there is no inevitable one-to-one relationship between the various processes, and that imperatives operative in one system are not wholly dependent upon the other, then ethnic political behavior becomes something less of a mystery. *For ethnic social sub-systems may persist or evolve new structures independent of the host society and despite dramatic cultural transitions in the direction of the mainstream culture.*

Since early colonial times, nearly every group arriving in America has attempted to reconstruct communities that were replications of the old world societies from which they had emerged. With the exception of a few isolated sectarian enclaves such as the Hutterites,
the Amish and the Hasidic, they failed to do so. If culture is

to be represented as the accumulated beliefs, styles, solutions and practices which represent a society's total and continuing adjustment to its environment, then it would seem to follow that no specific cultural system can be transplanted from one environment to another without some measure of change. Unable to draw upon a complete cultural base of their own in the new world, and with no larger constellation of societal and institutional forces beyond the ghetto boundaries to back them, the immigrants eventually lost the battle to maintain their indigenous ways. By the second generation, attention was directed almost exclusively toward American events and standards, American language, dress, recreation, work, and mass media, while interest in old world culture became minimal or, more usually, non-existent. To one extent or another, all major historical and sociological studies of immigration and ethnicity document this cultural transition of the American-born generation.

However, such acculturation was most often not followed by social assimilation; the group became "Americanized" in much of its *cultural* practices, but this says little about its *social* relations with the host society. In the face of widespread acculturation, the minority still maintained a social sub-structure encompassing primary and secondary group relations composed essentially of fellow ethnics….

From birth in the sectarian hospital to childhood play-groups to cliques and fraternities in high school and college to the selection of a spouse, a church affiliation, social and service clubs, a vacation resort, and, as life nears completion, an old-age

home and sectarian cemetary–the ethnic, if he so desires, may live within the confines of his sub-societal matrix–and many do. Even if he should find himself in the oppressively integrated confines of prison, the ethnic discovers that Italian, Irish, Jewish, Negro and Puerto Rican inmates coalesce into distinct groups in "a complex web of prejudices and hostilities, friendships and alliances."….

II. Heterogeneity within the Homogeneous Society

Could not such unassimilated sub-structures be more representative of a time when urban areas were segmented into ghettos untouched by post-war affluence, upward occupational mobility and treks to the suburbs? This is the question which seems to anticipate both Dahl and Wolfinger. In actuality, while individual ethnics have entered professional and occupational roles previously beyond their reach, minority group mobility has not been as dramatic as is often supposed. A comparison of first and second generation occupational statuses as reported in the 1950 national census shows no evidence of any substantial convergence of intergroup status levels. The occupational differences among ethnic groups, with the Irish as a possible exception, remain virtually the same for both generations, leading C.B. Nam to observe that even with the absence of large-scale immigration, "the importance of nationality distinctions for the American stratification system will remain for some time to come." If today's ethnics enjoy a better living standard than did their parents, it is because there has been an across-the-board rise throughout America. Fewer pick-and-shovel jobs and more white collar positions for minority members are less the result

of ethnic mobility than of an over-all structural transition in our national economy and the composition of our labor force.

Furthermore, despite the popular literature on the hopeless homogeneity of suburbia, suburbs are not great *social* melting pots. Scott Greer, after noting the breakup of some of the central city ethnic communities, cautions: "The staying force of the ethnic community (in suburbia) must not be underestimated." The good Catholic, for instance, "can live most of his life, aside from work, within a Catholic environment," in a sub-societal network of schools, religious endogamy, family, church, social, athletic and youth organizations, and Catholic residential areas. Similarly, Robert Wood observes that suburbs tend toward ethnic clusters. In the more "mixed areas ," ethnic political blocs are not unknown. As in the city, the tension between the older resident and the newcomer sometimes reinforces ethnic political alignments and ethnic social identifications. Minority concentrations are less visible in suburban than in urban areas because less immigrant and second-generation persons reside there. Lieberson's study of ten major metropolitan areas shows that the groups most highly segregated from native whites in the central city are also most residentially concentrated in the suburbs, so that suburban patterns bear a strong similarity to those found in the city.

Finally, residential segregation is not a necessary prerequisite for the maintenance of an ethnic sub-societal structure; *a group can maintain ethnic social cohesion and identity, while lacing an ecological basis.* The Jews of Park Forest live scattered over a wide area and "participate with other Park Foresters in American

middle-class culture," that is, they clearly are acculturated. Yet in one year a Jewish sub-community consisting of informal friendship groups, a women's club, a B'nai B'rith lodge and a Sunday school had emerged. Similarly distinct Lutheran and Catholic social groupings also had developed in which national origin played a large part. (Religion, according to Herbert Gans, was not the exclusive concern of any of the three groups.)

The neighborhood stores, bars, coffee-shops, barber shops, and fraternal clubrooms which serve as social nerve centers in the ecologically contiguous first-settlement urban areas are difficult to reconstruct in the new topography of shopping centers and one-family homes, but they are frequently replaced by suburban-styled church, charity and social organizations, informal evening home-centered gatherings and extended family ties kept intact over a wide area with the technical assistance of the omnipresent automobile. The move to second and third settlement areas and the emergence of American-born generations, rather than presaging an inevitable process of disintegration has led to new adjustments in minority organization and communication. Even when most of the lifestyles assume an American middle-class stamp, these in-group social patterns reinforce ethnic identifications and seem to give them an enduring nature. Today identifiable groups remain not as survivals from the age of immigration but with new attributes many of which were unknown to the immigrants. In short, changes are taking place in ethnic social patterns, but the direction does not seem to be toward greater assimilation into the dominant Anglo-American social structure.

In addition to the movement of ethnics from first settlement areas to the surrounding suburbs there is a smaller "secondary migration" to the Far West. What little evidence we have of this phenomenon suggests that highly visible acculturation styles do not lead to the loss of ethnic consciousness….At the same time, the emerging political articulation of Mexican-Americans throughout the Far West should remind us that growing acculturation often leads to *more* rather than less ethnic political awareness.

In general terms, the new "affluence," often cited as a conductor of greater assimilation, may actually provide minorities with the financial and psychological wherewithal for building even more elaborate parallel sub-societal structures, including those needed for political action. In prosperous suburban locales, while the oldest and most exclusive country clubs belong to old-stock Protestant families, the newer clubs are of Jewish or varying Catholic-ethnic antecedents. Among Chicago's debutantes, established "society," primarily Anglo-Protestant, holds a coming-out at the Passavant hospital ball. Debutantes of other origins make do with a Presentation Ball (Jewish), a Links Ball (Negro) and the White and Red Ball (Polish). Similar developments can be observed in numerous other urban and suburban regions. Rather than the expected structural assimilation, parallel social structures flourish among the more affluent ethnics….

If ethnic social relations show this notable viability, it might also be remembered that ethnic sub-cultures have not been totally absorbed into mainstream America. Numerous writers have

observed the influence of ethnic cultural valuations on political life, causing one to conclude that not only is there slim evidence to show that assimilation is taking place, but there is even some question as to whether acculturation is anywhere complete. Acculturation itself is a multifaceted process, and even as American styles, practices, language, and values are adopted, certain ethnic values and attitudes may persist as a vital influence; for instance, the attitude that fellow-ethnics are preferable companions in primary group relations.

…In sum, *cultural belief systems or residual components of such systems may persist as cultural and political forces independently of objective an material factors.*

III. Identificational Durability

From the time he is born, the individual responds to cultural cues mediated by representatives that help shape his personal character structure. As Parsons suggests, beside the distinction made between the cultural and social systems, one must take into account the personality system. Insofar as the individual internalizes experiences from earlier social positions and sub-cultural matrices, his personality may act as a determinant–or character interpreter–of his present socio-cultural world. To apply that model to our present analysis: ethnic identifications are no matter of indifference even for the person who is both culturally and socially assimilated to the extent that his professional, recreational, and neighborhood relations and perhaps also his wife are of the wider White Protestant world. A holiday dinner at his parents' home may be his only active ethnic link, or it may be–as Stanley Edgar Hyman said when

asked what being Jewish meant to him–nothing more than "a midnight longing for a hot pastrami sandwich"; yet it is a rare person who reaches adulthood without some internalized feeling about his ethnic identification. Just as social assimilation moves along a different and slower path than that of acculturation, so does identity assimilation, or rather non-assimilation enjoy a pertinacity not wholly responsive to the other two processes.

There are several explanations for the persistence of individual ethnic identity in such cases. First, even if the available range of social exposure brings a man into more frequent contact with out-group members, early in-group experiences, family name and filial attachments may implant in him a natural awareness of, and perhaps a pride in, his ethnic origins. An individual who speaks and behaves like something close to the Anglo-American prototype may still prefer to identify with those of his own racial, religious or national background because it helps tell him who he is. For fear of losing my identity some individuals have no desire to pass completely into a "nondescript" non-ethnic when the "search for identity" concerns many, an identification which is larger than the self yet smaller than the nation is not without its compensations….

As long as distinctions obtain in the dominant society, and the foreseeable future seems to promise no revolutionary flowering of brotherly love , and as long as the family and early group attachments hold some carry-over meaning for the individual, ethnic identifications and ethnic-oriented responses will still be found even among those who have made a "secure" professional

and social position for themselves in the dominant Anglo-Protestant world.

IV. Conclusion

By way of concluding I may summarize my major propositions and discuss their broader political and theoretical applications.

1. If the wrong question is asked, then the answers are irrelevant. If our conceptual and analytic tools are insufficient, then we fail to do justice to our data. The question of why ethnics continue to vote as ethnics despite increasing assimilation focuses on a false problem because minority groups are not assimilating. Using an admittedly simplified application of Parson's model, we arrive at the hypothesis that the cultural, social and personality systems may operate with complex independent imperatives to maintain ethnic consciousness. *Assimilation involves much more than occupational, educational and geographic mobility.* From the evidence and analysis preferred in the foregoing pages, there is reason to believe that despite a wide degree of second and third generation acculturation: (1) residual ethnic cultural valuations and attitudes persist; acculturation is far from complete; (2) the vast pluralistic parallel systems of ethnic social and institutional life show impressive viability; structural assimilation seems neither inevitable nor imminent; (3) psychological feelings of minority group identity, both of the positive-enjoyment and negative-defensive varieties, are still deeply internalized. In sum, ethnic distinctiveness, can still be treated as a factor in social and political pluralism….We can see that (a) increases in education have not necessarily led to a diminished ethnic consciousness; indeed, the increase in sectarian education often

brings a heightened ethnic consciousness. (b) Increases in income and adaptation to middle-class styles have not noticeably diminished the viability and frequency of ethnic formal and informal structural associations. Such stylistic changes as have occurred may just as easily evolve *within* the confines of the ethnically stratified social systems, thereby leading to a proliferation of parallel structures rather than absorption into Anglo-Protestant social systems. (c) Geographical disperson, like occupational and class mobility has been greatly overestimated. Movement from the first settlement area actually may represent a transplanting of the ethnic community to suburbia. Furthermore, as we have seen, even without the usual *geographic* contiguity, *socially* and *psychologically* contiguous ethnic communities persist. (d) Inter-group contacts, such as may occur, do not necessarily lead to a lessened ethnic awareness; they may serve to activate a new and positive appreciation of personal ethnic identity. Or intergroup contacts may often be abrasive and therefore conducive to ethnic defensiveness and compensatory in-group militancy. Perhaps intermarriage, as a genetic integration (for the offspring) will hasten assimilation; where hate has failed, love may succeed in obliterating the ethnic. But intermarriage remains the exception to the rule, and in the foreseeable future does not promise a large-scale structural group assimilation. Furthermore, in the absence of pertinent data, we need not assume that the offspring of mixed marriages are devoid of ethnic identifications of one kind or another.

2. While not denying what was granted earlier, namely that the political system itself may be an instigator and fabricator

of ethnic appeals, we would do well to avoid common overstatements along these lines. It is quite true that politicians are capable of amazing alertness to ethnic sensibilities even in instances where such sensibilities fail to materialize. Yet in the light of the above discussion it would be unduly hasty to conclude that politicians betray a "cultural lag" or perceptual laziness by their continued attention to ethnic groups. The political organization attempting to mobilize support faces the problem of having to construct definitions of its constituency which will reduce the undifferentiated whole into more accessible, manageable, and hopefully more responsive components….More specifically, he must find means of making his constituency accessible to him in the most economical way. Given the limited availability of campaign resources and the potentially limitless demands for expenditure, the candidate is in need of a ready-made formal and informal network of relational sub structures within his constituency. He discovers that "reaching the people" is often a matter of reaching particular people who themselves can reach, or help him reach, still other people….

That many urban and suburban politicians persist in giving attentive consideration to minority social groupings in American-born constituencies, then, may be due less to their inveterate stupidity than to the fact that ethnic sub-structures and identifications are still extant, highly visible and, if handled carefully, highly accessible and responsive. The political practitioner who chooses to ignore the web of formal and informal ethnic sub-structures on the presumption that such groupings are a thing of the past does so at his own risk.

3. Historically, the theoretical choice posed for the ethnic has been either isolated existence in autonomous cultural enclaves or total identificational immersion into the American society. We have seen that neither of these "either-or" conditions have evolved….In reality a person experiences cumulative and usually complementary identifications, and his life experiences may expose him to some of the social relations and cultural cues of the dominant society while yet placing him predominantly within the confines of a particular minority sub-structure. For the ethnic, a minority group identity is no more incompatible with life in America and with loyalty to the nation than is any regional, class, or other particular group attachment. A pluralistic society, after all, could not really exist without pluralistic sub-structures and identities. Ethnics can thus sometimes behave politically as ethnics while remaining firmly American….

The disappearance of ethnicity as a factor in political behavior waits in large part upon total ethnic structural-identificational assimilation into the host society. Perhaps even in that far-off future "when national origins are forgotten, the political allegiances formed in the old days of ethnic salience will be reflected in the partisan choices of totally assimilated descendants of the old immigrants." If so, then the forces of political continuity will once more have proven themselves, and ethnicity will join long-past regional ties, wars, depressions, defunct political machines, deceased charismatic leaders and a host of other half-forgotten forces whose effects are transmitted down through the generations to shape the political continuities and allegiances of all social groups. But before relegating them

to the history of tomorrow, the unassimilated ethnics should be seen as very much alive and with us today.

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Ethnic Assimilation Versus Cultural Pluralism: Some Political Implications

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The purpose of this essay is to suggest and compare two different styles of ethnic politics, the politics of cultural pluralism and that we might identify with ethnic assimilation. The posited existence of one style or another merely means that the dominant characteristics are those of one style or the other. As complex as is human behavior, we can expect elements of both styles to be present; in each case it is a question of which order of concerns has greatest saliency. The focus and scope of this paper is limited to a discussion of the white ethnic, in general terms, and any reference to non-white ethnic groups is made solely for the purpose of illustration.

We are today much better informed about the political implications of cultural pluralism since it has been the prevailing phenomenon over the past century. Our knowledge and understanding of the process of assimilation, however, is much less reliable since the dimensions in this process have only recently emerged. I will first attempt to indicate some consequences of the traditional style of ethnic politics and then to suggest some of the implications in the continued pursuit of this style of political life. Finally, consideration will be given to some of the present conditions as they enhance or detract from the style of political life as the ethnic population becomes increasingly assimilated, as I assume it to be today.

It is not my intention to dwell in detail upon the enormous contribution of various ethnic groups to the American social, political, and economic systems other than to note that the history of this nation is inextricably tied to the history of ethnic groups, black and white, as they began as immigrants and inched their way upward into the higher social and economic strata of the society.

American ethnic history has been unique in at least one respect, namely, the ability (or perhaps necessity) of ethnic groups to placate and accommodate one another in their daily activities. Greeley may be correct when he suggests that future historians may view the peaceful co-existence of diverse ethnic groups in this century as an achievement on the order of magnitude of industrialization in the 19th century (Greeley). I think we do tend to gloss over this condition, a fact whose importance is highlighted in such internecine struggles as we have witnessed

abroad between Indian and Pakistani, Irish Catholic and Ulster Protestant, Ibo and Hausa-Yoruba in Nigeria, and, closer to home, Canadians and the irredentist French-Canadians. These struggles reflect differences in tribe, nation, religion, and/or race–differences that we in the United States have subdued and subordinated.

This is not to imply that our heritage has been free of political conflicts involving different ethnic minorities, but rather to suggest that the intensity of the conflicts have not, thus far, resulted in a pyrrhic victory for one ethnic faction or another. The tensions have been mitigated, in part, by the achievements of different groups in the economic and political systems, with the resultant cross-cutting rather than reinforcing cleavages. Indicators of the extent of achievement are visible in the increased number of ethnic surnames among holders of corporate power, the reduced emphasis on ethnic politics, and, not least, the changing income, educational, and occupational status of an essentially working class (originally peasant) population.

The achievements have occurred unevenly to be sure, and frequently with social disruption. But one would need to abandon standards of evidence to conclude, as some do, that there has been no progress in the conditions of Blacks, Chicanos, and other minority groups. It is true that the upward mobility of some groups has been more pronounced than that for others, Japanese Americans being a case in point (Petersen). And some groups, the American Indian particularly, have hardly budged in terms of the dimensions of upward mobility. The conditions

of Blacks–a long-neglected population–are also improving. As Moynihan has observed, the Negro middle class is making marked improvements in their status and larger numbers of Blacks are moving into the middle class. There is evidence to suggest, however, that the average Black person may be worse off on a number of important measures, the progressive divergence in income levels between Blacks and whites provides a testimonial to the problems inherent in substantially changing the status of that "colonial" population.

To cite specific examples of success among, say, Italians, Poles, Slovenes, or Slovaks seems unnecessary. What better evidence do we need for viewing the combined impact of motivation and opportunity on the ethnic group than the growing concern among ethnic group leaders, conspicuous in their age, for the loss of ethnic habits, consciousness, and identity among the young?

Cultural Pluralism and Assimilation

Cultural pluralism in the United States is based on the idea of ethnic pluralism, the belief that pluralism is founded initially on ethnic differences. I have deliberately avoided imputing a normative interpretation to that which is valuable in ethnicity and thus ought to be sustained, or to that which is less desirable and, thus, should be changed. The concepts of cultural pluralism and ethnic assimilation have often been used for purposes of persuasion, as Nathan Glazer reminds us. As new immigrants were confronted by hostility, pro-ethnic propagandists utilized ideas such as the "melting pot" to allay the fears and suspicions of the native whites. As assimilation appeared to be occurring

at glacial speed (or to be something undesirable in itself) propagandists often argued for the rewards of a society containing a rich mixture of distinct and identifiable ethnic groups.

The national government has also reflected the different concerns in its ambivalent treatment of ethnics. At one time the federal government promoted programs intended to eradicate that which made the ethnic group distinct, an extreme illustration may be seen in the activities of the Bureau of Indian Affairs as it treats American Indians. Indian heritage and culture suffered at the hands of the Bureau and today the government demands affirmative action in the way of minority group "quotas" for hiring.

What makes for an ethnic group aside from the pejorative themes? Ethnicity refers to a collectivity of individuals who identify with a particular ethnic group, share the values, interests, and language of the group, find themselves in territorial concentration (Lieberson, 1963), and, in general, confine their interpersonal relations to group membership (Gordon, 1964, p. 98). One implication of the dimensions of self identification and commonality of value is the conviction that the group standards are indeed the superior ones, the norms constituting the standards by which all out-group individuals are to be judged–ethnocentrism.

The extent of shared values and value differences are of course related to differences in place of national origins and the experiential conditions derived from that common point of departure. Heterogeneity, then, is assumed to be a function of

these initial starting points, time of immigration, and the nature of the conditions that stimulated geographic movement from one political jurisdiction to another. The characteristic of heterogeneity (in some measure) also applies to American Blacks. Blacks have a longer history in America than the ethnics who arrived after 1850. The extent to which Blacks share the values of the plantation is also a question for further investigation, but Elliot Liebow's class study of street-corner society (Tally's Corner) tells us that heterogeneity may be as typical of Black culture as it is for white ethnic cultures.

It is my belief that we are witnessing today a slow but inexorable process in which initially very different ethnic groups are becoming more alike in a number of ways: education, common language (English), mobility (upward rather than downward), increased frequency of personal relationships with "out-group" individuals, and life styles dictated by the mutually shared experiences in the organizational life of post-industrial society. Hence, the view here is that ethnic pluralism and ethnic assimilation are polar extremes of a continuum, one end representing a condition of considerable heterogeneity between groups and the other end reflecting the characteristics that we now associate with ethnic assimilation. Ethnics today, I think, are somewhere between these two extremes, but clearly becoming more assimilated.

Moreover, the societal forces that are so corrosive of ethnic bonds are supplemented by the natural process of attrition, the dying off of the immigrant population and now first and second generation Americans who in fact were the prime carriers and

guardians of the traditions, values, and language of the mother country. Subsequent generations of ethnic groups are today better educated than their forbears. They are more mobile, geographically and socially, and have radiated outward from their earlier areas of residential concentration. They have all but relinquished their language commonality which had earlier contributed so much to making them distinct. And they have conformed to the role requirements imposed by modern organizations, often at the expense of earlier shared values and interests. In addition to the obvious advantages and perquisites coming to those with more and better education, ethnics have become more pragmatic (and tolerant) in adapting and accommodating to out-group persons. The latter is clearly evidenced in the general decline of segregationist attitudes in the United States over the last 25 years. (Greeley and Sheatsley, 1971).

In brief, younger people differ significantly from their elders on the critical dimensions of ethnicity. There is overlap, to be sure, and there are probably few groups that have been fully assimilated into the host society; but like the middle class Negro, the ethnics are also on the move. The student of ethnic politics asks ultimately whether these differences between, say, first and third generations reflect significant differences in their political attitudes and behavior. Assimilation is total when, according to Lieberson, "A group of persons with similar foreign origins, knowledge of which in no way gives a better prediction or estimate of their relevant social characteristics than does knowledge of the total population of the community or nation involved" (1963, p. 10). The political concerns and interests

of cultural pluralism are apparent. The nature of current ethnic concerns is also discernible, but certainly not so obvious as are the past practices of the ethnics.

I will not hazard to guess where on the assimilation/cultural pluralism continuum various ethnic groups are to be located. As we have said, different ethnic groups arrived at different times and often for different reasons. There has been a general improvement in the socio-economic conditions of large numbers of Americans of many different ethnic groups and it provides greater likelihood of class-related differences. Given this uplifting, and it is not merely a reflection of a total upgrading of the societal structures as Parenti suggests, the unit of analysis ought to be something that includes both ethnicity and class standing. Perhaps a more useful concept for purposes is the "eth-class" (Gordon, 1964). By "eth-class," Gordon means the "subsociety created by the intersection of the vertical stratifications of ethnicity with the horizontal stratifications of social class" (p. 51). The idea of an "eth-class" can be seen in Figure 1.

Figure 1

	HUNGARIANS	POLES
Upper Class	A1	B1
Middle Class	A2	B2
Working Class	A3	B3
Lower Class	A4	B4

The cell occupied by Al is the resultant of the class and ethnicity variables. Assimilation suggests a greater similarity between Al and Bl, for example; while the idea of cultural pluralism suggests greater similarity between Al, A2, A3 and so on, and greater differences between any A cell compared to any B cell entry. It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine differences in eth-classes. We do assume, however, that larger numbers of ethnics are moving upward on the class variable, that is, reflecting social mobility.

The Political Implications of Cultural Pluralism

In the past, ethnic politics have flourished where the perceptions of voters and leaders included the ethnic dimension as important to perception of self and the perception of "significant others" (Brimm & Wheeler, 1966). Available research confirms its importance in such distant states as Connecticut, New York, New Mexico, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and a host of local settings. The political impact of the ethnic, however, is greatest at the local level. The ethnic immigrant gravitated to the urban centers of America and most of his political activity and concerns were directed to local politics. If not actually engaged in local campaign work, the ethnic provided the reservoir of votes necessary for the birth and growth of the urban political "machines" (Greenstein, 1966). At one time, remember, aliens were allowed to vote in 22 states and territories; though by 1926, Arkansas joined the nation by making citizenship a requirement for the ballot.

There are, of course, notable exceptions to this generalization about the municipal orientation of the ethnic. When American

foreign policy directly or potentially involved the ethnic's place of national origins, the ethnic frequently broadened his perspective to include the activities of national government: Jews and American policy in the Middle East; German-Americans and our involvement in WWI, and subsequently Roosevelt's relationship with Britain immediately prior to our involvement in WWII; today Irish-Americans and the cause of the Catholics of North Ireland; and Blacks and embargo policies directed at segregationist administrations in Sub-Sahara Africa. Notwithstanding these illustrations, the ethnic was a local force transcending the pulls of state and national issues and affairs.

It should not be thought that ethnic groups were totally misdirected in their efforts. The stakes in an active and successful political life at the local level were considerable: jobs through patronage, contracts, official preferments, and especially "recognition" by way of a high-level appointment, which, for the few, served as a catalyst for a political career (Lane, 1959). The politics of the ethnic were above all else a politics of "recognition," as Wolfinger has observed (Wolfinger, 1966).

That "recognition" had its rewards was equally beyond question. Ethnic politicians were recognized and gained access to the perquisites of public office. The reward for the rank and file ethnic group member, suffering the pangs of an identity crisis in an indifferent if not hostile society, existed in the psychological gratification of seeing one's own in high public station. Thus the ethnic traded off the substantive power of his vote for the symbolic satisfactions which were not substantive in any

material sense. Visibility thus became a critical requirement in municipal politics; and therefore the state legislatures, predictably, tightened up the legal requirements for a candidate changing his name and thus capitalizing on the shortcomings of a system based on "recognition."

Cultural pluralism, when dominated by a concern for recognition, was symbolic It was symbolic in the sense that the large majority of the ethnic group derived a sense of satisfaction from the fact that *they* had been recognized, and that their own would surely look after their political interests and concerns. Indeed, the style prevailing in the past politics of cultural pluralism was symbolic.

Politics for the ethnic, as for his counterpart in the working class, was clearly of secondary importance. His primary orientation was, and probably continues to be, economic. His attention, interest, and energies are consumed by economic matters, political interest fluctuating with the individual's perception of a threat to his livelihood or security brought on by distant and unfamiliar economic and political forces. His acquiescence was usually achieved through official pronouncements of reassurance and governmental concern (Edelman, 1964). Rarely did this restricted view of politics result in substantive gains to the ethnics.

The achieved psychological satisfactions, it should be noted, have come at an enormous cost to ethnics, both Black and white. Too long the ethnic has been content with the assumption that his interests and values would be safeguarded by the ethnic politician. And too often the ethnic politician has sacrificed

the real interest of the ethnic. This was inevitable, given the unwarranted assumption that the ethnic leader's interests were the same as those of the rank and file. In point of fact, the situation was frequently just the opposite. The ethnic leader often had economic interests quite at odds with those of the rank and file ethnic; or, as also happened, he had been coopted by opposition interests.

The pluralist politics of the ethnic, then, when obsessed with the rewards of recognition, resulted in the exploitation of the ethnic. The recent handling of a "feminist" demand by Mayor Daley of Chicago beautifully depicts the resultant merger of "recognition" and the process of cooptation. As reported by one journalist,

> visited by a woman's liberation delegation not long ago, and beset with complaints, Mr. Daley devised a typical solution. He gave the delegation's leader, Mrs. Joanne Alter, the nomination for sanitary district trustee. That was the end of that protest." (*New York Times*, February 12, 1972)

The example is not that of an ethnic demand, but the practice and results are identical: the enrichment of the few at the expense of the many.

Daley, though he may be the last of the old-school ethnic leaders, is hardly unique in the annals of political history. We need only mention Congressman Dawson, a Black, who reigned for decades over the First Congressional District of Illinois, the Tammany politicians of New York City, and closer to home the

voting record of former Senator Lausche, to suggest the error in assuming equivalency in interests of the ethnic leadership and their followers. In each case, the ethnic traded his vote for recognitions' rewards and in each case the leader too often voted against the real interests of the ethnic which, after all, were most often the interests of the working class, and not the interests of business, industry, banking, insurance, and the mass media. In each case a few leaders were afforded career opportunities through the heavy infusion of ethnic block-voting and in each case the leader often sacrificed his trust.

Despite the redeeming value in the ethnic's search for identity, he is not totally innocent of the situation in which he now finds himself. He was too often content to do his labor in the economic vineyard with the hope, often enough frustrated, that he and his kind would eventually make good. The system rewards for the working class ethnic were the collective rewards resulting from negotiated settlements with industry and not the kinds of immediate rewards expected by business from the political system. The indictment of the ethnic is made, in part, on the ground that as ignorant as he may have been of the political implications of economic life, (we must remember that some did perceive the connection between local governmental affairs and personal prosperity), the middle class had made abundantly clear the extent to which class and interest group action may be rewarded in the political system. The folly of the ethnic's philosophy of "individualism," for example, becomes painfully apparent in such aphorisms as "the rich get richer, the poor get poorer," or "socialism for the middle class and private enterprise (the bootstrap thesis) for the poor," and "nothing succeeds like

success." Note the dilemma of minicipal administrations throughout America being strapped for revenues to sustain current service levels, and the almost universal tendency of the working class to resist an income tax. An income tax, because of its progressive tendency, is also opposed by the well-to-do segments of the population. The "compromise" comes in the shape of an increase in the sales tax, a tax that always fall disproportionately on the poorer and less affluent people in the population.

Rather than mobilizing the population into a viable political coalition for such urgent problems as housing, transportation, education, poverty, environmental pollution, and land-use policies, ethnics divide with the predictable consequences. They are subsequently ruled by organized and well-financed interest groups-business, agriculture, and labor–minority groups that have been highly effective in exploiting the political system.

Given the nature of this indictment, it comes as no surprise to find ethnic leaders in Congress, promoting a bill for nationalities' centers in urban America, on the one hand, and also paring down federal support for education, or, as in the case of the long-term low interest NDEA loans for needy students, place the administration of them in the hands of those who made the governmental program desirable in the first place, the banking industry of America.

The questions for all of us are compelling. Why are the airlines and shipbuilding industries subsidized three times as heavily as urban public transportation? Why must pollution continue unabated? Why are we more concerned with the symbolic issue

of busing, when, as Reverend Hesburgh so perceptibly noted recently in Cleveland, the real problem is the kind of education available at the end of the bus ride? Why must land-use policies be so inimical to the human dimension? Why must we have hunger and poverty among our indigent populations, of all colors? And why do we supinely condone the "invisible violence," to use Nader's phrase, perpetrated by the food industry through the chemical adulteration of foods consumed by the general public?

The ethnic is not the culpable party in this state of affairs. Cultural pluralism, however, when obsessed with "recognition" is. Lest I be accused of setting up a straw man in the ethnic, let me return to those factors that have altered the dimensions of ethnicity.

The changes in the dimensions of ethnicity are the cues to a better comprehension of the process of assimilation. There is little to be gained in pointing to a community's resistance to a large public housing project as evidence that the "melting pot" is not melting as it should (Glazer, *NY Times*). Let us acknowledge the fact that we have a rich cultural diversity; the fact that political leaders pay assiduous attention to the ethnic characteristic suggests that we have yet certain culturally distinct characteristics. The existence of noticeable differences on the dimensions of ethnicity indicates that ethnics are becoming *more* assimilated and *more* alike. That is, higher SES Poles are becoming more like higher SES Czechs, both differing from their ethnic cohorts of lower class status. It is a relative measure

we are concerned with, despite the unpopularity of this view among some of my confreres at this convention.

Let me preface my observations about the "new" ethnic politics, the politics of ethnic assimilation. I do not think that the traditional concern for recognition will be, nor ought it be, the predominant consideration today or in the future. We have changed too much in our sophistication about politics and economics, and in general our expectations of what is rightfully our due, to be bought off with the "symbolic" gestures of upwardly mobile politicians. This may be the wishful thought of an academic; I doubt that it is a utopian one.

Political Implications of Ethnic Assimilation

One assumption made here, and I suspect this can be viewed as the parochialism of a political scientist, is that politics and political life are inextricably bound up with the issue of conflict and the governmental institutions available for resolving conflict. The very existence of government attests to the pervasiveness of conflict, as Madison long ago observed:

> But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external controls on government would be necessary. *Federalist #51*.

While Madison clearly wrote to persuade others of the necessity for internal checks on government, his more neglected thesis is quite appropriate to our current considerations. If there is to be

a lasting truth in the study of politics it is that politics implies conflict. Frankly, I do not see the elimination of conflict in an increasingly secular, rational, and technically oriented society. And if we view increased assimilation as the end of conflict, or even its sublimation, we labor under an assumption that makes quite difficult any real understanding of the process of assimilation.

We have said that the ethnic population is becoming more like the native population and that different ethnic groups are also becoming more similar. Are the general concerns of our political climate reflected among ethnics? Are ethnics today more "politicized"?

More demanding in what they view as the responsibilities of government? More mobile, better educated and more tolerant toward outgroups than their predecessors? The answer to each of these questions seems to be an emphatic "Yes."

Ethnics are becoming more "politicized." This is a result of a number of factors: increased militancy of Blacks; a sense of relative deprivation; the seductiveness of an ever-demanding "expectant" society; and the realization that, despite wage increases, society's benefits are for many even further out of reach.

This increased politicization is buttressed by the feeling that large institutions no longer respond to the needs of the people. The demands for accountability have left no organization untouched: city hall, the churches, the universities, the corporations, federal programs at the grass roots, all are deficient

in the public mind's eye. The consequence is the increased demand for participation in the decisions made.

Another factor is that we look increasingly to the federal government to bail us out of the many new and sometimes old problems afflicting society. Herbert Gans has written, and I find myself in agreement, that the new American malaise is less a result of scarcity and hardship than of unprecedented prosperity (Gans 1972). We have become, in brief, a society heavy with the pregnancy of high expectations.

Ethnics today share in their frustrations brought on by a disparity between what they have come to see as rightfully theirs and the increased difficulty in attaining their goals. Aspirations indicate what the citizen hopes for, what he views as an ideal situation; expectations being a more direct and immediate feeling that one is entitled to that previously hoped for. The psychological change from a society of high hopes to one of high expectations is paralleled by an intensified dissatisfaction with governmental performance. Predictably, we are now beginning to focus on the problems of relative deprivation as it affects political and economic behavior (Pettigrew, et al 1972).

It is not terribly difficult to see how this psychological change came about. The national government three decades ago committed itself to alleviating the individual's fears of want and suffering, and it continues to implement programs designed to increase citizen demands (OEO is but one example); business and the media have internalized this sense of expectation of more and better services and items. "Wouldn't you really rather have a Buick?" is not beyond the pale of possibilities under

a credit economy; and, finally, labor unions have demanded ever and higher wages, which in turn have been used to justify higher and higher prices (and profits)–wage increases that were unimaginable a few short years ago. It is this new ingredient that has made for so much of a new style of politics; and it is this factor that compounds the problem of race relations today.

It would require an irresponsible view of the evidence to conclude that there have been no changes, for the better, in anti-minority group attitudes and behavior in the U.S. since 1945. In their examination of NORC trend data, Greeley and Sheatsley found a marked decline in the level of segregationist attitudes among all ethnic groups, the only exception being those less educated East European Catholics. But while attitudes toward Blacks may no longer be based on the prejudicial foundation of race, there may well be conditions associated with post-industrial society that sustain these out-group hostilities, or at least increase the possibility of their emergence again.

Plain and simple prejudice based on racial and religious differences gives way to a more complex set of motivations rooted in feelings of insecurity. The sources of the individual's sense of insecurity may vary. For example, what consequences come from a rate of upward mobility as it erodes the individual's primary group structures and relationships? Given the drastically increased tempo of change in post-industrial society, what consequences can we expect from the produced increase in the rate of occupational obsolescence? And more serious, what can we expect of the individual who is downwardly mobile and has lost status in a society which is achievement oriented?

We have learned that children of one social class when exposed to children of a higher social class tend to absorb the values and attitudes of the higher status children. Much the same thing can be said of the more assimilated ethnic. As he moves upward in the social system he tends to adopt the values and interests of his "new" social class. For the upwardly-mobile ethnic we can predict that he will behave and think more like other members of the middle class he is joining. The middle-class ethnic, let me reiterate, does not necessarily have the same values, interests, and concerns of the less assimilated ethnic. Black militants have been quick to stigmatize this difference in values and interests under the label of "uncle Tomism." Thus, it is probable that the interests, values, and demands of the more assimilated ethnic will converge with the class interests of his social and occupational status, that is, the interests of the corporation, the bank, the insurance company, the accounting firm, or what have you. Whatever character the interests of the assimilated ethnic may take, they are unlikely to be congruent with the interests of the less assimilated (unless, as we have seen, he aspires to public office).

Some Poles, for example, have higher educations, better paying white-collar jobs, and reflect the values and interests of the social class into which they moved. Others, unassimilated, are less educated and consequently continue in the more menial jobs; these persons tend to reflect the patterns of political behavior and attitudes of the white working class.

One way of highlighting the differences between the styles of ethnic politics is to juxtapose the two concerns, recognition as

opposed to the substantive interests and class-related demands of others in the political system. Let me now point out the nature of the outcomes of a politics based on "recognition" and that *modus operandi* that tends to be more substantive and less symbolic in form. The final section of this essay will be devoted to an example problem, one now pressing the public conscience–busing.

The demand for equal employment opportunity (an end to discrimination in employment practices) is the exemplar of a substantive program. The demand for "monuments," such as nationalities centers in urban America, as evidence acknowledging our ethnic heritage is the epitome of our current concern, an old one to be sure, for recognition. As such, it is largely symbolic. In the first case, the rewards for political behavior are much greater, the beneficiaries larger in number, and, over time, the results are lasting. In the second case, the rewards for political behavior are conspicuous in their token quality, have many fewer beneficiaries, and, over time, have a transient quality.

Notice the way in which the national government has responded to these kinds of demands. In legislation recognizing white ethnic demands, Congress passed an act for the establishment of nationalities' centers in our urban areas. After the centers are built, and provided with limited operating funds, what then? However, the substantive demand to end discrimination against Blacks, Chicanos, and the American Indian has produced quite a different set of outcomes. Congress responded by passing the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968. These acts prohibit

discrimination in hiring and firing practices in all institutions under contract with the federal government, and having more than 25 employees. To mobilize the sanctions of the federal government, the nation's largest employer and its largest consumer, is a tribute to the civil rights movements' effectiveness. This class legislation has had, and will continue to have, a marked effect.

Furthermore, in attempting to mollify the demands of visible minority groups for equity, the federal government through the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has begun to promote the idea of quotas for these minorities. This is a practice that personally I find questionable, and, I suspect directly contradicts the spirit and intent of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. That act, title VI, forbade any discrimination based on race, color, or national origins. The quota reflects in governmental implementation reverse discrimination and allegiance to ascription based on skin color rather than achievement as the basis of hiring, firing, and promotion.

From San Francisco to New York City, the institutions subsidized by the federal government are now under increasing pressure to comply, not because of established discriminatory practices, but because they have failed to produce the quotas through "affirmative
action" programs. As indicated above, the visible minorities are not going to be satisfied with official reassurances for their interests. They want the "goods." But what of white ethnic groups?

I have yet to hear any person make a case for quotas for Poles, Italians, Croatians, Czechs (or any other minority) proportionate to their numbers in the community. But this was expected given the white ethnic's concern for nationality centers, language programs in the schools, and cultural and history courses–all symbolic. It is instructive to note here the general decline in the number of black studies programs in the universities and colleges which implemented them but a short time ago. Blacks are now much too pragmatic to tie their demands to non-substantive programs and ideologies.

The demands of the white ethnics have thus far been demands for symbolic reassurances ("Why don't they recognize our contribution to America?"). The demands of Blacks, no longer willing to be fed the pap about equality, justice, and the land of opportunity-they so well know better–are much closer in kind to the demands placed on government by business and industry; they are insatiable. And they are insatiable no matter what degree of success in their attainment.

The unassimilated ethnic, however, is still tied to his daily need and in every sense reflects the less advantaged characteristics of the working class. His interests are much more easily satisfied although there are signs that his expectations are also increasing. I would go so far as to suggest that these ethnics constitute a part of the population now called the "neglected majority." And as such, they constitute a different order of needs, aspirations, and desires. For these individuals I see a different order of demands more appropriate as they assume increasingly active roles in the political system: Demands directed toward the quality of

education available, and the question of who is to pay for that education; consumer protection from the producer who, despite all protests to the contrary, is motivated, first and foremost, by a concern for profits of a larger magnitude than the previous year's; and the environmental and health questions now pressing so urgently upon the nation. If we are to move together, then let us be aware of the implications of assimilation and the different needs of different segments of the population *as well as* the differences within ethnic groups.

Our national concern for education of Americans has a long history. Education is the key to better employment, better income, better housing, and more adequate health care. As a nation we have come to accept the ideal of equality of opportunity in education. This does not mean that all will be provided equal education. It does mean that we have committed ourselves to the proposition that individuals of similar preparation and capacity should be given equal opportunity to that level of education that the child and young adult is capable of. It means that a person's education should not depend on his skin color, religion, or sex, or place of national origin.

Consider the current "crisis" over the issue of busing. Busing is not unique as educational practices go, since for decades we have had it. The South has had a long history of busing for the purpose of maintaining separate and segregated facilities for Blacks. For politicians to raise the issue now seems, at least to me, to be but another ploy at vote-gathering in the vineyards of political life. Busing is raised for public consumption as a symbolic issue capable of generating electoral support. The

better-off population in the United States is already convinced of the shortcomings of public education. Why else would they be sending their children to private institutions? The issue of busing has validity only under one assumption: that the quality of the schools is good or as good as it can be for the whites, and that the influx of limited number of black students would undermine that quality. I do not subscribe to this assumption of quality, and available data confirms this conviction. The issue is symbolic. Some men will have their political stock rise at the cost of many. Should busing be prohibited, has the public a claim to more substantive considerations from the political system regarding issues on the content and quality of public education? The likelihood is that it will not.

Aside from the white ethnic's concern for the possibility of black students in their schools, what are the focal points of their energies? They want to sustain cultural identity, to promote language courses and a whole range of courses which seem, to me, to reflect an insensitivity to the needs of children in our society. A more cogent case for ethnics can be made for examining the quality of education offered to all in the public schools. The available evidence is not very encouraging. We know, for example, that schools are excessively concerned with compliance to the rules and regulations and tend to neglect the wide range of issues for which the child, turned adult, will be held responsible. If the objective of political stability is a desirable one, then we should be seeking a more heterogeneous not homogeneous school population "mix." For Blacks this means either busing or residential integration, both capable of

integrating American society. For whites it means either busing or residential integration.

Of equal importance for our future is the extent to which schools are moving in the area of status socialization as contrasted with its past concern for role socialization. The anticipated rate of occupational obsolescence in the not-too-distant future makes our present preoccupation with training a doubtful practice at best. Are the schools preparing our children to cope with the needs of a change-oriented society? Are the children going to be adaptable and flexible enough to handle the tempo of changes we are going to subject them to? We are not that far removed from the case of the railroad fireman confronted by the diesel engine.

It is probably true that in order to move concertedly we will need to be aware of the existence of conflicting demands. At no point is the issue of conflict and cleavage more apparent than in the perverse implementation of the quota system by the federal government which results in reverse discrimination. The elimination of discrimination in hiring is a commendable goal. To discriminate against others who have only recently moved upward simply serves to compound and aggravate the racial situation, which has never been good, in the country. But a commitment to end discrimination can become the basis upon which we all–black and white–can move together in a spirit of reconciliation and compromise. There is no reason why the Poles or the Slovene should think his lot is any better than that of the Black when it comes to various kinds of training programs–and this commonality can be the basis of conciliation

and compromise. Open the doors, say the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and do not recognize race, religion, and place of national origin as a condition for hiring.

The issues of poverty, health care, pension programs, education, the quality of the environment we live in, and the food and drugs consumed are all lines on which a coalition can be effective. The order of these concerns is in the last analysis far removed from the priorities of traditional cultural pluralism with an emphasis on "recognition."

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Cultural Variables in the Ecology of an Ethnic Group

CHRISTEN JONASSEN

The attempt to discover, describe, and explain regularities in man's adaptation to space has long been a matter of concern to social scientists and sociologists. In the United States the ecological school of sociology, depending primarily on the observation of man in an urban environment, has concerned itself with this problem. Since Alihan's shattering critique[1] of the Parkian ecological theory a decade ago, two schools of thought seem to have emerged. Their discussions have sought to determine whether or not a science of ecology is possible without a socio-cultural framework of reference. The crux of the problem seems to center around the relative influence of "biotic," strictly economic, "natural," and "sub-social" factors on the one hand, and socio-cultural elements on the other hand.

1. Milla A. Alihan. *Social Ecology*, New York, 1938.

Those stressing the former as causative factors have been referred to as the "classical" or "orthodox" ecologists,[2] while those emphasizing the latter factors might be called the "socio-cultural" ecologists.[3]

Perhaps the best if not the only way to determine where the correct emphasis should lie is by empirical research. It is hoped that the results of a research project[4] reported in this paper may contribute toward that end.

One writer suggests "that the time has come when we should study the influence of the cultural factor in the phenomena

2. The "classical'" ecological position is perhaps best expressed by: Robert E. Park, "Succession, an Ecological Concept," *American Sociological Review*, I, April, 1936; "Human Ecology," *The American Journal of Sociology*, XLII, July, 1936; "Reflections on Communication and Culture," *The American Journal of Sociology*, XLIV, Sept., 1938; Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, Roderick D. McKenzie, *The City*, Chicago, 1925; Ernest W. Burgess, Ed., *The Urban Community*, Chicago, 1925; Roderick D. McKenzie, *The Metropolitan Community*, New York, 1933; "The Concept of Dominance and World Organization," *The American Journal of Sociology*, XXXIII, July, 1926. Following the general orientation but differing somewhat from the "classical" position we have: James A. Quinn, "The Nature of Human Ecology--Re-examination and Redefinition," *Social Forces*, 18:161-168, 1939; "Ecological Versus Social Interaction," *Sociology and Social Research*, 18:565-570, 1934; "Culture and Ecological Phenomena," *Sociology and Social Research*, XXV:313-320, March, 1941; Amos H. Hawley, Ecology and Human Ecology," *Social Forces*, 22:398-405, May, 1944.
3. Perhaps the most forceful expression of the position of the "socio-cultural" position is in the writings of: Walter Firey, *Land Use in Central Boston*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1947; "Sentiment and Symbolism as Ecological Variables," *American Sociological Review*, X:140-204, April, 1945; August B. Hollingshead, "A Re-examination of Ecological Theory," *Sociology and Social Research*, 31:194-204, January, 1947; Warner E. Gettys, "Human Ecology and Social Theory," *Social Forces*, 18:469-476, 1939.
4. See C.T. Jonassen. *The Norwegians in Bay Ridge: A Sociological Study of an Ethnic Group*, University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1947.

sociologists have defined as ecological."[5] The study of an ethnic group in an American urban environment seems particularly suitable for such a project. Such a group has a distinct culture which can be described and characterized, and the reaction of such a group to the American environment is more readily observed since it is set apart from the general population in the Census and other governmental reports.

The Norwegians in New York have a continuous history[6] as a group since about 1830 when they formed their first settlement and community in Lower Manhattan. Since that day the community has moved until it is now located in the Bay Ridge section of Brooklyn.[7] The first location was .25 mile from City Hall, the center of city; the present location is about ten miles from that point. From 1830 to the present time six fairly distinct areas of settlement may be observed.

I. The Problem

We shall be primarily interested in the mobility of the Norwegian community. Why did the group first settle where it did, and why did it move from this area to another? We shall want to know why it moved in one direction and not in another, and we shall be interested in the rate and type of movement. And if we are able to suggest some answers to these questions, we shall be able to ascertain if the distribution

5. A.B. Hollingshead, *op. cit.*
6. See A.N. Rygg. *The Norwegians in New York 1825-1925,* Brooklyn, New York, 1941.
7. Smaller settlements have also been formed in suburban sections of Staten Island, Queens, and the Bronx, but the main group is located in Bay Ridge. See Figure 1.

of the Norwegian group in New York and the movement of its community can be explained in terms of factors that are "non-cultural," "sub-social," "impersonal," and "biotic," as the classical ecologists and their followers would contend; or if causality must be referred to cultural and social factors to explain the movement of this community in New York, as the "socio-cultural" ecologists would maintain.

II. Cultural Background of the Settlers

If we are to ascertain the comparative influence of culture in determining spatial distribution , it becomes necessary to sketch briefly the cultural background of this group so that their values and cultural heritage may be indicated. The Norwegians who created this settlement, unlike those who pioneered in the Western states, came for the most part from the coastal districts of Norway. Norway was in those days underdeveloped industrially and its main means of livelihood were agriculture, lumbering, fishing and seafaring. Many individuals would combine all of these occupations and especially fishing and agriculture which were carried on in the innumerable fjords and inlets of the long indented shoreline of Norway. In these districts a culture based primarily on the sea as a means of transportation and a source of food combined with a little farming has flourished for centuries since the Viking days. The people are trained from their earliest youth in skills necessary to make a living in such an environment. The men and women who founded and continued the Norwegian settlement in New York originated in such environments, and many men joined the

colony by the simple expedient of walking off the ships on which they worked as sailors.

Norway, of all the civilized countries in the world, has one of the most scattered populations, the density being only 23.2 persons per square mile as compared to 750.4 for England and 41.5 for the United States.[8] Norway does not have very large cities and its people never live far from the mountains, the fjords, and the open sea. They are for the most part nature lovers and like green things and plenty of space about them.

III. Settlement and Movement of Norwegians in New York

The first Norwegian community which has an unbroken connection with the present one was located about 1830 in the area now bounded by the Brooklyn Bridge, the Manhattan Bridge, and the East River.[9] At that time, along this section of Manhattan were located docks where ships from all parts of the world loaded and unloaded, and here were also located the only large drydocks in New York, capable of repairing large ocean-going vessels. Here also were found the offices of shipping masters, vessel owners, and other seafaring occupations. In this atmosphere of salt water and ships, men familiar with the sea could feel at home. And within walking distance of their homes they found plenty of work as carpenters, shipbuilders, sailmakers, riggers, and dock and harbor workers.

Across the East River lay Brooklyn, a town of some 3,298 inhabitants in 1800. It grew rapidly and became an incorporated

8. As of 1938.
9. See Figure 1.

city in 1834, and by 1850 it had grown to 96,850 inhabitants. In 1940, the Borough according to Census figures had a population of 2,698,284. Brooklyn gradually superseded New York as a shipbuilding, ship repairing, and docking center. There was the New York Navy Yard in Wallabout Bay. But the center of shipping activity became Red Hook, that section of Brooklyn jutting into the New York harbor, across from the Battery. The Atlantic Docks were completed here in 1848. It also became the terminus of the great canal traffic that tapped the vast resources of the American continent. Here large grain elevators were built to hold grain for ships that came from all parts of the world to load and discharge. In 1853, the famous Burtis Shipyard already employed 500 men, and in 1866 a great celebration was held when the John N. Robbins Company opened two huge graving docks and three floating docks in Erie Basin.[10] These docks could build and float the largest vessels and they were the only such docks in New York outside those in the Navy Yard. Red Hook became a humming yachting, shipping, and ship-building center.

The Norwegians living in New York found the journey by horsecar and ferry tedious and time-consuming. They soon began to settle in Red Hook and the next Norwegian settlement developed in the area immediately adjacent to and north of Red Hook, where a small group of Norwegians settled in 1850. By 1870 the invasion of Brooklyn was gathering speed.

A horsecar, travelling along South Street in Manhattan, took Norwegian ship workers to Whitehall. Here they boarded the

10. *Brooklyn Daily Eagle,* April 17, 1910.

Hamilton Ferry to Hamilton Avenue, Brooklyn. Between 1870 and 1910, Hamilton Avenue became the most Norwegian street in Brooklyn and New York.

The colony developed to the north of Hamilton Avenue. The churches moved over from New York and new churches were established. In the Nineties, this section was one of large beautiful homes and tree-shaded streets. The section became better as one went north and became very exclusive at Brooklyn Heights where the grand old families lived. This section occupied in those days a functional relation to the downtown section of Manhattan that Westchester, Connecticut, and Long Island do today. A contemporary wrote, "…the greater part of the male population of Brooklyn daily travels to Manhattan to work in its offices…The very fact that Brooklyn is a dwelling place for New York…a professional funnyman long ago called it a 'bed chamber.'"[11] It was actually as the saying went "a city of homes and churches."

Norwegian immigrant girls coming to New York found jobs as domestics in these beautiful homes and Norwegian men, skilled in the building, repair, and handling of ships of all kinds, found plenty of work for their hands in Erie and Atlantic Basins a short distance to the south. The section therefore became a logical location for the development of a Norwegian immigrant community. It offered them everything they needed. The Irish and Germans also moved into this neighborhood, and as it grew more and more crowded the old families moved out. Just as the New Englanders had forced out the Dutch, so now Norwegians,

11. Edward Hungerford. "Across the East River," *Brooklyn Life*, 1890-1915, p. 81.

Irish, and Germans were forcing out the New Englanders. The stately old homes were converted to two-and three-family houses, and some to boarding houses. In this neighborhood the Norwegian colony flourished for some decades up to the beginning of the Twentieth Century.

At the time that certain members of the New York community moved away to settle in this area of Old South Brooklyn, others migrated across the liver to Greenpoint in another part of the Brooklyn waterfront.[12] This section was also connected to the old Manhattan community by ferry. There was some shipping activity along this side of the waterfront but it offered only limited opportunity for the particular skills of the Norwegian immigrants. The area was soon invaded by new immigrants from the south of Europe and by factories of various kinds. It is rather significant that unlike the settlement in Old South Brooklyn this community did not move to adjacent territory, and after some years it ceased to exist, its inhabitants scattering in all directions.

The inexorable growth of the city continued. In old South Brooklyn, open places became fewer and fewer and green grass and trees disappeared. Old large one-family houses were torn down to give place to tightly packed tenements. Then it came the turn of the Norwegians, Irish, and Germans to be invaded and succeeded by the southern Europeans, mostly Italians from Sicily.

By 1890, many old downtown families purchased fashionable homes a little further out near Prospect Park, in the Park Slope section, as "a means of getting away from the thickly populated

12. See Figure 2.

section of Brooklyn," the incentive being the scarcity of houses, plenty of wide open spaces and an abundance of trees and garden spots in the Park Slope area.[13] The residents of the area used to be known as the brownstone people who lived in beautiful mansions, paid their bills monthly, and ordered from the store by telephone. In the beginning of the century, the Norwegians also started to move out of the downtown area and into this section. This became the next center of the Norwegian colony in Brooklyn.

But the city continued to push its rings of growth further and further out and the same process repeated itself allover again. By 1910, the Norwegians were on the move again, this time to the adjoining area of Sunset Park. The docks and shipyards were extended all the way out to Fifty-ninth Street. And in 1915, the Fourth Avenue subway was completed. Electric cars running on Ninth and Fifteenth Streets and Third Avenue and Hamilton Avenue provided transportation to the shipping center at Red Hook.

The center of the Norwegian colony remained in Sunset Park district up to about 1940. The exodus of Norwegians from this section and into Bay Ridge and other outlying sections is now in progress. It is the sections of Sunset Park and Bay Ridge which now constitute the area of the settlement. The present Norwegian settlement is located on the high ground overlooking New York Harbor. For the most part it is a section of one-and two-family houses with small lawns, backyards, and tree-planted streets. The nature of this area was determined by indices which have

13. *Brooklyn Daily Eagle,* December 5, 1926.

proved reliable in characterizing urban neighborhoods. Indices of economic status, rents, condition of housing, density of population, mobility rates, morbidity and mortality rates, demographic characteristics, standardized rates of crime and juvenile delinquency, dependency, poverty and desertion rates were also employed. From the cumulative evidence of such data it is apparent that the area in which the Norwegians live is, when compared with other areas of New York and Brooklyn, one of the best, and no part of this area according to this study displays the characteristics of a slum district. However, a detailed study of the various parts of the area shows that it can be divided into areas that, on the basis of the indicated indices, may be designated as "poor," "medium," and "best." The distribution of Norwegians living within these areas is as follows: ten per cent live in "poor" sections, fifty-four per cent in "medium," and thirty-six per cent in "best" areas. The "best" areas include parts of Bay Ridge and Fort Hamilton which contain some of the best residential areas in New York, while the "poor" areas in the northwestern part of the Sunset Park district have some sections that border perilously on slum conditions.

An analysis of population movements within the area of the Norwegian settlement indicates that the Norwegians are moving out of the northern and western census tracts of the Sunset Park district and into the southwestern census tracts of Bay Ridge and Fort Hamilton. Italians and Poles are moving in from the northeast and Russian Jews are taking over the sections of the northern and eastern periphery of the area vacated by the Norwegians and other Scandinavians.

From the ecological and historical study of the characteristics of the Norwegian community over a period of more than a hundred years, it appears that it has maintained rather consistent characteristics and a functional position in New York since the community was established. Like all other groups, native and foreign, the Norwegians were unable to prevent change of the character of their neighborhood, nor were they able to prevent invasion by other land use and lower status groups; they could maintain the things they valued only by retreating before the inexorable development of the city to new territory where conditions were more in harmony with their conceptions of a proper place to live.

It is apparent from the data of this study that numerous causative factors have operated in determining the location and movement of the Norwegian community in New York: the economic and social conditions of Norway, the economic and social conditions of the United States, the rate and direction of New York City growth, the condition of the neighborhood, available lines of communication between the cultural area and the location of the economic base, and attitudes and values of the Norwegian heritage. Where they were to settle and the rate and direction of movement were thus largely determined by elements of the immigrants' heritage and the character and needs of the host society of the United States.

Neither one of these factors was *the* determining one. The Norwegians' reaction to this urban environment resulted rather from a judicious balance of all these factors. It is clear from old maps that transportation to Bay Ridge was available as early

as 1895, if they had wanted to live there. But this was slow transportation by horsecar in the early days, and the downtown area evidently presented agreeable enough conditions. As the city grew, however, these conditions became less desirable to people who valued plenty of space around them and nearness to nature.

It is apparent that the Norwegian immigrants broke away from the original economic base to a certain extent later. This development depended on the advance of lines of transportation and new technological and economic development and on the fact that the Norwegian culture was becoming ever more industrialized, which gave later emigrants new skills and knowledge that they could apply here. The erection of skyscrapers and use of steel construction in New York gave Norwegian sailors jobs as structural steel and iron workers. They were used to working aloft and their experience as riggers made them particularly valuable for this work. In the Twenties, the great building boom provided skilled carpenters with plenty of work.

Figure 1 shows the sections the Norwegians have inhabited at various times. The dotted lines represent lines of transportation. Figure 2 is the same map with its salient factors consolidated and simplified. The progression of the Norwegian cultural area, as can be seen, may be represented as a series of interlocking circles, the centers of which are the centers of .the cultural areas at the times specified. The path of this progression is the locus of the centers of the interlocking circles, and it represents in reality the lines of communication.

Fig. 1. Norwegian Settlements, 1850-1947

Fig. 2. Movement of Norwegians, 1850-1947

At each stage, the cultural area presents definite ecological characteristics. It has a center, a clustering of ethnics. The center attracts and repels (Repulsion and attraction here are considered

as functions of the choice of individuals in relation to the realities of the environment); it repels some who move out and establish the basis for a new center farther out along the path of advance, and it attracts others to it who are lagging behind. The lagging areas, shaded on the map (Fig. 2), are created at the stage when the colony is breaking up to advance again; they represent transitional areas in process of invasion by other land use and lower status groups. They are therefore the least desirable sections of the settlements to which those who are economic failures gravitate. The advance guard of the new cultural area settled new territory or mingled with native Americans, and these Norwegians in turn formed a center for a new Norwegian cultural area. The process is a continuous one, and change from one area to another must be measured in decades rather than in years. It is a seepage-like movement rather than a sudden mass change.

IV. Some Implications of This Study for Ecological Theory

The change of location of the Norwegian community was produced by persons breaking away from the old area and individually choosing a new habitat. Because of its concerted progression in a certain direction to a certain place, the illusion of a directed mass movement is created. But this ecological behavior arises out of the interaction of the realities of the New York environment with the immigrants' attitudes and values. The resulting actions of many individuals are very much alike since they are motivated by very similar attitudes created in conformity with the cultural pattern of Norway. *It is therefore indicated that the movement of these people must be referred*

to factors that are volitional, purposeful, and personal and that these factors may not be considered as mere accidental and incidental features of biotic processes and impersonal competition.

It has been stated that immigrant colonies are to be found in the slums or that immigrants make their entry into the city in the area immediately adjacent to the central business district.[14] From the data of this study we are fairly certain that the Norwegian colony has not existed in an area with the characteristics of a slum, and we can be certain that it does not occupy such an area today even though it is the habitat of recently arrived immigrants. It would therefore appear that the statements referred to above can not be taken as generalizations, but apply to certain ethnic or racial groups only.

The cause of the Norwegians' settling where they did and in no other place around New York is not at all clear if we refer the explanation to biological, sub-social, and non-cultural factors. It is logical to assume that as biological creatures interested primarily in sustenance and survival, the Norwegians could have survived in any number of other places. But if we refer the explanation of the location of their community to cultural factors it becomes so obvious as to be banal. It is clear that their cultural heritage had given them the tools whereby they were able to elicit meaning and values from this particular environment. Other sections of New York, for example the financial section,

14. Cf. R.D. McKenzie, *The Metropolitan Community*, p. 241; Ernest W. Burgess, "The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a Research Project,": in Robert E. Park, *et. al., The City*, pp. 55, 56; Harvey W. Zorbaugh, *The Gold Coast and the Slum*, Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1929, pp. 11, 128.

the clothing manufacturing sections, etc., had little meaning for them in terms of survival or satisfaction. To the Jew from a crowded Ghetto in the center of Poland the realities of the harbor district would probably have no values and meaning, or they might have different values and meanings, perhaps negative values. But to the Norwegian, socialized in the coast culture of Norway, this environment had meaning and value in terms of sustenance and psychological satisfaction. The very method by which he could compete and sustain himself was inherent in the cultural heritage which he brought to this country, and whether or not this cultural heritage should ever find expression and be useful to him depended on the cultural pattern of the United States and the cultural artifacts of that country.

The objective realities of New York thus presented the Norwegians with a multitude of environments to which they might have reacted. It is significant that they reacted primarily to those aspects of the New York milieu that had meaning in their value system. Thus the environmental facts were of little significance per se and only as they were incorporated into the value-attitude systems of the Norwegian immigrants.

The movement of the group, when compared with the movements of other ethnic groups in New York and other American cities, assumes some significance. Studies of Italians[15] and Jews[16] reveal different developments. The usual situation in these groups is one in which an area of first

15. Cf. Leonard Covello, *The Social Background of the Italo-American School Child: A Study of the Southern Italian Family Mores and Their Effect on the School Situation in Italy and America*, New York: New York University School of Education, (Ph.D. thesis), 1944.
16. Cf. Louis Wirth, *The Ghetto*, Chicago, Illinois, 1929.

settlement is established which stays in one place, and continues to receive new arrivals. As the old immigrants become assimilated and the second generation grows up, they move out to an area of "second settlement," usually far removed from the first in space and time. Thus Italian and Jewish communities in New York are still found in many of the areas, such as the Lower East Side of Manhattan and downtown Brooklyn where they were first established. But there is hardly a trace of any Norwegians in the areas of New York and Brooklyn which they originally inhabited. Furthermore, the development and progression of Norwegian cultural areas in New York show a continuum of space and time and result from the unique character of their heritage in interaction with their new environment. It does not therefore seem possible to generalize as to the type of movement that all immigrant groups in urban areas will exhibit; rather the type of movement, its rate and direction will depend on the interaction of the particular heritage of each immigrant group with the urban environment in which the immigrants live. The different rates of movement of different ethnic groups[17] from the center of-cities might find a more satisfactory explanation on this basis.

The area of the Norwegian community was described in terms of indices of various kinds. These might be regarded as objective measures of the values which Norwegians have in regard to the environment in which they want to live. Thus the amount of crowding within the home and congestion without, and other conditions indicated by crime, delinquency, health, and

17. Cf. Paul F. Cressey, "Population Succession in Chicago: 1898-1930," *American Sociological Review*, August, 1938, pp. 59-69.

population statistics, have for Norwegians apparently reached an intolerable point in certain census tracts. Other tracts present them with conditions that they find more favorable, and it is to these areas that they move as soon as they are able to do so.

It is probable that the Norwegian community has been able to maintain its solidarity for over a hundred years and in spite of constant moving, because the variable factors that determined its existence were favorable. The dissolution of the Greenpoint settlement indicates what happened when the factors that sustained it were unfavorable. But for the community that did survive and more, there was, when conditions reached an intolerable state, always an appropriate area immediately adjacent to the old area; so the community was able to move from Manhattan to old South Brooklyn, to Park Slope, to Sunset Park, and finally to Bay Ridge. Norwegians have not been segregated from native whites, nor is there any evidence that they have been discriminated against in any way as far as choosing a home is concerned. The clustering within the area is therefore voluntary.

However, there is no place having the characteristics which Norwegians require adjacent to the present settlement in Bay Ridge. The city is moving in on them from north and west, and there is only water to the east and south. The area is also being invaded by other ethnic groups. Nor is the type of buildings within this area entirely to their liking. It is still predominantly a neighborhood of single- and two-family houses, but a great number of large, high class apartment houses have been built, and the land value has increased so tremendously that wherever

zoning permits, this is the type of housing that is erected. It would seem that the Norwegian community in Brooklyn is making its last stand in Bay Ridge with its back to the sea. Its final dissolution is a matter of years and will be brought about because the balance of variables that determined its development cannot be maintained much longer. As long as the values of their heritage could be integrated and harmonized with conditions of the developing city, the community grew and flourished; when this integration is no longer possible it will disintegrate and its members disperse.

This development has already commenced. Census figures and the changes of addresses for subscribers to *Nordisk Tidende*, the newspaper of the Norwegian community, indicate that many Norwegians are moving to Queens, Staten Island, New Jersey, and Connecticut, where new settlements are forming in environments which are more in harmony with the values of their heritage. Some of these settlements have started as colonies of summer huts, and finally developed into all-year round communities.

The peculiar interplay of a plurality of motives that goes into the determination of ecological distribution of Norwegians is well illustrated by these informants:

> I like it here (Staten Island) because it reminds me of Norway. Of course, not Bergen, because we have neither Floyen nor Ulrik, nor mountains on Staten Island, but it is so nice and green allover in the summer. I have many friends in Bay Ridge in Brooklyn, and I like to take trips there, but to tell the

> truth when I get on the ferry on the way home and get the smell of Staten Island, I think it's glorious. However, I'm taking a trip to Norway this summer, and Norway is, of course, Norway–and Staten Island is Staten Island.[18]

A man states:

> I arrived in America in 1923, eighteen years old. I went right to Staten Island because my father lived there and he was a ship-builder at Elco Boats in Bayonne, New Jersey, right over the bridge. I started to work with my father and I am now foreman at the shipyard where we are building small yachts–the best in America. I seldom go to New York because I don't like large cities with stone and concrete. Here are trees and open places….[19]

Another tells what he likes about his place in Connecticut:

> I like the private peace up here in the woods. There is suitable space between the cabins so that we do not have to step on each other's toes unless we want to get together with someone once in a while. Since I started to build this house, it is as if I have deeper roots here than in the city. This is my *own* work for myself….[20]

And a woman says:

18. *Nordisk Tidende*, March 3, 1947.
19. *Loc. cit.*
20. *Ibid.*, September 5, 1946.

> …It is a real joy to get out of the city with all its wretchedness. I go down to the brook where I have a big Norwegian tub. There I sing lilting songs and wash and rinse clothes. Everything goes like play, and before you know it, the summer is over, and all this glorious time is gone and I could almost cry.[21]

One who has moved to Staten Island weighs the advantages and disadvantages:

> It is countrylike and quiet here with plenty of play room for the children. But I must admit I am homesick for Brooklyn once in a while, perhaps often. Then I take the ferry and visit friends and acquaintances there.[22]

The assumption that "in general, living organisms tend to follow the line of least resistance in obtaining environmental resources and escaping environmental dangers" has been used as the basis for hypotheses of human distribution in space.[23] Such a statement in the light of this study seems too mechanistic, too simple, and therefore inadequate as an explanation of the distribution of this group in New York. Men need not merely to survive, require not only shelter or just any type of sustenance; they want to live in a particular place, in a particular way. A better description of man's distributive behavior might be: *men tend to distribute themselves within an area so as to achieve the greatest efficiency in realizing the values they hold most*

21. *Loc. cit.*
22. *Ibid.*, March 3, 1947.
23. James A. Quinn, "Hypothesis of Median Location," *American Sociological Review*, April, 1943.

dear.[24] Thus man's ecological behavior in a large American city becomes the function of several variables, both socio-cultural and "non-cultural."

One writer has pointed out that the early ecologists "envisaged an abstract ecological man motivated by physiological appetites and governed in his pursuits of life's goals by competition with others who sought the same things he sought because physiologically they were like him."[25] It is quite evident now that this ecological creature was the product of the same intellectual miscegenation which begot the now somewhat extinct "economic man." The men and women observed in this study are not abstract entities; they are very real persons with physical needs. But they are also governed and motivated in the pursuit of culturally determined goals by culturally determined habits and ways of living. They compete for things high in the hierarchy of their value system which mayor may not be the same things for which other individuals and groups strive. It hardly seems possible to achieve a systematic theory of ecology that squares with empirical observation and meets the needs of logical consistency without the cultural component as an integral part of such formulations.

Taken from *American Sociological Review*, 14 (February, 1949) 32-41 with the permission of The American Sociological Association.

24. This conclusion is essentially in agreement with the "theory of proportionality" as proposed by Walter Firey, *Land Use in Central Boston*, p. 328.
25. A.B. Hollingshead, *op. cit*., p. 204.

Understanding One Another

ANTHONY CELEBREEZE

Ours is a nation which must be uniquely aware of that quality which has come to be called ethnicity.

Ours is not a land populated by people who have lived and worked and played together for many centuries. Some of the American people have indeed been here for thousands of years, but they have been joined by other, more recent immigrants to the North American Shores.

The passage of time has brought to our shores people whose roots can be traced to every corner of the earth. Northern Europeans came in great numbers in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the wake of the great explorers' voyages to the new world. Blacks were carried to our shores during that same period to fulfill the needs of an underpopulated expanse. The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw

millions…of central and southern Europeans reach this nation….Throughout these centuries in addition groups of Asians added their numbers to the growing population of America.

For many years it was fashionable to speak of a melting pot-in which the individual cultures immigrants brought with them would be boiled–and presumably sanitized thereby–and from which could be distilled a new American culture.

In the last few years it has been recognized by many Americans-frequently the children and grandchildren of immigrants–that the melting pot metaphor is an unfortunate one. It suggests a belief that the proper way to treat ethnic cultures is to destroy them; this is not acceptable. It has been recognized too that the image of the melting pot never comported with reality in any event. Whatever emphasis was placed on homogeneity and adoption of a common outlook and culture, persistent elements of individual ethnic cultures remained with groups of Americans. Now most Americans have come to recognize that the cultural heritages which make each ethnic group unique are not properly sources of embarrassment, but should be sources of intense pride.

Ethnic pride is necessary. It allows a man or woman to give his or her best effort, to surmount by accomplishment and diligence the barriers presented by discrimination and prejudice. It allows a person to face any other as an equal secure in the conviction that no accident of birth makes him inferior, knowing that any man who willingly gives in to the weakness of bigotry and prejudice acts not from strength and knowledge but from weakness and ignorance. Ethnic pride allows men and women

to exert themselves to their fullest capacities, to strive and to achieve, convinced that they need apologize to no man for their forbears.

Ethnic pride has its potential dangers, as well, of course. If narrowly understood such pride can…add new dimensions to the divisions which plague our nation,…can open new wounds in the body of American unity. It can encourage bigotry and discrimination, it can pit man against man simply because the roots of each can be traced to different corners of the earth.

Or–the ethnic's interest in his own origins, his love for the culture of his ancestors, can help us bind up our national wounds and can aid in the struggle to attain the long sought after goal of national unity and understanding. Properly understood, I believe the new found interest in ethnicity has such potential.

Anyone who has come to love a culture must, if he is at all sensitive, come to understand that others may have a similar feeling for the heritage which they call their own. As an individual compares the culture of his ancestors with the culture of his neighbors he must begin to realize that for all the substantial differences which set those cultures apart the needs and drives which men seek to deal with in their stay upon this earth are remarkably similar….It would seem that such understanding is the first step toward a solution of the disunity which plagues us.

From such understanding can result a breakdown of alienation, and ultimately the maintenance of a pluralistic society with a diversity of attitude but with some consensus about basic values

and common national goals. With these insights into our fellow man–and perhaps more importantly into ourselves and those who are most like us–we can begin anew the task of bringing unity to our nation.

The challenge which faces us all is to ensure that the values of ethnicity are not perverted by those who misunderstand its importance. We must not allow the pride which allows each of us to stand up as an equal to any other become confused with the arrogancd which makes us believe that an accident or birth can make us superior to another.

Our pride in our heritage can and should enable us to make sacrifices for what we know to be the common good without the fear of weakness which would give pause to those who do not understand their own worth.

Address presented at the National Conference on Ethnicity at The Cleveland State University on May 13, 1972.