



The Hough Riots of 1966

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Marc Lacritz

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Letter Submitting Report

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771-48115

July 22, 1968

The Rev. Louis M. Brereton, Chrmn.
Regional Church Planning Office
2230 Euclid Avenue
Cleveland, Ohio 44115

Dear Dr. Brereton,

Perhaps no event of this decade has had a greater impact on the conscience of the religious community of Greater Cleveland than the riot that occurred in Hough in July 1966.

The events of that week supplied the central theme for scores of sermons. The shock of those events sparked the involvement of dozens of suburban congregations in the affairs of the inner city. The impact of those events aroused hundreds of laymen living in all parts of Cuyahoga County to a recognition that the problems of Hough are the problems of the entire Cleveland community.

As time passes the actual events of such a week tend to be shrouded in a growing collection of romanticized recollections and misleading myths. This report is published in an effort to make available to a larger audience a chronology of the events of that week and to offer an interpretation of why the riots occurred.

The text of this report was written by Mr. Marc E. Lackritz as a senior thesis. It was presented to the Faculty of the Department of History and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, in partial fulfillment of the Requirements for the Bachelor of Arts degree. Mr. Lackritz is a resident of Shaker Heights and has had the opportunity to make a first hand investigation of the problems of Hough.

Respectfully submitted,
Lyle A. Schaller

Excerpt of Testimony

“ . . . I am reminded as well of the preamble to the *Tale of Two Cities* by Charles Dickens which all of you are aware of, I am sure: ‘It was the best of times, it was the worst of times. It was the age of wisdom; it was the age of foolishness. It was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity. It was the season of light, it was the season of darkness. It was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair. We had everything before us, we had nothing before us.’”

— Former Mayor Ralph S. Locher, testifying before the United States Commission on Civil Rights, April 1, 1966

Preface

The Hough riots of 1966 hardly seem to be a proper subject for a history thesis in 1968. Historical perspective provided by detached observation of events and their subsequent consequences is prohibited by the factor of time. Final conclusions are necessarily relegated to the realm of conjecture and, therefore, historical analysis suffers in the purely academic sense. However, analysis, limited as its perspective may be, is most pertinent on the subject of civil disorder.

Our nation is presently faced by the gravest crisis of its brief history. Racial injustice and second class status for black citizens have culminated in wide-spread civil disorder that shakes the very foundations of our society. The events of recent days — the tragic assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the urban violence that followed in the wake of his death — have once again demonstrated the unwillingness of our country to give the black people equal rights. While the resources of our nation are being diverted for projects such as an unpopular war and an effort to place a man on the moon, millions of Americans who are black still suffer the consequences of discrimination. The means by which these people seek to attain equal status have been changing in recent years, accompanied in each case by increased misunderstanding in the white community. Only greater knowledge will result in the understanding necessary for permanent racial harmony.

The summer of 1966 was crucial to the entire civil rights movement. Watts had exploded the previous summer, and the great legislative gains achieved by the methods of non-violent protest had not resulted in significant *de facto* gains for the black people. A new cry was heard in the black ghetto — “Burn, baby, burn” — that threatened to alter the entire course of the civil rights movement in America. The events in Cleveland in 1966 were certainly relevant to the decision facing the civil rights movement as well as portentous of future civil disorder.

The discussion in this thesis is limited only to Cleveland. Cleveland is similar to many other metropolitan areas where disorder has erupted, and many of the causes for the riots of last summer delineated by the Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders abounded in Cleveland. The consequences of the riots there, however, were very different from those in other cities, and so a careful study of the events in Cleveland provides valuable insight into the problems and dilemmas facing other riot-stricken urban centers.

This thesis, then, is an etiological study of the Hough riots. The causes of the disorder are the central theme of the text, and consequences of the violence are briefly discussed in the last chapter. Understanding by whites of the problems and conditions of the black ghetto today is fundamental to their understanding of the principles

and rationale of black power, the means advocated by new black leaders for the black people to attain equality. Thus, the study of the Hough riots, despite its lack of prerequisites for historical study in perspective, still merits historical analysis because of its relevance to the struggle for equal black rights today.

The bigotry which produces black ghettos like Hough debases everyone in society — its victims, its perpetrators, and in more subtle ways, those who acquiesce in it.¹ Racism can no longer be tolerated in this country. Kenneth Clark, the noted sociologist, once said “Negroes will not break out of the barriers of the ghetto unless whites transcend the barriers of their own minds.”² The barriers must now crumble.

April 10, 1968

Marc E. Lackritz
Princeton University

1. Kenneth B. Clark, *Dark Ghetto* (New York, 1965), p. 63.

2. Kenneth B. Clark, “Delusions of the White Liberal,” *New York Times Magazine*, April 14, 1965, p. 136.

Chapter I: Hough Explodes

It's a loaded gun, waiting for someone to pull the trigger.¹

Riots start with small incidents. Small incidents are all that is necessary to ignite the tinder of latent frustrations and passions that have built up over the years. In Cleveland, Ohio, the Hough riots of July, 1966, certainly were no exception to the pattern.

The Seventy-Niners' Cafe stood at the corner of East 79th Street and Hough Avenue (see Appendix One for Hough diagram), the geographical center of the Hough neighborhood. It was owned by the Feigenbaum brothers, Abe and Dave, both of whom had experienced poor relationships with the surrounding black community. In January, 1966, someone had tried to set fire to their car. On Monday, July 18, their relations became much worse.

At about 5:00 P.M., Dave Feigenbaum ordered a prostitute who was in the bar soliciting funds for a deceased prostitute's children to leave. The woman hesitated, and soon the bar owner and the prostitute were exchanging curses and vulgarities. The woman finally did leave, but only after the tension had heightened. Customers present at the time said that Feigenbaum then muttered something about serving Negroes. Later the same day, a Negro walked into the bar and bought a pint of cheap wine. He also asked for a pitcher of ice water and a glass. However, this request was denied by the owner who told the customer that since the sale was a take-out item, he would not serve him any ice water. A young man in the bar at this time then heard Feigenbaum tell the bar maid not to serve "no niggers no water (sic)." The customer who had just been denied the ice water arose and shouted to his friends that he had been refused a drink of water. He angrily left the bar, and in minutes a sign scribbled on a brown paper bag which said, "No water for Niggers" adorned the front door of the bar. As news of the latest incident and the earlier one spread, a crowd gathered outside the cafe. A call to the police was quickly placed by the owners, and they soon appeared on the sidewalk in front of the bar, one armed with a pistol and the other armed with a rifle. The police arrived after some delay, and suddenly the rioting erupted "with the explosiveness of a firebomb."²

As the police attempted to disperse the crowd, the mob spread toward 79th Street, and vandalism and looting became widespread and prevalent. Rocks and bricks were thrown at police as well as store front windows, and soon fires broke out in many of the neighborhood establishments. Wire mesh grills were wrenched loose from

1. Robert G. McGruder, "Who Cares Anything for Us?," *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 31, 1966.

2. Account of incident pieced together by a combination of newspaper accounts, Citizens Panel Report, and interviews. For example, see Michael D. Roberts, "Funeral Fund Helped Spark Riot," *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 23, 1966.

store fronts so that the stores could be looted and torched. Three chain grocery stores, a “cut-rate” drug store, and an easy credit clothing company were among the first buildings to go up in flames. The worst damage occurred in the area bordered by East 71st and East 93rd, and soon the police blocked off entrance to this area from the outside. Specifically, the two block area between East 84th and East 86th received the heaviest damage, and it was reported that “so many businesses were looted that the police could not keep an accurate account.”³

Fires were soon spreading everywhere, but firemen were having difficulty getting their vehicles through the crowd that lined the perimeter of the riot zone. Even after penetrating the riot area, the firemen faced more problems as they were pelted by rocks and bottles. Firehoses were cut, and, despite police protection, occasionally the firemen were ordered by their commanding officer to withdraw with the admonition to “let it burn.”⁴ Police cruiser windows were smashed, tires were slashed, and the policemen themselves were also objects of hurled missiles.

The shouting began amidst the vandalism and looting, and soon the area resembled a battlefield. A mobile police command post was quickly established at the corner of East 73rd and Hough Avenue, and the police hastily shot out the streetlights when the post fell under attack by snipers in nearby apartments. Police Captain James Birmingham described the situation as “like the part in an old western where you’re caught in crossfire in a box canyon.”⁵

The rioting the first night seemed to reach its peak at midnight, at which time every available policeman and patrol car was ordered to the area. Even Police Chief Richard Wagner arrived on the scene, attired in a green golf shirt, work pants, and armed with his own shotgun. In an effort to combat the dangerous situation, policemen entered homes along Hough Avenue to find the sources of gunfire. Many private residences were entered by force, and personal property was occasionally destroyed and individual rights neglected in the frantic searches which occurred. In the heat of the rioting irrational behavior became the rule rather than the exception.

People were ordered off the streets and into nearby buildings for their personal safety. Occasionally this measure was ineffective. Mrs. Joyce Arnett, 26, was returning home at about 1:30 A.M. when she was ordered into a nearby apartment by police. She became frantic about the safety of her three infant daughters who were at home, and so she yelled from the second story window that she was going to come out. As she shouted shots were heard, and three bullets from an unknown assassin hit her in the head and chest. She died on arrival at Mount Sinai Hospital, the first victim of the riots. Police later explained that she had been caught in a crossfire “between police and one of the many snipers lurking in the shadows of the area.”⁶ Three other Negroes were shot and injured the first night before the shooting stopped. A light rain began to fall in the early morning, and the widespread shooting and looting ended at about 4:00 A.M.

The toll of the first night was not light. A woman had been killed, and three persons had been injured by bullets. Seven policemen and one fireman were injured by thrown rocks, bottles, and other missiles, and eight other people were treated at hospitals for similar injuries. Fifty-three people were arrested for disorderly conduct, looting, and

3. *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 20, 1966.

4. Hilbert Black, “Police Fill Hough Riot Area,” *Cleveland Press*, July 19, 1966, p. 1.

5. Donald L. Bean, “‘Like Western,’ Says Policeman,” *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 20, 1966, p. 6.

6. *Cleveland Press*, July 19, 1966, p. 1.

throwing objects at police, and damage in the Hough area was estimated to be almost a million dollars the next morning.⁷ One patrolman who was on the scene commented, “I was in London in the bombings of World War II — that’s what it was like here last night and that’s what it looks like this morning.”⁸ Police Chief Wagner ordered all the policemen to work in definite twelve hour shifts, and he prophetically declared that he felt his police “could contain any further trouble.”⁹

The next morning attention focused on Mayor Ralph Locher to see what his response would be to the previous night’s activities. He said that he was not considering calling in the National Guard, but that he would not hesitate to do so if he thought that the situation had moved out of control. He met for two hours with his top advisers, and instructed Bertram Gardner, director of the Community Relations Board, and Barton Clausen, Urban Renewal Director, to meet with community leaders and submit recommendations for remedial action. An appeal was directed by the mayor to “all responsible citizens” of the Hough area to help restore normalcy.¹⁰ Normalcy, however, was not soon to be found in Cleveland.

Tuesday in Hough found only the looters profiting from the activities of the previous night. Many small businesses, some of which represented lifetime investments, were quickly picked bare by the plunderers. One resident of Hough claimed that suits were being sold for ten dollars, scotch whiskey for three dollars a fifth, wine for fifty cents a fifth, and prime beef at the low price of only a dollar and a quarter per pound.¹¹ Even a policeman was seen carrying a pack of flashlight batteries under his arm from a looted Hough store. The situation was definitely not under control.

At City Hall, the toll of the previous evening, the uncontrolled looting, and the threat of new violence that evening began to weigh heavily on Mayor Locher. At about noon he talked with Governor James Rhodes and, from Locher’s own account, he was given assurance by the governor’s office that the National Guard could arrive by sundown.¹² In the hours that followed, Locher came under tremendous pressure to request the governor to call up the Guard. Because he reasoned that the delays in calling up the National Guard in both Watts and Chicago had cost so much in lives and damage, and because of the previously mentioned factors, Locher made the decision to request the National Guard at 3:30 that afternoon. Locher then called the Governor, and Safety Director John McCormick later reported that the guardsmen were supposed to arrive three hours after the order was given.¹³ McCormick also stated that the City was “prepared to meet force with force. We were on top of the trouble that erupted after dark Monday night.”¹⁴

At 5:00 P.M., the mayor reported that one thousand men were alerted and available, and that the callup action seemed to be the “prudent, proper, and correct action to take.” It was also announced at this time that all bars, taverns, and cafes had been ordered to close for the night.¹⁵

7. Black, “Police Fill,” p. 1.

8. Norman Mlachak, “Just Like a War, Awed Policemen and Firemen Say,” *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 19, 1966.

9. Black, “Police Fill,” p. 1.

10. Paul Lilley, “Locher Doubts State Troops Needed Now,” *Cleveland Press*, July 19, 1966, p. 1.

11. Michael D. Roberts and James Van Fleet. “Plunderers Profit; Merchants Quit,” *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 20, 1966, p. 1.

12. Interview with Ralph S. Locher, January 22, 1968.

13. Robert P. Daniels, “2nd Negro Dies, 2 Wounded in New Violence,” *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 20, 1966, p. 8.

14. *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 20, 1966.

15. Daniels, “2nd Negro Dies,” p. 8.

Sundown arrived and the National Guard had still not appeared in Cleveland because of transportation difficulties. No convoy trucks were available to the 107th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the unit ordered into Cleveland, since the unit had lent many of its trucks to the 37th division, and they had been driven to Grayling, Michigan. In the absence of the Guard, activities in the Hough area were resumed with only slightly less enthusiasm than the night before.

The pattern was the same: looting, vandalism, and sniping. Armed police were stationed at strategic roof locations around the area to prevent attacks from the rioters, and the police command post was moved to East 79th and Hough, the scene of the inciting incident the previous evening. This heavy show of force apparently scattered gangs into the fringe areas, and so it became difficult for the police to find the fire setters and looters. Many abandoned houses and commercial buildings were torched, and police were posted on firetrucks to prevent any injury to the firemen.¹⁶ Sixty-seven fire alarms were reported, and firemen battled some forty fires, almost all of which appeared to have been set by the rioters.¹⁷

Gunfire Tuesday night tapered off from Monday's activity, and fewer snipers were encountered by the police. Isolated instances did occur, however, and another person was killed by gunfire. Percy Giles, 36, was on his way to help a fellow Negro board up his place of business on Hough Avenue when he was shot in the back of the head. Police explained that the victim was probably killed by a stray bullet from an exchange of gunfire between snipers and police.¹⁸ He died later at 8:55 P.M. at Mount Sinai Hospital. Two other men were shot and wounded later in the night.

Finally, at 11:00 P.M., several hundred men of the 107th Armored Regiment arrived in Cleveland. Armed with bayonet-tipped M-1 rifles, the helmeted guardsmen were sent in to reinforce the police command post and the surrounding area at midnight, after waiting an hour for ammunition to arrive. Simultaneously in Columbus, Governor Rhodes declared that "a state of tumult, riot, and other emergency exists in Cleveland." He added that as many guardsmen as necessary to control the disorder would be sent to the City.¹⁹

The Hough area was quiet after the troops were deployed, but the delay in reaching Cleveland had been costly. One man had been killed, and at least twenty-four persons, including twelve policemen and one fireman, were injured. Fire damage was considerable, and almost eighty persons were arrested for looting and disorderly conduct.²⁰ And the damage was not yet over.

As Wednesday dawned on Hough Avenue, only one grocery store was left unscathed and no open drug stores were to be found. Some neighborhood residents expressed hope that the disorder would end soon, and surrounding neighborhoods took precautionary steps to avert rioting in their areas. Area Council President Solomon Harge and Opportunity Center Co-ordinator Howard Reed led efforts in the adjacent impoverished Central Area in an attempt to keep the violence from their region. Door-to-door campaigns were instituted which implored "responsible residents" to refrain from partaking in the disorder.²¹

16. Hilbert Black and Wally Guenther, "Rioters Set Off New Fires," *Cleveland Press*, July 20, 1966, p. 1.

17. *Ibid.*

18. Daniels, "2nd Negro Dies," p. 8.

19. *Ibid.*

20. Black and Guenther, "Rioters Set Off," p. 1.

21. Pat Royse, "Seek to Avert Spread of Riots," *Cleveland Press*, July 21, 1966, p. C8.

Traffic was sealed off on Hough Avenue between East 79th and East 93rd Streets. Patrol forces of guardsmen were doubled, but they did not succeed in halting much of the widespread looting that went on during the day. A hurled firebomb ignited an apartment building at East 73rd and Hough, but no other major fires were reported during the day.²²

DuBois Club activity in the form of pamphlets distributed in the Hough area which criticized police practices was reported, and the news was quickly met by a report that police were investigating the backgrounds of some of the persons arrested to determine whether they were members of any extremist or militant organizations. Police also announced that they were investigating possible links between subversive groups and the widespread violence to determine whether the rioting was organized and by whom.²³

Mayor Locher conferred with the head of the National Guard contingent, Ohio Adjutant General Erwin C. Hostetler, and later announced that the guard manpower was being increased to 1700 men. He added, "The National Guard will be here as long as necessary . . . Our job is to end lawlessness in Cleveland."²⁴ He also spoke with Vice-President Hubert Humphrey in an effort to obtain low interest or interest-free loans for the merchants whose businesses were destroyed in the activities of the Hough area. Once again, saloons were ordered to close at sundown, and a curfew proposal of City Council President James Stanton was considered but not enacted. Five rioters, each under twenty-five years old, were sentenced to the work-house for their roles in the first evening's festivities.²⁵

Darkness fell over the city accompanied by relative order in the Hough area. Three guardsmen were stationed at every intersection on Hough Avenue, and police patrols were escorted by guardsmen. The new strategy helped to avert any new major acts of violence, but the atmosphere was described as "tense." Small fires and acts of vandalism kept the police and guard busy, but the main show of police and guard strength along Hough Avenue had resulted in increased trouble in the outlying Glenville and Kinsman areas. Fire alarms poured in from the surrounding areas, and all fire equipment was being utilized at 11:00 P.M.²⁶ Shortly after midnight, Police Chief Wagner announced, "We have secured the Hough area, but the trouble has spread to the fringes."²⁷

Suddenly, at 4:00 A.M., fire swept through the University Party Center, located south of the Hough area, and immediately the area was inundated with police, guardsmen, and firemen who attempted to battle the blaze. Inside a house closeby, Henry Townes thought it best to evacuate his wife, 16, and their two young children from the impending danger. They loaded some belongings in Townes' 1957 convertible, and with their two children and Mrs. Townes' younger brother, they attempted to drive out of the area to the home of Mrs. Townes' mother. The car pulled out of the driveway and into the street, which had been barricaded by police to seal off all traffic, and it was immediately stopped and surrounded by the police. Hot words were exchanged by Townes and the police, and soon the argument turned to a physical struggle as the policemen attempted to keep Townes from driving any further by pulling him out of the car. On the other side of the car, a policeman sought to pull Mrs. Townes away from her husband, to whom she was clinging tightly. The policeman successfully pulled Mrs. Townes away by her

22. Black and Guenther, "Rioters Set Off," p. 1.

23. *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 21, 1966, p. 9.

24. Black and Guenther, "Rioters Set Off," p. 1.

25. *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 21, 1966, p. 9.

26. *Cleveland Press*, July 21, 1966, p. A4.

27. *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 21, 1966, p. 1.

hair, and the sudden release by Mrs. Townes coupled with the struggle between Mr. Townes and the police caused the manually operated car to lurch forward quite suddenly. Panic stricken, Townes tried to gain control of the car and leave the area. Police immediately opened fire, and Townes' car was riddled by bullets. Mr. Townes himself was not hit, but Mrs. Townes and the youngest child were seriously injured and received permanent disabilities. The other two youngsters in the car were injured, but not seriously. Twenty-one bullets in all ripped into the vehicle, none of which were fired by guardsmen, although one guardsman was injured by a ricocheting bullet. Ernest Williams, the twelve-year-old younger brother of Mrs. Townes, reported later, "It sounded like they were using a machine gun. There were so many shots, so fast."²⁸

All of the injured were taken to University Hospital, and Townes was arrested and charged with using his automobile as a deadly weapon in an attempt to crash through a police roadblock. The County Grand Jury later refused to indict him.²⁹ The event served to once again heighten the tension surrounding the entire city, and the city braced for another outbreak of violence.

Those who predicted further trouble were not disappointed. The fears of the Central Area Community Council became realities early Thursday morning as fires and vandalism spread to that area southwest of Hough. The switchboard of the fire department was flooded with alarms, and by late afternoon of the fourth day of the disturbance, 115 fires were reported, almost half of which were set off by Molotov cocktails.³⁰ Once again, all vehicular traffic was barred from Hough Avenue, and the area was given the strictest security surveillance since the riots began. Councilman M. Morris Jackson, a Negro from a predominantly Hough ward, requested the mayor to place the Hough area under martial law.³¹

Mayor Locher reported that martial law was not being considered, and that a curfew had not been instituted "because of the great difficulties of enforcement and the tremendous hardships it would place on innocent people."³² He and Major General Hostetler conferred and decided that no additional Guard troops would be needed because Major Hostetler felt that the available force could handle any new developments in the situation.

Locher also came under attack from two different sources. The NAACP blasted Locher for failing to act on previously made recommendations by the Negro community, and it demanded the ouster of Safety Director John McCormick. The police department was charged with an "inability . . . to realistically understand the grievances and sensitivity of the Negro community." The charges also included demands for the complete integration of the Police Department, new housing in Hough within sixty days, and a meeting of black leaders with the mayor.³³

A group of Negro pastors on the East Side also addressed some requests to Mayor Locher. This effort called for more Negro policemen, enforcement of all housing codes, establishment of additional playgrounds, and the immediate start of new construction in blighted areas. It also requested the mayor to declare Cleveland's East Side

28. Account of incident from combination of newspaper articles and Citizens Panel Report. For example, see James M. Naughton, "Uneasy Calm Shattered by Fire and Police Salvo," *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 22, 1966.

29. Sam Giaimo, "Jury to Quiz City Officials Next in Probe of Riots," *Cleveland Press*, July 30, 1966.

30. *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 22, 1966.

31. *Cleveland Press*, July 22, 1966, p. 1.

32. *Ibid.*, July 21, 1966, p. 4.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

a disaster area and sought to have emergency housing and supplies made available to the people of the damaged area through the health and welfare agencies.³⁴

Thursday also witnessed an increased espousal of the conspiracy theory as applied to the riots. Police Chief Wagner stated that the rioting of the third night and early Thursday morning “definitely seemed more organized than the last two nights.”³⁵ Council President Stanton concurred with the police chief, claiming that the rioters were organized because of the selective looting that had occurred. Many people expressed the belief that the organizers were from outside of the community, and one priest declared that some cars without of state licenses should be impounded.³⁶

The courts were quite busy with preliminary hearings on many of those arrested in the course of the disorder. It was disclosed that about one-fourth of those arrested up to this time were juveniles, but most of the persons having preliminary hearings were between twenty-five and thirty-five.³⁷ However, the disorder still smoldered beneath the relative calm that passed over the city as the day ended.

Once darkness had set in, the pattern of arson and vandalism began once again. In the four hours following sundown, firemen battled some fifty-five fires, most of them set by arsonists. It was estimated that ninety more fires were set in the time between 9:00 P.M. and 3:00 A.M. on Friday, and the fire department found itself hard pressed for equipment for the fourth straight night.³⁸

In the Kinsman area, a quarter of a mile from the home of Mayor Locher, a fifty-four year old Negro, Sam Winchester, was fatally shot as he waited for a bus. Reports stated that Winchester told the police before he died that his assassin was white. The murder, like all the others, however, was not solved, and despite its distance from the center of the disturbances, it only further hampered interracial relations.³⁹

Police were ordered to record out-of-state license numbers of cars in troubled areas in an effort to pinpoint any “outside agitation,” and there were reports that FBI agents were in the area to uncover any leads on professional troublemakers.

Looting and sniping were considerably down by comparison to the rest of the week’s activities, and as a result, it appeared that the period of disorder was beginning to draw to a close.

Friday was the quietest day since the riots began. Mayor Locher met for ninety minutes with Wagner, McCormick, and Hostetler, and announced that there would be no further call-up of guardsmen. He also rejected both the imposition of a curfew and the declaration of martial law, claiming that there were many legal questions involved (e.g., who could legally declare a state of martial law) and that the consequences of such action were too broad.⁴⁰

Police Chief Wagner claimed that the J.F.K. House,⁴¹ run by Lewis G. Robinson, was serving as a “fire bomb

34. *Ibid.*, July 22, 1966.

35. *Ibid.*, July 21, 1966, p. 1.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

37. *Ibid.*

38. *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 22, 1966.

39. Wally Guenther and Dick McLaughlin, “Wagner Brands J.F.K. House ‘Bomb School,’” *Cleveland Press*, July 22, 1966, p. 1.

40. *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 23, 1966.

41. J.F.K. stood for both John F. Kennedy and Jomo Freedom Kenyatta.

training school,” and pictures showing gasoline cans and empty bottles in the building appeared in the local newspapers. Some public officials claimed to have talked with students of the “school,” as well as other people who described how the school operated.⁴² Police, however, made no arrests, and no charges were filed against Mr. Robinson. One high-ranking city official admitted that no youths questioned by police had admitted to receiving any firebomb training at the youth center.⁴³

National guardsmen stopped an automobile at East 81st and Chester early in the morning and confiscated many “inflammatory leaflets” prepared by the W.E.B. DuBois Club. The four men in the car with the leaflets were questioned and released, but the incident added fuel to the conspiracy argument being advocated by many people in Cleveland.⁴⁴

Friday night was almost normal. Only twenty fire calls were turned in all night, and fewer people were arrested than was normal for a summer Friday night. Everything was relatively quiet in the riot-torn area, and conditions were much improved. For the fifth straight night, however, gunfire interrupted the calm.

Benoris Toney, 29, black father of five, was driving alone when he was hit in the face by a shotgun blast from another car in the early morning hours at the corner of 121st Street and Euclid Avenue. The police immediately apprehended six suspects, all white, and Toney was rushed to the hospital.

The close proximity of the incident and the tension that prevailed stirred many of the residents of Murray Hill, known to city residents as “Little Italy,” and so police and guardsmen spent the rest of the night subduing some crowds that had gathered in this area, only a short distance from Hough.⁴⁵ Apparently Toney had been the victim of a self-appointed vigilante group that was attempting to secure the area from the black threat. Only a year and a half earlier, Murray Hill residents had vehemently protested and rioted against the bussing of Negro students to schools in the Italian neighborhood, and the strained racial relations had once again hit the boiling point with the outbreak of the disorder in Hough. The Toney shooting came after a false rumor circulated through the area that two Italian residents were shot and wounded by Negro marauders. Toney died on Saturday night, the fourth Negro killed by bullets since the rioting began, and charges of second degree murder were issued against two men and a juvenile on the following Monday morning.⁴⁶

On Saturday, an announcement was made by the mayor that Cleveland was applying for \$150,000 of federal funds to help clean up the riot area. He also announced his unwillingness to meet with a group of Negro ministers who had requested to see him until after order had been restored in the area. An appeal was again made to all concerned citizens to help correct the problems that had been raised by the riots.⁴⁷

A few isolated cases of sniper fire were reported Saturday night, but otherwise, a peaceful pall spread over the entire city. Detectives in Shaker Heights, an upper middle class suburb on the East Side, stopped a car with six black youths on Lee Road at the south end of the suburb and discovered an abundance of raw materials that

42. Guenther and McLaughlin, “Wagner Brands,” p. 1.

43. Doris O'Donnell, “Chief Calls J.F.K. House School for Arsonists,” *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 23, 1966.

44. *Cleveland Press*, July 22, 1966.

45. *Ibid.*, July 23, 1966.

46. Wally Guenther, “Guard Unit to Stay on Daily Basis,” *Cleveland Press*, July 25, 1966.

47. *Cleveland Press*, July 23, 1966.

went into the production of firebombs in the car. However, fires, vandalism, looting and murder were finally absent from the evening's activities. The guardsmen stationed in Murray Hill also proved to be deterrents from any further violence in that ethnic subculture.⁴⁸ Talk was beginning to circulate that the National Guard would be released in a few days, and the entire community appeared ready at last to return to normalcy.

Sunday was normal. There was very little activity of any kind during the day, just as on any normal Sunday, and that night saw no outbreaks of any kind. A rainstorm, late by perhaps six days, the police and the presence of the National Guard, combined with the attitudes of the people in the community, all contributed to making Sunday night abnormally quiet. By 11:00 P.M., the fire department had responded to only one call. However, no definite plans were yet announced regarding the release of the Guard.⁴⁹

On Monday, July 25th, exactly one week after the incident occurred in the Seventy-Niners' Cafe which set off the disorders, the Pick-N-Pay grocery store on Hough Avenue reopened, and normal life slowly tried to return to Hough and the rest of Cleveland. A filling station attendant in the Hough neighborhood, however, aptly expressed the feelings of many others in the area when he said, "You can't say it's back to normal because it won't be as before."⁵⁰ The damage was totaled, the situation was surveyed, and the city reflected on the events of the previous week and plotted its course of action in the months to follow.

The National Guard, first called out on July 19th, was gradually released from active duty during the week of July 25th. The process ended when the last guardsmen were released from duty on July 31st and given thank from Mayor Locher for the rest of the community. It was computed that 2215 guardsmen were paid \$187,488 for service from three to thirteen days.⁵¹

The City Safety Department estimated their share of the cost at \$248,181. This figure included almost 70,000 hours of overtime work for firemen and policemen, as well as damage to vehicles of the Fire and Police departments.⁵² But the damage to the riot-stricken area was impossible to estimate. Some guesses went into several millions, whereas others hovered between one and two million. However, damage in riots is not measured only in dollars and cents. Four people had been killed, many others injured, and intangible damage was beyond computation. Scores of individuals had been arrested during the disturbances, and their ages provided interesting evidence as to who were the actual rioters.

Although many people said that it was mostly teenagers who looted and burned, others recalled seeing scatterings of older men in the crowds. Still others believed that the teenagers in the area had been incited by outsiders. Mrs. Juanita Stepps, a neighborhood youth worker, admitted, "It would not take much to stir up the teenagers; they have nothing and need everything."⁵³ Statistics of those arrested and given hearings tended to support the belief that the majority of the participants were young. Although juveniles were not listed in the paper, a sampling of those appearing in court during the week following the disorders showed a concentration of nineteen-year-olds

48. *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 24, 1966.

49. *Ibid.*, July 25, 1966.

50. George J. Harmann, "Hough Struggling Back to 'Business as Usual,'" *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 26, 1966.

51. *Cleveland Press*, August 5, 1966.

52. *Cleveland Press*, September 21, 1966.

53. McGruder, "Who Cares."

who had participated. The median age of those appearing was twenty-two, and the average figure was pulled up to twenty-five by isolated cases of older men becoming involved in the action (see Appendix One).⁵⁴

While observers computed the damage and analyzed the disorders, the City of Cleveland, still reeling from the shock of the previous week's activities, strained to return to normal. The mass violence and disorder were over. Unfortunately, the problems were not.

54. Compiled from newspaper statistics, July 25 to July 31.

Chapter II: Cleveland's Reaction

In the aftermath, the simplest solution was to look for villains . . .¹

In the immediate first days of the calm following the disorders, relief was promised to the residents of the stricken area. Congressman Michael Feighan said that financial relief would be provided to riot victims and also indicated that the disorders would be the subject of a congressional investigation.² The Small Business Authority announced that it would make loans to Hough area businessmen whose stores had been damaged or destroyed and who wanted to rebuild or relocate.³ The Legal Aid Society said that more than thirty experienced criminal lawyers were offering their legal services free to indigent persons who had been arrested during the disturbances.⁴ Even Mayor Locher announced some plans for relief for the area in the near future. He stated that the city planned to advertise for bids on three parcels of land to be developed for 110 low-cost housing units for the Hough area.⁵ But the reaction of the community to the previous week of violence and disorder was not primarily one oriented to reconstructing the damaged black community. The problem, it seemed, was to find out *what* and specifically *who* had caused the riots.

Many civic leaders denounced the disturbances as just “lawlessness.” Both Mayor Locher and City Council President Stanton claimed that the riots had no connection with the civil rights movement, but were instead just “a matter of lawlessness.”⁶ Some Negro leaders agreed with this assessment of the situation. Harry Alexander, business manager and secretary of the Negro owned and run *Call and Post*, said that the riots themselves were not racial, but that they “were triggered . . . because of constant continued discrimination against Negroes.”⁷ Councilman Leo Jackson of the neighboring Glenville area strongly agreed with the mayor and city council president. He classified the disorders as “a struggle, not for civil rights, but a struggle by thugs for leadership of the Negro community.”⁸ He also went on to describe the rioters as

1. “Ice, Water and Fire,” *Newsweek*, LXVII, August 1, 1966.

2. *Cleveland Press*, July 22, 1966.

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Ibid.*, July 26, 1966.

5. Norman Mlacak, “Hough People to be Quizzed on Riot Cause,” *Cleveland Press*, July 27, 1966.

6. The citation was not available in printed version of this book.

7. The citation was not available in printed version of this book.

8. The citation was not available in printed version of this book.

. . . an element which looks with contempt on the man who holds two jobs to support his family; disrupts schools and takes over playgrounds; snatches purses of women rather than seeking employment; burglarizes homes and stands around street corners treating our women with disrespect.⁹

Jackson further claimed that the action had been organized and precipitated by “hoodlums.”

Such an attitude was to be heard often in the weeks that followed. Police Chief Wagner called the efforts “criminal syndicalism,” and proposed that simplified riot laws be enacted that would enable the police to charge one person with inciting a riot to replace the existing law which permitted arrests only if there were at least three persons conspiring to riot.¹⁰ A white councilman, Edward Katalinas, from a neighboring ward, claimed that the riots had been planned purposely for when National Guard units would have difficulty mobilizing quickly. He added that some disturbances along Superior Avenue on the northern boundary of the Hough area that had occurred earlier in June were a planned “dry run” for the Hough disorders. However, Katalinas also mentioned that there did exist some underlying causes for the trouble, and he pointed specifically to Mayor Ralph Locher’s administration as one of them. Plans were made by the administration, he said, for a \$385,000,000 highway and a catch basin in the lake that prohibited them from doing more for the East Side depressed areas.¹¹ Other leaders focused their attention on both the city government and the frustration of the black community.

Bertram E. Gardner, the executive director of the Cleveland Community Relations Board, thought that the rioting indicated “a combination of frustrations,” which included housing, jobs and education problems. There was, in his words, “a deterioration of the total community” that stemmed from people who were “unwilling or unable” to handle the problems of the city. The war on poverty was not a total failure, but Gardner claimed that it was by no means the total answer to the problems of the ghetto. He asserted that the real provocation for the riots did not come from any of the specific problems that were often mentioned, but instead it came from the “deep frustration” that resulted from the combination of inequities.¹²

The ineptitude of the city government was also bewailed by Ernest C. Cooper, executive director of the Urban League of Cleveland. He blamed the city’s power structure and the maintenance of the status quo for the disorder. “Authorities appear to be more interested in controlling the situation than attempting to work out the problems that cause violence,” he stated in a press release. He also challenged the city government “to give concrete evidence to those persons who find themselves frustrated . . . that a positive change is taking place around the pressing problems they face in everyday life.”¹³

State Representative Carl Stokes, a Negro who had narrowly missed unseating Mayor Locher in the election the previous fall, remarked that black leaders had been unable to offer the community any “evidence of hope and progress” because of a “long list of studies, plans, and broken promises” that had been made by the municipal government.¹⁴ The charge against the city government was further amplified by Councilman M. Morris Jackson.

9. Norman Mlachak, “Leo Jackson Warns Council of Organized Negro Thugs,” *Cleveland Press*, July 26, 1966.

10. Robert G. McGruder, “Wagner Waits for Riot Law Model,” *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, August 8, 1966.

11. Sam Giaimo, “Names of Rioters Revealed to Jury,” *Cleveland Press*, July 27, 1966.

12. Doris O’Donnell, “Rioting Blamed on Negro Frustration,” *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 20, 1966.

13. *Ibid.*

14. “And Now Cleveland,” *The Reporter*, XXXV, August 11, 1966, p. 8.

He attributed the causes to a lack of communication between Hough people and the white community and specifically referred to broken promises on urban renewal projects that the government had made to the people. Jackson stated that despite its allocated budget of millions of dollars, the urban renewal program had failed to provide adequate housing or recreation facilities. Insufficient city services and the lack of an integrated police force were also mentioned by Jackson as causes of the riots.¹⁵ County Judge Thomas Parrino spoke for many of the community leaders when he said, “The seeds of these riotous acts are found in grave social injustice. Poverty and a denial of equal opportunity produces enormous frustrations.”¹⁶

Numerous members of the community reflected the sentiments of their leaders, while others exhibited bitter personal feelings toward other members of the community. Many of the neighborhood merchants were shocked and dismayed that the businesses which had taken them a lifetime to build had suddenly been destroyed so quickly and easily.

Joe Berman, owner of the Starlite Delicatessen for twelve years, had locked the front door of his store with six-inch spikes the day after the first outbreak of violence. That night the spikes didn’t hold the door past six o’ clock, and when Berman returned the next morning, he found looters running throughout his food store in full daylight while the police cruised nearby. His reaction was typical. “I’ve been here twelve years and never had any serious trouble with anyone. But whether you’re good or bad makes no difference when a riot comes. We all got it.”¹⁷

The riots ended twenty-one years of work for Al and Louis Rosenberg, owners of the Corner Cut-Rate Drug Store, and nineteen years of labor for the owner of a meat market, Earl Gamer. The Rosenbergs, like most other merchants, could not understand why their business had been a target for destruction but the fact that two black-owned businesses across the street and next door had been left unscathed helped to explain the reasons. Gamer was somewhat bitter, and his attitude probably exemplified the feelings of fellow merchants who had been wiped out. Upon viewing his ruined business, he announced, “I can’t and will not open again. I’m completely ruined.” He went on to add, “When I moved in here nineteen years ago, there were very few Negroes. They came to me, I didn’t come to them.” As to the charges of low quality food at high prices, Gamer replied, “They say we are capitalizing on them. Well, that’s not true.”¹⁸

Many of the area’s residents, however, did not agree with Gamer’s assessment of the situation. Mrs. Daisy Craggett, a leader in the Hough Community Council, claimed that the store owners that had suffered had made up for their losses in advance “over and over again . . . in bad service and high prices for inferior merchandise.”¹⁹ She also recalled her experience of walking through the violence-torn neighborhood on the third day of the disorders:

I walked through the area. I saw those high-price stores burning down. I couldn’t feel too badly.²⁰

Many of the local residents echoed the sentiments of Mrs. Craggett. Julius X, the operator of a Hough beauty

15. Norman Mlachak, “Leo Jackson.”

16. *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 26, 1966.

17. Sam Giaimo “Merchants Who Felt Licked Prepare to Leave Hough,” *Cleveland Press*, July 20, 1966.

18. Michael D. Roberts and James Van Fleet, “Plunderers Profit; Merchants Quit,” *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 20, 1966, p. 1.

19. *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 25, 1966.

20. *Cleveland Press*, July 21, 1966.

salon, showed obvious resentment toward the white man. “The white man is reaping what he has sown. He is learning you can’t push people around. This trouble is here because the white man won’t treat the black man right,” he commented after the second night of trouble. The same militancy was apparent in the attitude of James Jackson, a young resident of Hough, who claimed that “about ninety percent of the people out here want to get whitey.” A black dry cleaner in Hough whose business had not been harmed in the riots lamented that the disorders had “been a long time coming and it’s about time; it’s too bad some of our own people have to suffer. . .”²¹

Most of the older residents of the neighborhood were most concerned with this fact that some of “their own” people did have to suffer, and as a result, they questioned both the motives and purposes underlying the urban disorder. Mrs. Ceola King, a worker in the area anti-poverty office, wondered if the people of Hough had done all the damage. “Why would people want to harm themselves?” she asked. “The hardships that are created are going to be the hardships of the people who live in Hough,” she later observed.²² Agreement with this attitude prevailed only among some of the older people. A shoestore manager in the area commented after a few days of rioting, “They are burning up their homes and their jobs. They are burning up their payday and hurting our own people.”²³ The director of Halfway House, a transition center in Hough for released convicts, Reverend James Redding, said that the released convicts “shook their heads, bewildered by the foolish destruction.” He added:

This is all so useless and senseless. Here we are, trying to rebuild people into decent, law-abiding citizens, trying to give them a better chance — and they spend a night watching people trying to destroy themselves.

As an after thought, Reverend Redding said, “Maybe one of the problems is that no one has been listening to what we have been saying.”²⁴ Even among those people who opposed the violence because of its self-destructive effects, there remained the gnawing feeling of frustration.

Everyone in Hough seemed to be angry with everyone else. A newspaper reporter wrote that along Hough Avenue, people “talked in expressions of shame and defiance, anger and anxiety. Young men spoke of their grievances against the white man, old men of their grievances against the young.”²⁵

Reactions varied as to the amount of support that the violent actions commanded in the black community. Bertram Gardner felt that perhaps “ninety to ninety-five percent of the people” did not approve of the methods of destruction, and that the riots did not have “community approval.”²⁶ However, many of the residents disagreed with Gardner’s appraisal. Phil Mason, a fieldworker in the Hough area, felt that a substantial portion of the community supported and participated in the action by noting that “people who were just sitting on their porches would run over to a store after the windows were broken and steal stuff.”²⁷

Other community residents and leaders directed their efforts toward determining the specific nature of the problems that helped to foment the trouble. The pastor of Calvary Presbyterian Church, Reverend Bruere,

21. Robert G. McGruder, “Older People of Hough Want No Part of Trouble,” *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 20, 1966, p. 1.

22. Bob Modic, “Why Do People Hurt Themselves? Saddened Hough Residents Ask,” *Cleveland Press*, July 19, 1966.

23. McGruder, “Older People,” p. 1.

24. Modic, “Why Do People.”

25. Robert T. Stock, “Stores Reopen in Hough’s Daylight,” *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 23, 1966.

26. O’Donnell, “Rioting Blamed.”

27. Norman Mlachak, “Just Like a War, Awed Policemen and Fireman Say,” *Cleveland Press*, July 19, 1966.

pinpointed several specific causes of the riots which he had observed in his work of helping his church pioneer projects to alleviate some inner-city problems. He blamed the disorder on everyone in the community, and cited specifically the churches which had moved out of the inner city as the Negro moved in, the city administration's incompetence, apathetic citizens of the city, suburbs that wanted "to remain aloof from the problems of the city," "absentee landlords and irresponsible tenants," and "people who produce large families of illegitimate children . . . people who loaf and expect to be supported by some welfare agency."²⁸ No one was spared in Bruere's sweeping indictment of the entire community, but most other people, such as Guy Goens, a supervisor at the Hough anti-poverty office, were less broad in their diagnoses of the problem. He emphasized that one of the principle causes of the disorder was "the general frustration in Hough."²⁹

Many organizations across the city joined in the search for underlying causes for the riots, but most of their findings seemed to echo those sentiments expressed by individual citizens. The East Side Community Union, a group of seventy-five Glenville residents once again expressed the dominant view of the Negro community. Its report stated:

These so-called disturbances are not isolated uprisings of teen-age vandals, nor are they the result of 'outside agitators.' They are the expression of a despair, of an anger that is deeply ingrained into the Negro community; a despair and anger caused by years of exploitation, suppression and discrimination.³⁰

The Congress on Racial Equality chapter charged all responsible businessmen and administrators of the city with the failure to address themselves to the problems faced by the ghettos substandard housing, poor education, large unemployment, and minimum welfare programs.³¹ The city leaders were also singled out by the Council of Churches of Christ as a major factor behind the disorders. It claimed that the leadership's inability to understand "the depth of discontent and desperation felt by large numbers of Cleveland Negroes" had caused the riots and made them so dangerous.³² The Americans for Democratic Action suggested that the city could raise the level of welfare to a decent standard and thus break the two bonds of misery, poverty and segregation, that united the Hough ghetto.³³

Analyses of the trouble continued to emanate from many individuals in the stricken area. At an area meeting near the Hough area held on Sunday, July 25, speakers said that the troubles there had been bad, but that they were what the city deserved. These opinions flowed from a broad spectrum of opinion — from ministers to Black Nationalists and from middle-aged people to the more militant youth.³⁴ The black youth and teens were almost unanimous in their feelings of hatred and distrust for the whites. Examples of their reactions follow:

You (whitey) reap what you have sown. . .

28. Sam Giaimo, "Bruere Says All to Blame for Riots," *Cleveland Press*, August 1, 1966.

29. Modic, "Why Do People."

30. *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 24, 1966.

31. *Cleveland Press*, July 20, 1966.

32. *Ibid.*

33. *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 24, 1966.

34. *Ibid.*, July 25, 1966.

We showed we ain't scared of them. . .
 We've done the city a favor. Look at the urban *renewal* we've accomplished. . .³⁵

Whitey, however, also reacted to the black community in less than congenial terms. Firemen talked of quitting because they were not paid to “fight a guerrilla war” with the black man. Fire Chief William Barry stated the opinions of many of his men when he said, almost incredulously, “We came out to protect lives and these people attacked us.” A staff member of the University-Euclid Urban Renewal Project illustrated a large segment of sentiment in the white community as well as an unenlightened view of the underlying causes of the disorders when he said, “Police should be ordered to shoot all looters. . .”³⁶

Still confused and bewildered by the events that shattered the calm summer, Clevelanders groped to find answers to the questions raised by the riots. The mixed emotions toward violence accompanied by a general feeling of frustration and a deeply ingrained resentment of whites which characterized the black community only demonstrated the need for lasting solutions to the city's problems. The black attitudes were not widely shared throughout the rest of the community by either the majority of whites or the city's leadership. If anything, the disorders served in the short run to further polarize the city's “establishment” and the black community — two groups which, in the previous few years, had been drifting further apart. The differences and problems had become more apparent as well as more intractable.

It appeared doubtful that a non-partisan investigation of the disorders by a group of “respected” citizens, such as the Grand Jury, would resolve any differences or settle any quarrels. Such an investigation might only further alienate the black community without resulting in any positive good. Thus, as the hot summer began to cool down, the city stood frustrated in its efforts to understand itself.

35. Bob Modic, “Hate, Revenge, Sorrow and Shock Divide Hough Residents,” *Cleveland Press*, July 20, 1966.

36. Modic, “Why Do People.”

Chapter III: The Grand Jury vs. the Black Community

Will this crisis bring forth conventional wisdom that seeks out scapegoats and attempts to show that Cleveland was victim of a sinister master plan?¹

In an effort to uncover the real underlying causes of the Hough disorders, Judge Thomas Parrino announced on July 2nd that a special session of the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury had been called for the next day. The Grand Jury's task would be to ferret out the real sources of unrest and trouble. Specifically, the purposes of the investigation included assistance in the restoration of order, suggestions of "meaningful remedies to existing community problems," and taking "appropriate action where evidence of unlawful acts" was discovered.²

The jury convened the next day to begin its study of the disorders. Its first act of business was to take a fifty minute bus ride through the riot-torn area of Hough to provide background information of the physical realities and problems of the area. The trip was made for educational purposes only, because none of the Grand Jury members resided in the Hough area. However, at the end of the trip some indication of the investigations' future course was given by the jury's foreman, Louis Seltzer, the former editor of the Cleveland Press. Seltzer, regarded by many people as a very powerful man and as a firmly entrenched member of the Cleveland "establishment," had become a controversial personality in the city because of his newspaper's account of a Cleveland murder and its subsequent trial twelve years earlier.³ He was soon to become even further embroiled in controversy of a different nature, for he remarked at the conclusion of the fifty minute bus tour that:

The Grand Jury saw enough to realize the violence was organized and planned because of specific targets singled out for looting and burning.⁴

His conclusions passed largely unnoticed the next day in the newspaper, but other sources also revealed that Seltzer was being sued for libel by Lewis G. Robinson at the time of the investigation. Robinson was suing Seltzer personally for the Press's account of the announcement that Robinson was forming a gun club in the Hough area

1. Americans for Democratic Action, as quoted in *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 24, 1966.

2. Sam Giaimo, "Riot Probe Set by Grand Jury," *Cleveland Press*, July 25, 1966.

3. The conviction of Dr. Sam Sheppard for murdering his wife was overruled in 1966 by the Supreme Court primarily because of the unfair treatment Sheppard was accorded by the press at the time of the murder.

4. *Cleveland Press*, July 26, 1966.

a year earlier.⁵ Some persons called for Seltzer to disqualify himself as a prospective juror because Robinson had been mentioned during the disturbance as a possible instigator of the trouble, and his J.F.K. House had been identified as a training ground for fire-bombing. In addition, Robinson was scheduled to testify before the jury as a subpoenaed witness. However, Seltzer remained as foreman of the jury, and, despite a rather rocky beginning, the investigation into the riots proceeded with the testimony of subpoenaed witnesses for the next several days.

Civic leaders, government officials, residents of Hough, law enforcement men, and community leaders all testified before the jury. The proceedings were marked by surprise witnesses and by surprise performances by the witnesses who testified. On the second day of the hearings, a seventeen-year-old resident of Hough was reported to have given the jury the names of “leaders and plotters” of the disturbances, along with dates when meetings had been held to discuss violence. He ostensibly testified that the Black Panthers, a gang of more than two hundred youths in the Hough area, had caused more damage and terror than any other gang during the riots. Later the same day, Lewis G. Robinson appeared to testify before the jury wearing a button that read, “The Viet Cong never called me NIGGER.” He denied that his J.F.K. House was involved in the manufacturing of firebombs or instruction in their use.⁶ His testimony was followed by the appearance of the Reverend Charles Rawlings, executive director of the commission on metropolitan affairs of the Greater Cleveland Council of Churches, and the hearings returned to a more sedate pace. The Grand Jury applauded two witnesses, M. Morris Jackson and Ralph Findley, head of the Greater Cleveland Council of Economic Opportunities, at the end of their testimonies. Neither man attacked the city administration as a primary cause of the riots.⁷

Four young members of the W.E.B. DuBois Club testified before the jury in the following day’s session. It was reported that two of the members resorted to the Fifth Amendment, and therefore, refused to answer any questions. After testifying, one member of the group read a prepared statement outside the room in which the hearings were being held that accused the Mayor, the Safety Director, and Police Chief of being “criminally responsible” for the conditions and violence in Hough. Upon finishing, an unidentified Negro woman approached him, and immediately began berating the individual for the trouble that he and his friends had supposedly helped to foment. She yelled adamantly, “I want you to know we didn’t ask for you in the Hough area. We don’t need you in the Hough area. We don’t want you in the Hough area. You and your group do nothing but arouse people.”⁸ The woman then scurried off quickly, before shocked reporters could establish who she was or why she had cried out so vehemently. Police reports had indicated that some members of the DuBois Club had come to Cleveland about two weeks before the violence, and that they had settled near the center of the riot-torn area. It was still unclear as to the role, if any, that they had played in the disorders. The hearings moved on, and testimony was heard in the next few days from public servants who were involved in various activities relating to the disturbances.

On August 2, the last day of the hearings, the jury heard testimony from two witnesses who were believed to be police undercover agents.⁹ The two witnesses were shielded from contact with the press or photographers, and after the testimony, the formal hearings ended. The jury then went into closed session to draw up the document that hopefully would provide the answers to many questions that had been raised by the trouble in Hough. The

5. John Skow, “Can Cleveland Escape Burning?” *Saturday Evening Post*, CCXL, July 29, 1967, p. 48.

6. Sam Giaimo, “Names of Rioters Revealed to Jury,” *Cleveland Press*, July 27, 1966.

7. *Ibid.*

8. Sam Giaimo, “Grand Jury Indicts Seven for Hough Area Riots,” *Cleveland Press*, July 29, 1966.

9. Sam Giaimo, “Jury Hears Two Mystery Witnesses,” *Cleveland Press*, August 2, 1966.

community anxiously awaited the report of the Grand Jury, and so the group was under some pressure to produce its conclusions as quickly as possible.

The Grand Jury's answers were presented to the community in the form of a report that was issued on August 9 by its foreman, Louis Seltzer. The statement was divided into three parts: a preface outlining some general observation of the members of the jury; one section that sought to "establish the immediate cause of the fire-bombing, shooting (sic), pillaging, general lawlessness and disorder"; and a section that de-scribed some of the basic conditions under which the residents of Hough lived.¹⁰ A brief recapitulation of the jury's findings is necessary to understand the broader implications of the report.

The preface of the document dealt largely with the general attitudes of the members of the jury. They stated their firm belief that America needed a "renewal of good citizenship," by everyone and went on to deplore the apparent decay and erosion "of ideals and principles of God and Country and their persistent replacement by the deification of material idols and material 'principals.'" They stated their conviction that law and order were the prerequisites of civilized society and that there "should be a restoration of the qualities of good faith, of honesty, and a willingness to hear out the other person or side without resort to violence and disorder. . ." The preface ended by calling for "not so much a bloodbath but a good cleansing spiritual bath."¹¹

The first section was centered around the conclusion that, in the words of the jury itself:

. . . the outbreak of disorder was both organized, precipitated, and exploited by a relatively small group of trained and disciplined professionals at this business.¹²

The "agitators" were avowed believers in violence and extremism, the report said, and they had some affiliation with the Communist party. The section also concluded that the majority of the residents of Hough had neither participated in nor benefited from the outbreaks of disorder, and it lamented the fact that the laws of both Cuyahoga County and the State of Ohio prohibited them from indicting any "responsible irresponsibles" for their parts in the disorders. Both the Police Department and the National Guard were commended for their effective work in the "aggravated situation." The jury expressed its beliefs that the potential still existed for "repetition of these disorders" and that the results of any new action would be "equally disastrous." Then, before referring to specific individuals and organizations that the jury felt were major contributors to the disorder, the report warned of the Communist threat and its dangers, such as "the effective uses made of impressionable, emotionally immature and susceptible young minds by those who for one reason or another have set out to accomplish their designs and objectives in Europe, Asia, South America and elsewhere."¹³

The Grand Jury report then went into specifics and named individuals who were responsible for the disorder without issuing any indictments. It claimed that the young people who were engaged in the acts of lawlessness had obviously been "assigned, trained and disciplined" in their specified roles because of the selective pattern of destruction and the fact that "the targets were plainly agreed upon." It also suggested that both the Superior

10. "Special Grand Jury Report Relating to Hough Riots," Submitted for Filing August 9, 1966, by Louis B. Seltzer.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

12. *Ibid.*, p. I-1.

13. *Ibid.*, p. I-3

*Avenue disturbances in late June and the Hough area disorders were planned and fomented by the same individuals.*¹⁴

*The J.F.K. House (called only by the name Jomo Freedom Kenyatta) and its leaders received the brunt of the Grand Jury's accusations. Lewis G. Robinson and his wife, and three other associates of Robinson who were also advocates of black nationalism were named as responsible for aiding and abetting the disorders. The jury claimed to have been shown "irrefutable evidence" that Robinson had "pledged reciprocal support to and with the Communist party of Ohio." The four members of the Du Bois Club who testified before the jury were also charged with responsibility for the riots, although the only points that were made against them were that they had arrived in town two weeks before the trouble, lived near the center at the ghetto, "were seen constantly together," and had contacted the Communist party.*¹⁵

The report shifted gears again by commending the police and firemen for their efforts to maintain law and order in the face of great personal danger and their general conduct during the trouble. At this point in the report, the jury suggested a number of changes in the law to strengthen the severity of the law for acts inciting to riot or actions that occurred in the course of a riot (e.g., attempted arson during a riot). These suggested legal changes ended part one of the report.

The second and last section dealt specifically with the "conditions of life prevailing in the Hough area," and the jury discovered many inequities and adverse conditions which characterized the ghetto. The prevalent sentiment of the black community was enunciated once again, but with an additional interpretation, when the report stated, "Poverty and frustration, crowded by organized agitators, served as the uneasy backdrop for the Cleveland riots." The basic conditions they found included inadequate and substandard housing, exorbitant rents charged by absentee landlords, and non-enforcement of the housing code. They also discovered "woefully inadequate recreational facilities," "substandard educational facilities," and excessive food prices for inferior quality food stuffs. The denial of equal economic opportunities, the program of Aid to Dependent Children, and the density of the population were also cited as conditions which led to the feelings of frustrations so often expressed in the black ghetto. Another cause cited in the report was that the black community was attempting to gain "too much too fast for the community to bear within an arbitrarily fixed time limit." From this set of conditions, the jury was able to conclude that

*. . . all these complex social evils are used as subtle and inflammatory provocations by resident and non-resident organizers who exploit riots . . .*¹⁶

To meet the pressing problems that were now faced by the city, the jury proposed that all of the city's resources should be directed toward solutions, and specifically recommended four short-range measures that it felt would improve the conditions. These proposals included improved enforcement of the housing code, strengthened law enforcement in the ghetto, better rubbish collection in the ghetto, and a refurbished program of urban renewal that would have the full cooperation of the Federal Government. The report further stated that neither the community

14. *Ibid.*, p. I-4.

15. *Ibid.*, p. I-6.

16. The citation was not available in printed version of this book.

nor the leaders of Hough and other areas of the community had adequately measured up to their responsibilities and called upon the political, economic, and civic leaders of the city to “put Cleveland in the forefront in meeting the sociological and moral challenges of our time.” After paying tribute to the “wise leaders” who had foreseen the situation and worked “selflessly” to improve it, the report closed with the declaration that the “time for total community action is now.”¹⁷

The Grand Jury had spoken. Reaction to the report was somewhat varied, according to skin color, but most of the community still did not seem satisfied that the report was an accurate assessment of the trouble that had occurred. Most controversy centered around the jury’s allegations that the rioting was organized and precipitated by agitators with Communist Party affiliations. Many people felt that the report had simplified the entire situation, and had not given enough consideration to the very fundamental causes which had caused the disorder. Preoccupation of the jury with the highly questionable immediate causes of the disorders left many people feeling that the jury had not adequately fulfilled its duty to the city.

City officials were not, however, among the detractors of the report. Almost all of the top echelon of the city’s government were overflowing in their praise of the document and the great civic effort that had been performed by the jury’s members. Mayor Locher quickly reacted to the report by lauding it as “a notable public service.” Locher said that he agreed fully with the jury’s findings, and added, “This Grand Jury had the guts to fix the approximate cause — which had been hinted at for a long time — that subversive and Communist elements in our community were behind the rioting.”¹⁸ City Council President Stanton and Safety Director John McCormick fully agreed with the mayor, as did Police Chief Richard Wagner, who had previously pointed out that the organizers and agitators had “studied the laws very carefully and then just as carefully evaded the scope of their coverage.” Wagner also boasted, “If the Supreme Court had not tied our hands by preempting the criminal syndicalism laws for federal jurisdiction, we would have put those responsible away long ago.”¹⁹ Later in the month, Mayor Locher fully defended and agreed with the Grand Jury in his testimony before a Senate Subcommittee on urban problems. There he stated that he assumed that the Jury had reached “reasonable conclusions,” and added that the turmoil in Cleveland would not have occurred without Communist instigation.²⁰

However, the rest of the community was not quite so ready to accept the conclusions of the report. An editorial in the *Cleveland Press*, whose former editor had served as the foreman of the jury, summed up many feelings when it stated that it was “hard to believe that so few people wreaked so much havoc.” The editorial closed on a rather pessimistic note, as it claimed:

Furthermore, it might be dangerous to believe. Because once the community assigns the Hough looting, shooting, burning and general hell-raising to a traveling band from Havana or Peking, the door will be open for another riot.²¹

Carl Stokes labeled the report a “whitewash,” and Bertram Gardner called the effort an attempt by the white

17. The citation was not available in printed version of this book.

18. *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, August 11, 1966.

19. Kenneth D. Huszar, “Jury’s Riot Probe Goes ‘Step Beyond,’” *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, August 2, 1966.

20. Robert Crater and John Russell, “Mayor Backs Jury in Senate Hearing,” *Cleveland Press*, August 26, 1966.

21. *Cleveland Press*, August 10, 1966, p. B-2.

community to escape responsibility for the conditions which caused the riots. Stokes charged that the jury had exercised a great deal of “diligence in removing the liability of the city administration as the immediate precipitating cause of the riot.” They had performed, he said, “in the grand old Cleveland style of sweeping the city’s mistakes under the rug.”²²

Federal officials did not agree that subversives and Communists had organized the rioting. In Cleveland, U.S. Attorney Merle M. McCurdy declared that Communists and other agitators had not instigated the disorder. His conclusions, he said, were based on an “intensive investigation” by the FBI, and personal observations that he had made.²³ Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach also disagreed with the conclusions of the Grand Jury. He concurred that the riots were indeed fomented by agitators — “agitators named disease and despair, joblessness and hopelessness, rat-infested housing and long impacted cynicism” — but said that the sources of agitation were not products of “Communists, Black nationalists, or terrorists.” They were instead the products of “generations of indifference by all the American people to the rot and rust and mold which we have allowed to reach in to the core of our cities.”²⁴ Katzenbach asserted that subversive elements did not plan or control the riots in Cleveland, but had apparently attempted to “exploit” some of the unrest. He stated that there was no Communist Party involvement but added that some of the people identified with the J.F.K. House had “made some efforts to keep the rioting going.” Apparently, reports from both the FBI and the Community Relations Service, both arms of the Justice Department, had enabled the Attorney General to reach his conclusions.²⁵

On August 11, two days after the report had been made public, it was also revealed that the majority of the evidence that the jury had used to conclude that the riots had been organized by agitators came from two undercover police detectives who had infiltrated many of the organizations of the area. The two men, one white and one black, had infiltrated the DuBois Club, the J.F.K. House, and the Communist Party as a team, and both men had risen to positions of power in the various organizations. Jessie Thomas, the black undercover detective, had been elected Chairman of the local DuBois Club in January of 1966, and he claimed that financing for recruiting new members came from the Communist Party of New York. He stated that he had heard the individuals who had been implicated in the Grand Jury report make speeches at the J.F.K. House that incited youths with such statements as “you’ve got to take what you want,” and also claimed to have heard talks at the J.F.K. House about organizing rifle clubs, making firebombs, and distributing militant literature. The other undercover agent, Fred Giardini, a white, had been made the “Peace Chairman” of the DuBois Club in late 1965. He was also a member of the Communist Party. However, when asked if he had any personal knowledge of DuBois Club members actually planning or leading the Hough disorders, Giardini’s reply was, “To my personal knowledge, no.”²⁶

Thus, the controversy over whether or not the violence had been organized and precipitated by “a small band of agitators” raged on. In Hough, the sentiment was nearly unanimous that the riots had occurred rather spontaneously, and that no organization was needed. One reporter observed, “In the streets of Hough, where

22. *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, August 11, 1966.

23. *Ibid.*, August 25, 1966.

24. *Ibid.*, August 18, 1966.

25. Sanford Watzman, “Katzenbach Sees No Extremist Planning in Hough Race Riots,” *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, August 18, 1966.

26. Hilbert Black, “Police Tell Story of Hough Spying,” *Cleveland Press*, August 11, 1966.

*the only constants are poverty and the sidewalks, they are sure of one thing — no outside groups initiated the rioting.”*²⁷

The option was open for the black community to stage a hearing of its own, patterned similarly to the Grand Jury hearings, to present their own conclusions about the disorders. Therefore, a citizens’ review panel was constituted, and hearings on the Hough disturbances were scheduled to begin on Tuesday, August 22. The board was a biracial one, composed of nine leaders of various civic organizations, such as the Hough Community Council and the National Association of Social Workers, all of whom had worked and had contact in the Hough area. By means of the mass media, a public invitation was issued to all individuals who wished to testify, and special invitations were extended to Mayor Locher, Council President Stanton, Safety Director John McCormick, and Assistant Safety Director Richard McKean.

The hearings lasted for three days, and twenty-six witnesses (none of them recipients of special invitations) volunteered to testify. Questioning of the witnesses was conducted by five lawyers of the community as well as by members of the panel. From the evidence and testimony presented at the sessions, the panel compiled a full report of its findings and conclusions and presented the information to the entire community.

*The report was basically structured as a reply to the findings of the Grand Jury. Its nature was indicated on the first page of the document, where it was clearly stated that the purpose of presenting the report to the community was “the belief that the Grand Jury Report fails to substantially give adequate emphasis to the underlying causes of the riot.” The report went on to say that the emphasis of the Grand Jury on subversives and outside agitators was a disservice to the community and that news media during the disturbances did not give adequate coverage to acts of injustice and police brutality. Many of the witnesses who volunteered to testify before the panel had not been called upon to testify before the Grand Jury, and so the Citizens Panel Report concludes that “had these residents been invited to make statements to the Grand Jury, the report would have been of a different nature.”*²⁸

The report was presented in four distinct parts. The first part discussed the implications of the Grand Jury Report, the second section dealt with the underlying causes of the riots, the third traced the events of both the Hough disturbances and the Superior Avenue trouble in June, and the fourth part listed a set of recommend actions which the panel felt to be necessary and desirable for the entire community.

The first section of the report proceeded on the assumption that if the community were “to allow the Grand Jury report to go unquestioned and unchallenged (would be) to give tacit approval to injustice.” As a result, the Citizens’ Report lashed out at the various points made by the Grand Jury. It castigated the Jury for violating the Ohio Code which specifically stated that “the names of people suspected of subversive activity cannot be made public unless there is sufficient evidence for indictment,” and the report expressed amazement that the Grand Jury thought the black community was moving too fast, implying that “Cleveland has repudiated the carefully documented report of the United States Civil Rights Commission and rejects the underlying spirit of the Great Society programs of President Johnson.” The report then questioned the Grand Jury’s assessment of the Aid to Dependent Children program by explaining that an incremental seventy-three cents a day was hardly the motivation for bringing a child into the world, as the Grand Jury had implied. The conclusion of the Grand Jury

27. Pat Royse, “Hough Residents Hit Jury Report,” *Cleveland Press*, August 11, 1966.

28. “Report of the Panel Hearings on the Superior and Hough Disturbances,” p. 2.

that outside agitators caused the riots could only have been founded upon ignorance of the civil rights movement and the black community of Cleveland, the report went on to say, because any individual living in the squalor and poverty of Hough needed “no one to tell him just how deplorable his living conditions” were. After charging that the Jury’s report did not give adequate prominence to the social conditions that were the main causative factors of the riots, the section ended with a condemnation of the Jury for praising every member of the police department when evidence indicated that there were often instances of poor handling of incidents by the police.²⁹

The next portion of the document was concerned with “the social conditions that exist in the ghetto areas of Cleveland,” — the underlying causes of the rioting. Specifically cited by the panel as these causes were the housing problem and inept program of urban renewal, poor police relations, the high unemployment rate in the ghettos, subsistence welfare levels and high prices for inferior merchandise, lack of recreational facilities, and failure by the city government administration to act on or even acknowledge suggestions made by the Hough leadership to improve that area of the city. This frustration of the black community was the reason, the report said, why the majority of the people in Hough “stood by and let the small minority try violence and property destruction as a new method (to gain black objectives).” Thus, while only a small portion of the community had actually engaged in the violence and destruction, “the sentiments of many were with the rioters.”³⁰

The actual events of both the Hough and Superior disturbances were then discussed in the report. The background of the disorders was briefly sketched as a setting for the trouble which occurred, but the report focused more on instances of abusive practices of police which were either missed or omitted in the reporting by the local news media. The last portion of the section refuted the Grand Jury’s conclusion that the J.F.K. House leadership had helped to organize and plan the violence. The panel emphasized that even though individual members of the House had participated in the disturbances, “all evidence leads to the conclusion that their behavior was a rejection of the thinking and problem-solving philosophy expressed by the J.F.K. leadership.”³¹

Ten recommendations were made in the final section, all of which were based on the evidence presented in the three-day hearings. The recommendations centered primarily around measures to alter police procedures and establish better police-community relationships. The panel proposed an investigation of the “waiver” method of release from police custody, investigations by the Justice Department of both the practice of detaining persons without charging them with an offense and the relationship between the police and the citizens of Cleveland, and the development of a new mechanism to adequately respond to grievances of local citizens against specific police actions.³² Other recommendations called for increased welfare levels, fair housing legislation for the city and suburbs, improved administration of the urban renewal program, and investigation of the shootings that had occurred during the disturbances. The report advocated that the Grand Jury Report be legally “quashed” because it violated the Ohio Code, and finally, recognizing the deeply ingrained feeling of impotence and frustration prevalent in the black community, the panel called on the mayor to establish the means by which to maintain continued contact with the black community and its leaders. The stated reason for the last proposal was that

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-5.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

32. The “waiver” was a form signed by the citizen upon release that in effect absolved the police of all brutality and misconduct charges. Blacks charged that persons were forced to sign the “waiver” before they were released.

*“if these grievances (of the black community) cannot be given expression through normal channels, they will be expressed destructively.”*³³

The black community had responded to the Grand Jury Report. Clearly, there were great differences in the two interpretations of the riots, and the implications of the disorders varied on the basis of skin color. Polarization of the two races of the community had been heightened and certainly not lessened by the differences in the two reports. Furthermore, prospects for the near future appeared grim for the black ghetto, for power was not in their hands, but instead in the hands of leadership that fully agreed with a report that had been declared inadequate and mistaken by the black community. Fortunately, however, the long hot summer was rapidly drawing to a close in Cleveland. As the summer gradually disappeared, the problems appeared to expand while the prospects for solving them seemed to decrease.

Unfortunately, problems of a lifetime and longer are not solved between September and June. Very few people expected them to be solved that quickly, and for that reason, the summer ended on twin notes of relief and pessimism — relief that the violence was over, at least for the next nine months, and pessimism that it would return again next summer in more violent form and with more destructive effects. But communities don't live in terms of long range goals or attitudes; they rather plod along from day to day, worrying only about tomorrow, and not about yesterday or next month. Next summer was a long time away for Cleveland, and so were solutions to Cleveland's deep-rooted problems.

33. “Report,” pp. 14-15.

Chapter IV: The Frustration of a Black Ghetto

Our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white — separate and unequal.¹

The two divergent reports that were presented in the weeks following the Hough disturbances carefully attempted to pinpoint the specific causes of the riots. However, the main emphases of the two interpretations were directly in conflict with each other — the Grand Jury Report tried to demonstrate that outside agitators and Communist sympathizers had been the precipitating factors involved, and the Citizens' Panel Report was primarily motivated to refute the conclusions of the Grand Jury. The story was not as simple as either report told it. Instead, the disorders were caused by a complex and interwoven pattern of events and conditions that produced a general malaise as well as growing frustration within the ghetto. The conditions of Hough and the inciting series of events in Cleveland were closely tied together by the thread of racism — a thread that ultimately led to five days of destruction and violence in July, 1966.

Cleveland, Ohio — A Typical Urban Center

The problems of Cleveland were similar to those of other large metropolitan areas across the country. An old city that grew in the flush of the industrial revolution, it aged rapidly in the mid-twentieth century, challenged by the suburban push on its periphery. Like other cities experiencing suburbanization, Cleveland saw the gradual migration of her industry, her more affluent white taxpayers, and her cherished institutions from the central part of the city to the surrounding communities.

During its fast growth during the booming industrial era, Cleveland developed an interesting mosaic-like pattern of ethnic residential areas. Pockets of ethnic groups were scattered throughout the city, and lines were fairly well drawn between settlements of different nationality groups. Most of the wealthier, older families of the city moved out to the suburbs, which surrounded the city and covered a much higher proportion of the land in the metropolitan area than did the central city. The suburbs had many advantages when compared to Cleveland's inner city. Therefore, Cleveland found a declining tax base with which to meet new and increasing problems. The largest set of problems that faced the city focused on the high concentration of poor black people in the inner city.

1. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (New York, 1968), p. 1. (Source hereafter cited as Advisory Commission).

Statistics from the censuses of 1960 and 1965 illustrated numerically the problems of the city. The total population of the city decreased from 876,050 in 1960 to 810,858 in 1965, a decline of 7.4%, while at the same time the black population of the area increased 10.1% from 250,889 to 276,376. Apparently the white population was moving to the suburbs as the black population, because of a very high birth rate and migration from other parts of the country, was growing within the city.

But the black population, similar to other ethnic groups in the city, was clustered and concentrated in a small section of the community. Almost all of the city's black people lived in neighborhoods on Cleveland's East Side. Before World War I, most of the Negroes had lived in the Central neighborhood, an area southeast of Hough. The end of the war was followed by a great influx of Negroes who also settled on the East Side and moved the area of concentration to about East 55th Street, the western border of Hough. In the late twenties and early thirties the area continued to move east, but the period following World War II witnessed the greatest change. Neighborhoods such as Hough, Glenville, Mt. Pleasant, and Kinsman became predominantly black in their racial composition. There were almost no Negroes living on the West Side, and nearly half of the few living there resided in public housing.

The segregated pattern of housing was still abnormally high in the 1960's. Over ninety-one percent of the city's Negroes would have had to move to different blocks to have attained a normal racial balance (same percentage as entire city) in every block.² In the early 1960's, black people began to migrate to a few of the eastern suburbs, but their movement out of the city was still very restricted. The limited black suburbanization did not help to alleviate the pressure of the increasing black population within the city. It was estimated that about two-thirds of the increase in the black population occurred in areas of the central city which were either biracial or predominantly black.³ The curious mosaic pattern had resulted in concentrated pockets of impoverished black people. The worst such pocket was known as Hough.

Hough — The Tragic Components of a Ghetto

Causes of unrest and despair among urban-ghetto Negroes, as well as their grim, sobering and costly consequences are found in classic form in Cleveland.⁴

There was an area of two square miles that stretched from East 55th Street to University Circle on Cleveland's East Side. It was known by the name of the avenue that bisected the neighborhood — Hough. Hough was a black ghetto.

A ghetto is not merely an area of a city. For its inhabitants it is a way of life, a means by which to exist. The people of the ghetto are locked in its way of life and escape is not easy, for the vicious cycle of life that pervades the entire fabric of the ghetto is almost impossible to break. It is a vicious cycle that includes segregated and inadequate housing, unemployment and a dependence on welfare to subsist, poor schools that rarely lead to higher learning,

2. Karl E. Taeuber and Alma F. Taeuber, *Negroes in Cities* (Chicago, 1965), p. 39.

3. *Hearing before the United States Commission Rights*, April 1-7, 1966, p. 100, testimony of Mr. Lyle Schaller. (Source hereafter cited as *Civil Rights Commission*).

4. Kenneth Clark, as quoted in John Skow, "Can Cleveland Escape Burning?" *Saturday Evening Post*, July 29, 1967, p. 39.

an increasing crime rate, disease and squalor which infest everything and everyone, and attitudes of bitterness, frustration, and defeat. To the visitor, the most noticeable feature of the urban ghetto is its physical ugliness — the dirt, the filth, and the total *neglect* of the area. As Kenneth Clark stated in his book *Dark Ghetto*, “The only constant characteristic is a sense of inadequacy.”⁵ Another characteristic of the ghetto is that its inhabitants are predominantly black. This fact only increases the barriers faced by the residents of the ghetto. The combined walls of poverty and discrimination are difficult to scale simultaneously.

The ghetto has not been a happy place. Little chance has existed for its inhabitants to fulfill the American dream of social and economic upward mobility. Often exploited by profiteers and politicians, the urban ghettos have stood severed from the outer world by invisible walls of racism and poverty. Many embittered Americans who are black have lived within these walls.

Hough was a black ghetto in 1966. Figures from the special Census taken in Cleveland in 1965 illustrate the problems of the areas. In 1960, the population of Hough was 73.7% black. By 1965, the figure had increased considerably to 87.9% because of the constant stream of white migration to outlying areas. Although the white population of the ghetto in 1965 was only one-third of its level in 1960, the number of black people had only declined a few percentage points. Every census tract in the neighborhood had become predominantly black in the five years between censuses, and everywhere the percentage of black people in 1965 was higher than in 1960. The percentage of unemployed members of the labor force was much higher in Hough than it was for the rest of the city. For males in Hough, the unemployment rate was 13.4% compared to 6.47% for the entire city, and the unemployment figure for females there was almost more than twice the rate for the city. The median number of years of schooling for adults over twenty-five again compared unfavorably, Hough showing a median of 9.7 years completed compared to the entire city's 10.3 years, and the difference had been increasing over the years. The comparison worsened if the quality of the education became another variable. Most revealing were the income statistics. While the entire city's median family real income was increasing from \$6,325 in 1960 to \$6,895 in 1965, an increase of 9.1%, the real income in Hough per family decreased from \$4,900 to \$4,050, a decrease of 17.3% in the same length of time. Hough also experienced an increase of almost two thousand persons who existed below the poverty level in this five year period, despite the fact that the area had lost population in this time. The percentage of family members subsisting below the poverty line had increased by almost a third in Hough, while for the entire city, the percentage had remained rather constant at a rate one-half to one-third that of Hough.⁶

Hough was also crowded. There were about forty-five persons per acre there compared to a range of ten to thirty-five persons per acre in other city neighborhoods. This crowding was a result of the World War II years, when Cleveland had become an arsenal of the war and thousands of skilled and unskilled workers had migrated to the city.⁷ However, unlike the immigrant and ethnic groups who passed through the ghetto stage on their way to social acceptance and suburbia, the Southern black people who migrated to Hough were offered almost no hope of escape. Here they were denied a chance to improve their lot because of their color or some other related factors.⁸

5. Kenneth B. Clark, *Dark Ghetto* (New York, 1965), p. 27.

6. Bureau of the Census, "Changes in Economic Level in Nine Neighborhoods in Cleveland: 1960 to 1965," Series P-23, No. 20, September 22, 1966, pp. 1-7. Also Series P-23, No. 21, January 23, 1967.

7. Robert Crater and John Russell, "Mayer Backs Jury in Senate Hearing," *Cleveland Press*, August 26, 1966.

8. Paul Welch, "A Bitter and Insistent Plague: The People on Hough Find Themselves in a Racial Trap," *Life*, LIX, December 24, 1965, p. 106.

The area did not become a monolithic slum. Neat houses in rows on one street contrasted sharply with the places unfit for human habitation. Hough had formerly been the home of a large segment of the Jewish middle class as well as some of the wealthier families of Cleveland. However, the visible remnants of elegance and better days only served to intensify the aura of decay that encompassed Hough. In spite of the fact that most whites had moved out of the area, many of the small shops, markets, and bars were owned and operated by whites. Many of the rented homes were owned by absentee landlords, and the condition of most of the land and buildings was described by almost everyone as “deteriorating.” Although Hough contained only 7.3% of the city’s population, the area provided nineteen percent of the welfare cases for the entire county.⁹ More than one-third of the area’s 1,372 births in 1966 were illegitimate, one-half of them born to teenage mothers. The infant mortality rate in Hough doubled that of the rest of the city, and Hough’s rate of participation in the Aid to Dependent Children Program almost doubled that of the rest of the city. About twenty percent of the major crimes in the city were committed in Hough, and the crime rate there had tripled since 1950.¹⁰ All of these factors coupled with inadequate government services combined to give the ghetto’s residents little reason to care about the neighborhood.¹¹ As a result, most of the people who lived there did not care about the community, as shown rather effectively in July, 1966, and by the reactions of the community following the disorders. The reactions were similar to those of a tenant in one of the slum’s apartments. “If I come back after death,” he stated bitterly, “I want to come back as a tiger and tear up Hough.”¹²

The businessman driving to his home in the eastern suburbs from his office downtown would see only a glimpse of the life behind the invisible walls surrounding the area known as Hough. Although he would see rows of dilapidated houses and streets with nothing but garish bars and small store-front churches, he could not have much empathy for the dwellers inside the walls nor much understanding of the smoldering fire within the ghetto. The white middle-class experience prohibited full understanding of the black ghetto because the values, institutions, and mores inside the walls of Hough were so different from those of the surrounding areas. Thus, the experience of Hough coupled with a lack of understanding and empathy by the white community helped the vicious cycle to spiral on downward. Few people outside the ghetto realized the consequences.

The Events Preceding the Riots

Disorder did not erupt as a result of a single “triggering” or “precipitating” incident. Instead, it was generated out of an increasingly disturbed social atmosphere, in which a series of tension heightening incidents over a period of weeks or months became linked in the minds of many in the Negro community with a reservoir of underlying grievances.¹³

Many events led up to the precipitating incident in the Seventy-Niners’ Café on July 18. Although some of the events touch on some underlying causes of the riots, those incidents provide the background for a clearer understanding of the disorders. It is necessary to begin in 1963, when Ralph S. Locher, law director of the city,

9. Letter from Mrs. Roberta Allport, Research Department, Cuyahoga County Welfare Department, January 28, 1968.

10. Saul S. Friedman. "Riots, Violence and Civil Rights," *National Review*, XIX, August 22, 1967, p. 899.

11. Welch, "Insistent Plague," pp. 108-109.

12. *Ibid*

13. *Advisory Commission*, p. 6.

succeeded Anthony J. Celebrezze as Mayor of Cleveland after Celebrezze was appointed Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.

Mayor Locher's relations with the black community progressively declined from the moment he became mayor. At first he met with leaders of "responsible" groups to discuss "reasonable demands," but that effort was discontinued after a while. In the summer of 1963, a mass rape of a white girl by black youths almost incited violence. The group had stabbed the girl's boyfriend repeatedly in the incident, and mass retaliation and violence appeared inevitable. To avert trouble, Locher asserted his authority and pressed for immediate and heavy punishment. His actions did not endear him to the black community, most of whom felt that the white establishment did not understand many of the deeper sociological implications of the incident. The next major incident occurred in the spring of 1964. Some black citizens and civil rights groups tried to impede construction of a new school in a black neighborhood on the East Side because the school would perpetuate *de facto* segregation. Locher attempted to resolve the differences by a series of conferences which produced no positive results. The alienation of the blacks from Locher was completed when Reverend Bruce Klunder was accidentally killed by a bulldozer at the site of the proposed school during a demonstration.¹⁴ At this time, Ruth Turner, a graduate of Oberlin College and a full-time CORE worker in Cleveland, commented that Cleveland was a "polarized community by virtue of the fact that a vacuum has been created in the white community through apathy, and that vacuum has been filled by people who would rather scream Communism than address themselves to the real grievances" of the community.¹⁵ Her words, uttered in 1965, were very prophetic.

A measure of the polarization between the black community and Mayor Locher occurred in the spring of 1965, when Locher proposed an income tax of one percent on gross income to generate new revenue and provide new services. The tax was to be used for hiring extra police and firemen, raising the pay of city employees, funding additional staff members for the housing and recreation departments improvement of the street lighting and air and water pollution control and demolition of abandoned houses. The measure was widely endorsed by influential organizations throughout the community, and it was even backed by the Negro-run and owned newspaper, the *Call and Post*. The tax was opposed by only the Chamber of Commerce, the Citizens' League, and the NAACP, but the proposal was soundly crushed at the polls, 89,290 to 62,816. The difference occurred because the black wards had voted overwhelmingly against the tax. In Hough, the vote was 3,525 for the tax to 6,789 opposed, and Hough was typical of most of the other black communities in its voting behavior. It was noted that many of the residents of Hough had nothing to lose by voting for the measure because people who were on welfare relief would not have been taxed. Most observers concluded, however, that most black citizens did not favor the measure because the revenues would not have been used to measurably improve the lot of the people in the black neighborhoods and because the black community was very disenchanting with the Locher administration.¹⁶

The voters had a chance the next November to directly express their dissatisfaction with Mayor Locher in the election for Mayor. The black community united behind a little-known State representative from one of the black wards, Carl Stokes. With the Republican candidate siphoning off a few white votes, Stokes, running as an independent Democrat (after losing the party nomination in a primary), came within 2,000 votes of

14. Friedman, "Riots, Violence," p. 900.

15. Robert Penn Warren, *Who Speaks for the Negro?* (New York, 1965), p. 380.

16. Friedman, "Riots, Violence," p. 901.

unseating Mayor Locher. Black power, demonstrated in terms of votes at the polls, had almost succeeded indirectly influencing the decisions to be made at City Hall.

During this period of time, some efforts were made to reach the youths of the ghetto. Unfortunately, these programs were usually failures because of executive, administrative, and planning inadequacies. A good example of such a program was the Community Action for Youth Program (CAY), chartered in 1962. The expressed goals of this program were to decrease juvenile delinquency, to build youth aspirations, to stimulate educational and occupational achievement, and to strengthen the role of the father in the family. However, in the words of one conservative reporter, “CAY turned out to be the biggest bust since Edsel.”¹⁷ The program was reported to have been plagued by many intra-agency personality conflicts and a high rate of personnel turnover. The personnel involved in the program often came in from other communities for “experience,” and as a result were sometimes incompetent and unempathetic, with little understanding of the problems facing Cleveland or Hough. Attempts to give top priority to child neglect and family cases were occasionally sabotaged because of a lack of personnel, low wages, and the press of intake cases in the Hough area. Services to unwed mothers, preadolescent youngsters with learning difficulties, and activities for “aggressive” boys were often inadequate, and the drop-out rate was very high. Many of the proposals for youth camps, after-school programs, and pilot programs for unwed fathers never even achieved reality because of the many problems which beset CAY.


(Notes on Cleveland's Nine Poverty Neighborhoods)

In 1959 99,138 residents of these nine neighborhoods were below the “poverty line”, by 1964 this number had dropped to 93,424. In 1959 66 per cent of the individuals living in poverty in Cleveland were concentrated in these nine neighborhoods, by 1964 this figure had risen to 69 percent — although in 1964 these nine neighborhoods included only 39 percent of the Cleveland population as compared to 41 percent in 1959.

The number of children under 14 years of age living in poverty in these nine neighborhoods rose from 36,157 in 1959 to 38,166 in 1964 — despite a seven percent decrease in the number of children in this age group in these nine neighborhoods. In all of the City of Cleveland there were 46,560 children under 14 years of age living below the poverty line. This number is approximately equal to the total number of children in that age range in Lakewood, Parma and Shaker Heights combined.

In 1960 less than one-half (47.6 percent) of the residents, five years old and older, had been living in the same house for five years or longer and in Hough only 22 percent had not moved during the previous five years. In 1965 the mobility rate was almost exactly the same (47.2% were in the same house as five years earlier) and Hough again led in mobility as less than one-third of the residents of Hough were occupying the same house that they had been living in back in 1960.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 903.



The goals and ideas of CAY were widely accepted within the community. However, the program ended without measurably improving the status of the ghetto dwellers, and many of the workers in the program left for other areas with higher salaries and jobs because of their “contributions” to the Hough community.

In the spring of 1966, the United States Civil Rights Commission held hearings in Cleveland for seven days, and in a report issued later diagnosed Cleveland’s ills to be “the classic ones of the ghetto: inadequate housing, schools and jobs.”¹⁸ The hearings were widely publicized in the city, and many citizens testified about the city’s grave problems. Many of the underlying causes of the disorders three months later were spelled out in detail by the testimony at the hearings. The result of the Commission’s week in Cleveland was a new awareness in both the total community and the black neighborhoods of the deplorable conditions in which the majority of Cleveland’s black citizens existed. Unfortunately, the situation was not improving.

At the beginning of the summer, many Hough residents were among the group of marchers that walked from Cleveland to Columbus in an effort to secure more welfare relief.¹⁹ The group’s request was turned down by an

18. "Ice, Water and Fire," *Newsweek*, LXVIII, August 1, 1966, p. 18.

19. "And Now Cleveland," *The Reporter*, XXXV, August 11, 1966, p. 8.

unsympathetic Governor Rhodes, and the long, hot summer began on a rather discouraging note for many of Cleveland vs black citizens. The outlook worsened as the community soon saw racial tension rise to new heights.

Relations between the black and white citizens living on opposite sides of the northern border of the Hough area had always been strained. Negro youths had attacked a white father and son there in January, 1966, and as the school year closed that spring, many anti-Negro signs were painted in a park north of Hough. There were also many instances of interracial fighting that occurred at the beginning of the summer. Black residents of the area became quite perturbed when the attacks continued and police did not seem to do anything to alleviate the tension between the two groups. Finally, on June 22, two black youths were attacked by a gang of whites in the Sowinski area at the northern outskirts of Hough. A crowd gathered after the incident and confronted police with evidence including a description of the attackers and the automobile in which they were riding. The police ostensibly refused to investigate or pursue the youths, and soon rocks and bottles were being hurled at both police and passing cars. Area residents met the next day on three separate occasions with city officials and law enforcement officers, but no positive action was taken in response to the residents' complaints. That night, fueled by the frustration and anger that had been building up over the months, groups of neighborhood black youths destroyed some property and continued the missile barrage on passing cars. A boy was allegedly shot by a white man in a passing car, and when residents linked the cart to the owner of a neighborhood supermarket, the store was immediately torched. Much damage was inflicted on several other white owned businesses on Superior Avenue in the three nights of trouble that so ominously forewarned of the disturbances in July. On Saturday, June 25, a meeting was held between area residents, youth and the mayor. The group aired its grievances and made specific recommendations to the city's chief executive, most of which concerned police, recreation, and urban renewal. That night, the disturbances ceased, and only minor incidents of rock throwing along Superior Avenue were reported for the next several days.²⁰

In analyzing the situation, Assistant Safety Director Richard McKean had noted that there "was no danger of a Watts riot" in Cleveland. He claimed that he had faith in the "law-abiding" people of Cleveland. Safety Director John McCormick added, "We're prepared to deal with the situation,"²¹ and it appeared that most of the officials closely connected with the safety of the City of Cleveland did not have the foresight that would have enabled them to have quickly and effectively halted the riots in the Hough area once they began. Thus, the disturbances on Superior Avenue were not recognized to be the omen that they actually were. The City reacted as if almost nothing had happened.

As the disturbances on Superior Avenue ended, Ralph Findley, Director of the Greater Cleveland Office of Economic Opportunity, announced the city's plans to keep the idle youths of the city busy. Cleveland was set to spend almost one and a half million dollars in programs involving inner-city youth, with the federal and city governments paying most of the bill. These programs included opportunities for jobless youngsters to work in their neighborhoods and organize playground groups to keep other children off the streets and jobs to work as playground helpers. Also available to the city's youth were many jobs in institutions and government agencies, and the school system offered about 1500 jobs for high school students. The Neighborhood Youth Corps and Opportunity Centers sought to aid the students by providing some 1300 jobs, and the Welfare Federation provided

20. "Report of the Panel Hearings on the Superior and Hough Disturbances," pp. 9-10.

21. *Cleveland Press*, June 24, 1966.

opportunities for seventy-five young leaders. The list went on further, and most people connected with the effort to provide jobs agreed that there were enough opportunities to accommodate every youth who desired work.²² As the hot summer stretched into July, job opportunities had greatly increased for the unemployed youth, but the other events in June had caused a simultaneous increase in racial tension.

On July 1, plans were revealed for the downtown expansion of Cleveland State University. The project was to cost a few million dollars, and the resentment and cynicism that these plans evoked in the black community were plainly evidenced by the negative reactions of such black leaders as Councilman Leo Jackson and Ernest Cooper, director of the Urban League.²³ Obviously, with the problems faced by the black community in Cleveland, its residents would be less than enthusiastic about an expensive project that would not benefit them either directly or indirectly.

Fifty of the black community's leaders met with Mayor Locher on July 5 to offer their help to the mayor in his efforts to relieve racial tension within the city. The group presented the mayor with an eight point program that they believed would help to meet many of the black community's problems that had arisen in the previous months. These suggestions to the mayor included a request for the police department to fully support law and order and to treat all persons equally when making arrests. They also called for an investigation into the shooting of a ten-year-old boy during the Superior incidents twelve days earlier, an explanation by the police of the absence of any arrests for the shooting, and an investigation by the police into the source of leadership distributing incendiary race-hatred literature in the black community. The leaders also requested the appointment of a special mayor's committee to make recommendations to help ease the racial tension, and the ordering of specially trained police into tense neighborhoods, to be kept there until the trouble had disappeared. The group ended its list of suggestions with a broad appeal for racial amity. After the meeting, Mayor Locher stated that the efforts were "entirely constructive."²⁴

However, constructive as the black leaders' efforts were, the rest of the community remained frustrated and aggravated. Mayor Locher had met with Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Robert Weaver early in the summer, and Weaver had given Locher a list of the city's responsibilities to improve the stagnating East Side which included measures to uplift the housing, derelict buildings, parking facilities, garbage collection and playgrounds. Locher did very little to satisfy Weaver's recommendations, and as a result, the city lost a federal grant of \$1,500,000 for parks and playgrounds.²⁵

Meanwhile, the city's urban renewal program remained mired in red tape. The University Euclid Project of rehabilitation for part of the Hough area had stood almost still since its inception in 1962. With the goal of rebuilding some of the sturdier structures of the area to preserve and improve the neighborhood, the city had estimated in 1962 that the project would be completed in June, 1967. The project had first been approved by David Walker, then a commissioner of urban renewal for the federal government. The city later hired Walker as a consultant in 1964 to "speed up" the rehabilitation program, but Walker announced in May, 1966, that the project

22. Bob Modic, "Vast Projects to Keep Idle City Youths Busy," *Cleveland Press*, June 25, 1966.

23. *Cleveland Press*, July 2, 1966.

24. Paul Lilley, "Mayor Meets With Negroes," *Cleveland Press*, July 5, 1966.

25. *Cleveland Press*, July 25, 1967.

would not be finished by its original target date, and set no date for its completion.²⁶ By June of 1966, only twelve per cent of the planned rehabilitation had been completed. It was also widely rumored that the federal government would soon cut off all new funds for the badly bogged urban renewal plans.

In Columbus, the State Legislature conducted hearings on proposed legislation that would abolish capital punishment. One of those officials testifying for retention of the death penalty was Cleveland's Chief of Police, Richard R. Wagner. Wagner claimed that the death penalty was an effective deterrent to many black nationalists who plotted to kill. When the civil rights leadership of Cleveland heard Wagner's statements before the legislature, they requested again to meet with the mayor in order to air their grievances about the police chief's attitudes. Mayor Locher would not see them, however, and the group waited in his office for three days in a vain attempt to gain a hearing.²⁷ When, at the end of the third day of protest, the group decided to stay overnight, the mayor had them arrested and thrown in jail.²⁸ Tension between the mayor and the black community heightened to the breaking point.

Chicago erupted in violence and destruction on July 12th, 13th and 14th. The damage was not too extensive, but the action was portentous of disorders to come. The events in Cleveland over the months and years before July, 1966, made the city a likely spot for violence and destruction. Tension had heightened, relations had become strained between the city government and the black community, and the social conditions of the black ghetto, the real underlying causes of the disorders, had become intolerable.

The Underlying Social Conditions

Many conditions caused the outbreaks of disorder in Hough. Certainly some factors were much more important and relevant than others, but each contributed to the final outburst of frustration and despair which exploded on Cleveland's East Side for those five days in July, 1966.

The deplorable social and economic conditions existing in the ghetto gave rise to many of the incidents which finally led to the violence and destruction. These same conditions were also the basis for the general frustration and accumulated dissatisfaction which combined with the inciting series of events to produce the rampant disorder.

Many people pointed to the vicious cycle that entrapped Hough's black residents — housing, jobs, and education — as the primary factor behind the frustration and bitterness so prevalent in the ghetto. Others mentioned that these causes had been compounded by poor police-community relations, a sense of impotence within the black community, inadequate welfare levels, poor recreation facilities and programs, and irregular garbage collections. Certainly, all these factors were interrelated, and each contributed to the disorder. These pitiful social and economic conditions were perpetrated, explained and tolerated by an underlying racism — the belief that black people are inferior to white people. The latent but omnipresent racism of the community only served to push

26. Donald Sabath, "Hough Slum Battle Still at Standstill," *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 26, 1966.

27. In an interview, Locher claimed that he did not see the leaders because they had not gone through the prerequisite "proper channels" to see him. He also justified the later arrests on the grounds that each offender was later convicted.

28. Skow, "Can Cleveland?," p. 42.

the cycle of poverty, inadequate housing and schools further downward, and served as the basis by which the tangible factors became important contributors to the decay of the community.

Inadequate Housing

I would love to live in a regular house.²⁹

*Much of urban life centers around housing. Location of residence often determines the opportunities for gainful employment, for education, and for many other benefits of urban life. The black community of Cleveland was subjected to a shortage of adequate housing, poor and crowded living conditions, and racial discrimination when black residents tried to move. These charges were all well documented in the Special Census of 1965, the hearings before the Civil Rights Commission in April, 1966, and the PATH report, issued in March, 1967, after six months of investigation by a group of thirty citizens.*³⁰

*In the period-from 1950 to 1967, only 30,000 new dwelling units were constructed within the city as compared to about 150,000 units constructed in the suburbs throughout the rest of the county.*³¹ *With only five per cent of the county's black residents living in the suburbs, there was an increasing shortage of new housing in the city available to blacks compared to whites.*³² *The existing dwellings within the city were deteriorating during this time, too. The 1960 Census showed 50,000 units within the city as substandard, and in 1966, despite the demolition of some 10,000 units, there were still about 50,000 substandard dwellings inside the city.*³³ *These statistics hit areas like Hough particularly hard, especially as the community became more and more segregated as whites moved out. Many people testified at the Civil Rights Commission Hearings about the deteriorated conditions in which they were forced to live, and the difficulty black residents had securing loans from any of the financial institutions to finance new construction in the blighted areas such as Hough. Thus, because of the residential patterns of the city and the unwritten rules of segregation, there weren't many housing and dwelling opportunities for black citizens of the inner-city.*

Those opportunities that did exist in Hough were considerably less than attractive. Many individuals testified at the hearings in April about the conditions of Hough's housing. The absentee landlords rarely responded to complaints of their tenants, and because of the city's lax methods of enforcing the housing code, conditions of squalor and total deterioration often went unnoticed and uncorrected. The testimony of the Commissioner of Housing demonstrated that the city's housing code was not strictly enforced because of a personnel shortage as well as political pressures exerted on the city government. In areas of urban renewal, it was disclosed that the codes were never enforced because the jurisdiction for enforcement was changed to the department of urban renewal. As a result of the code practices, absentee landlords often let their property totally deteriorate and rarely made substantial improvements. Approximately 50,000 substandard dwellings stood within the city at the 1960

29. *Civil Rights Commission*, p. 31. Testimony of Mrs. Hattie Mae Dugan.

30. PATH -- Plan of Action for Tomorrow's Housing. It was a group of thirty citizens formed by the Greater Cleveland Associated Federation in September, 1966 to study housing problems of Cleveland.

31. PATH Citizens Advisory Committee. "Plan of Action for Tomorrow's Housing in Greater Cleveland," March, 1967, p. 12.

32. *Civil Rights Commission*, p. 206. Testimony of Mr. Townsend.

33. "PATH Report," p. 13.

census, but the Commissioner of Housing disclosed that in 1965 only 299 warrants were issued by the courts that dealt with housing code violations. There were no warrants issued to landowners in the area affected by the urban renewal plans.³⁴

The success of the urban renewal programs in the ghetto was virtually nonexistent. As the PATH report accurately summed up, Cleveland's urban renewal program had been a failure in the years before the riots. The program had not added to the housing supply of the city nor had it succeeded in blocking further deterioration of the community's dwellings. The area's largest project, the University-Euclid project, was centered on the East Side of town, and it had planned to rehabilitate over 4,000 units in 1961. In late 1966, despite the fact that its administrative budget had been used up, the project had only rehabilitated about 600 units.

The urban renewal programs suffered from several defects, among them: inadequate planning and slow execution of plans that were made; lax enforcement of housing code in renewal areas; ineffective and often discriminatory relocation assistance to families that had to be moved during the renovation process; and lack of resident participation and consent on the goals and methods of attaining the goals of the program.³⁵ Research data presented at the Civil Rights Commission hearings showed that only fifteen per cent of all the families relocated in the most recent projects before 1966 went to housing to which they were referred by the relocation office. In University-Euclid, data showed that of 383 black families that were relocated, only 76 resettled in census tracts that were less than fifty per cent black. Almost half of those displaced settled in census tracts that were more than ninety per cent Negro, thus compounding the ghetto problems.³⁶ Earlier, other downtown urban renewal projects had dislocated many residents from their homes, but rather than smoothly assimilating into the outlying suburbs like other displaced ethnic groups, the Negroes were almost forced to move into already crowded black neighborhoods. Ghettos like Hough were the inevitable result of these urban renewal efforts.³⁷ Cleveland also illustrated another shortcoming of many urban renewal programs that was mentioned by Robert Weaver — the disregard for democracy which seemed to characterize many of Cleveland's efforts. Cleveland could very well have been the city to which Weaver alluded when he wrote that in one community, some new greeting cards were circulated. On the cover, the cards read, "Urban Renewal is Good for You," and on the inside flap the cards said, "So Shut Up."³⁸

Cleveland's Urban Renewal Director until January, 1966, James Lister, illustrated a rather uninformed attitude toward the entire concept of urban renewal and planning in 1965 when he said, "Even if we don't find ready builders (for a project) ... just clearing the land to get rid of those slums justifies what we are doing."³⁹ According to Lister, desolation [sic] was a blessing, and his department appeared to have been guided by that principle during the time of his direction. Lister was replaced in March of 1966 by Barton Clausen, a man formerly associated with television broadcasting with no previous experience in either actual urban planning or urban

34. *Civil Rights Commission*, p. 131. Testimony of Mr. Sheboy.

35. "PATH Report," pp. 19-20.

36. *Civil Rights Commission*, p. 175. Testimony of Mr. Wolf.

37. Doris O'Donnell, "Hough Fuse Has Sputtered for Years," *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 27, 1966.

38. Robert G. Weaver, *The Urban Complex: Human Values in Urban Life* (Garden City, 1964), p. 82.

39. Charles Abrams, *The City is the Frontier* (New York, 1965), p. 150.

renewal. The program continued along at its feeble pace until finally in January, 1967, the Department of Housing and Urban Development announced that no new funds for urban planning or renewal would be allocated to Cleveland until the present problems were solved and the entire project restructured.⁴⁰

Even the department's public information officials were not impressed with the department's record over the last five or ten years. One official remarked, "We've had some bad failures and good successes," while another city employee frankly admitted, "Urban renewal hasn't been the brightest light on our horizon."⁴¹

Discrimination was actively practiced against black citizens in the sale of housing in Cleveland, and so the walls of Hough became nearly impossible to scale. Many young educated Negroes testified that they were often not shown housing in white areas by realtors, and often their names were referred to black realtors by the white realtors whom they had contacted. Mr. and Mrs. Robert Crumpler related an incident to the Civil Rights Commission that was typical of the plight of many Negroes. Mr. Crumpler, a black elementary school science teacher, and his wife, a white, had sought to rent a home in Cleveland Heights, a middle class suburb on Cleveland's East Side. After reaching verbal agreement with Mr. Crumpler to rent over the telephone, the owner talked with a present tenant and discovered that Mr. Crumpler was black. Suddenly, the lady talked again to Mr. Crumpler and explained that her child had contracted measles and so she couldn't have a contract for several days. An hour later, the owner rented the apartment to a white Couple. As Mr. Crumpler later testified, the measles of the owner's son were "possibly the fastest case in history."⁴²

The suburbs were virtually closed to Negro migration. Of the more than fifty municipalities surrounding the City of Cleveland, only three had allowed more than a few Negroes to live in their communities, and even in these places, the process of integration was a very slow and uneasy one. Because of this denial of housing opportunities, the demand for housing in the city by blacks was very high. The result was that Negroes often had to pay more than whites for housing of an inferior quality. Even in the placement of people by the Cleveland Metropolitan Housing Authority, the public housing department, there was evidence of some discrimination. It was documented in the Civil Rights Commission hearings that 99% of the white tenants in public housing lived in predominantly white estates, and about 81% of the black tenants lived in three predominantly Negro projects. Occupancy statistics of public housing indicated that white tenants comprised fifty-three per cent of the total while blacks comprised about forty-seven per cent.⁴³

The housing problems of the Negro in Cleveland were monumental in the years before the Hough disorders. A shortage of available dwellings, terrible living conditions that were rarely corrected, an inept urban renewal program, and widespread racial discrimination worked an even greater hardship on the residents of Hough. The ghetto became severed from the rest of the community, and the living conditions there were often unbearable. The ghetto was bound to explode.

40. "PATH Report," p. 22.

41. Interviews with the public information officials in Cleveland, January 26, 1968. Names withheld upon request.

42. *Civil Rights Commission*, p.199. Testimony of Mr. Robert Crumpler.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 157. Staff research.

Unemployment and Underemployment

Cleveland has an ordinance which prohibits employers, employees, labor unions, and employment agencies from discriminating on the basis of race, creed, color or national origin.⁴⁴

Unemployment and under employment are firmly entrenched in the ghetto. Unemployment of the labor force in any area can result in further problems for the society, and in the ghetto, these problems assume a much greater importance. Other conditions are present there that compound the problems of the unemployed. Similarly, underemployment has adverse effects, psychological and otherwise, on the inhabitants of the ghetto. Menial jobs with little chance for advancement, creativity, or enjoyment, are often not the answer to the problems of unemployment and as a result, underemployment often does more to reinforce the “revolution of rising expectations” than to alleviate the problem of unemployment.

Hough residents were victims of both unemployment and underemployment. In 1965, Negroes comprised about one-sixth of Cleveland’s metropolitan labor force of 885,000. Unemployment was estimated at 2.9% of the labor force in July of the same year⁴⁵ At this same time, unemployment within the city was at 7.1%, and for the black workers within the City of Cleveland, the situation was even worse, unemployment averaging about four per cent higher than the mark for the entire city. Thus, unemployment for blacks ran about three times higher than the rates for whites within the city. The Hough neighborhood showed an even higher rate of unemployment, with 13.4% of the male labor force and 17.5% of the female labor force recorded as unemployed, but the black residents of Hough hit an even lower figure, as 14.3% of the black male labor force and 19.1% of the black female labor force in Hough were unemployed during the 1965 special Census in Cleveland.⁴⁶ Unemployment among the black people of Hough was worse than their white neighbors in the ghetto and drastically worse than among even other Negroes throughout the city. However, the black resident of Hough faced other problems even when he was employed.

If he were employed in the building industry, he would have had difficulty getting good jobs and remaining continually employed because he wouldn’t have been in a trade union. In 1965, the total union membership in building trade unions was 7,786. Of this total only 55 members were black, less than one per cent of the total, despite the fact that a higher percentage of Negroes were in the industry.⁴⁷

Cleveland’s black citizens also had difficulty securing employment in white collar jobs. In 1965, about forty per cent of employed white males had white collar jobs, while only fifteen per cent of employed black males were in jobs of this nature. On the other hand, sixty-three per cent of the black male employed labor force were in blue collar jobs, compared to only forty-nine per cent of the white males in such jobs.⁴⁸ Many government sponsored training programs were instituted in Cleveland in 1965, but most of the Negroes that were selected for these programs were taught semi-skilled professions. Even the status of trainees that completed the training

44. *Ibid.*, p. 792. Staff research.

45. *Ibid.*, pp. 784-786.

46. Bureau of the Census, Series P-23, No. 20, p. 5. Also, Series P-23, No. 21, p. 14.

47. *Civil Rights Commission*, pp. 786-788.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 794.

program funded by the Manpower Development and Training Act indicated that the black citizens of Cleveland were coming out second best. The white trainees reported a rate of unemployment of 18.5% for all white trainees, but the figure for black unemployment out of total black trainees was 26.7%.⁴⁹

The problem of unemployment was compounded by other factors involving black employment. The men and the women of the ghetto, when they were employed, were often relegated to the lowest and most menial positions. Even training programs found fewer of their black graduates employed than the white graduates. The black people of Hough faced great barriers in their attempts to secure gainful employment. Part of the reason they rioted was to pull down some of these barriers.

Inferior Education

Negro students as a group consistently score in the lower ranges on standardized tests, and the divergence between white and Negro academic performance increases over the child's academic career.⁵⁰

Inferior education is the third major component of the ghetto cycle of life. Combined with inadequate housing and unemployment, poor education helps to lock the ghetto inhabitants in their impoverished pattern of life forever. The residents of Hough saw their children receive a segregated and very inadequate education. This condition only increased the bitterness and frustration of the black community.

Cleveland's educational system was based on the neighborhood principle — children attended schools in their own neighborhoods, the schools that had the closest geographical proximity. Residential segregation, therefore, resulted in educational segregation. In October of 1965, eighty-three per cent of all students attending public schools in Cleveland attended schools that were more than ninety-five per cent white or black, in their racial composition. About ninety-one per cent of the students attended schools with eighty per cent or more of a racial imbalance, and in elementary schools, over ninety per cent of the children attended schools with more than ninety five per cent white or black students attending them.⁵¹ Newly constructed schools only perpetuated de facto segregation. In all but two of the twenty-seven new schools that were constructed in the few years prior to 1965, the racial imbalance was greater than ninety per cent. Black teachers were very rare in predominantly white schools — only five per cent of the teachers in the white schools were black. The reverse trend was true in predominantly black schools, and from the statistics presented by the Civil Rights Commission Staff, it was rather obvious that new teachers had been assigned partly on the basis of race. There were twenty-three Negro principals in the school system in 1965, and twenty-one of them supervised schools that were more than ninety-five per cent black. Even in the advanced enrichment programs that were offered to students with high academic potential, more than eighty per cent of the students attended schools with a racial imbalance greater than ninety-five per cent.⁵²

The quality of education in the predominantly Negro school was inferior to that received in, the white schools.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 804.

50. *Civil Rights Commission*, p. 755.

51. *Ibid.*, pp. 750-752. Staff reports.

52. *Ibid.*,

A comparison of standardized test scores showed that by the sixth grade, students in predominantly black schools were more than one grade behind their counterparts at white schools, and this difference had increased from only a half-grade difference that had been present at the first grade level. The results of the Probable Learning Rate Tests also showed that the students at predominantly black schools were learning at a slower rate than other students.⁵³ The dropout rates at the segregated black schools were also much higher than they were at the white schools — 14.6% of the student body per year for black schools compared to 6.5% a year for the white schools.⁵⁴

In 1962, the Greater Cleveland Associated Federation designated a group of citizens to formulate a seven year plan for improving the city's educational system. In April, 1963, the committee made a report of its findings and recommendations, and they focused considerable attention on the deteriorating state of the Cleveland and ghetto school districts. The PACE (Plan for Action by Citizens in Education) report called for a commitment by the entire community to upgrade the quality of the public education in the city. However, in 1965, the staff of the Civil Rights Commission was able to report. "Since publication of the PACE report, there has been little change in the system."⁵⁵ A new school superintendent, Dr. Paul Briggs, was hired in 1964, however, and soon he announced that he intended to eliminate much of the criticism directed at the school system by improving the quality of education and increasing integration. Such progressive ideas, however, had not been very widely implemented by the spring of 1966, and the school system for the vast majority of the city's black citizens remained inferior.

The City of Cleveland spent about one-half as much as some of the richer suburbs for the education of its students. Cleveland's cost per pupils of \$436.90 per year placed it among the very lowest districts in Cuyahoga County, and its student-teacher ratio was the highest in the county at thirty to one.⁵⁶ Thus, even within the city's inadequately staffed and financed school district, the bulk of the black students received an inferior education. This fact was most detrimental to impoverished pockets of black life such as Hough, because in these areas, one of the only hopes of escape was a decent education. The residents of Hough did not receive even that hope.

Hough's black residents thus experienced the classic conditions of discrimination and poverty inadequate housing, unemployment, and inferior education. Other Negroes in the rest of the city also experienced these phenomena to a lesser extent. Only in Hough were these conditions all prevalent simultaneously with a severity not experienced throughout the rest of the city. But even these classic conditions were further compounded by other adverse factors in the Hough community such as inadequate welfare levels and poor police relations. These conditions also collaborated in igniting the destruction and violence of the 1966 summer.

Inadequate Welfare — Aid to Dependent Children

... our present system of public assistance contributes materially to the tensions and social disorganization that have led to civil disorders.⁵⁷

53. *Civil Rights Commission*, p. 755.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 756.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 758.

56. *Ibid.*

57. *Advisory Commission*, p. 457.

There were seven programs of welfare and relief that were administered by the Cuyahoga County Department of Welfare in 1966. The most costly and widespread of these programs was the Aid to Dependent Children (AOC). This relief was directed at families and children without a family head who could provide a source of income. Two-thirds of the program was federally financed, but administration of the welfare was left up to the county units.

Cuyahoga County had a total of 10,311 cases of families on ADC in 1966. About eighty-seven per cent of the persons involved in this welfare were black, and about one out of every four families in Hough were on ADC. To be eligible for payments, a family's income could not exceed \$165 a month. This standard of eligibility placed Ohio sixteenth in the nation despite Ohio's eighth place ranking in per capita income. Other states with high per capita income, such as New York, allowed families to earn much more than \$165 a month without taking them off welfare.

The standard of welfare payments for ADC was set in 1959 and had not been changed since then in spite of the rising cost of living and inflated prices.⁵⁸ Unfortunately, the county did not even meet the 1959 standards in the actual ADC payments made. Instead, in 1966, the average payment was only 76% of the established standard. Payments to a family of four on ADC remained constant during the period from 1960 to 1966, and as a result, the position of the recipients of ADC, in economic terms, had declined drastically.⁵⁹ The ADC payment to a family of four headed by a female, was only seventy-one per cent of the poverty level of existence set by the Social Security Administration in 1964. Even allowing for a food stamp bonus in which a family could receive extra food at minimal cost, the cash payment and medical allowance of the ADC program was still only eighty per cent of the Social Security poverty index.⁶⁰ Food allowance payments averaged only sixty per cent of the standard budget figure set in 1959 for "food and other" expenses. And yet, all other welfare programs administered by the county were paying higher than ninety-five per cent of their standard budgets set in 1959.⁶¹

Hough's dependence on the ADC program resulted in extremely adverse effects for the area because of the inadequate welfare payments. Coupled with the extremely low payments was the problem that merchants in Hough often raised their prices on the tenth of every month, "Mother's Day" as it was known in Hough, when ADC checks were issued. Sales at stores were strategically held at the end of every month when few of the recipients of ADC had any money, and often stores in the area required a certain amount of goods to be purchased before they would cash any ADC checks.⁶²

For an additional child, the incremental payment of ADC worked out to be seventy-three cents a day. Although many persons felt that the welfare structure of Aid to Dependent Children encouraged women to have more children, it was rather dubious that women would have children merely to receive an additional seventy-three cents a day. The program did not reach many ghetto inhabitants that needed welfare and discouraged many recipients from seeking work because of the low eligibility standards. By remaining in the ghetto for extended periods of time, it was only natural for the women on ADC to have large numbers of children, for in a slum like Hough, the next day was the "unimaginable future," and nine months was "an absurdity."⁶³

58. Civil Rights Commission, p. 745. Staff report.

59. *Ibid.*, p. 744.

60. *Ibid.*

61. *Ibid.*, p. 749.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 253. Testimony of panel of women on ADC.

63. Skow, "Can Cleveland?," p. 46.

The welfare structure which prevailed in the ghetto only compounded the adverse conditions that originally led to the need for some form of welfare. The welfare that was received only added further tinder that soon ignited.

Police Practices

There evidently is a sharp difference in feeling toward the police between the Negro and white citizens of Cleveland.⁶⁴

The attitudes of the Hough community toward the police were very apparent once disorder had erupted in the community. Latent hostility and bitterness quickly rose to the surface once the looting and vandalism began in July, and therefore, attitudes toward the police served as an important underlying cause of the rioting once it had begun. The ghetto's feelings were justified by much evidence, but the attitudes were also affected to some extent by Hough's own perception of the facts.

Before, during, and after the disorder had broken out in Hough, it was plain that there were not cordial relationships between the police department and the Hough neighborhood. In the spring hearings of the Civil Rights Commission, there were no witnesses from the black community that claimed the relations were good. Many witnesses related incidents of police brutality, and some complained of deficient protection in the black ghettos. The black community's testimony was almost unanimous in its criticism of the police department. In the days before the riots, a petition to City Hall was circulated door-to-door throughout the Hough neighborhood that expressed "discontent at a seemingly biased and ineffectual Police Department."⁶⁵ During the actual disorders, many residents of the area spoke bitterly of their disdain for the police department. A group of young residents told a reporter that most of the people in Hough were very troubled by the police attitudes, and most people in the ghetto did not have any respect or confidence in the department. one man said, "It would help if the police stopped bugging us all the time, picking up people on the streets for no reason."⁶⁶ Lawyer Stanley Tolliver stated that there was no respect for the police in Hough because of their illicit money-making activities on the side, and Lewis G. Robinson added, "The only hoodlums Tuesday night (second night of the riots) were Mayor Locher's blueshirted hoodlums."⁶⁷ One unidentified nineteen-year-old told reporters that police stopped him to search him with the words, "Stand still, Nigger. Turn around. Nigger." Then they searched him for a knife and in the process ripped some of his clothing.⁶⁸

After the disorders had ended, there were many public utterances and proclamations by black leaders that the present relationships with the Police Department were intolerable. and the head of CORE, Baxter Hill, called for a police surveillance squad in order to "patrol the police."⁶⁹ In the Citizens' Panel hearings, the police were often the subject of discussion, and the bulk of the recommendations in their report centered on methods to improve police-community relations. Much testimony of police brutality and racist attitudes were presented to this

64. Professor John Ronayne, report in *Civil Rights Commission*, p.838.

65. *Cleveland Press*, July 22, 1966.

66. Pat Royse, Hough's Looters Offer 'Bargains'." *Cleveland Press*. July 20, 1966.

67. *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 25, 1966.

68. Pat Royse. "Niles Hurlled Fire Bomb, Tells Why." *Cleveland Press*. July 23, 1966.

69. *Cleveland Press*, August 26, 1966.

committee, demonstrating with little doubt that the black community attitudes were very antagonistic toward the police.

The President's Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders concluded that attitudes toward police had been an important factor in catalyzing the conditions of frustration into destructive action. The Commission stated that the police were symbols of white racism and white repression to many Negroes, and that often police did, in fact, express and reflect these white attitudes. "The atmosphere of hostility and cynicism is reinforced," the Commission added, "by a widespread belief among Negroes in the existence of police brutality and in a 'double standard' of justice and protection — one for Negroes and one for whites."⁷⁰ The statistics and facts of Cleveland serve to partially substantiate such feelings of the black community.

In October, 1965, the Police Department employed 2,021 people despite its budgeted authorization of more than 2,700 persons. Only 133 of the Police Department personnel were black. Of this group, only two men were above the rank of patrolman, and they both were sergeants.⁷¹ Chief Wagner explained that the department was having great difficulty recruiting both white and black applicants, but that it was making every effort to attract qualified Negroes.

The city was divided into six districts, each with an office centrally located within its geographical boundaries, to facilitate law enforcement throughout the entire city. The Fifth District at the police network encompassed the Hough community and included about 18% of the entire city's population. This district, however, witnessed more than a quarter of all the city's crime. Prostitution was the largest single class of vice, and it accounted for more than one-third of the arrests in the district in the three years preceding 1966.⁷² The complaints of the Hough residents were basically within three related categories. First, they believed that police were slower to respond to calls for help within their district. Secondly, the people believed that the police did not enforce the law as strictly in the predominantly black district as they did in other areas. Finally, many people complained about arrest procedures. They thought that the police were often unnecessarily brutal in making arrests, that arrests were often made for no reason, and that complaints of citizens against these abuses were not properly acknowledged.

Statistics of the police department did show that police were slower to respond to calls in the Hough district than in other areas of the city. Appendix Four shows a comparison of the time it took police to respond to calls in the Fifth District to the times for the First and Second Districts, both predominantly white in their composition. The table was compiled from random checks on each district for every day of the week. From the figures, it is clear that the response in Hough was much slower than the response for the two white districts. The Fifth District had the slowest average response in ten of the eleven categories of incidents which occurred in all districts. In the robbery category, response in the Fifth District was about four times slower than in the two white districts, and in cases of burglary and housebreaking without larceny, the response was more than twice as slow.⁷³ The police answered the charges of slower response by claiming that the large number of calls coupled with inadequate equipment made faster response impossible. They did not mention the possibility of reallocating some of their available resources.

70. *Advisory Commission*, p. 11.

71. *Civil Rights Commission*, p. 825.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 826.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 827.

The major thrust of the second complaint that the residents of Hough leveled at the Police Department was that vice offenses were not enforced as strictly in the Hough area as they were in other places. The available statistics did not substantiate this charge. Neither did they disprove it. Arrests for prostitution and gambling increased in the Fifth District in 1965 from the previous year, and police vigorously denied that there was any double standard involved in making arrests.⁷⁴ Total crime in the area had decreased, but this decrease could at least partially be explained by the decrease in population of the district as well as by strict police enforcement. Similarly, the increase in arrests of gamblers and prostitutes did not necessarily indicate a strict policy of enforcement because increases in these vices might have meant that a smaller percentage of offenders were caught. The black community, however, persisted in its belief that the law was more loosely enforced within their district.

There were numerous occasions when Hough residents complained of brutal treatment by the police. However, both police Chief Wagner and Safety Director McCormick proudly claimed that no investigations had ever sustained any case against a member of the Police Department. They neglected to mention that the system of handling complaints that was used by the police was both archaic and ineffective. Complaints were not systematically recorded, and when complaints were received, they were handled in a rather flexible procedure by the ranking officer of the district in which the complaint was lodged. If the complaints were serious enough (as judged by the district officer) they were brought to the attention of Chief Wagner and even Director McCormick. Complaints could also be lodged through the Community Relations Board of city government, but Chief Wagner had kept his men from appearing at the board's hearings to answer charges that were made against them.⁷⁵

The attitudes of some Cleveland policemen were also responsible for much of the black resentment in the ghetto. Professor John Ronayne of Fordham University, in a study of the police department for the Civil Rights Commission, concluded that some police believed "that eighty-five per cent of the crime in Cleveland is committed by Negroes although they only make up about thirty to forty per cent of the city's population."⁷⁶ This attitude partially explained why many black people were picked up in the Fifth District on suspicious person charges. The number of arrests made in other districts on these charges were much lower. Hough residents often complained of being arrested as "suspicious persons," and police records indicated that a higher percentage of people in the Fifth District were arrested and later released without charge in investigations of robbery and prostitution than in the other police districts. Statistics from 1965 indicated that 999 females in the Fifth District had been arrested for investigation of prostitution, but that only 76 were formally charged with the offense. The police said that the reason for this abundance of arrests was that there was often evidence indicative of prostitution (e.g. waving at passing cars, talking to strangers, etc.) that could not have been sufficient to convict the females in courts of law. Therefore, police had liberally arrested known prostitutes and other women who were soliciting business despite the fact that they had too little evidence to charge them or convict them in order to eliminate the vice. However, it was also true that a disproportionate number of black males were arrested in the Fifth District for investigation of robbery.⁷⁷ Thus, the resentment of the black community toward the police department was justified to an extent

74. Civil Rights Commission, p. 839, Report by Professor Ronayne.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 843.

76. *Ibid.*, p. 842.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 843.

through the departments own statistics in the areas of grievances and unnecessary arrests. Instances of police brutality were heavily disputed by the police even though testimony by area residents had frequently revealed mistreatment.

The Hough residents had Some legitimate grievances to air against abuses of policemen in their district. The established mechanisms for handling grievances and complaints were ineffective and unresponsive to the needs of the community. Resentment and bitterness toward the police force ran deeply throughout the black community. Perhaps these attitudes were some of the reasons that the department had such difficulty recruiting any more qualified Negroes. In any case, the hostility of the community toward police authority and practices served as a very real and supporting cause in the ignition and subsequent course of the Hough disorder.

Many other specific factors could be mentioned as underlying contributors to the disorder that occurred in Cleveland. Lack of recreation facilities in the ghetto, relations with white merchants, and family instability were some of these other conditions that were prevalent in Hough.

All of the deplorable conditions in Hough resulted in a pervasive frustration that was ingrained in almost every black resident. The common denominator among all the specific causes of the frustration was the factor of race, and thus, the latent racism of the community led ultimately to the ghetto's deep frustration — a frustration that finally culminated in civil disorder.

Black Frustration

It happened because no one in Cleveland cares anything for us out here.⁷⁸

In all the discussions with rioters throughout the disorders, one word was frequently used — frustration. The residents of Hough were frustrated in attempts to partake in the decision-making process that determined their way of life. The residents of Hough were frustrated in their efforts to secure better and decent housing. The residents of Hough were frustrated when they tried to secure gainful employment and anything but menial jobs. The residents of Hough were frustrated by their inability to improve abusive police practices. And the residents of Hough were frustrated in their efforts to leave the ghetto and improve their socio-economic standing in the community.

Much of the black community regarded the Negroes in city government as sellouts because they were so easily co-opted by the white establishment once they were elected. As a result, many of the-black citizens did not feel that there was any true representation of the black community's interests in the city government. One woman aptly summed up the ghetto's feelings when she told a reporter, "They're (black elected officials) us's when we send them, but they're not us's when they get there."⁷⁹ The remark illustrated the feeling of frustration ingrained in the black citizen even in the area of political influence. Thus, the ghetto dweller found all avenues of hope through which he could win self-esteem blocked — blocked by inadequate education and job discrimination, and by a

78. Robert G. McGruder, "Who Cares Anything for Us?," *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 31, 1966.

79. Skow, "Can Cleveland?," p. 46.

system of political power that did not respond to his needs. Lewis Go Robinson echoed these sentiments when he stated that there was “too much political expediency in the system.”⁸⁰

The symbol of all the frustration that had built up was the ghetto itself. Hough embodied everything that the black man had been forced to accept. Its physical appearance, its way of life, its standards and mores — all reflected the frustration of the black community in its efforts to gain equality in a democracy. Because the ghetto so symbolized the despair and defeat, it was only natural that those who had been forced into it — those whose way of life was mired in an endless downward spiral of poverty and discrimination who had little to lose — should attempt to destroy their own neighborhood. This property held them captive in the ghetto and was a manifestation of white power and supremacy. One rioter succinctly stated this attitude when he remarked, “White man own the place. Prices too high. Like to see it burn.” He later added, with a subdued chuckle, “When people get through, ain’t gonna be no Hough.”⁸¹ Hough symbolized all that was bad for the black citizens of the nation.

It was impossible to identify one specific cause for the Hough riots. As a newspaper reporter accurately asserted at the time of the disorders, it was too late for the city to quickly remedy the problems that were responsible for the riots, “because there (was) ... no one problem at which to point an accusing finger with deadly, bitter certainty.”⁸² A combination of inequities and injustices which were unescapable for the vast numbers of black people who found themselves in these atrocious conditions resulted in a general malaise and frustration which was certain to finally culminate in civil disorder.

Unfortunately, the white community and leadership did not have the empathy to fully understand the situation of the black ghetto and to help alleviate its problems. White from closely knit families in middle class America could not easily comprehend the problems of blacks from broken families in the ghetto. Similarly, the black ghetto dweller had a distorted view of the world around him only because of his limited experience in it. The tragedy of such misunderstanding and frustration was the disorder that claimed human lives and resulted initially in the further polarization of the two communities. The vicious cycle also included violence and destruction.

As Kenneth Clark has pointed out, the poor have always been alienated from society. They are rejected by society because of their low social and economic standing. However, when the poor are black, as they have increasingly become in the major urban centers, “a double trauma exists.”⁸³ The poor black man is also shackled by the bonds of despair and frustration, the resulting evils of racial discrimination. The general frustration that evolved into destructive action emanated [sic] from deeply ingrained racist notions of the Cleveland community.

White Racism

All my life, people been calling me Nigger.⁸⁴

80. Interview with Lewis G. Robinson, January 26, 1968.

81. Royse, "Niles Hurlled."

82. O'Donnell, "Hough Fuse."

83. Clark, *Dark Ghetto*, p. 21.

84. Royse, "Niles Hurlled."

Beneath the complex causes and interrelated phenomena that ignited the five days of disorder in Cleveland was an intrinsic and widespread prejudice against the black man that permeated almost every aspect of the white community.

Every available statistic substantiates the pattern of discrimination in Cleveland — the second class citizenship afforded its black population. The figures show that the black citizens of Cleveland, particularly those of Hough, were much poorer in socio-economic terms than the rest of the community. The average of a black person's education was less than the average for whites, and this disparity was compounded by the inferior quality of education that the blacks received. Median income declined for the black people of Hough while it increased for everyone else. Family instability was more prevalent in Hough than anywhere else in the city. Although individual Negroes were occasionally accepted by the surrounding white society, racism impeded the development of the entire black community of Cleveland. Racism was the primary cause of the high incidence of residential segregation within the city as well as the ramifications of this pattern. Discrimination in employment and labor unions had occurred to a higher degree than anyone in the community wished to admit. Policemen did have different attitudes toward the blacks as a group than they did toward the whites, despite all protestations to the contrary by the Police Chief. Bigotry and prejudice combined to build almost unsurmountable walls that surrounded the Hough ghetto and stymied the advances of the entire black community.

The traditional American dream of upward mobility through rugged individualism was a sham for the black citizen of Cleveland. For other minority groups, assimilation into society has depended only on modification of their traditional cultural and behavioral patterns. The black people have not been so fortunate. Black people must also overcome the barrier of prejudice in their efforts to win full equality.

The walls of the Hough ghetto were erected by a white society with power both to confine those who had no power and to perpetuate the inherent powerlessness of that community. As Kenneth Clark explained, the ghettos that have emerged arose as “social, political, educational, and — above all — economic colonies. Their inhabitants are subject peoples, victims of the greed, cruelty, insensitivity, guilt and fear of their masters.”⁸⁵

The people of Hough, by either their violent actions or quiet acquiescence to the destruction, rebelled against the authority that trapped them in the ghetto. They rebelled against the conditions of their existence. They rebelled against racism.

Cleveland had indeed moved toward two societies, one black, one white — very separate and very unequal. Divisive forces were neither recognized nor heeded by the community. Disorder was the ultimate consequence, and so Hough burned.

The initial impact of the violence only heightened the same divisive forces. Only time would reveal the final significance of the disorders. The new awareness in the white community of the black ghetto's problems was not head-one by reaction to the means of destruction which had produced that new awareness. Progress hinged on the outcome of that encounter.

85. Clark, *Dark Ghetto*, p. 11.

Chapter V: Epilogue--Hough After the Riots

Little change came to Hough in the months following the disorders of the 1966 summer. As a result, the spring of 1967 saw the area inundated with newspaper reporters and journalists, all of whom drew similar conclusions — Hough was going to burn again that summer. Many of the city's residents also expressed such fears, and only hoped that the violence would not spread to outlying areas. The white community demonstrated a fatalistic attitude of helplessness and did not act constructively to stem the tide of frustration in the ghetto.

The physical appearance of Hough did not change from its appearance of the previous summer. The burned-out and vandalized buildings provided an atmosphere of even greater desolation than before. The vacant structures served to further intensify the wasteland appearance of the entire area, and little repair had been done on buildings damaged in the disorders. Overflowing garbage cans still lined the streets accompanied by the unpleasant sight of underclothed and underfed children. Violence and crime continued after the riots throughout the rest of the year. Three white grocers were murdered in the ghetto, and robberies increased by 300%. Fire bombings occurred sporadically, and in April, teenagers mashed some store windows in a twenty-block area of Hough. Between September and March, fifty-nine teachers were assaulted in schools in the neighborhood. Drop-out and unemployment rates continued to be the highest in the city, and welfare payments stayed below the poverty existence level. The Police Department still employed only one hundred and fifty Negroes on the 2100 man force, and the urban renewal program remained ineffective. City leaders still found the conditions of the neighborhood deplorable, but no massive effort to improve these conditions was launched. In the words of one writer, Hough had "been Hough for one more year."¹

Violence and disorder were predicted by everyone. Bertram Gardner joined the Cassandra-like chorus by predicting that the violence of 1967 would be worse than in 1966. He advocated that the city's best course of action for Hough would be "to tear down the whole section."²

Most observers and residents recognized that there was still very little communication between the ghetto and the political leadership, and the local government continued to be rather unresponsive to the needs of the ghetto. Mayor Ralph Locher remained unempathetic and insensitive to the problems of the black people. When Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. announced that Cleveland was to be a summer project of his Southern Christian Leadership Conference and that he personally planned to visit Cleveland, Locher was asked if he planned

1. Skow, "Can Cleveland?," p. 18.

2. Jack Star, "You Can't Stop the Riot That's Coming," *Look*, XXXI, May 30, 1967, p. 96.

to meet with Reverend King. He responded that he would not meet with any "extremists."³ The urban renewal funds for new projects were formally cut off to Cleveland in January, 1967. The city's urban renewal efforts were also hampered by personal disagreements between Locher and Ralph Besse, chairman of the Inner-City Action Committee. Besse offered Locher help in the area of urban renewal on the condition that Locher would appoint the Vice-Chairman of the Inner-City Action Committee to be Urban Renewal Director. Locher refused the offer and help, and so Besse severed relations with Locher, claiming, "The causes (of the problems in Cleveland) are to be found primarily in the inadequacies of executive personnel and almost complete lack of (administrative) coordination."⁴

A few token gains were achieved during the year. Private organizations such as HOPE (Housing Our People Economically) and others succeeded in renewing some of the deteriorated housing in the area, and the city put in new and brighter street lighting throughout the Hough area. Garbage was collected more frequently, and some new training and employment programs were initiated. For example, the Cleveland Economic Opportunity Office established a program called AIM-Jobs. The program was designed to actively seek the unemployed and guarantee them good jobs with advancement opportunities once they completed the training. Each trainee was to have a "coach" in the program who helped him along, and a specially assigned "friend" in his first job. To eliminate early discouragement, those persons who failed the program in their first attempt were placed in the next group of trainees.⁵ However, the gains that were made were only a fraction of what was needed in the city, and so predictions of summer violence and destruction proliferated.

Lewis Robinson said that a peaceful summer in Hough depended on many things. Cooperation from City Hall and the Chamber of Commerce, success of the efforts of Martin Luther King to obtain concessions, and a complete program for the development of the Negro's life in Cleveland were the prerequisites for a "cool summer" in Cleveland according to Robinson. "If all these things happen," Robinson said, "then I'll be out there on the streets telling the kids, 'Cool it. cool it baby. We'll be there in a couple of years.'"⁶ But prospects appeared grim.

Fred A. Evans, a black nationalist leader in Hough, known as Ahmed to his followers, predicted racial violence for May 9, to coincide with a scheduled eclipse of the sun. As the date for the riots approached, the city braced in anxious anticipation, but when the predicted "doomsday" arrived, mass violence did not occur. However, the day was not without a comic incident. Some detectives of the city broke into the editorial offices of the Cleveland Plain Dealer, looking for NBC cameramen who supposedly knew where the riot was going to start.⁷ Police also broke into Ahmed's astrological headquarters in Hough but did not discover anything. There were no riots, and the residents of Cleveland breathed a collective sigh of relief, grateful that they were spared the inevitable for the time being.

The summer of 1967 witnessed the worst series of civil and racial disorders in the history of the United States. Forty-one serious incidents of civil disorder erupted across the country, resulting in almost one hundred deaths and property losses totaling hundreds of millions of dollars. Relations between blacks and whites in America had

3. Roldo S. Bartimole and Murray Gruber, "Cleveland: Recipe for Violence," CCIV, June 26, 1967, p. 817.

4. *Ibid.*

5. Skow, "Can Cleveland?," p. 49.

6. Bob Modic, "Negroes See Unity in King's Campaign." *Cleveland Press*. May 17, 1967.

7. Bartimole and Gruber, "Cleveland: Recipe," p. 816.

reached a crucial point in history, and President Lyndon Johnson appointed an Advisory Commission to study the causes and possible solutions of the many civil disorders. However, despite the many predictions of violence for the summer months, despite the violence and destruction that occurred widely around it in all parts of the country, and despite the fact that conditions had hardly improved in the ghetto, Hough did not explode again.

The explanation behind the cool summer in Cleveland was not a very complex one. State Representative Carl Stokes had once again decided to run for Mayor of Cleveland. To win election in the fall, it was necessary for Stokes, a Negro, to receive more than just the black votes. About twenty-five per cent of the white voters of Cleveland would have to cast their ballots for Stokes to give him a majority, assuming that the black votes were unanimously cast for him. Any disorder or eruption in Hough, therefore, would have greatly diminished Stokes' chances of being elected the first black mayor of a major metropolitan city. As a result, civic leaders of the black community, neighborhood leaders throughout the ghetto, and youth organizations combined to spread the word to "cool it for Stokes." Even leaders like Ahmed Evans participated in this effort to keep the ghetto from exploding, and it worked very well. Some incidents that could have become precipitants for disorder were quickly extinguished, and the hotter individuals were soothed by many farsighted blacks who looked ahead to the fall election.⁸

Much of Cleveland's white "establishment" finally realized that the ineffective and inefficient Locher administration had allowed the city to slide into a sad state of disrepair. Consequently, many of the industrial leaders of the city gave their influential support to Stokes, and he was also endorsed by the Cleveland Plain Dealer, the daily morning newspaper. The Press, the afternoon paper, merely came out against Locher, and thus for either one of his challengers in the Democratic primary — Frank Celeste, the former mayor of a western suburb who had moved into the city to run for mayor (and who had been told that he would receive the Press' endorsement), or Representative Stokes. With the help of these sources of white support and a solid block organization of the black vote, Stokes swept to victory in the October primary to receive the Democratic party nomination.

The only remaining obstacle between Carl Stokes and the mayor's office was the Republican challenger, Seth Taft. Cleveland had a strong Democratic tradition, and Stokes showed great strength in the opinion polls, but the possibility remained that Taft would gain enough white support to nip Stokes in the final election. As the campaign closed, it appeared that Taft had gained some strength, and final public opinion polls showed the contest to be a toss-up.⁹

November 7, 1967 was an historic day in Cleveland and the country. Aided by a turnover of over ninety-five per cent of the registered voters in the black wards, while polling almost twenty-five per cent of the white vote, Carl Stokes slipped by Seth Taft into the office of Mayor of Cleveland. When all the returns were in, they showed Stokes with 50.1% of the vote against Taft's 49.9%¹⁰ Pandemonium engulfed the black sections of Cleveland that night, for it was a victory long in coming. The delirium subsided after a few days, and the community settled back to observe the Stokes administration go to work.

8. Interviews with A. Deane Buchanan, March 15, 1968 and Reverend De Forest Brown, President, Hough Community Council, January 26, 1968.

9. Cleveland Press, November 6, 1967.

10. Ibid., November 8, 1967.

Mayor Stokes encountered some trouble at the beginning of his administration. First, his early appointments showed that he was going to repay his political debts promptly. One of his major appointments was the inexperienced thirty-one year old son of the president of a large Cleveland bank who had avidly supported Stokes' campaign. Then later, when he was vacationing in Puerto Rico, a Press reporter discovered that Stokes' Executive Secretary was also the secretary of a neighborhood illegal bar. She was immediately fired by the Mayor from his vacation spot without his hearing her side of the story, although many observers hinted that Stokes had known the information all along. Both events cost Stokes some support within the black community, and the second incident cost Stokes some respect from both whites and blacks for opposite reasons. The whites were upset about the "scandal" that had been uncovered so early in the administration, while the black community was disturbed by the way in which the incident was handled.

Hough still did not change much. The people living there awakened each morning with their deplorable conditions unaltered. At Christmas of 1967 Hough did not show many decorations, and the area still appeared desolate and depressing. Signs of new construction and renewal appeared sporadically in the neighborhood, but boarded up buildings and vacant lots cast a gloomy pall over the entire area.¹¹

After a few months, the Stokes administration began achieving some of its promised goals. Police were ordered to crack down in arrests involving prostitution by arresting the male participant as well as the female. Such action was ordered to help eliminate the vice from the streets of the ghetto, and to answer some of the criticism that had previously been directed at the Police Department. Mayor Stokes also succeeded in renewing the flow of federal funds for urban renewal projects, although one cynical observer had written that Stokes could have submitted his requests for cash "on Cheerio box tops" and had them "expeditiously approved."¹² A new urban renewal director was attracted by raising the pay to a level higher than that of the Mayor, and the appointment of Richard Greene, an urban expert from Boston, was welcomed by the city as a positive step toward improving the lagging urban renewal effort. Recent studies also showed that some Hough residents were moving out to the suburbs, an opportunity never before afforded the ghetto's residents. As the Stokes administration entered its sixth month, the outlook for the black people of Cleveland was very encouraging.

Some black leaders were less optimistic about the future. Lewis Robinson thought that Stokes' major contribution would only be a psychological one, showing black children that the American dream might still come true.¹³ Wendell Erwin, president of the local chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, thought that Stokes had made some progress so far by working within the system. He believed, however, that substantial gains for the black community would have to wait until "the establishment died out."¹⁴

Progress was being made, though, and its momentum seemed to increase every day of the new administration. It appeared that the election of Carl Stokes would benefit the entire City of Cleveland, and especially its black residents. Assuming that Stokes' election would be an asset to the black community and to Hough specifically, it is clear that the disorders of 1966 played an important role in the progress of the black people.

11. Tour of Hough area taken by author, December 24, 1967.

12. Saul Friedman, "Focus on Cleveland," *National Review*, XIX, November 28, 1967, p. 1336.

13. Interview with Lewis G. Robinson, January 26, 1968.

14. Interview with Wendell Erwin. December 21, 1967.

The riots affected Cleveland's white "establishment" in two different ways. First, by increasing the white awareness of the ghetto's problems, the riots and subsequent events demonstrated effectively that the Locher administration had neither the foresight nor the competence to deal with the pressing problems of the city. Secondly, the industrial and financial leaders were concerned that violence and disorder would erupt in Cleveland again, posing a serious economic and financial hazard for capital investment throughout the entire city. The election of Carl Stokes would increase the competence and responsiveness of the city government as well as lower the probability of future racial disorder. For these reasons, influential business and civic leaders threw their support behind Stokes' candidacy. Many other liberal whites followed the same course of action.

The support of the white leaders was crucial, however, to Stokes' success in the election. Without their endorsement, it is doubtful that he would have received the necessary twenty-five per cent of the white vote that made him a winner. Thus, the Hough riots aided directly in Stokes' election.

Had the conditions of Cleveland been different, the city's black citizens would not have gained as much in the long run. If the civic and business leaders had not been perceptive enough to see the need for change, the city would have made little progress, if any. If the administration in power when the disorder erupted had been slightly more responsive and understanding, the white leadership would have been less likely to support the candidacy of Mayor Stokes, resulting in the sacrifice of long range gains for the Negroes for short term concessions from a white, moderate mayor. And if the black community had not been so united and organized, it is doubtful that Stokes would have won. Thus a combination of newly enlightened civic leadership, an inept incumbent city government, and a unified and organized black community produced the environment that led to the election of Carl Stokes and the possibility of many long term gains for the black citizens of Cleveland.

Tragically, a riot had been necessary to move the City of Cleveland to action. The election of Carl Stokes began a new and brighter period in the history of Cleveland, Ohio. The events of July, 1966, hastened the end of an earlier and more frustrating era.

Postscript

As the last words of this thesis were being written, a bullet in Memphis, Tennessee, tragically ended the life of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The nation, shocked and bereaved by the savage murder, was swept by a wave of violence that descended upon scores of cities in the wake of Dr. King's death. Cleveland, however, stayed "cool."

As the news of the tragedy spread, Mayor Stokes walked and drove through the predominantly black sections of Cleveland, pleading for calm in the restless city. Visibly shaken by the assassination because of their close personal friendship, Mayor Stokes delivered a moving eulogy the following day to an overflow gathering at a memorial service in the Old Stone Church. Later in the day, Stokes huddled with black nationalist leaders in an effort to maintain calm. The efforts at keeping the peace succeeded in Cleveland. At a time when more than one hundred cities experienced mass disorders of some sort, Cleveland was conspicuous as the only major urban center that remained quiet. The calm had not resulted from para-military efforts or through repressive measures. Instead, the peace was maintained primarily through the efforts of Mayor Stokes and black leaders of the community, people who had regained some of their lost faith in the system of democracy. They were able to demonstrate to the dissident black residents that they had a very real stake in the decision-making apparatus of City Hall.

The episode following Dr. King's assassination heralded a change in Mayor Stokes and his administration. Until this time the new mayor had appeared somewhat unsure of himself, groping blindly sometimes for nonexistent solutions; now he projected an infectious new self confidence in his own ability to lead the people of Cleveland toward solutions of their great problems. He now seemed to become the dynamic and vibrant leader that was necessary to move the community ahead. Thus, the assassination of Dr. King marked the beginning of a new period in the leadership of Carl Stokes.

In the ensuing months new ideas, new plans, and new programs were suggested and implemented by the Mayor and his administration. Incorporating an idea of his opponent in the previous election, Mayor Stokes began holding cabinet meetings in various neighborhoods around the city in an effort to move government "closer" to the people. On April 26, the Mayor announced the formation of the Mayor's Council on Youth Opportunity programs, a group whose function would be to find and create jobs for the youth of Cleveland.

Finally, on May 1, Mayor Stokes unveiled plans for a broad new program to combat the urban ills of Cleveland. Entitled "Cleveland: Now!," the plan called for the expenditure of \$177,000,000 for rehabilitation, urban

renewal, economic development, job training and job placement — an attempt to attack the cycle of poverty from many directions. The money for “Cleveland: Now!” was to come primarily through the federal government (\$143,000,000) if the city could raise \$11,250,000 from private sources and pledge an additional \$22,750,000 of state and local government funds. The innovative experiment combining the resources of various levels of government with resources from the private sector of the economy was lauded by many community leaders. Editorial support of the plan poured forth from both newspapers, and it became quite evident that Cleveland was taking a progressive step toward establishing new institutions and programs to rebuild the city. Symbolic evidence of the widespread support for “Cleveland: Now!” came in the form of a \$1000 contribution to the program from two merchants whose salvage business had been completely destroyed in the Hough disorders two years earlier.

Mayor Stokes continued to exert dynamic leadership in other areas. At the polls in the May primary, the voters of Cuyahoga County approved four issues that had been strongly endorsed by the Mayor. These measures provided for the establishment of a Port Authority, more buildings for mentally retarded children, and a renewed as well as an increased County Welfare levy. “Cleveland: Now!” continued to gain popular and financial support, especially when it was announced that a private donation of one million dollars had been given to the program anonymously. Mayor Stokes had united Cleveland’s divergent forces into common action with the plans for “Cleveland: Now!”

Late in May some tension developed between the Mayor and City Council over the Mayor’s recommendation of an income tax hike from $\frac{1}{2}\%$ to 1%. Although the proposed rate increase received wide support from many sources, the Council was reluctant to raise taxes, primarily because it feared the image of being “pressured” into enacting legislation. However, yielding to economic realities as well as persuasion from the Mayor, the Council finally passed the tax hike on June 10 with only three members voting against the measure.

The summer arrived optimistically for most Clevelanders. The Mayor had dramatically demonstrated that he could keep Cleveland “cool,” new programs were being implemented that pushed Cleveland to the forefront among progressive cities, and the long-dormant Indians appeared to have a chance to win the pennant. New cultural attractions and programs in the inner city brought a new dimension to life there, and some people almost forgot that violence had flared in the city only two years before.

The night of July 23 brought the entire city crashing down into reality again. In Glenville, another of Cleveland’s East Side neighborhoods, a group of heavily armed men suddenly opened fire on an unarmed police towning crew. The group, composed chiefly of militant black nationalists and ostensibly led by the renowned Fred “Ahmed” Evans, did not stop shooting until ten persons had died, including three white policemen and a black civilian shot while trying to rescue a policeman. The tense East Side once again tottered on the brink of widespread civil disorder. Some looting and arson followed the attack on the policemen on Tuesday night, forcing Mayor Stokes to ask for the National Guard as a precautionary measure. The following night, with the city anticipating the worst violence, Mayor Stokes took the unprecedented and controversial action of removing all white police and guardsmen from the Glenville and Hough areas to positions on the periphery of the neighborhoods. After meeting with black leaders for much of the day, Stokes had decided to allow the black leaders to assume the responsibility of maintaining calm in the area. Only black policemen were allowed in the cordoned-off zone in a move calculated to avert the further loss of human lives.

The daring move by Stokes was successful. Although vandalism and looting occurred to a moderate degree, there were no more deaths that night. By Thursday it appeared that the crisis had passed, although Mayor Stokes ordered a curfew for the area and sent the National Guard and all police back into the troubled area in an effort to curtail further vandalism and looting.

Many unanswered questions lingered after the brief period of violence that served to tarnish the bright image of Mayor Stokes as well as some of his new programs, despite his courageous handling of the situation. A reporter discovered that “Ahmed” Evans had received “Cleveland: Now!” money to establish a black cultural center but that some of the money allegedly had been used to purchase weapons for the Tuesday night encounter. The method of distributing the funds came under severe criticism, even though other such efforts had been successful in the past. The police also claimed to have had prior knowledge of the arms cache of the black nationalists, but that orders from City Hall had prevented them from taking any action before the violence broke out. The actual facts of the circumstances surrounding the event were not readily available.

The police and other embittered sections of the community openly criticized the Mayor and his actions during the crisis. However, a broad cross section of community leaders were persuaded to rally to support the Mayor’s handling of the situation, and it seemed that any damage to Mayor Stokes or his programs was not irreparable.

As the Summer entered its final month, the black community no longer remained unified behind Mayor Stokes. A small and violently militant faction had given up on the system and sought to destroy it, but their actions appeared to be of a different nature than those that had characterized the Hough disorders of 1966. However, a segment of the black community, convinced that present institutions were not flexible enough to produce significant and lasting change, remained skeptical of Mayor Stokes and his attempts to effect change within the system. Others, though, recognized the innovative and exciting spirit that had permeated the city since Stokes’ election and retained their faith in the democratic process. There is little doubt that this new brand of leadership will be increasingly necessary in the future if the cities are to survive.

Contemporary history never quite catches up to itself. Analysis ages quickly in the rapid cycle of human affairs, and the future is impossible to foresee. The administration of Mayor Stokes has met with both success and failure during its brief tenure. However, its greatest success so far, as demonstrated by Stokes’ handling of the Glenville violence, has been to restore hope and faith to Cleveland and to provide the bold and aggressive leadership required to cope with the severe problems of the urban centers. Some wrong turns have been taken and some efforts have been made to impede its motion, but the City of Cleveland is at last moving down the tracks toward progress. A return trip won’t be necessary.

August 1, 1968 Marc E. Lackritz

Appendix 1

Ages of Participants:

<i>Age</i>	<i>No. of Participants</i>	<i>Age</i>	<i>No. of Participants</i>
18 yrs	4	29 yrs	3
19	17	30	2
20	3	31	3
21	3	32	0
22	4	33	0
23	4	34	3
24	1	38	1
25	3	40	1
26	2	48	1
27	0	50	1
28	1	52	1

Median – 22 yrs.

Average – 25 yrs.

Source: Compiled from newspaper accounts, July 25-August 2, 1966.

Appendix 2

Suburban Statistics

*SUBURBS HAVE MORE LAND, HIGH INCOME FAMILIES
AND PEOPLE, BUT FEWER JOBS AND NON-WHITES*

	<i>Suburbs</i>	<i>Central City</i>
<i>Total land area</i>	89%	11%
<i>Family incomes above Metro Area's Median</i>	65%	35%
<i>Total population</i>	56%	44%
<i>Jobs</i>	28%	72%
<i>Area's non-whites</i>	3%	97%

Source: Hearing before United States Commission on Civil Rights, April 1-7, 1966, p. 205. (Figures from 1959-60).

Appendix 3

Percentage Change in Racial Balance For Each Tract In Hough:

% Black

<i>Tract</i>	<i>1960</i>	<i>1965</i>	<i>Increase</i>
<i>L-1</i>	<i>57.3%</i>	<i>78.6%</i>	<i>+ 21.3</i>
<i>L-2</i>	<i>80.5</i>	<i>93.4</i>	<i>+ 12.9</i>
<i>L-3</i>	<i>83.8</i>	<i>93.1</i>	<i>+ 9.5</i>
<i>L-4</i>	<i>91.3</i>	<i>97.0</i>	<i>+ 5.7</i>
<i>L-5</i>	<i>88.8</i>	<i>95.3</i>	<i>+ 6.5</i>
<i>L-6</i>	<i>88.6</i>	<i>97.7</i>	<i>+ 9.1</i>
<i>L-7</i>	<i>64.0</i>	<i>70.9</i>	<i>+ 6.9</i>
<i>L-8</i>	<i>68.0</i>	<i>88.0</i>	<i>+ 20.0</i>
<i>R-6</i>	<i>69.7</i>	<i>83.7</i>	<i>+ 14.0</i>
<i>R-9</i>	<i>43.9</i>	<i>74.9</i>	<i>+ 31.0</i>
<i>Total</i>	<i>73.7</i>	<i>87.9</i>	<i>+14.2</i>

Source: Computed from Bureau of the Census, "1960 Census," and "Special Census of Cleveland, Ohio, April, 1965," Series P-28, No. 390, November 5, 1965.

Appendix 4

Police Response to Calls

	5th District		1st District		2nd District	
	<i>Calls Av.</i>	<i>Response(min.)</i>	<i>Calls Av.</i>	<i>Response(min.)</i>	<i>Calls Av.</i>	<i>Response(min.)</i>
<i>Misc. Police Service</i>	1,492	13.7	714	8.5	996	9.3
<i>Traffic Accidents</i>	144	18.0	102	7.0	137	10.1
<i>Larceny</i>	54	18.8	36	15.2	38	10.2
<i>Burglary & Housebreaking with Larceny</i>	33	19.3	11	8.0	14	17.4
<i>Burglary & Housebreaking s/o Larceny</i>	22	20.1	10	8.5	9	4.5
<i>Criminal Homicide</i>	7	3.4	–	–	–	–
<i>Assault and Battery</i>	58	11.8	10	13.5	17	7.3
<i>Robbery</i>	24	12.0	1	1.0	21	2.9
<i>Rape</i>	2	61.0	1	4.0	–	–
<i>Auto Thefts</i>	44	22.4	14	8.5	20	5.8
<i>Disorderly Conduct</i>	23	29.0	8	9.4	20	15.8
<i>Drunkenness</i>	20	15.7	15	4.5	22	13.4
<i>All Others</i>	29	11.0	4	9.3	19	10.9
<i>Totals</i>	1,952	14.6	926	8.6	1,313	9.5

Source: Computed from Civil Rights Commission, p. 827. Staff report.

Basic Church Planning Studies

Report No. 1	September	1960	<i>The Church in a Changing Neighborhood</i>	<i>Out of Print</i>
Report No. 2	November	1960	<i>Planning for Protestantism in Interurbia</i>	<i>O.P</i>
Report No. 3	February	1961	<i>Planning for Protestantism in Northeastern Lorain County</i>	<i>O.P</i>
Report No. 4	April	1961	<i>Planning for Protestantism on Cleveland's Near West Side</i>	<i>O.P</i>
Report No. 5	May	1961	<i>Urban Renewal and the Church</i>	<i>O.P</i>
Report No. 6	June	1961	<i>The Church in Southwestern Akron</i>	<i>O.P</i>
Report No. 7	July	1961	<i>Planning for Protestantism in Geauga County</i>	<i>O.P</i>
Report No. 8	August	1961	<i>The Church and Public Housing</i>	<i>O.P</i>
Report No. 9	September	1961	<i>Th Church in Kent</i>	<i>O.P</i>
Report No. 10	October	1961	<i>The Church in Glenville</i>	<i>O.P</i>
Report No. 11	November	1961	<i>The Church in University-Euclid</i>	<i>O.P</i>
Report No. 12	December	1961	<i>Planning for Protestantism in Lake County</i>	\$4.00
Report No. 13	February	1962	<i>Annual Report for Nineteen Sixty-One</i>	\$2.00
Report No. 14	May	1962	<i>The Church in Changing Suburb</i>	\$5.00
Report No. 15	August	1962	<i>Planning for Protestantism in Bath-Richfield</i>	\$2.00
Report No. 16	October	1962	<i>The Church in Clark-Denison</i>	\$4.00
Report No. 17	April	1963	<i>Church Related Housing Projects</i>	<i>O.P</i>
Report No. 18	April	1963	<i>Annual Report for Nineteen Sixty-Two</i>	\$2.00
Report No. 19	October	1963	<i>Suburbanization of the Negro Population</i>	<i>O.P</i>
Report No. 20	November	1963	<i>The Church in Akron</i>	\$7.00
Report No. 21	January	1964	<i>The Church on Lee Road</i>	\$2.00
Report No. 22	March	1964	<i>Annual Report for Nineteen Sixty-Three</i>	\$2.00
Report No. 23	April	1964	<i>Planning for Protestantism in Northern Summit Co.</i>	\$5.00
Report No. 24	May	1964	<i>Race and Poverty</i>	<i>O.P</i>
Report No. 25	September	1964	<i>Planning for Protestantism in Southern Summit Co.</i>	\$3.00
Report No. 26	December	1964	<i>Planning for Protestantism in Medina County</i>	\$3.00
Report No. 27	June	1965	<i>Annual Report for Nineteen Sixty-Four</i>	\$4.00
Report No. 28	November	1965	<i>The Church in Woodland Hills</i>	\$3.00
Report No. 29	December	1965	<i>The Lutheran Churches of Northeastern Ohio</i>	\$2.00
Report No. 30	February	1966	<i>The Churches in Northeastern Ohio</i>	\$2.00
Report No. 31	May	1966	<i>The Church in Lakewood</i>	\$4.00
Report No. 32	June	1966	<i>Annual Report for Nineteen Sixty-Five</i>	\$2.00
Report No. 33	December	1966	<i>Trends Affecting New Church Development</i>	\$3.00

<i>Report No. 34</i>	<i>January</i>	<i>1967</i>	<i>Cooperative Ministries</i>	<i>\$2.00</i>
<i>Report No. 35</i>	<i>March</i>	<i>1967</i>	<i>Church Building</i>	<i>\$1.00</i>
<i>Report No. 36</i>	<i>March</i>	<i>1967</i>	<i>Annual Report for Nineteen Sixty-Six</i>	<i>\$2.00</i>
<i>Report No. 37</i>	<i>May</i>	<i>1967</i>	<i>Methodist Salary Study</i>	<i>\$1.00</i>
<i>Report No. 38</i>	<i>August</i>	<i>1967</i>	<i>Organizing for Mission</i>	<i>\$2.00</i>
<i>Report No. 39</i>	<i>September</i>	<i>1967</i>	<i>The Challenge of Change</i>	<i>\$2.00</i>
<i>Report No. 40</i>	<i>December</i>	<i>1967</i>	<i>The Coming Crisis in New Church Development</i>	<i>\$2.00</i>
<i>Report No. 41</i>	<i>January</i>	<i>1968</i>	<i>Who Joins a New Mission?</i>	<i>\$3.00</i>
<i>Report No. 42</i>	<i>April</i>	<i>1968</i>	<i>Annual Report for Nineteen Sixty-Seven</i>	<i>\$2.00</i>
<i>Report No. 43</i>	<i>July</i>	<i>1968</i>	<i>The Hough Riots of 1966</i>	<i>\$2.00</i>
<i>Report No. 44</i>	<i>August</i>	<i>1968</i>	<i>Ecclesiastical Boundaries</i>	<i>\$3.00</i>
<i>Report No. 45</i>	<i>August</i>	<i>1968</i>	<i>Collinwood Revisited</i>	<i>\$2.00</i>
<i>Report No. 46</i>	<i>September</i>	<i>1968</i>	<i>Planning for Tomorrow's Church in Guyana</i>	<i>\$3.00</i>
<i>Report No. 47</i>	<i>September</i>	<i>1968</i>	<i>The Churches on Cleveland's West Side</i>	<i>\$3.00</i>