{"id":105,"date":"2021-03-23T15:25:44","date_gmt":"2021-03-23T15:25:44","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/chapter\/7-of-truthfulness\/"},"modified":"2026-07-03T00:58:20","modified_gmt":"2026-07-03T00:58:20","slug":"7-genuineness","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/chapter\/7-genuineness\/","title":{"rendered":"Section 7: Genuineness"},"content":{"raw":"The mean opposed to being phony is found in almost the same sphere and is also without a usual name. It wouldn't be a bad idea, then, to describe these dispositions as well. For we shall both know the facts about [15]<\/sub> character better if we go through them in detail, and we shall be convinced that the virtues are means if we see this to be so in all cases. In the field of social life, those who make the giving of pleasure or pain their goal in associating with others have been described. Let us now describe those who pursue truth or falsehood alike in words and actions and in the claims they put forward. [20]<\/sub>\r\n\r\nThe phony person, then, is thought to be someone who tends to claim the things that bring him glory when he has not got them, or to claim more of them than he has. In contrast, the self-deprecating person tends to disclaim what he has or belittle it. The person who observes the mean is one who calls a thing by its own name, being truthful and genuine both in life and in word, owning to what he has, and neither more nor less. [25]<\/sub>\r\n\r\nNow each of these approaches to social life may be adopted either with or without a goal. But each person speaks and acts and lives in accordance with his character, if he is not acting for some ulterior motive. And falsehood is in itself base and culpable, and truth noble and worthy of praise. Thus the genuine or truthful person is another case of a person who, being in the mean, is worthy of praise, [30]<\/sub> and both forms of the ungenuine person are blameworthy, and particularly the phony.\r\n\r\nLet us discuss them both, but first of all the genuine person. We are not speaking of the person who follows through on his agreements. That is, we are not talking about matters that pertain to justice or injustice (for this would belong to another virtue). Instead, we are talking about the person who in the matters in which nothing of this sort is at stake [1127b1]<\/sub> is genuine and true both in word and in life because his character is such. But such a person would seem to be as a matter of fact equitable. For the person who loves truth, and is genuine and truthful where nothing is at stake, will still more be genuine and truthful where something is at stake. The genuine person will avoid falsehood as something shameful, [5]<\/sub> seeing that he avoided it even for its own sake. And such a person is worthy of praise. He inclines rather to understate the truth. For this seems in better taste because exaggerations are more offensive.\r\n\r\nHe who claims more than he has with no ulterior motive is a contemptible sort of fellow, otherwise he would not have delighted [10]<\/sub> in falsehood. But he seems more to be vain and foolish than bad. But if he does it for some goal, he who does it for the sake of reputation or honor is not very much to be blamed, but he who does it for money, or the things that lead to money, is an uglier character, as a person is a liar because he enjoys the lie itself, [15]<\/sub> and another person is a liar because he desires reputation or gain. It is not the capacity that makes the phony person, but the purpose. For it is in virtue of his state of character and by being a person of a certain kind that he is phony.\r\n\r\nNow those who are phony or put on a facade for the sake of reputation claim such qualities as will bring praise or congratulation. But those whose goal in being phony is profit claim qualities which are of value to one's neighbors and one's lack of which is not easily detected; for example, the powers of a seer, a sage, or a physician. For this reason, [20] it is such things as these that most people claim and are false about, since in them the above-mentioned qualities are found.\r\n\r\nSelf-deprecating people, who understate things, seem more attractive in character, since they are thought to speak not for gain but to avoid pomposity. And here too it is qualities which bring reputation that they disclaim, as Socrates [25]<\/sub> used to do. Those who disclaim trifling and obvious qualities are called \"affected\" and are more contemptible. And sometimes this seems to be phony, like the Spartan dress. For both excess and great deficiency are ways of being phony. But those who use understatement with moderation and understate about matters that do not very much force themselves [30]<\/sub> on our notice seem attractive. And it is the phony person that seems to be opposed to the genuine one, since he is the worse character.","rendered":"

The mean opposed to being phony is found in almost the same sphere and is also without a usual name. It wouldn’t be a bad idea, then, to describe these dispositions as well. For we shall both know the facts about [15]<\/sub> character better if we go through them in detail, and we shall be convinced that the virtues are means if we see this to be so in all cases. In the field of social life, those who make the giving of pleasure or pain their goal in associating with others have been described. Let us now describe those who pursue truth or falsehood alike in words and actions and in the claims they put forward. [20]<\/sub><\/p>\n

The phony person, then, is thought to be someone who tends to claim the things that bring him glory when he has not got them, or to claim more of them than he has. In contrast, the self-deprecating person tends to disclaim what he has or belittle it. The person who observes the mean is one who calls a thing by its own name, being truthful and genuine both in life and in word, owning to what he has, and neither more nor less. [25]<\/sub><\/p>\n

Now each of these approaches to social life may be adopted either with or without a goal. But each person speaks and acts and lives in accordance with his character, if he is not acting for some ulterior motive. And falsehood is in itself base and culpable, and truth noble and worthy of praise. Thus the genuine or truthful person is another case of a person who, being in the mean, is worthy of praise, [30]<\/sub> and both forms of the ungenuine person are blameworthy, and particularly the phony.<\/p>\n

Let us discuss them both, but first of all the genuine person. We are not speaking of the person who follows through on his agreements. That is, we are not talking about matters that pertain to justice or injustice (for this would belong to another virtue). Instead, we are talking about the person who in the matters in which nothing of this sort is at stake [1127b1]<\/sub> is genuine and true both in word and in life because his character is such. But such a person would seem to be as a matter of fact equitable. For the person who loves truth, and is genuine and truthful where nothing is at stake, will still more be genuine and truthful where something is at stake. The genuine person will avoid falsehood as something shameful, [5]<\/sub> seeing that he avoided it even for its own sake. And such a person is worthy of praise. He inclines rather to understate the truth. For this seems in better taste because exaggerations are more offensive.<\/p>\n

He who claims more than he has with no ulterior motive is a contemptible sort of fellow, otherwise he would not have delighted [10]<\/sub> in falsehood. But he seems more to be vain and foolish than bad. But if he does it for some goal, he who does it for the sake of reputation or honor is not very much to be blamed, but he who does it for money, or the things that lead to money, is an uglier character, as a person is a liar because he enjoys the lie itself, [15]<\/sub> and another person is a liar because he desires reputation or gain. It is not the capacity that makes the phony person, but the purpose. For it is in virtue of his state of character and by being a person of a certain kind that he is phony.<\/p>\n

Now those who are phony or put on a facade for the sake of reputation claim such qualities as will bring praise or congratulation. But those whose goal in being phony is profit claim qualities which are of value to one’s neighbors and one’s lack of which is not easily detected; for example, the powers of a seer, a sage, or a physician. For this reason, [20] it is such things as these that most people claim and are false about, since in them the above-mentioned qualities are found.<\/p>\n

Self-deprecating people, who understate things, seem more attractive in character, since they are thought to speak not for gain but to avoid pomposity. And here too it is qualities which bring reputation that they disclaim, as Socrates [25]<\/sub> used to do. Those who disclaim trifling and obvious qualities are called “affected” and are more contemptible. And sometimes this seems to be phony, like the Spartan dress. For both excess and great deficiency are ways of being phony. But those who use understatement with moderation and understate about matters that do not very much force themselves [30]<\/sub> on our notice seem attractive. And it is the phony person that seems to be opposed to the genuine one, since he is the worse character.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":249,"menu_order":7,"template":"","meta":{"pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[48],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-105","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry","chapter-type-numberless"],"part":92,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/105","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/249"}],"version-history":[{"count":9,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/105\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1039,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/105\/revisions\/1039"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/92"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/105\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=105"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=105"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=105"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=105"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}