{"id":114,"date":"2021-03-23T15:49:27","date_gmt":"2021-03-23T15:49:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/chapter\/2-of-justice-2-fairness-how-related-to-justice-1-what-is-just-in-distribution-distinguished-from-what-is-just-in-correction\/"},"modified":"2026-07-10T14:55:17","modified_gmt":"2026-07-10T14:55:17","slug":"2-particular-justice","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/chapter\/2-particular-justice\/","title":{"rendered":"Section 2: Particular justice"},"content":{"raw":"
\r\n

Particular justice (justice as fairness) differentiated from universal justice (justice as lawfulness)<\/h3>\r\nWhat we are looking for, however, is the justice that is a part<\/em> of virtue. For there is a justice of this kind, as we maintain. Similarly, it is with injustice in the particular sense that we are concerned. [15]<\/sub>\r\n\r\nThat there is such a thing is indicated by this: A person who exhibits in action other kinds of wickedness acts wrongly, but not greedily--for example, the person who throws away his shield through cowardice or speaks harshly through bad temper or fails to help a friend with money through stinginess. In contrast, when someone is greedy, he often exhibits none of these vices and certainly [20] <\/sub>not all of them together. But it is certainly wickedness of some kind (for we blame it), namely, wickedness with injustice. There is, then, this kind of injustice [i.e., particular injustice] that is a part of \"injustice\" in the wider, universal sense. In this way something can be unjust by being part of what is \"unjust\" in the wider sense of \"contrary to the law.\"\r\n\r\nFurther, if one person commits adultery for the sake of gain and makes money by it, while another does so at the bidding of appetite [25]<\/sub> even though he loses money and is penalized for it, the latter would be held to be intemperate rather than greedy. The former, however, is unjust [in the narrow, particular sense], but not intemperate. Evidently, therefore, the person who commits adultery for the sake of gain or money is unjust [in the narrow, particular sense].\r\n\r\nAgain, all other unjust actions are ascribed invariably to some particular kind of wickedness--for example, adultery to intemperance, the desertion of a comrade in battle to cowardice, [30]<\/sub> physical violence to anger. But if a person makes gain, his action is ascribed to no form of wickedness except for injustice.\r\n\r\nEvidently, therefore, in addition to injustice in the universal sense, there is another, \"particular,\" injustice which shares the name and nature of the first, because its definition falls within the same genus. For both consist in a relation to one's neighbor. [1130b1]<\/sub> But particular injustice is concerned with honor or money or safety--or that which includes all these, if we had a single name for it--and its motive is the pleasure that arises from gain. Universal injustice, in contrast, is concerned with all the things with which the good person is concerned. [5]<\/sub>\r\n\r\nIt is clear, then, that there is more than one kind of justice, and that there is one which is distinct from virtue entire. We must try to grasp its genus and differentia.\r\n\r\nThe unjust has been divided into the unlawful and the unfair, and the just into the lawful and the fair. To the unlawful answers the early mentioned sense of injustice. But since [10]<\/sub> the unfair and the unlawful are not the same, but are different as a part is from its whole--for all that is unfair is unlawful, but not all that is unlawful is unfair--the unjust and injustice in the sense of the unfair are not the same as but different from the former kind, as part from whole. For injustice in this sense is a part of injustice in the wide sense, and similarly justice in this sense part [15]<\/sub> of justice in the wide sense. Therefore, we must also speak about particular justice and particular injustice, and about what is just and the unjust in this sense.\r\n\r\nWe can leave aside, then, the [universal] justice that answers to the whole of virtue, and the corresponding [universal] injustice, the former being the exercise of virtue as a whole toward one's neighbor, and the latter that of vice as a whole towards one's neighbor. [20]<\/sub> And how the meanings of \"just\" and \"unjust\" which answer to these are to be distinguished is evident. For practically the majority of the actions commanded by the law are those which are prescribed from the point of view of virtue taken as a whole. For the law bids us practice every virtue and forbids us to practice any vice. And the things that tend to produce virtue taken as a whole are those of the actions prescribed by the laws [25]<\/sub> that have been prescribed with a view to education for the common good. But with regard to the education of the individual as such, which makes the individual without qualification a good person, we must determine later whether this is the function of political wisdom or of another discipline. For perhaps it is not the same to be a good person and a good citizen of any society taken at random.\r\n

Particular justice divided into distributive and corrective justice<\/h3>\r\nOf particular justice and that which is just in the corresponding sense, (A) one kind [i.e., distributive justice] is that which is manifested [30]<\/sub> in distributions of honor or money or the other things that fall to be divided among those who have a share in the constitution (for in these it is possible for one person to have a share either unequal or equal to that of another), and (B) another kind [i.e., corrective justice] is that which plays a rectifying or correcting part in transactions between person and person. Of corrective justice there are two divisions: [1131a1]<\/sub> Of transactions (1) some are voluntary and (2) others involuntary--the voluntary are such transactions as sale, purchase, loan for consumption, pledging, loan for use, depositing, letting (they are called voluntary [5]<\/sub> because the origin of these transactions is voluntary), while of the involuntary (a) some are clandestine, such as theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, enticement of slaves, assassination, false witness, and (b) others are violent, such as assault, imprisonment, murder, robbery with violence, mutilation, abuse, insult.\r\n\r\n<\/div>","rendered":"
\n

Particular justice (justice as fairness) differentiated from universal justice (justice as lawfulness)<\/h3>\n

What we are looking for, however, is the justice that is a part<\/em> of virtue. For there is a justice of this kind, as we maintain. Similarly, it is with injustice in the particular sense that we are concerned. [15]<\/sub><\/p>\n

That there is such a thing is indicated by this: A person who exhibits in action other kinds of wickedness acts wrongly, but not greedily–for example, the person who throws away his shield through cowardice or speaks harshly through bad temper or fails to help a friend with money through stinginess. In contrast, when someone is greedy, he often exhibits none of these vices and certainly [20] <\/sub>not all of them together. But it is certainly wickedness of some kind (for we blame it), namely, wickedness with injustice. There is, then, this kind of injustice [i.e., particular injustice] that is a part of “injustice” in the wider, universal sense. In this way something can be unjust by being part of what is “unjust” in the wider sense of “contrary to the law.”<\/p>\n

Further, if one person commits adultery for the sake of gain and makes money by it, while another does so at the bidding of appetite [25]<\/sub> even though he loses money and is penalized for it, the latter would be held to be intemperate rather than greedy. The former, however, is unjust [in the narrow, particular sense], but not intemperate. Evidently, therefore, the person who commits adultery for the sake of gain or money is unjust [in the narrow, particular sense].<\/p>\n

Again, all other unjust actions are ascribed invariably to some particular kind of wickedness–for example, adultery to intemperance, the desertion of a comrade in battle to cowardice, [30]<\/sub> physical violence to anger. But if a person makes gain, his action is ascribed to no form of wickedness except for injustice.<\/p>\n

Evidently, therefore, in addition to injustice in the universal sense, there is another, “particular,” injustice which shares the name and nature of the first, because its definition falls within the same genus. For both consist in a relation to one’s neighbor. [1130b1]<\/sub> But particular injustice is concerned with honor or money or safety–or that which includes all these, if we had a single name for it–and its motive is the pleasure that arises from gain. Universal injustice, in contrast, is concerned with all the things with which the good person is concerned. [5]<\/sub><\/p>\n

It is clear, then, that there is more than one kind of justice, and that there is one which is distinct from virtue entire. We must try to grasp its genus and differentia.<\/p>\n

The unjust has been divided into the unlawful and the unfair, and the just into the lawful and the fair. To the unlawful answers the early mentioned sense of injustice. But since [10]<\/sub> the unfair and the unlawful are not the same, but are different as a part is from its whole–for all that is unfair is unlawful, but not all that is unlawful is unfair–the unjust and injustice in the sense of the unfair are not the same as but different from the former kind, as part from whole. For injustice in this sense is a part of injustice in the wide sense, and similarly justice in this sense part [15]<\/sub> of justice in the wide sense. Therefore, we must also speak about particular justice and particular injustice, and about what is just and the unjust in this sense.<\/p>\n

We can leave aside, then, the [universal] justice that answers to the whole of virtue, and the corresponding [universal] injustice, the former being the exercise of virtue as a whole toward one’s neighbor, and the latter that of vice as a whole towards one’s neighbor. [20]<\/sub> And how the meanings of “just” and “unjust” which answer to these are to be distinguished is evident. For practically the majority of the actions commanded by the law are those which are prescribed from the point of view of virtue taken as a whole. For the law bids us practice every virtue and forbids us to practice any vice. And the things that tend to produce virtue taken as a whole are those of the actions prescribed by the laws [25]<\/sub> that have been prescribed with a view to education for the common good. But with regard to the education of the individual as such, which makes the individual without qualification a good person, we must determine later whether this is the function of political wisdom or of another discipline. For perhaps it is not the same to be a good person and a good citizen of any society taken at random.<\/p>\n

Particular justice divided into distributive and corrective justice<\/h3>\n

Of particular justice and that which is just in the corresponding sense, (A) one kind [i.e., distributive justice] is that which is manifested [30]<\/sub> in distributions of honor or money or the other things that fall to be divided among those who have a share in the constitution (for in these it is possible for one person to have a share either unequal or equal to that of another), and (B) another kind [i.e., corrective justice] is that which plays a rectifying or correcting part in transactions between person and person. Of corrective justice there are two divisions: [1131a1]<\/sub> Of transactions (1) some are voluntary and (2) others involuntary–the voluntary are such transactions as sale, purchase, loan for consumption, pledging, loan for use, depositing, letting (they are called voluntary [5]<\/sub> because the origin of these transactions is voluntary), while of the involuntary (a) some are clandestine, such as theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, enticement of slaves, assassination, false witness, and (b) others are violent, such as assault, imprisonment, murder, robbery with violence, mutilation, abuse, insult.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"author":249,"menu_order":2,"template":"","meta":{"pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[48],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-114","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry","chapter-type-numberless"],"part":111,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/114","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/249"}],"version-history":[{"count":8,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/114\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1077,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/114\/revisions\/1077"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/111"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/114\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=114"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=114"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=114"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=114"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}