{"id":122,"date":"2021-03-25T09:57:57","date_gmt":"2021-03-25T09:57:57","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/chapter\/6-one-can-act-unjustly-without-being-unjust-that-which-is-just-in-the-strict-sense-is-between-citizens-only-for-it-implies-law\/"},"modified":"2026-07-16T21:48:31","modified_gmt":"2026-07-16T21:48:31","slug":"6-political-justice","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/chapter\/6-political-justice\/","title":{"rendered":"Section 6: Political justice"},"content":{"raw":"Since acting unjustly does not necessarily imply being unjust, we must ask what sort of unjust acts imply that the doer is unjust with respect to each type of injustice: for example, a thief, an adulterer, or a pirate. Surely the answer does not turn on the difference between these types. For a person might even sleep with a woman knowing who she is, but the origin of his action might be not a deliberate choice [20]<\/sub> but passionate desire. He certainly acts unjustly but is not unjust--for instance, someone is not a thief, although he stole, nor an adulterer, although he committed adultery, and similarly in all other cases.\r\n\r\nNow we have previously stated how the reciprocal is related to the just. But we must not forget that what we are looking for is not only what is just without qualification but also [25]<\/sub> political justice. This is found among people who share their life with a view to self-sufficiency, people who are free and either proportionately or arithmetically equal, so that between those who do not fulfil this condition there is no political justice but justice in a special sense and by analogy. For justice exists only between people whose mutual relations are governed by law. [30]<\/sub> And law exists for people between whom there is injustice. For legal justice is the discrimination of the just and the unjust. And between people among whom there is injustice there is also unjust action (although there is not injustice between all among whom there is unjust action), and this is assigning too much to oneself of things good in themselves and too little of things evil in themselves.\r\n\r\nThis is why we do not allow a human being to rule, but reason, because [35]<\/sub> a human rules for himself and thus becomes a tyrant. A genuine ruler, in contrast, is the guardian [1134b1]<\/sub> of justice, and, if of justice, then of equality also. And since he is assumed to have no more than his share, if he is just (for he does not assign to himself more of what is good in itself, unless such a share is proportional to his merits--so that it is for others that he labors, and it is for this reason that people, as we stated previously, say that justice [5]<\/sub> is \"another's good\"), a reward must be given him, and this reward is honor and privilege. But those for whom such things are not enough become tyrants.\r\n\r\nThe justice of a master and that of a father are not the same as the justice of citizens, although they are like it. For there can be no injustice in the unqualified sense towards things that are one's own, but one's possessions and one's child, [10]<\/sub> until it reaches a certain age and is out on its own, are as it were part of oneself. And no one chooses to hurt himself, which is why there can be no injustice towards oneself. Therefore, the justice or injustice of citizens is not manifested in these relationships. For justice was as we saw according to law, and between people naturally subject to law, and these, as we saw, are people who have an equal share in ruling and being ruled. Hence [15]<\/sub> justice can more truly be manifested towards one's wife than towards children and possessions. For this is household justice. But even this is different from political justice.","rendered":"

Since acting unjustly does not necessarily imply being unjust, we must ask what sort of unjust acts imply that the doer is unjust with respect to each type of injustice: for example, a thief, an adulterer, or a pirate. Surely the answer does not turn on the difference between these types. For a person might even sleep with a woman knowing who she is, but the origin of his action might be not a deliberate choice [20]<\/sub> but passionate desire. He certainly acts unjustly but is not unjust–for instance, someone is not a thief, although he stole, nor an adulterer, although he committed adultery, and similarly in all other cases.<\/p>\n

Now we have previously stated how the reciprocal is related to the just. But we must not forget that what we are looking for is not only what is just without qualification but also [25]<\/sub> political justice. This is found among people who share their life with a view to self-sufficiency, people who are free and either proportionately or arithmetically equal, so that between those who do not fulfil this condition there is no political justice but justice in a special sense and by analogy. For justice exists only between people whose mutual relations are governed by law. [30]<\/sub> And law exists for people between whom there is injustice. For legal justice is the discrimination of the just and the unjust. And between people among whom there is injustice there is also unjust action (although there is not injustice between all among whom there is unjust action), and this is assigning too much to oneself of things good in themselves and too little of things evil in themselves.<\/p>\n

This is why we do not allow a human being to rule, but reason, because [35]<\/sub> a human rules for himself and thus becomes a tyrant. A genuine ruler, in contrast, is the guardian [1134b1]<\/sub> of justice, and, if of justice, then of equality also. And since he is assumed to have no more than his share, if he is just (for he does not assign to himself more of what is good in itself, unless such a share is proportional to his merits–so that it is for others that he labors, and it is for this reason that people, as we stated previously, say that justice [5]<\/sub> is “another’s good”), a reward must be given him, and this reward is honor and privilege. But those for whom such things are not enough become tyrants.<\/p>\n

The justice of a master and that of a father are not the same as the justice of citizens, although they are like it. For there can be no injustice in the unqualified sense towards things that are one’s own, but one’s possessions and one’s child, [10]<\/sub> until it reaches a certain age and is out on its own, are as it were part of oneself. And no one chooses to hurt himself, which is why there can be no injustice towards oneself. Therefore, the justice or injustice of citizens is not manifested in these relationships. For justice was as we saw according to law, and between people naturally subject to law, and these, as we saw, are people who have an equal share in ruling and being ruled. Hence [15]<\/sub> justice can more truly be manifested towards one’s wife than towards children and possessions. For this is household justice. But even this is different from political justice.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":249,"menu_order":6,"template":"","meta":{"pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[48],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-122","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry","chapter-type-numberless"],"part":111,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/122","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/249"}],"version-history":[{"count":9,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/122\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1135,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/122\/revisions\/1135"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/111"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/122\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=122"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=122"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=122"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=122"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}