{"id":126,"date":"2021-03-25T10:03:49","date_gmt":"2021-03-25T10:03:49","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/chapter\/8-the-internal-conditions-of-a-just-or-unjust-action-and-of-a-just-or-unjust-agent\/"},"modified":"2026-07-17T02:45:56","modified_gmt":"2026-07-17T02:45:56","slug":"8-when-just-or-unjust-actions-are-voluntary-or-involuntary","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/chapter\/8-when-just-or-unjust-actions-are-voluntary-or-involuntary\/","title":{"rendered":"Section 8: When just or unjust actions are voluntary or involuntary"},"content":{"raw":"With [15]<\/sub> just and unjust action being as we have described them, a person acts unjustly or justly whenever he does such acts voluntarily. When he does them involuntarily, he acts neither unjustly nor justly except in an incidental way. For he does things which happen to be just or unjust.\r\n\r\nWhether an action is or is not one of injustice (or of justice) is determined by its voluntariness or involuntariness. For when [20]<\/sub> it is voluntary it is blamed, and at the same time is then an act of injustice, so that there will be things that are unjust but not yet acts of injustice, if voluntariness be not present as well. By the voluntary I mean, as has been said before, any of the things in a person's own power which he does with knowledge, that is, not in ignorance either of the person acted on or of the instrument used or of the end that will be attained (for instance, whom he is striking, with what, and [25]<\/sub> to what end). Each such action being done not incidentally nor under compulsion (for example, if A takes B's hand and therewith strikes C, B does not act voluntarily, since the act was not in his own power). The person struck may be the striker's father, and the striker may know that it is a man or one of the people present, but not know that it is his father. A similar distinction may be made [30]<\/sub> in the case of the goal of the action, and with regard to the whole action. Therefore, that which is done in ignorance, or although not done in ignorance is not in the agent's power, or is done under compulsion, is involuntary. For many natural processes we knowingly both perform and experience, none of which is either voluntary or [1135b1]<\/sub> involuntary--for example, growing old or dying.\r\n\r\nBut in the case of unjust and just actions alike the injustice or justice may be only incidental. For a person might return a deposit unwillingly and from fear, and then he must not be said either to do what is just or to act justly, [5]<\/sub> except in an incidental way. Similarly, the person who under compulsion and unwillingly fails to return the deposit must be said to act unjustly, and to do what is unjust, only incidentally. Of voluntary actions we do some by choice, others not by choice; by choice those which we do after deliberation, [10]<\/sub> not by choice those which we do without previous deliberation.\r\n\r\nThus there are three kinds of injury in transactions between people. Those done in ignorance are mistakes when the person acted on, the act, the instrument, or the end that will be attained is other than the agent supposed. The agent thought either that he was not hitting anyone or that he was not hitting with this thing or not hitting this person or to for this purpose, but a result followed other than that which he thought was likely (for example, he hit not with intent to wound but [15]<\/sub> only to provoke), or the person hit or the weapon was other than he supposed. Now when (1) the harm takes place contrary to reasonable expectation, it is a misfortune. When (2) it is not contrary to reasonable expectation, but does not imply vice, it is a mistake. For a person makes a mistake when the starting-point originates in him, but is the victim of accident when the origin lies outside him. When (3) he acts with knowledge but not after deliberation, it is an act of injustice--for example, actions due to anger [20]<\/sub> or to other emotions necessary or natural to man. For when people do such harmful and mistaken actions they act unjustly, and the acts are acts of injustice, but this does not imply that the doers are unjust or wicked, since the harm is not due to vice. But when (4) a person acts from choice, he is an unjust and vicious person.\r\n\r\nWherefore [25]<\/sub> actions proceeding from anger are rightly judged not to be premeditated. For the starting-point is not the person who acts in anger but the person who enraged him. Again, the matter in dispute is not whether the thing happened or not, but its justice. For anger is directed at apparent injustice. For they do not dispute about the occurrence of the act--as in commercial transactions where one of the two parties must be [30]<\/sub> vicious--unless they do so owing to forgetfulness. But, agreeing about what happened, they dispute on which side justice lies (whereas a person who has deliberately injured another cannot help knowing that he has done so), so that the one thinks he is being treated unjustly and the other disagrees.\r\n\r\nBut if a person harms another by choice, he acts unjustly. [1136a1]<\/sub> And these are the acts of injustice which imply that the doer is an unjust person, provided the action violates proportion or equality. Similarly, a person is just when he acts justly by choice. But he acts justly if he merely acts voluntarily.\r\n\r\nOf involuntary actions, some are excusable, others [5]<\/sub> are not. For the mistakes that people make not only in ignorance<\/em> but also because of ignorance<\/em> are excusable.[footnote]For the distinction between in ignorance<\/em> and because of ignorance<\/em>\u00a0see Book 3.1<\/a>[\/footnote] Yet those that people do that are not because of ignorance<\/em> but (although they do them in ignorance<\/em>) owing to an emotion that is neither natural nor such as a human is liable to, are not excusable.","rendered":"

With [15]<\/sub> just and unjust action being as we have described them, a person acts unjustly or justly whenever he does such acts voluntarily. When he does them involuntarily, he acts neither unjustly nor justly except in an incidental way. For he does things which happen to be just or unjust.<\/p>\n

Whether an action is or is not one of injustice (or of justice) is determined by its voluntariness or involuntariness. For when [20]<\/sub> it is voluntary it is blamed, and at the same time is then an act of injustice, so that there will be things that are unjust but not yet acts of injustice, if voluntariness be not present as well. By the voluntary I mean, as has been said before, any of the things in a person’s own power which he does with knowledge, that is, not in ignorance either of the person acted on or of the instrument used or of the end that will be attained (for instance, whom he is striking, with what, and [25]<\/sub> to what end). Each such action being done not incidentally nor under compulsion (for example, if A takes B’s hand and therewith strikes C, B does not act voluntarily, since the act was not in his own power). The person struck may be the striker’s father, and the striker may know that it is a man or one of the people present, but not know that it is his father. A similar distinction may be made [30]<\/sub> in the case of the goal of the action, and with regard to the whole action. Therefore, that which is done in ignorance, or although not done in ignorance is not in the agent’s power, or is done under compulsion, is involuntary. For many natural processes we knowingly both perform and experience, none of which is either voluntary or [1135b1]<\/sub> involuntary–for example, growing old or dying.<\/p>\n

But in the case of unjust and just actions alike the injustice or justice may be only incidental. For a person might return a deposit unwillingly and from fear, and then he must not be said either to do what is just or to act justly, [5]<\/sub> except in an incidental way. Similarly, the person who under compulsion and unwillingly fails to return the deposit must be said to act unjustly, and to do what is unjust, only incidentally. Of voluntary actions we do some by choice, others not by choice; by choice those which we do after deliberation, [10]<\/sub> not by choice those which we do without previous deliberation.<\/p>\n

Thus there are three kinds of injury in transactions between people. Those done in ignorance are mistakes when the person acted on, the act, the instrument, or the end that will be attained is other than the agent supposed. The agent thought either that he was not hitting anyone or that he was not hitting with this thing or not hitting this person or to for this purpose, but a result followed other than that which he thought was likely (for example, he hit not with intent to wound but [15]<\/sub> only to provoke), or the person hit or the weapon was other than he supposed. Now when (1) the harm takes place contrary to reasonable expectation, it is a misfortune. When (2) it is not contrary to reasonable expectation, but does not imply vice, it is a mistake. For a person makes a mistake when the starting-point originates in him, but is the victim of accident when the origin lies outside him. When (3) he acts with knowledge but not after deliberation, it is an act of injustice–for example, actions due to anger [20]<\/sub> or to other emotions necessary or natural to man. For when people do such harmful and mistaken actions they act unjustly, and the acts are acts of injustice, but this does not imply that the doers are unjust or wicked, since the harm is not due to vice. But when (4) a person acts from choice, he is an unjust and vicious person.<\/p>\n

Wherefore [25]<\/sub> actions proceeding from anger are rightly judged not to be premeditated. For the starting-point is not the person who acts in anger but the person who enraged him. Again, the matter in dispute is not whether the thing happened or not, but its justice. For anger is directed at apparent injustice. For they do not dispute about the occurrence of the act–as in commercial transactions where one of the two parties must be [30]<\/sub> vicious–unless they do so owing to forgetfulness. But, agreeing about what happened, they dispute on which side justice lies (whereas a person who has deliberately injured another cannot help knowing that he has done so), so that the one thinks he is being treated unjustly and the other disagrees.<\/p>\n

But if a person harms another by choice, he acts unjustly. [1136a1]<\/sub> And these are the acts of injustice which imply that the doer is an unjust person, provided the action violates proportion or equality. Similarly, a person is just when he acts justly by choice. But he acts justly if he merely acts voluntarily.<\/p>\n

Of involuntary actions, some are excusable, others [5]<\/sub> are not. For the mistakes that people make not only in ignorance<\/em> but also because of ignorance<\/em> are excusable.[1]<\/sup><\/a> Yet those that people do that are not because of ignorance<\/em> but (although they do them in ignorance<\/em>) owing to an emotion that is neither natural nor such as a human is liable to, are not excusable.<\/p>\n

  1. For the distinction between in ignorance<\/em> and because of ignorance<\/em>\u00a0see Book 3.1<\/a> ↵<\/a><\/li><\/ol><\/div>","protected":false},"author":249,"menu_order":8,"template":"","meta":{"pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[48],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-126","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry","chapter-type-numberless"],"part":111,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/126","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/249"}],"version-history":[{"count":13,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/126\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1145,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/126\/revisions\/1145"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/111"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/126\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=126"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=126"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=126"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=126"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}