{"id":135,"date":"2021-03-25T10:19:22","date_gmt":"2021-03-25T10:19:22","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/chapter\/1-must-be-studied-because-a-reason-prescribes-the-meanb-they-are-a-part-of-human-excellence-the-intellect-is-1-scientific-2-calculative-we-want-the-virtue-of-each\/"},"modified":"2026-07-27T23:25:25","modified_gmt":"2026-07-27T23:25:25","slug":"1-introduction-to-intellectual-virtue","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/chapter\/1-introduction-to-intellectual-virtue\/","title":{"rendered":"Section 1: Introduction to the study of intellectual virtue"},"content":{"raw":"Since we have previously said that one should choose what is intermediate, not the excess nor the defect, and that the intermediate is determined by what right reason says, let us discuss what right reason says. [20]<\/sub> In all the states of character we have mentioned, as in all other matters, there is a target to which the reasonable person looks, and heightens or relaxes his activity accordingly. And there is a standard that determines the middle conditions, which we say are intermediate between excess and defect, being in accordance with right reason.\r\n\r\nBut such a statement, though true, [25]<\/sub> is by no means clear. For not only here but in all other pursuits that are objects of systematic knowledge it is indeed true to say that we must not exert ourselves nor relax our efforts too much nor too little, but to an intermediate extent and as right reason. Yet if a person had only this knowledge he would be none the wiser. For instance, he would not know what sort of medicines to apply to [30]<\/sub> the body if someone were to say \"apply all those medicines that medical knowledge prescribes, and which agree with the practice of one who is a skilled doctor.\" Hence it is also necessary with regard to the dispositions of the soul not only to make this true general statement, but also to determine what correct reason is and its defining mark.\r\n\r\nWe divided the virtues of the soul and a said that some are [35]<\/sub> virtues of character [i.e., moral virtues] and others virtues of thought [i.e., intellectual virtues]. [1139a1]<\/sub> Now we have discussed in detail the moral virtues. With regard to intellectual virtues, let us express our view in what follows, beginning with some remarks about the soul.\r\n\r\nWe said before that there are two parts of the soul--one that has reason and one that lacks it. Let us now draw a similar distinction within the part that has reason. [5]<\/sub> Let it be assumed that there are two parts that have reason--one by which we contemplate the kind of things whose starting-points are invariable, and one by which we contemplate things that can be otherwise. For where beings differ in kind, the part of the soul suited to grasping each is different in kind, [10]<\/sub> since it is because of a certain likeness and kinship that they have the knowledge they have.\r\n\r\nLet one of these parts be called the \"systematically knowing\" and the other part be called the \"rationally planning.\" For to deliberate and to rationally plan are the same thing. But no one deliberates about what's unchanging. Therefore, the rationally planning part is one part of the power that has reason. We must, then, learn [15]<\/sub> what is the best state of each of these two parts, since this is the virtue of each. And the virtue of a thing is relative to its proper function.","rendered":"

Since we have previously said that one should choose what is intermediate, not the excess nor the defect, and that the intermediate is determined by what right reason says, let us discuss what right reason says. [20]<\/sub> In all the states of character we have mentioned, as in all other matters, there is a target to which the reasonable person looks, and heightens or relaxes his activity accordingly. And there is a standard that determines the middle conditions, which we say are intermediate between excess and defect, being in accordance with right reason.<\/p>\n

But such a statement, though true, [25]<\/sub> is by no means clear. For not only here but in all other pursuits that are objects of systematic knowledge it is indeed true to say that we must not exert ourselves nor relax our efforts too much nor too little, but to an intermediate extent and as right reason. Yet if a person had only this knowledge he would be none the wiser. For instance, he would not know what sort of medicines to apply to [30]<\/sub> the body if someone were to say “apply all those medicines that medical knowledge prescribes, and which agree with the practice of one who is a skilled doctor.” Hence it is also necessary with regard to the dispositions of the soul not only to make this true general statement, but also to determine what correct reason is and its defining mark.<\/p>\n

We divided the virtues of the soul and a said that some are [35]<\/sub> virtues of character [i.e., moral virtues] and others virtues of thought [i.e., intellectual virtues]. [1139a1]<\/sub> Now we have discussed in detail the moral virtues. With regard to intellectual virtues, let us express our view in what follows, beginning with some remarks about the soul.<\/p>\n

We said before that there are two parts of the soul–one that has reason and one that lacks it. Let us now draw a similar distinction within the part that has reason. [5]<\/sub> Let it be assumed that there are two parts that have reason–one by which we contemplate the kind of things whose starting-points are invariable, and one by which we contemplate things that can be otherwise. For where beings differ in kind, the part of the soul suited to grasping each is different in kind, [10]<\/sub> since it is because of a certain likeness and kinship that they have the knowledge they have.<\/p>\n

Let one of these parts be called the “systematically knowing” and the other part be called the “rationally planning.” For to deliberate and to rationally plan are the same thing. But no one deliberates about what’s unchanging. Therefore, the rationally planning part is one part of the power that has reason. We must, then, learn [15]<\/sub> what is the best state of each of these two parts, since this is the virtue of each. And the virtue of a thing is relative to its proper function.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":249,"menu_order":1,"template":"","meta":{"pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[48],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-135","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry","chapter-type-numberless"],"part":134,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/135","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/249"}],"version-history":[{"count":10,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/135\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1213,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/135\/revisions\/1213"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/134"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/135\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=135"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=135"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=135"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=135"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}