{"id":143,"date":"2021-03-25T10:24:16","date_gmt":"2021-03-25T10:24:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/chapter\/5-and-3-of-prudence-in-what-we-do-the-virtue-of-the-calculative-intellect\/"},"modified":"2026-07-26T02:32:36","modified_gmt":"2026-07-26T02:32:36","slug":"5-prudence","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/chapter\/5-prudence\/","title":{"rendered":"Section 5: Prudence"},"content":{"raw":"

<\/span>Regarding prudence (phron\u00easis<\/em>), we will get at the truth by considering who are the persons we credit with it. Now it is thought to be the mark of a prudent person [25]<\/sub> to be able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself, not in some particular respect--for example, about what sorts of thing conduce to health or to strength--but about what sorts of thing conduce to the good life in general.<\/p>\r\nThis is shown by the fact that we credit people with prudence in some particular respect when they have reasoned well with a view to some good goal that is not the goal of any skill. It follows that in the general sense [30]<\/sub> someone who is capable of deliberating well has prudence.\r\n\r\nNow no one deliberates about things that cannot be otherwise. Nor do people deliberate about things that are impossible for them to do. Therefore, since systematic knowledge involves demonstration, but there is no demonstration of things whose first principles are variable (for all such things might actually be otherwise), and since it is [35]<\/sub> impossible to deliberate about things that are necessarily the way they are, [1140b1]<\/sub> prudence cannot be systematic knowledge, nor can it be skill. Prudence cannot be systematic knowledge because things people can do are capable of being otherwise. And prudence cannot be skill because action and making are different kinds of things. [Skills deal with making things, whereas prudence deals with action.]\r\n\r\nThe remaining alternative, then, is that prudence is a disposition of truth involving reason and having to do with action that concerns what is good [5]<\/sub> or bad for a human being. For while making things has a goal other than itself, [for example making a house has the house as its goal], action does note, since doing a good action is its own goal.\r\n\r\nThis is why we think Pericles and people like him have prudence, because they can see what is good for themselves and what is good for human beings in general. We consider that people can do this who are good at managing households or states. [10]<\/sub> This is why we call temperance (s\u00f4phrosun\u00ea<\/em>) by this name--we imply that it preserves one's prudence (s\u00f4zousa t\u00ean phron\u00easin<\/em>).\r\n\r\nNow what it preserves is a judgement of the kind we have described. For it is not any and every judgement that pleasant and painful things ruin and distort. For example, [frequently indulging in excessive pleasures does not ruin or distort] a person's judgement that the triangle has or has not its angles equal to two right angles. [Rather, frequently indulging in such pleasures or experiencing excessive pains only ruins or distorts a person's] judgements about what [15]<\/sub> is to be done. For the originating sources of actions consist in the goal at which they aim. But someone who has been ruined by pleasure or pain fails to see any such an originating source--fails to see that for the sake of which or because of which he ought to choose and do whatever he chooses and does. For vice is destructive of the originating source of action. Prudence, then, must be a disposition of truth involving reason and having to do with action [20]<\/sub> that concerns human goods.\r\n\r\nWhile there is such a thing as being excellent at a skill, there is no such thing as being excellent in prudence. And in skills, the person who makes things in the wrong way if he wants to is preferable. But when it comes to prudence, the person who does what is wrong is not preferable. Clearly, then, prudence is a virtue and not a skill.\r\n\r\nGiven that there are two parts of the soul [25]<\/sub> that have reason, it must be the virtue of one of the two, namely, of the part that forms opinions. For opinion is about the variable and so is prudence. Yet it not a disposition involving reason only. For dispositions involving reason only are susceptible to being forgotten, [like something we learned a long time ago,] whereas prudence is not. [30]<\/sub>","rendered":"

<\/span>Regarding prudence (phron\u00easis<\/em>), we will get at the truth by considering who are the persons we credit with it. Now it is thought to be the mark of a prudent person [25]<\/sub> to be able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself, not in some particular respect–for example, about what sorts of thing conduce to health or to strength–but about what sorts of thing conduce to the good life in general.<\/p>\n

This is shown by the fact that we credit people with prudence in some particular respect when they have reasoned well with a view to some good goal that is not the goal of any skill. It follows that in the general sense [30]<\/sub> someone who is capable of deliberating well has prudence.<\/p>\n

Now no one deliberates about things that cannot be otherwise. Nor do people deliberate about things that are impossible for them to do. Therefore, since systematic knowledge involves demonstration, but there is no demonstration of things whose first principles are variable (for all such things might actually be otherwise), and since it is [35]<\/sub> impossible to deliberate about things that are necessarily the way they are, [1140b1]<\/sub> prudence cannot be systematic knowledge, nor can it be skill. Prudence cannot be systematic knowledge because things people can do are capable of being otherwise. And prudence cannot be skill because action and making are different kinds of things. [Skills deal with making things, whereas prudence deals with action.]<\/p>\n

The remaining alternative, then, is that prudence is a disposition of truth involving reason and having to do with action that concerns what is good [5]<\/sub> or bad for a human being. For while making things has a goal other than itself, [for example making a house has the house as its goal], action does note, since doing a good action is its own goal.<\/p>\n

This is why we think Pericles and people like him have prudence, because they can see what is good for themselves and what is good for human beings in general. We consider that people can do this who are good at managing households or states. [10]<\/sub> This is why we call temperance (s\u00f4phrosun\u00ea<\/em>) by this name–we imply that it preserves one’s prudence (s\u00f4zousa t\u00ean phron\u00easin<\/em>).<\/p>\n

Now what it preserves is a judgement of the kind we have described. For it is not any and every judgement that pleasant and painful things ruin and distort. For example, [frequently indulging in excessive pleasures does not ruin or distort] a person’s judgement that the triangle has or has not its angles equal to two right angles. [Rather, frequently indulging in such pleasures or experiencing excessive pains only ruins or distorts a person’s] judgements about what [15]<\/sub> is to be done. For the originating sources of actions consist in the goal at which they aim. But someone who has been ruined by pleasure or pain fails to see any such an originating source–fails to see that for the sake of which or because of which he ought to choose and do whatever he chooses and does. For vice is destructive of the originating source of action. Prudence, then, must be a disposition of truth involving reason and having to do with action [20]<\/sub> that concerns human goods.<\/p>\n

While there is such a thing as being excellent at a skill, there is no such thing as being excellent in prudence. And in skills, the person who makes things in the wrong way if he wants to is preferable. But when it comes to prudence, the person who does what is wrong is not preferable. Clearly, then, prudence is a virtue and not a skill.<\/p>\n

Given that there are two parts of the soul [25]<\/sub> that have reason, it must be the virtue of one of the two, namely, of the part that forms opinions. For opinion is about the variable and so is prudence. Yet it not a disposition involving reason only. For dispositions involving reason only are susceptible to being forgotten, [like something we learned a long time ago,] whereas prudence is not. [30]<\/sub><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":249,"menu_order":5,"template":"","meta":{"pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[48],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-143","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry","chapter-type-numberless"],"part":134,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/143","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/249"}],"version-history":[{"count":9,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/143\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1202,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/143\/revisions\/1202"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/134"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/143\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=143"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=143"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=143"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=143"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}