{"id":145,"date":"2021-03-25T10:24:51","date_gmt":"2021-03-25T10:24:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/chapter\/6-4-of-intuitive-reason-as-the-basis-of-demonstrative-science\/"},"modified":"2025-08-07T12:37:03","modified_gmt":"2025-08-07T12:37:03","slug":"6-insight","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/chapter\/6-insight\/","title":{"rendered":"Section 6: Insight or Understanding"},"content":{"raw":"<p id=\"Aristotle_0328_882\"><span class=\"milestone\"><\/span>Expert knowledge is judgement about things that are universal and necessary, and the conclusions of demonstration, and all expert knowledge, follow from first principles (for expert knowledge involves apprehension of a rational ground). This being so, the first principle from which what is expertly known follows cannot be an object of expert knowledge, of skill, or of prudence; for that which can be expertly known can be demonstrated, and skill and prudence deal with things that are variable. Nor are these first principles the objects of philosophic wisdom, for it is a mark of the philosopher to have demonstration about some things. If, then, the states of mind by which we have truth and are never deceived about things invariable or even variable are expert knowledge, prudence, philosophic wisdom, and insight or understanding, and it cannot be any of the first three (i.e. prudence, expert knowledge, or philosophic wisdom), the remaining alternative is that it is insight or understanding that grasps the first principles.<\/p>","rendered":"<p id=\"Aristotle_0328_882\"><span class=\"milestone\"><\/span>Expert knowledge is judgement about things that are universal and necessary, and the conclusions of demonstration, and all expert knowledge, follow from first principles (for expert knowledge involves apprehension of a rational ground). This being so, the first principle from which what is expertly known follows cannot be an object of expert knowledge, of skill, or of prudence; for that which can be expertly known can be demonstrated, and skill and prudence deal with things that are variable. Nor are these first principles the objects of philosophic wisdom, for it is a mark of the philosopher to have demonstration about some things. If, then, the states of mind by which we have truth and are never deceived about things invariable or even variable are expert knowledge, prudence, philosophic wisdom, and insight or understanding, and it cannot be any of the first three (i.e. prudence, expert knowledge, or philosophic wisdom), the remaining alternative is that it is insight or understanding that grasps the first principles.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":249,"menu_order":6,"template":"","meta":{"pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[48],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-145","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry","chapter-type-numberless"],"part":134,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/145","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/249"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/145\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":762,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/145\/revisions\/762"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/134"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/145\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=145"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=145"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=145"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=145"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}