{"id":194,"date":"2021-03-29T10:32:30","date_gmt":"2021-03-29T10:32:30","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/chapter\/2-three-motives-of-friendship-friendship-defined\/"},"modified":"2026-09-08T13:31:26","modified_gmt":"2026-09-08T13:31:26","slug":"2-the-definition-of-friendship","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/chapter\/2-the-definition-of-friendship\/","title":{"rendered":"Section 2: The definition of friendship"},"content":{"raw":"<h3>Three qualities we love: the good, the pleasant, the useful<\/h3>\r\n<p id=\"Aristotle_0328_1105\"><span class=\"milestone\"><\/span>The kinds of friendship may perhaps be cleared up if we first come to know the object of love. For not everything seems to be loved, but only what is lovable. And what is loveable is (1) what is good, (2) what is pleasant (enjoyable), or (3) what is useful (helpful). But the useful would seem to be that by which some good or pleasure is produced, so that <sub>[20]<\/sub> it is the good and the pleasant that are lovable as ends.<\/p>\r\nDo people, then, love the good? Or do they love what is good for them? These sometimes clash. So too with regard to the pleasant. It is thought that each person loves what is good for himself, and that the good is without qualification lovable, and what is good for each person is lovable for him. Yet each person loves not what is really good for him, but instead <sub>[20]<\/sub> what seems good to him. This, however, will make no difference. We shall just have to say that \"what is lovable\" is \"that which seems lovable.\"\r\n<h3>Basic definition of friendship<\/h3>\r\nAlthough there are three grounds on which people love, the love of lifeless objects we do not call \"friendship.\" For the love of inanimate objects is not mutual love, nor is there a wishing of good to the other (for it would surely be ridiculous to wish wine well; if one wishes anything for it, it is that it may keep, so that one may have it oneself). <sub>[30]<\/sub> But we say that we should wish what is good to a friend for his sake. Yet to those who thus wish good we ascribe only goodwill, if the wish is not reciprocated. Goodwill when it is reciprocal is friendship. Or must we add \"when it is recognized\"? For many people have goodwill to those whom they have not seen but whom they judge to be good or useful. <sub>[1156a1]<\/sub> And one of these might return the feeling. These people seem to bear goodwill to each other. But how could they be called friends when they don't know that they have goodwill towards each other? To be friends, then, people must have mutually recognized goodwill toward one another and wish good things for each other, because they find each other enjoyable, helpful, or good. <sub>[5]<\/sub>","rendered":"<h3>Three qualities we love: the good, the pleasant, the useful<\/h3>\n<p id=\"Aristotle_0328_1105\"><span class=\"milestone\"><\/span>The kinds of friendship may perhaps be cleared up if we first come to know the object of love. For not everything seems to be loved, but only what is lovable. And what is loveable is (1) what is good, (2) what is pleasant (enjoyable), or (3) what is useful (helpful). But the useful would seem to be that by which some good or pleasure is produced, so that <sub>[20]<\/sub> it is the good and the pleasant that are lovable as ends.<\/p>\n<p>Do people, then, love the good? Or do they love what is good for them? These sometimes clash. So too with regard to the pleasant. It is thought that each person loves what is good for himself, and that the good is without qualification lovable, and what is good for each person is lovable for him. Yet each person loves not what is really good for him, but instead <sub>[20]<\/sub> what seems good to him. This, however, will make no difference. We shall just have to say that &#8220;what is lovable&#8221; is &#8220;that which seems lovable.&#8221;<\/p>\n<h3>Basic definition of friendship<\/h3>\n<p>Although there are three grounds on which people love, the love of lifeless objects we do not call &#8220;friendship.&#8221; For the love of inanimate objects is not mutual love, nor is there a wishing of good to the other (for it would surely be ridiculous to wish wine well; if one wishes anything for it, it is that it may keep, so that one may have it oneself). <sub>[30]<\/sub> But we say that we should wish what is good to a friend for his sake. Yet to those who thus wish good we ascribe only goodwill, if the wish is not reciprocated. Goodwill when it is reciprocal is friendship. Or must we add &#8220;when it is recognized&#8221;? For many people have goodwill to those whom they have not seen but whom they judge to be good or useful. <sub>[1156a1]<\/sub> And one of these might return the feeling. These people seem to bear goodwill to each other. But how could they be called friends when they don&#8217;t know that they have goodwill towards each other? To be friends, then, people must have mutually recognized goodwill toward one another and wish good things for each other, because they find each other enjoyable, helpful, or good. <sub>[5]<\/sub><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":249,"menu_order":16,"template":"","meta":{"pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[48],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-194","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry","chapter-type-numberless"],"part":191,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/194","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/249"}],"version-history":[{"count":8,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/194\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1295,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/194\/revisions\/1295"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/191"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/194\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=194"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=194"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=194"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=194"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}