{"id":237,"date":"2021-03-29T11:03:32","date_gmt":"2021-03-29T11:03:32","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/chapter\/9-why-a-happy-man-needs-friends\/"},"modified":"2025-07-16T22:20:10","modified_gmt":"2025-07-16T22:20:10","slug":"9-why-a-happy-person-needs-friends","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/chapter\/9-why-a-happy-person-needs-friends\/","title":{"rendered":"Section 9: Why a happy person needs friends"},"content":{"raw":"It is also disputed whether or not a happy person would need friends. It is said that those who are supremely happy and self-sufficient have no need of friends, since they have the things that are good, and therefore need nothing further since they are self-sufficient. A friend, being another self, provides what a person cannot get by his own effort; hence the saying, 'when fortune is kind, what need of friends?'\r\n\r\nBut it seems strange, when one assigns all good things to the happy person, not to assign friends, who are thought the greatest of external goods. And if it is more characteristic of a friend to confer benefits than to receive them, and to confer benefits is characteristic of the good person and of virtue, and it is nobler to confer benefits on friends than on strangers, thus the good person will need people to confer benefits on. This is why the question is asked whether we need friends more in prosperity or in adversity, on the assumption that not only does a person need people in adversity to confer benefits on him, but also those who are prospering need people to confer benefits on. <\/span>\r\n\r\nSurely it is strange, too, to make the supremely happy person live a solitary life. For no one would choose the whole world on condition of being alone, since man is a political creature and one whose nature is to live with others. Therefore, even the happy person lives with others; for he has the things that are by nature good. And plainly it is better to spend one's days with friends and good people than with strangers or any chance persons. Therefore, the happy person needs friends.<\/span>\r\n\r\nThen what does the first view mean [when it says that happy people don't need friends], and in what respect is that view right? Is it that most identify friends with useful people? Of such friends indeed the supremely happy person will have no need, since he already has the things that are good. Nor will he need those whom one makes one's friends because of their pleasantness, or he will need them only to a small extent (for his life, being pleasant, has no need of adventitious pleasure). And because he does not need such merely useful or pleasant friends, he is thought not to need friends at all.\r\n\r\nBut it is surely not true that happy person needs no friends at all. For we have said at the outset that living a happy life is an activity. And activity plainly comes into being and is not present at the start like a piece of property. If (1) a happy life lies in living and being active, and the good person's activity is virtuous and pleasant in itself, as we have said at the outset, and (2) a thing's being one's own is one of the attributes that make it pleasant, and (3) we can contemplate our neighbors better than ourselves and their actions better than our own, and if the actions of virtuous friends are pleasant to good people (since these have both the attributes that are naturally pleasant)--if all this is true, then the supremely happy person will need virtuous friends, since his purpose is to contemplate worthy actions and actions that are his own, and the actions of a good person who is a friend have both these qualities: [they are worthy actions and actions that are one's own because they are the actions of one's friend, who is another self].\r\n\r\nFurther, people think that the happy person ought to live pleasantly. Now if he lived a solitary life, life would be hard for him. For by oneself it is not easy to be continuously active. But with others and towards others it is easier. With others, therefore, his activity will be more continuous, and it is in itself pleasant, which is how it ought to be for the person who is supremely happy. For a good person as good delights in virtuous actions and is repelled by vicious ones, as a musician enjoys beautiful melodies but is pained by bad ones. A certain training in virtue also arises from the company of the good, as Theognis has said before us.\r\n\r\nIf we look deeper into the nature of things, a virtuous friend seems to be naturally desirable for a virtuous person. For that which is good by nature, we have said, is for the virtuous person good and pleasant in itself. Now life is defined in the case of animals by the power of perception. But it is defined in the case of humans by the power of perception as informed by understanding. And a power is defined in reference to the corresponding activity, so that the full thing is found in the activity. Therefore, life in the full sense seems to be an act of perceiving or understanding. And life is among the things that are good and pleasant in themselves, since it is determinate, and the determinate is of the nature of the good. That which is good by nature is also good for the virtuous person, which is the reason why life seems pleasant to everyone.\r\n\r\nBut we must not apply this to a wicked and corrupt life nor to a life spent in pain. For such a life is indeterminate, as are its attributes. The nature of pain will become plainer in what follows. But if life itself is good and pleasant (which it seems to be, from the very fact that everyone desires it, and particularly those who are good and supremely happy; for to such people life is most desirable, and their existence is the most supremely happy) and if he who sees perceives that he sees, and he who hears, perceives that he hears, and he who walks, that he walks, and in the case of all other activities similarly there is something which perceives that we are active, so that if we perceive, we perceive that we perceive, and if we understand, perceives that we understand; and if to perceive that we perceive or understand is to perceive that we exist (for existing was defined as perceiving or understanding); and if perceiving that one lives is in itself one of the things that are pleasant (for life is by nature good, and to perceive that what's good is present in oneself is pleasant); and if life is desirable, and particularly so for good people (because to them existence is good and pleasant for they are pleased at the consciousness of the presence in them of what is good in itself); and if the virtuous person is to his friend as he is to himself (for his friend is another self)--if all this is true, then just as for each person one's own existence is desirable, so, or almost so, is the existence of one's friend. Now a person's own existence was seen to be desirable because he perceived his own goodness, and such perception is pleasant in itself. He needs, therefore, to be conscious of the existence of his friend as well, and this will be realized in their spending their lives together and sharing in discussion and thought. For sharing in discussion and thought is what spending one's life together would seem to mean in the case of human beings, and not, as in the case of cattle, feeding in the same place.\r\n\r\nIf, then, existence is in itself desirable for the supremely happy person (since it is by its nature good and pleasant), and that of his friend is very much the same, a friend will be one of the things that are desirable. Now that which is desirable for a happy person the happy person must have, or he will be deficient, and not completely happy, in that respect. The person who is to be happy will therefore need virtuous friends.","rendered":"

It is also disputed whether or not a happy person would need friends. It is said that those who are supremely happy and self-sufficient have no need of friends, since they have the things that are good, and therefore need nothing further since they are self-sufficient. A friend, being another self, provides what a person cannot get by his own effort; hence the saying, ‘when fortune is kind, what need of friends?’<\/p>\n

But it seems strange, when one assigns all good things to the happy person, not to assign friends, who are thought the greatest of external goods. And if it is more characteristic of a friend to confer benefits than to receive them, and to confer benefits is characteristic of the good person and of virtue, and it is nobler to confer benefits on friends than on strangers, thus the good person will need people to confer benefits on. This is why the question is asked whether we need friends more in prosperity or in adversity, on the assumption that not only does a person need people in adversity to confer benefits on him, but also those who are prospering need people to confer benefits on. <\/span><\/p>\n

Surely it is strange, too, to make the supremely happy person live a solitary life. For no one would choose the whole world on condition of being alone, since man is a political creature and one whose nature is to live with others. Therefore, even the happy person lives with others; for he has the things that are by nature good. And plainly it is better to spend one’s days with friends and good people than with strangers or any chance persons. Therefore, the happy person needs friends.<\/span><\/p>\n

Then what does the first view mean [when it says that happy people don’t need friends], and in what respect is that view right? Is it that most identify friends with useful people? Of such friends indeed the supremely happy person will have no need, since he already has the things that are good. Nor will he need those whom one makes one’s friends because of their pleasantness, or he will need them only to a small extent (for his life, being pleasant, has no need of adventitious pleasure). And because he does not need such merely useful or pleasant friends, he is thought not to need friends at all.<\/p>\n

But it is surely not true that happy person needs no friends at all. For we have said at the outset that living a happy life is an activity. And activity plainly comes into being and is not present at the start like a piece of property. If (1) a happy life lies in living and being active, and the good person’s activity is virtuous and pleasant in itself, as we have said at the outset, and (2) a thing’s being one’s own is one of the attributes that make it pleasant, and (3) we can contemplate our neighbors better than ourselves and their actions better than our own, and if the actions of virtuous friends are pleasant to good people (since these have both the attributes that are naturally pleasant)–if all this is true, then the supremely happy person will need virtuous friends, since his purpose is to contemplate worthy actions and actions that are his own, and the actions of a good person who is a friend have both these qualities: [they are worthy actions and actions that are one’s own because they are the actions of one’s friend, who is another self].<\/p>\n

Further, people think that the happy person ought to live pleasantly. Now if he lived a solitary life, life would be hard for him. For by oneself it is not easy to be continuously active. But with others and towards others it is easier. With others, therefore, his activity will be more continuous, and it is in itself pleasant, which is how it ought to be for the person who is supremely happy. For a good person as good delights in virtuous actions and is repelled by vicious ones, as a musician enjoys beautiful melodies but is pained by bad ones. A certain training in virtue also arises from the company of the good, as Theognis has said before us.<\/p>\n

If we look deeper into the nature of things, a virtuous friend seems to be naturally desirable for a virtuous person. For that which is good by nature, we have said, is for the virtuous person good and pleasant in itself. Now life is defined in the case of animals by the power of perception. But it is defined in the case of humans by the power of perception as informed by understanding. And a power is defined in reference to the corresponding activity, so that the full thing is found in the activity. Therefore, life in the full sense seems to be an act of perceiving or understanding. And life is among the things that are good and pleasant in themselves, since it is determinate, and the determinate is of the nature of the good. That which is good by nature is also good for the virtuous person, which is the reason why life seems pleasant to everyone.<\/p>\n

But we must not apply this to a wicked and corrupt life nor to a life spent in pain. For such a life is indeterminate, as are its attributes. The nature of pain will become plainer in what follows. But if life itself is good and pleasant (which it seems to be, from the very fact that everyone desires it, and particularly those who are good and supremely happy; for to such people life is most desirable, and their existence is the most supremely happy) and if he who sees perceives that he sees, and he who hears, perceives that he hears, and he who walks, that he walks, and in the case of all other activities similarly there is something which perceives that we are active, so that if we perceive, we perceive that we perceive, and if we understand, perceives that we understand; and if to perceive that we perceive or understand is to perceive that we exist (for existing was defined as perceiving or understanding); and if perceiving that one lives is in itself one of the things that are pleasant (for life is by nature good, and to perceive that what’s good is present in oneself is pleasant); and if life is desirable, and particularly so for good people (because to them existence is good and pleasant for they are pleased at the consciousness of the presence in them of what is good in itself); and if the virtuous person is to his friend as he is to himself (for his friend is another self)–if all this is true, then just as for each person one’s own existence is desirable, so, or almost so, is the existence of one’s friend. Now a person’s own existence was seen to be desirable because he perceived his own goodness, and such perception is pleasant in itself. He needs, therefore, to be conscious of the existence of his friend as well, and this will be realized in their spending their lives together and sharing in discussion and thought. For sharing in discussion and thought is what spending one’s life together would seem to mean in the case of human beings, and not, as in the case of cattle, feeding in the same place.<\/p>\n

If, then, existence is in itself desirable for the supremely happy person (since it is by its nature good and pleasant), and that of his friend is very much the same, a friend will be one of the things that are desirable. Now that which is desirable for a happy person the happy person must have, or he will be deficient, and not completely happy, in that respect. The person who is to be happy will therefore need virtuous friends.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":249,"menu_order":16,"template":"","meta":{"pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[48],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-237","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry","chapter-type-numberless"],"part":220,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/237","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/249"}],"version-history":[{"count":8,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/237\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":697,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/237\/revisions\/697"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/220"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/237\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=237"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=237"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=237"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=237"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}