{"id":33,"date":"2021-03-22T13:27:01","date_gmt":"2021-03-22T13:27:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/chapter\/7-the-good-is-the-final-end-and-happiness-is-this\/"},"modified":"2026-05-20T20:18:44","modified_gmt":"2026-05-20T20:18:44","slug":"7-the-complete-good-and-a-definition-of-happiness","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/chapter\/7-the-complete-good-and-a-definition-of-happiness\/","title":{"rendered":"Section 7.1: Further reflections on the nature of a happy life"},"content":{"raw":"

The good we are seeking is a goal achievable by human action<\/h3>\r\nLet us again return to the good we are seeking, namely a happy life, and [15]<\/sub> ask what it could possibly be.\r\n\r\nThe good seems different for different actions and different skills. For instance, the good aimed at by medical treatment is different from the good aimed at by military strategy, and likewise with other skills.\r\n\r\nWhat then is the good in the case of each action and skill? The good is that for whose sake everything else is done. In the case of medical treatment this is health, in military strategy victory, in architecture a building, in any other skill something else, and in [20]<\/sub> every action and every pursuit the good is the goal. For it is for the sake of a goal that all people do whatever else they do.\r\n\r\nTherefore, if there is a goal for everything that we do as humans, this goal will be a good achievable by action. And if there is more than one goal of everything we do, these goals will be the goods achievable by action. So the argument has by a different course reached the same point.\r\n

A happy life is what we desire for its own sake, and not for the sake of anything else<\/h3>\r\nBut we must try to state this even more clearly. Since there are clearly many [25]<\/sub> goals, and we choose some of these (for example, wealth, flutes, and in general tools) for the sake of something else, clearly not all our goals are complete. Yet the highest good is evidently something complete. Therefore, if there is only one complete goal, it will be what we are seeking. But if there are more than one complete goals, the most complete of these will be what we are seeking.\r\n\r\nNow we say that [30]<\/sub> what is worth pursuing for its own sake is more complete than what is worth pursuing for the sake of something else. Likewise, what is never desirable for the sake of something else more complete than the things that are desirable both for their own sakes and also for the sake of something else. Therefore, we say that what is unconditionally complete is always desirable for its own sake and never desirable for the sake of something else.\r\n\r\nNow a happy life seems to be the most like this, because we desire a happy life always for its own sake and never for the sake of something else. [1097b1]<\/sub> But reputation, pleasure, understanding, and every virtue we choose for their own sakes, because even if nothing resulted from them, we would still choose them. But we also choose them for the sake of a happy life, since we think that because of them we will be happy. When it comes to a happy life, however, [5]<\/sub> no one chooses it for the sake of things like reputation, pleasure, or virtue, nor, in general, for the sake of anything other than itself.\r\n

A happy life is something complete and self-sufficient<\/h3>\r\nFrom the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result also seems to follow. For the complete good is thought to be self-sufficient. Now by \"self-sufficient\" we do not mean what is sufficient for a person alone, living a solitary life. Instead, by \"self-sufficient\" we mean what is sufficient for oneself and also for one's parents, children, spouse, and in general for one's friends and fellow citizens, [10]<\/sub> since a human being is by nature social. But some limit must be set to these social relations, for if we extend our requirement for \"self-sufficiency\" to ancestors, descendants, and friends' friends it will go on without limit. Let us examine this question, however, on another occasion. <\/span>\r\n\r\nThe \"self-sufficient\" we now define as that which on its own makes a life desirable and lacking nothing; and this is [15]<\/sub> what we think a happy life is like. <\/span>\r\n\r\nFurther we think it the most desirable of all things, without being counted as one good thing among others--if it were so counted it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods. For that which is added becomes a superabundance of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable. <\/span>\r\n\r\nA happy life, then, is something complete and self-sufficient, [20]<\/sub> since it is the goal of all human action.<\/span>","rendered":"

The good we are seeking is a goal achievable by human action<\/h3>\n

Let us again return to the good we are seeking, namely a happy life, and [15]<\/sub> ask what it could possibly be.<\/p>\n

The good seems different for different actions and different skills. For instance, the good aimed at by medical treatment is different from the good aimed at by military strategy, and likewise with other skills.<\/p>\n

What then is the good in the case of each action and skill? The good is that for whose sake everything else is done. In the case of medical treatment this is health, in military strategy victory, in architecture a building, in any other skill something else, and in [20]<\/sub> every action and every pursuit the good is the goal. For it is for the sake of a goal that all people do whatever else they do.<\/p>\n

Therefore, if there is a goal for everything that we do as humans, this goal will be a good achievable by action. And if there is more than one goal of everything we do, these goals will be the goods achievable by action. So the argument has by a different course reached the same point.<\/p>\n

A happy life is what we desire for its own sake, and not for the sake of anything else<\/h3>\n

But we must try to state this even more clearly. Since there are clearly many [25]<\/sub> goals, and we choose some of these (for example, wealth, flutes, and in general tools) for the sake of something else, clearly not all our goals are complete. Yet the highest good is evidently something complete. Therefore, if there is only one complete goal, it will be what we are seeking. But if there are more than one complete goals, the most complete of these will be what we are seeking.<\/p>\n

Now we say that [30]<\/sub> what is worth pursuing for its own sake is more complete than what is worth pursuing for the sake of something else. Likewise, what is never desirable for the sake of something else more complete than the things that are desirable both for their own sakes and also for the sake of something else. Therefore, we say that what is unconditionally complete is always desirable for its own sake and never desirable for the sake of something else.<\/p>\n

Now a happy life seems to be the most like this, because we desire a happy life always for its own sake and never for the sake of something else. [1097b1]<\/sub> But reputation, pleasure, understanding, and every virtue we choose for their own sakes, because even if nothing resulted from them, we would still choose them. But we also choose them for the sake of a happy life, since we think that because of them we will be happy. When it comes to a happy life, however, [5]<\/sub> no one chooses it for the sake of things like reputation, pleasure, or virtue, nor, in general, for the sake of anything other than itself.<\/p>\n

A happy life is something complete and self-sufficient<\/h3>\n

From the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result also seems to follow. For the complete good is thought to be self-sufficient. Now by “self-sufficient” we do not mean what is sufficient for a person alone, living a solitary life. Instead, by “self-sufficient” we mean what is sufficient for oneself and also for one’s parents, children, spouse, and in general for one’s friends and fellow citizens, [10]<\/sub> since a human being is by nature social. But some limit must be set to these social relations, for if we extend our requirement for “self-sufficiency” to ancestors, descendants, and friends’ friends it will go on without limit. Let us examine this question, however, on another occasion. <\/span><\/p>\n

The “self-sufficient” we now define as that which on its own makes a life desirable and lacking nothing; and this is [15]<\/sub> what we think a happy life is like. <\/span><\/p>\n

Further we think it the most desirable of all things, without being counted as one good thing among others–if it were so counted it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods. For that which is added becomes a superabundance of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable. <\/span><\/p>\n

A happy life, then, is something complete and self-sufficient, [20]<\/sub> since it is the goal of all human action.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":249,"menu_order":8,"template":"","meta":{"pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[48],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-33","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry","chapter-type-numberless"],"part":20,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/33","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/249"}],"version-history":[{"count":26,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/33\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":884,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/33\/revisions\/884"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/20"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/33\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=33"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=33"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=33"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=33"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}