{"id":33,"date":"2021-03-22T13:27:01","date_gmt":"2021-03-22T13:27:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/chapter\/7-the-good-is-the-final-end-and-happiness-is-this\/"},"modified":"2025-08-15T00:45:35","modified_gmt":"2025-08-15T00:45:35","slug":"7-the-complete-good-and-a-definition-of-happiness","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/chapter\/7-the-complete-good-and-a-definition-of-happiness\/","title":{"rendered":"Section 7: The complete good and a definition of happiness reached by considering the function of man"},"content":{"raw":"

The good we are seeking is a goal achievable by human action<\/h3>\r\nLet us again return to the good we are seeking, and [15]<\/sub> ask what it could possibly be.\r\n\r\nThe good seems different for different actions and different skills; for instance, the good aimed at by medical treatment is different from the good aimed at by military strategy, and likewise with other skills.\r\n\r\nWhat then is the good in the case of each action and skill? The good is that for whose sake everything else is done. In the case of medical treatment this is health, in military strategy victory, in architecture a building, in any other skill something else, and in [20]<\/sub> every action and every pursuit the good is the goal. For it is for the sake of a goal that all people do whatever else they do.\r\n\r\nTherefore, if there is a goal for everything that we do, this goal will be the good achievable by action. And if there is more than one goal of everything we do, these goals will be the goods achievable by action. So the argument has by a different course reached the same point.\r\n

A happy life is what we desire for its own sake, and not for the sake of anything else<\/h3>\r\nBut we must try to state this even more clearly. Since there are clearly many [25]<\/sub> goals, and we choose some of these (for example, wealth, flutes, and in general tools) for the sake of something else, clearly not all our goals are complete. Yet the highest good is evidently something complete. Therefore, if there is only one complete goal, it will be what we are seeking. But if there are more than one complete goals, the most complete of these will be what we are seeking.\r\n\r\nNow we say that [30]<\/sub> what is worth pursuing for its own sake is more complete than what is worth pursuing for the sake of something else. Likewise, what is never desirable for the sake of something else more complete than the things that are desirable both for their own sakes and for the sake of something else. Therefore, we say that what is unconditionally complete is always desirable for its own sake and never desirable for the sake of something else.\r\n\r\nNow a happy life seems to be the most like this, because we desire a happy life always for its own sake and never for the sake of something else. [1097b1]<\/sub> But reputation, pleasure, understanding, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for even if nothing resulted from them, we should still choose each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of a happy life, supposing that because of them we will be happy. When it comes to a happy life, however, [5]<\/sub> no one chooses it for the sake of things like reputation, pleasure, or virtue, nor, in general, for the sake of anything other than itself.\r\n

A happy life is something complete and self-sufficient<\/h3>\r\nFrom the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result also seems to follow. For the complete good is thought to be self-sufficient. Now by \"self-sufficient\" we do not mean what is sufficient for a person alone, living a solitary life. Instead, by \"self-sufficient\" we mean what is sufficient for oneself and also for one's parents, children, wife, and in general for one's friends and fellow citizens, [10]<\/sub> since a human being is by nature social. But some limit must be set to these social relations, for if we extend our requirement for \"self-sufficiency\" to ancestors, descendants, and friends' friends it will go on without limit. Let us examine this question, however, on another occasion. <\/span>\r\n\r\nThe \"self-sufficient\" we now define as that which on its own makes a life desirable and lacking nothing; and this is [15]<\/sub> what we think a happy life is like. <\/span>\r\n\r\nFurther we think it the most desirable of all things, without being counted as one good thing among others--if it were so counted it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods. For that which is added becomes a superabundance of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable. <\/span>\r\n\r\nA happy life, then, is something complete and self-sufficient, [20]<\/sub> since it is the goal of action.<\/span>\r\n

Defining a happy life in light of the function of a human being<\/h3>\r\nPresumably, however, to say that a happy life is the highest good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is still desired.\r\n\r\nThis might perhaps be given, if we could first grasp the function of a human being. For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or [25]<\/sub> any craftsman, and, in general, all things that have a function or activity, the good and the 'well-done' is thought to reside in the function, the same would seem to hold for a human being, if humans have a function.\r\n\r\nDo the carpenter, then, and the shoemaker have certain functions or activities, while the human has none? Is a human by nature inactive? Or may we say that just as the eye, [30]<\/sub> hand, foot, and each part generally has a function, so the human as a whole also has a function beyond these parts?\r\n\r\nIf so, what can this function be? Life seems to be a function we share even with plants. But we are seeking what is special to humans. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. [1098a1] <\/sub>Next there would be the life of perception. But that life is clearly shared with the horse, the ox, and every animal.\r\n\r\nThere remains, then, the life of actions that involve reason or speech (logos<\/em>). Now one way in which something can involve reason or speech is by being persuaded by or obedient to reason or speech. Another way something can involve it is by possessing it, namely, by engaging in thinking. Given these two ways in which the life of actions can be said to involve reason or speech, [5]<\/sub> we must posit the one more in accord with activity, because this seems to be more authoritative.\r\n\r\nNow if the function of a human being is an activity of soul in accord with reason or speech, or not without it, and if we say the function of a sort of thing is the same in kind as the function of an excellent thing of that sort (for example, the function of a lyre player is the same as the function of an excellent lyre player), and if this is simply true in all cases when we add to the function [10]<\/sub> the preeminence that is in accord with virtue (for the function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of an excellent lyre-player is to play it well)--if all this is true, and we say that the function of a human being is a certain kind of life, and this life is the activity or actions of the soul with reason or speech, and if the function of an excellent man is the good and noble performance of these actions, and if any action is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the virtue that belongs to it [15]<\/sub>--if all this is true, the human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are many virtues, in accordance with the best and most complete virtue.\r\n\r\nBut we must add 'in a complete life.' For one swallow does not make a spring, nor does one day. Likewise, one day or a short time does not make a blessed and happy person.\r\n

The account of a happy life given so far is a rough outline<\/h3>\r\nLet this serve as an outline of the good. [20]<\/sub> For we must presumably first present a rough sketch, and then later fill in the details. But it would seem that anyone is capable of developing and articulating what has been outlined well, and that time is a good discoverer or partner in such a work. This is the source of many advances in the crafts, since anyone can add what is lacking. [25]<\/sub>\r\n\r\nAnd we must also remember what has been said before, and not look for precision in all things alike, but in each class of things such precision as accords with the subject-matter, and so much as is appropriate to the inquiry. For a carpenter and an expert in geometry inquire about the right angle in different ways: the carpenter does so insofar as the right angle is useful for his work, while the geometer asks what a right angle is or what sort of thing it is, since he contemplates the truth. We must act in the same way, then, in all cases, so that our main task may not be overwhelmed by minor questions.\r\n\r\n[1098b1]<\/sub> Nor must we demand the cause in all matters in a similar way. It is enough in some cases that the fact is correctly shown, as in the case of the starting-points of inquiry. For the fact is that something is so is a primary thing and a starting-point.\r\n\r\nNow when it comes to starting-points of an inquiry, we see some through induction, some through perception, some through a sort of habituation, and others in other ways. But we must try to follow out each starting-point in the natural way, and make a serious effort [5]<\/sub> to define them well, since they have a great influence on what follows. For the starting-point and beginning is thought to be more than half of the whole, and many of the things we are investigating will become evident through it.","rendered":"

The good we are seeking is a goal achievable by human action<\/h3>\n

Let us again return to the good we are seeking, and [15]<\/sub> ask what it could possibly be.<\/p>\n

The good seems different for different actions and different skills; for instance, the good aimed at by medical treatment is different from the good aimed at by military strategy, and likewise with other skills.<\/p>\n

What then is the good in the case of each action and skill? The good is that for whose sake everything else is done. In the case of medical treatment this is health, in military strategy victory, in architecture a building, in any other skill something else, and in [20]<\/sub> every action and every pursuit the good is the goal. For it is for the sake of a goal that all people do whatever else they do.<\/p>\n

Therefore, if there is a goal for everything that we do, this goal will be the good achievable by action. And if there is more than one goal of everything we do, these goals will be the goods achievable by action. So the argument has by a different course reached the same point.<\/p>\n

A happy life is what we desire for its own sake, and not for the sake of anything else<\/h3>\n

But we must try to state this even more clearly. Since there are clearly many [25]<\/sub> goals, and we choose some of these (for example, wealth, flutes, and in general tools) for the sake of something else, clearly not all our goals are complete. Yet the highest good is evidently something complete. Therefore, if there is only one complete goal, it will be what we are seeking. But if there are more than one complete goals, the most complete of these will be what we are seeking.<\/p>\n

Now we say that [30]<\/sub> what is worth pursuing for its own sake is more complete than what is worth pursuing for the sake of something else. Likewise, what is never desirable for the sake of something else more complete than the things that are desirable both for their own sakes and for the sake of something else. Therefore, we say that what is unconditionally complete is always desirable for its own sake and never desirable for the sake of something else.<\/p>\n

Now a happy life seems to be the most like this, because we desire a happy life always for its own sake and never for the sake of something else. [1097b1]<\/sub> But reputation, pleasure, understanding, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for even if nothing resulted from them, we should still choose each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of a happy life, supposing that because of them we will be happy. When it comes to a happy life, however, [5]<\/sub> no one chooses it for the sake of things like reputation, pleasure, or virtue, nor, in general, for the sake of anything other than itself.<\/p>\n

A happy life is something complete and self-sufficient<\/h3>\n

From the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result also seems to follow. For the complete good is thought to be self-sufficient. Now by “self-sufficient” we do not mean what is sufficient for a person alone, living a solitary life. Instead, by “self-sufficient” we mean what is sufficient for oneself and also for one’s parents, children, wife, and in general for one’s friends and fellow citizens, [10]<\/sub> since a human being is by nature social. But some limit must be set to these social relations, for if we extend our requirement for “self-sufficiency” to ancestors, descendants, and friends’ friends it will go on without limit. Let us examine this question, however, on another occasion. <\/span><\/p>\n

The “self-sufficient” we now define as that which on its own makes a life desirable and lacking nothing; and this is [15]<\/sub> what we think a happy life is like. <\/span><\/p>\n

Further we think it the most desirable of all things, without being counted as one good thing among others–if it were so counted it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods. For that which is added becomes a superabundance of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable. <\/span><\/p>\n

A happy life, then, is something complete and self-sufficient, [20]<\/sub> since it is the goal of action.<\/span><\/p>\n

Defining a happy life in light of the function of a human being<\/h3>\n

Presumably, however, to say that a happy life is the highest good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is still desired.<\/p>\n

This might perhaps be given, if we could first grasp the function of a human being. For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or [25]<\/sub> any craftsman, and, in general, all things that have a function or activity, the good and the ‘well-done’ is thought to reside in the function, the same would seem to hold for a human being, if humans have a function.<\/p>\n

Do the carpenter, then, and the shoemaker have certain functions or activities, while the human has none? Is a human by nature inactive? Or may we say that just as the eye, [30]<\/sub> hand, foot, and each part generally has a function, so the human as a whole also has a function beyond these parts?<\/p>\n

If so, what can this function be? Life seems to be a function we share even with plants. But we are seeking what is special to humans. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. [1098a1] <\/sub>Next there would be the life of perception. But that life is clearly shared with the horse, the ox, and every animal.<\/p>\n

There remains, then, the life of actions that involve reason or speech (logos<\/em>). Now one way in which something can involve reason or speech is by being persuaded by or obedient to reason or speech. Another way something can involve it is by possessing it, namely, by engaging in thinking. Given these two ways in which the life of actions can be said to involve reason or speech, [5]<\/sub> we must posit the one more in accord with activity, because this seems to be more authoritative.<\/p>\n

Now if the function of a human being is an activity of soul in accord with reason or speech, or not without it, and if we say the function of a sort of thing is the same in kind as the function of an excellent thing of that sort (for example, the function of a lyre player is the same as the function of an excellent lyre player), and if this is simply true in all cases when we add to the function [10]<\/sub> the preeminence that is in accord with virtue (for the function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of an excellent lyre-player is to play it well)–if all this is true, and we say that the function of a human being is a certain kind of life, and this life is the activity or actions of the soul with reason or speech, and if the function of an excellent man is the good and noble performance of these actions, and if any action is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the virtue that belongs to it [15]<\/sub>–if all this is true, the human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are many virtues, in accordance with the best and most complete virtue.<\/p>\n

But we must add ‘in a complete life.’ For one swallow does not make a spring, nor does one day. Likewise, one day or a short time does not make a blessed and happy person.<\/p>\n

The account of a happy life given so far is a rough outline<\/h3>\n

Let this serve as an outline of the good. [20]<\/sub> For we must presumably first present a rough sketch, and then later fill in the details. But it would seem that anyone is capable of developing and articulating what has been outlined well, and that time is a good discoverer or partner in such a work. This is the source of many advances in the crafts, since anyone can add what is lacking. [25]<\/sub><\/p>\n

And we must also remember what has been said before, and not look for precision in all things alike, but in each class of things such precision as accords with the subject-matter, and so much as is appropriate to the inquiry. For a carpenter and an expert in geometry inquire about the right angle in different ways: the carpenter does so insofar as the right angle is useful for his work, while the geometer asks what a right angle is or what sort of thing it is, since he contemplates the truth. We must act in the same way, then, in all cases, so that our main task may not be overwhelmed by minor questions.<\/p>\n

[1098b1]<\/sub> Nor must we demand the cause in all matters in a similar way. It is enough in some cases that the fact is correctly shown, as in the case of the starting-points of inquiry. For the fact is that something is so is a primary thing and a starting-point.<\/p>\n

Now when it comes to starting-points of an inquiry, we see some through induction, some through perception, some through a sort of habituation, and others in other ways. But we must try to follow out each starting-point in the natural way, and make a serious effort [5]<\/sub> to define them well, since they have a great influence on what follows. For the starting-point and beginning is thought to be more than half of the whole, and many of the things we are investigating will become evident through it.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":249,"menu_order":7,"template":"","meta":{"pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[48],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-33","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry","chapter-type-numberless"],"part":20,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/33","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/249"}],"version-history":[{"count":20,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/33\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":818,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/33\/revisions\/818"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/20"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/33\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=33"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=33"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=33"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=33"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}