{"id":56,"date":"2021-03-23T13:27:03","date_gmt":"2021-03-23T13:27:03","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/chapter\/5-virtue-not-an-emotion-nor-a-faculty-but-a-trained-faculty-or-habit\/"},"modified":"2025-06-04T16:06:44","modified_gmt":"2025-06-04T16:06:44","slug":"5-moral-virtue-is-a-state-of-character","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/chapter\/5-moral-virtue-is-a-state-of-character\/","title":{"rendered":"Section 5: What is virtue? A kind of state of character"},"content":{"raw":"Next we must consider what virtue is. There are three kinds of things that come about in the soul: feelings, capacities, and states of character. [20]<\/sub> So virtue must be one of these.\r\n\r\nBy \"feelings\" I mean desires, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, love, hate, longing, jealousy, pity, and in general whatever entails pleasure or pain.\r\n\r\nBy \"capacities\" I mean that within us which makes us susceptible to these feeling; for example, that within us which makes us susceptible to becoming angry, feeling pain, or feeling pity.\r\n\r\nBy \"states of character\" I mean [25]<\/sub> that within us which makes us either well off or badly off in relation to our feelings; for example, that within us which makes us either well off or badly off in relation our anger. If we feel anger too intensely or too weakly, we are badly off in relation to anger. Whereas if we feel anger moderately, we are well of in relation to anger. The same goes in relation to our other feelings.\r\n\r\nNow neither virtues nor vices are feelings, because we are not called good or bad on the basis of our feelings. Instead, we are called good or bad on the basis of our virtues and vices. [30]<\/sub> And we are neither praised nor blamed for our feelings, since the person who simply feels fear or anger is not praised for that, nor is the person who simply feels anger blamed, but the person who feels it in a certain way. Rather we are praised or blamed for our virtues and our vices.\r\n\r\n[1106a1]<\/sub> Again, we feel anger and fear without choosing to, but virtues are a sort of choice--or, rather, involve choice. Further, when it comes to our feelings we are said to be moved, [5]<\/sub> whereas when it comes to our virtues and vices, we are not said to be moved, but instead to be disposed to act in a certain way.\r\n\r\nFor these reasons virtues are not capacities either. For we are neither called good nor bad, nor praised nor blamed, simply for the capacity to have feelings. Again, we have these capacities by nature, but we are not made good by nature or bad by nature (we talked about this before).\r\n\r\nIf, [10]<\/sub> then, the virtues are neither feelings nor capacities, all that remains is that they are states of character. Thus we have stated what the genus of virtue is. [Or put differently, we have stated what kind of thing virtue is].","rendered":"

Next we must consider what virtue is. There are three kinds of things that come about in the soul: feelings, capacities, and states of character. [20]<\/sub> So virtue must be one of these.<\/p>\n

By “feelings” I mean desires, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, love, hate, longing, jealousy, pity, and in general whatever entails pleasure or pain.<\/p>\n

By “capacities” I mean that within us which makes us susceptible to these feeling; for example, that within us which makes us susceptible to becoming angry, feeling pain, or feeling pity.<\/p>\n

By “states of character” I mean [25]<\/sub> that within us which makes us either well off or badly off in relation to our feelings; for example, that within us which makes us either well off or badly off in relation our anger. If we feel anger too intensely or too weakly, we are badly off in relation to anger. Whereas if we feel anger moderately, we are well of in relation to anger. The same goes in relation to our other feelings.<\/p>\n

Now neither virtues nor vices are feelings, because we are not called good or bad on the basis of our feelings. Instead, we are called good or bad on the basis of our virtues and vices. [30]<\/sub> And we are neither praised nor blamed for our feelings, since the person who simply feels fear or anger is not praised for that, nor is the person who simply feels anger blamed, but the person who feels it in a certain way. Rather we are praised or blamed for our virtues and our vices.<\/p>\n

[1106a1]<\/sub> Again, we feel anger and fear without choosing to, but virtues are a sort of choice–or, rather, involve choice. Further, when it comes to our feelings we are said to be moved, [5]<\/sub> whereas when it comes to our virtues and vices, we are not said to be moved, but instead to be disposed to act in a certain way.<\/p>\n

For these reasons virtues are not capacities either. For we are neither called good nor bad, nor praised nor blamed, simply for the capacity to have feelings. Again, we have these capacities by nature, but we are not made good by nature or bad by nature (we talked about this before).<\/p>\n

If, [10]<\/sub> then, the virtues are neither feelings nor capacities, all that remains is that they are states of character. Thus we have stated what the genus of virtue is. [Or put differently, we have stated what kind of thing virtue is].<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":249,"menu_order":6,"template":"","meta":{"pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[48],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-56","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry","chapter-type-numberless"],"part":47,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/56","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/249"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/56\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":449,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/56\/revisions\/449"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/47"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/56\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=56"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=56"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=56"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=56"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}