{"id":88,"date":"2021-03-23T14:53:33","date_gmt":"2021-03-23T14:53:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/chapter\/11\/"},"modified":"2026-06-20T01:31:37","modified_gmt":"2026-06-20T01:31:37","slug":"11-vices-opposed-to-temperance","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/chapter\/11-vices-opposed-to-temperance\/","title":{"rendered":"Section 11: The vices opposed to temperance: intemperance and insensitivity"},"content":{"raw":"Some appetites seem to be shared by people, others to be peculiar to individuals and acquired. For example, the appetite for food is natural, since everyone who is without it craves for food or drink, and sometimes for both. [10]<\/sub> And likewise the appetite for sex (or \"bed\" as Homer puts it) is natural to someone young and in his prime. But not every one craves for this or that kind of nourishment, nor for sex with the same people. Yet it has of course something natural about it. For different things are pleasant to different kinds of people, and some things are more pleasant to everyone than random objects.\r\n\r\nNow when it comes to the natural appetites, few people [15]<\/sub> go wrong, and they only go wrong in one direction: that of excess. For to eat or drink random things until one is overfull is to exceed the natural amount, since the natural appetite is for the replenishment of one's need. Hence people who do this are called \"gluttons,\" this implying that they glut their belly beyond what is right. It is people of entirely slavish character that become like this. [20]<\/sub>\r\n\r\nBut with regard to the pleasures peculiar to individuals, many people go wrong and in many ways. For people are called \"lovers of this or that\" because they delight either in the wrong things, or more than most people do, or in the wrong way. Intemperate people exceed in all three of these ways. They delight in some things that they should not delight in (since they hate those things instead), [25]<\/sub> and if one should delight in some of the things they delight in, they do so more than one should and more than most people do.\r\n\r\nClearly, then, excess with regard to pleasures is intemperance and is blameworthy. With regard to pains, one is not, as in the case of courage, called temperate for facing them or intemperate for not doing so. But the intemperate person [30]<\/sub> is so called because he is pained more than he should be when he doesn't get pleasurable things (even his pain being caused by pleasure). And the temperate person is so called because he is not pained at the absence of what is pleasant and at his abstaining from it.\r\n\r\nThe intemperate person, then, craves for all pleasurable things [1119a1]<\/sub> or for those that are most pleasurable, and is led by his appetite to choose these at the cost of everything else. Hence, he is pained both when he fails to get them and when he is merely craving for them (for desire involves pain), even though it seems strange to be pained because of pleasure.\r\n\r\nPeople who fall short with regard to pleasures [5]<\/sub> and delight in them less than they should are hardly found. For such insensibility is not human. Even the other animals distinguish different kinds of food and enjoy some and not others. And if there is anyone who finds nothing pleasant and nothing more attractive than anything else, he would be far from being human. This sort of person has not received a name [10]<\/sub> because he rarely occurs.\r\n\r\nThe temperate person occupies a middle position with regard to these matters. For he neither enjoys the things that the intemperate person enjoys most--but rather dislikes them--nor in general the things that he should not, nor anything of this sort to excess, nor does he feel pain or craving when they are absent, or he only does so only to a moderate degree, and not more than he should, nor when he should not, and so on. [15]<\/sub> But he will moderately desire the pleasurable things that conduce to good health or to a good condition, and he will desire them as he should, and also other pleasant things if they are not hindrances to these ends, or contrary to what is noble, or beyond his means. For he who desires them in the intemperate way loves such pleasures more than they are worth, but the temperate person is not that sort of person, but the sort of person that right reason prescribes. [20]<\/sub>","rendered":"

Some appetites seem to be shared by people, others to be peculiar to individuals and acquired. For example, the appetite for food is natural, since everyone who is without it craves for food or drink, and sometimes for both. [10]<\/sub> And likewise the appetite for sex (or “bed” as Homer puts it) is natural to someone young and in his prime. But not every one craves for this or that kind of nourishment, nor for sex with the same people. Yet it has of course something natural about it. For different things are pleasant to different kinds of people, and some things are more pleasant to everyone than random objects.<\/p>\n

Now when it comes to the natural appetites, few people [15]<\/sub> go wrong, and they only go wrong in one direction: that of excess. For to eat or drink random things until one is overfull is to exceed the natural amount, since the natural appetite is for the replenishment of one’s need. Hence people who do this are called “gluttons,” this implying that they glut their belly beyond what is right. It is people of entirely slavish character that become like this. [20]<\/sub><\/p>\n

But with regard to the pleasures peculiar to individuals, many people go wrong and in many ways. For people are called “lovers of this or that” because they delight either in the wrong things, or more than most people do, or in the wrong way. Intemperate people exceed in all three of these ways. They delight in some things that they should not delight in (since they hate those things instead), [25]<\/sub> and if one should delight in some of the things they delight in, they do so more than one should and more than most people do.<\/p>\n

Clearly, then, excess with regard to pleasures is intemperance and is blameworthy. With regard to pains, one is not, as in the case of courage, called temperate for facing them or intemperate for not doing so. But the intemperate person [30]<\/sub> is so called because he is pained more than he should be when he doesn’t get pleasurable things (even his pain being caused by pleasure). And the temperate person is so called because he is not pained at the absence of what is pleasant and at his abstaining from it.<\/p>\n

The intemperate person, then, craves for all pleasurable things [1119a1]<\/sub> or for those that are most pleasurable, and is led by his appetite to choose these at the cost of everything else. Hence, he is pained both when he fails to get them and when he is merely craving for them (for desire involves pain), even though it seems strange to be pained because of pleasure.<\/p>\n

People who fall short with regard to pleasures [5]<\/sub> and delight in them less than they should are hardly found. For such insensibility is not human. Even the other animals distinguish different kinds of food and enjoy some and not others. And if there is anyone who finds nothing pleasant and nothing more attractive than anything else, he would be far from being human. This sort of person has not received a name [10]<\/sub> because he rarely occurs.<\/p>\n

The temperate person occupies a middle position with regard to these matters. For he neither enjoys the things that the intemperate person enjoys most–but rather dislikes them–nor in general the things that he should not, nor anything of this sort to excess, nor does he feel pain or craving when they are absent, or he only does so only to a moderate degree, and not more than he should, nor when he should not, and so on. [15]<\/sub> But he will moderately desire the pleasurable things that conduce to good health or to a good condition, and he will desire them as he should, and also other pleasant things if they are not hindrances to these ends, or contrary to what is noble, or beyond his means. For he who desires them in the intemperate way loves such pleasures more than they are worth, but the temperate person is not that sort of person, but the sort of person that right reason prescribes. [20]<\/sub><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":249,"menu_order":11,"template":"","meta":{"pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[48],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-88","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry","chapter-type-numberless"],"part":66,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/88","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/249"}],"version-history":[{"count":9,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/88\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":995,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/88\/revisions\/995"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/66"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/88\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=88"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=88"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=88"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=88"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}