{"id":90,"date":"2021-03-23T14:57:30","date_gmt":"2021-03-23T14:57:30","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/chapter\/12-how-profligacy-is-more-voluntary-than-cowardice\/"},"modified":"2026-06-20T01:54:08","modified_gmt":"2026-06-20T01:54:08","slug":"12-how-self-indulgence-is-more-voluntary-than-cowardice","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/chapter\/12-how-self-indulgence-is-more-voluntary-than-cowardice\/","title":{"rendered":"Section 12: How intemperance is more voluntary than cowardice"},"content":{"raw":"Intemperance is more like a voluntary state than cowardice. For the former comes about by pleasure, the latter by pain, of which the one is to be chosen and the other to be avoided. And pain upsets and destroys the nature of the person who feels it, while pleasure does nothing of the sort. Therefore, intemperance is more voluntary. Hence also it is more a matter of blame. For it is easier to become habituated to resisting pleasures, [25]<\/sub> since there are many pleasurable things in life, and the process of habituation is free from danger. But in the case of terrifying things, the reverse is the case.\r\n\r\nYet cowardice would seem to be voluntary in a different way from its particular manifestations. For it is itself painless, but in particular situations we are upset by pain, so that we even throw down our weapons and disgrace ourselves in other ways. Hence our actions are even thought to be done under compulsion. [30]<\/sub> In the case of the intemperate person, in contrast, the particular actions are voluntary (for he does them with craving and desire), but the whole state is less so; for no one craves to be intemperate.\r\n\r\nThe name \"intemperance\" is applied also to childish faults. For they bear a certain resemblance to what we have been considering. Which is called after which [1119b1]<\/sub> makes no difference to our present purpose. Clearly, however, the latter is called after the earlier. The transference of the name seems not a bad one. For that which desires what is shameful and which develops quickly ought to be kept in a disciplined condition, and these characteristics belong above all to our appetites and to children, since children in fact [5]<\/sub> live at the beck and call of their appetites, and it is in them that the desire for what is pleasant is strongest.\r\n\r\nThus, if our appetites are not going to be obedient and subject to the ruling element in us, they will go to great lengths. For in a nonrational being the desire for pleasure is insatiable even if it tries every source of gratification, and the exercise of the appetites increase their innate force, and if appetites are strong and violent they even expel the power of reasoning. [10]<\/sub> Hence they should be moderate and few, and should in no way oppose the rational element--and this is what we call an obedient and disciplined condition--and as the child should live according to the direction of his tutor, so the appetitive element should live according to rational element.\r\n\r\nHence the appetitive element in a temperate person should harmonize [15]<\/sub> with reason. For the noble is the mark at which both aim, and the temperate person craves for the things he ought, as he ought, and when he ought. And this is what reason prescribes.\r\n\r\nHere we conclude our account of temperance.","rendered":"

Intemperance is more like a voluntary state than cowardice. For the former comes about by pleasure, the latter by pain, of which the one is to be chosen and the other to be avoided. And pain upsets and destroys the nature of the person who feels it, while pleasure does nothing of the sort. Therefore, intemperance is more voluntary. Hence also it is more a matter of blame. For it is easier to become habituated to resisting pleasures, [25]<\/sub> since there are many pleasurable things in life, and the process of habituation is free from danger. But in the case of terrifying things, the reverse is the case.<\/p>\n

Yet cowardice would seem to be voluntary in a different way from its particular manifestations. For it is itself painless, but in particular situations we are upset by pain, so that we even throw down our weapons and disgrace ourselves in other ways. Hence our actions are even thought to be done under compulsion. [30]<\/sub> In the case of the intemperate person, in contrast, the particular actions are voluntary (for he does them with craving and desire), but the whole state is less so; for no one craves to be intemperate.<\/p>\n

The name “intemperance” is applied also to childish faults. For they bear a certain resemblance to what we have been considering. Which is called after which [1119b1]<\/sub> makes no difference to our present purpose. Clearly, however, the latter is called after the earlier. The transference of the name seems not a bad one. For that which desires what is shameful and which develops quickly ought to be kept in a disciplined condition, and these characteristics belong above all to our appetites and to children, since children in fact [5]<\/sub> live at the beck and call of their appetites, and it is in them that the desire for what is pleasant is strongest.<\/p>\n

Thus, if our appetites are not going to be obedient and subject to the ruling element in us, they will go to great lengths. For in a nonrational being the desire for pleasure is insatiable even if it tries every source of gratification, and the exercise of the appetites increase their innate force, and if appetites are strong and violent they even expel the power of reasoning. [10]<\/sub> Hence they should be moderate and few, and should in no way oppose the rational element–and this is what we call an obedient and disciplined condition–and as the child should live according to the direction of his tutor, so the appetitive element should live according to rational element.<\/p>\n

Hence the appetitive element in a temperate person should harmonize [15]<\/sub> with reason. For the noble is the mark at which both aim, and the temperate person craves for the things he ought, as he ought, and when he ought. And this is what reason prescribes.<\/p>\n

Here we conclude our account of temperance.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":249,"menu_order":12,"template":"","meta":{"pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[48],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-90","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry","chapter-type-numberless"],"part":66,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/90","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/249"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/90\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":998,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/90\/revisions\/998"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/66"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/90\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=90"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=90"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=90"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/nicomacheanethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=90"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}