{"id":201,"date":"2022-09-01T15:20:11","date_gmt":"2022-09-01T15:20:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/religionsofmiddleeast1\/?post_type=chapter&p=201"},"modified":"2022-11-04T01:51:39","modified_gmt":"2022-11-04T01:51:39","slug":"another-middle-eastern-cold-war","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/religionsofmiddleeast1\/chapter\/another-middle-eastern-cold-war\/","title":{"rendered":"Part 5. Another Middle Eastern Cold War"},"content":{"raw":"Saudis vs. Iran<\/strong>\r\n\r\nHesitant to take each other on directly, Saudi Arabia and Iran have backed different proxies in several Middle Eastern conflicts in recent years.\u00a0 Each country has superpower allies, with the US supporting Saudi Arabia, and Russia and China providing support for Iran. \u00a0Though divided on sectarian lines, the cold war is mostly political and economic in nature, as the two spar for regional hegemony.\u00a0 However, sectarian rhetoric is used to stir up support, particularly by the Saudis against Iran.\r\n\r\nThe conflict dates back to the Iranian revolution, when Iran\u2019s theocratic government challenged the Saudi claim to Islamic leadership, and Sunni-Shi\u2019ite clashes took place during the pilgrimage.\u00a0 Saudi-led initiatives in recent years have sought to isolate Iran.\u00a0 In January 2020, the US sided with Saudi Arabia, unleashing an air-strike on Iranian forces in Iraq, which killed the Iranian general Qasem Soleimani.\u00a0 The attack was in retribution for a September 2019 drone attack on a Saudi oil processing, presumed to have been launched by Iran.\r\n\r\nThe Abraham Accords: New Alliances in the Region <\/strong><\/span>\r\n\r\n40 years after the Camp David Accords, and 25 years after Jordan\u2019s peace agreement with Israel, a flurry of peace accords were signed between Israel and Arab states at the end of President Trump\u2019s term in office, negotiated by Jared Kushner and the American attorney Avi Berkowitz.\u00a0 They began with the Abraham Accords, signed by Israel with the leaders of the UAE and Bahrain.\r\n\r\nIn December 2020, Morocco agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Israel in exchange for US recognition of Morocco\u2019s claims in the Western Sahara and US willingness to sell drones to the country.\u00a0 Sudan made a similar deal to recognize Israel in October 2020 in exchange for being removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, opening up possibilities for future economic aid.\r\n\r\nThe fact that many Arab countries are now formally recognizing Israel shows both that, after 70 years, Arab governments are accepting the reality that Israel is here to stay and the Palestinian plight is no longer considered a top priority among their constituencies.\u00a0 Also, some of these countries (UAE and Morocco) have been dealing unofficially with Israel for years.\u00a0 They were willing to make their recognition official for the right price.\u00a0 Finally, it has become clear that Arab Gulf states now consider Iran to be a much bigger threat than Israel.\u00a0 With the possibility of further US withdrawal from the region, an alliance with Israel is now being seen as an asset.\u00a0 Even the Saudis have sent out feelers to negotiate with Israel, and a Saudi-Israel deal is no longer unthinkable.\r\n\r\nInitial indications, two years on, is that the Abraham Accords have been an economic success.\u00a0 Increased access to Israeli investment and technology, coupled with rising demand for Gulf petroleum following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and sanctions on Russian oil, has created a situation that\u00a0The Economist<\/em> refers to as \"boom time in the Gulf.\"\u00a0 The news magazine predicts that \"the six Gulf states . . . could earn $3.5trn over the next five years . . . Even as energy enriches the Gulf . . . the second force at work is a new alignment of power in the Middle East.\u00a0 Over the past decade Iran has established a sphere of influence across a northern belt including Iraq, Lebanon and Syria.\u00a0 A reaction is in full swing as most Gulf states, Egypt, Israel and other grow closer. . . This nacsnt bloc is partly about developing common defences against Iranian drones and missiles, probably using Israeli technology.\u00a0 But it is also a bet that trade can make these countries richer in a region with puny cross-border links\" (The Economist<\/em>, September 24-30, 2022).\r\n\r\nThe following articles discuss the changing alliances in the Middle East following the Abraham Accords.\u00a0 The first, by the German news agency DW, discusses how the UAE and Israel have moved from being nominal enemies to allies.\u00a0 The second article publishing by the Brookings-Doha on \"The emergence of GCC-Israel relations in a changing Middle East.\"\u00a0 The third is an Al-Jazeera article on Israel's relationships with the Arab states.\r\n\r\nhttps:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/israel-and-uae-how-nominal-enemies-became-allies\/a-60614394<\/a>\r\n\r\nhttps:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/research\/the-emergence-of-gcc-israel-relations-in-a-changing-middle-east\/<\/a>\r\n\r\nhttps:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2022\/3\/28\/blinken-and-arab-foreign-ministers-meet-at-negev-summit<\/a>","rendered":"

Saudis vs. Iran<\/strong><\/p>\n

Hesitant to take each other on directly, Saudi Arabia and Iran have backed different proxies in several Middle Eastern conflicts in recent years.\u00a0 Each country has superpower allies, with the US supporting Saudi Arabia, and Russia and China providing support for Iran. \u00a0Though divided on sectarian lines, the cold war is mostly political and economic in nature, as the two spar for regional hegemony.\u00a0 However, sectarian rhetoric is used to stir up support, particularly by the Saudis against Iran.<\/p>\n

The conflict dates back to the Iranian revolution, when Iran\u2019s theocratic government challenged the Saudi claim to Islamic leadership, and Sunni-Shi\u2019ite clashes took place during the pilgrimage.\u00a0 Saudi-led initiatives in recent years have sought to isolate Iran.\u00a0 In January 2020, the US sided with Saudi Arabia, unleashing an air-strike on Iranian forces in Iraq, which killed the Iranian general Qasem Soleimani.\u00a0 The attack was in retribution for a September 2019 drone attack on a Saudi oil processing, presumed to have been launched by Iran.<\/p>\n

The Abraham Accords: New Alliances in the Region <\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

40 years after the Camp David Accords, and 25 years after Jordan\u2019s peace agreement with Israel, a flurry of peace accords were signed between Israel and Arab states at the end of President Trump\u2019s term in office, negotiated by Jared Kushner and the American attorney Avi Berkowitz.\u00a0 They began with the Abraham Accords, signed by Israel with the leaders of the UAE and Bahrain.<\/p>\n

In December 2020, Morocco agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Israel in exchange for US recognition of Morocco\u2019s claims in the Western Sahara and US willingness to sell drones to the country.\u00a0 Sudan made a similar deal to recognize Israel in October 2020 in exchange for being removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, opening up possibilities for future economic aid.<\/p>\n

The fact that many Arab countries are now formally recognizing Israel shows both that, after 70 years, Arab governments are accepting the reality that Israel is here to stay and the Palestinian plight is no longer considered a top priority among their constituencies.\u00a0 Also, some of these countries (UAE and Morocco) have been dealing unofficially with Israel for years.\u00a0 They were willing to make their recognition official for the right price.\u00a0 Finally, it has become clear that Arab Gulf states now consider Iran to be a much bigger threat than Israel.\u00a0 With the possibility of further US withdrawal from the region, an alliance with Israel is now being seen as an asset.\u00a0 Even the Saudis have sent out feelers to negotiate with Israel, and a Saudi-Israel deal is no longer unthinkable.<\/p>\n

Initial indications, two years on, is that the Abraham Accords have been an economic success.\u00a0 Increased access to Israeli investment and technology, coupled with rising demand for Gulf petroleum following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and sanctions on Russian oil, has created a situation that\u00a0The Economist<\/em> refers to as “boom time in the Gulf.”\u00a0 The news magazine predicts that “the six Gulf states . . . could earn $3.5trn over the next five years . . . Even as energy enriches the Gulf . . . the second force at work is a new alignment of power in the Middle East.\u00a0 Over the past decade Iran has established a sphere of influence across a northern belt including Iraq, Lebanon and Syria.\u00a0 A reaction is in full swing as most Gulf states, Egypt, Israel and other grow closer. . . This nacsnt bloc is partly about developing common defences against Iranian drones and missiles, probably using Israeli technology.\u00a0 But it is also a bet that trade can make these countries richer in a region with puny cross-border links” (The Economist<\/em>, September 24-30, 2022).<\/p>\n

The following articles discuss the changing alliances in the Middle East following the Abraham Accords.\u00a0 The first, by the German news agency DW, discusses how the UAE and Israel have moved from being nominal enemies to allies.\u00a0 The second article publishing by the Brookings-Doha on “The emergence of GCC-Israel relations in a changing Middle East.”\u00a0 The third is an Al-Jazeera article on Israel’s relationships with the Arab states.<\/p>\n

https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/israel-and-uae-how-nominal-enemies-became-allies\/a-60614394<\/a><\/p>\n

https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/research\/the-emergence-of-gcc-israel-relations-in-a-changing-middle-east\/<\/a><\/p>\n

https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2022\/3\/28\/blinken-and-arab-foreign-ministers-meet-at-negev-summit<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":114,"menu_order":5,"template":"","meta":{"pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-201","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry"],"part":155,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/religionsofmiddleeast1\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/201","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/religionsofmiddleeast1\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/religionsofmiddleeast1\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/religionsofmiddleeast1\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/114"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/religionsofmiddleeast1\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/201\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":435,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/religionsofmiddleeast1\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/201\/revisions\/435"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/religionsofmiddleeast1\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/155"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/religionsofmiddleeast1\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/201\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/religionsofmiddleeast1\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=201"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/religionsofmiddleeast1\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=201"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/religionsofmiddleeast1\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=201"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu\/religionsofmiddleeast1\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=201"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}