19. The Impact of Modernization and Traditional Values on Kano Youth

Samantha Smith

A persistent issue in macro sociology is the relationship between culture and social change.  After decades of research on socioeconomic development, and much theoretical debate, two major contending schools of thought regarding patterns of mass cultural change remain.  The first school largely contends that traditional and modern beliefs exist on a zero-sum continuum.  That is to say, modernizing forces proliferate the replacement of traditional values with more “modern” (rational) values and beliefs. Consequently, this school suggests that values will converge cross-nationally as a result of societal level modernization (i.e., progressive societal development embodying industrialization, urbanization, bureaucratization and scientific discovery).

Alternatively, the second major school of thought regarding mass value change contends that convergence is unlikely.  This school emphasizes the persistence of traditional values despite structural development.  Under this paradigm traditional values are expected to persist regardless of societal and individual level socioeconomic change and continue to maintain an independent influence on cultural values.

Clearly these two paradigms are at odds with each other, yet both schools are backed by dense bodies of research.­­­­­­­­ In this paper I report a longitudinal case study of a single society to compare the two paradigms.  I use survey data collected from West African area youth samples in 1965, 1979, and 2007.

Convergence vs. Persistence

Although theories regarding modernization have been developing for over a century, three major studies (Inkeles, 1960, Kahl, 1968, and Inkeles and Smith, 1974) appear to have established the roots of the convergence paradigm. Collectively these studies empirically identified a distinct (cross-cultural) value shift (from traditional to modern) linked to socioeconomic development.

Alex Inkeles’ (1960) exploratory study titled Industrial Man was perhaps the first empirical research to investigate the psychological effects of modern industrial environments cross-nationally.  Relying on past survey data from a group of industrialized countries, Inkeles investigated the relationship between occupational status (or individual roles in the industrial system) and attitudes and beliefs. His findings were both diverse and revealing.  First, he found that differing occupational positions mediated job satisfaction values (across societies lower status workers more often equated job satisfaction with pay while higher status workers cared more about doing work they found to be interesting).  Second, he saw that occupational status also mediated general life satisfaction (lower status workers were more likely to be unhappy and dissatisfied with life compared to higher status workers).  Third, probing the extent to which industrial position influences values, he found both child-rearing values (regarding occupational recommendations) and values regarding ambition, obedience, optimism, and trust (which he termed “human nature”) to vary by occupational status.

Thus, Inkeles (1960) concluded that large scale industrial patterns of societies influenced individual values across nations somewhat systemically. This finding (that societal level structural development fuels systematic value change—the core of modernization theory) inspired two major studies that tested empirically the claim in less developed (more traditional) nations. (If similar value shifts were evident in diverse societies global value convergence was probable).

Kahl (1968) first explored the validity of a unidimensional measure of value change in the developing world.   In what was at the time a quite novel construction, Kahl developed an empirical “measure of modernism” consisting of 14 attitudinal scales exploring/measuring hypothesized “modern” views of work and life.^[1]  After factor analyzing the resulting data from some 1,300 men in Brazil and Mexico, Kahl identified seven value orientations representing the so-called “core” components of modernism: 1) activism, 2) low integration with relatives, 3) preference for urban life, 4) individualism, 5) low community stratification, 6) mass-media participation, and 7) low stratification of life chances.

Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, Kahl identified clear patterns (remarkably similar findings in Brazil and Mexico) regarding these core traits and place of residence (e.g., provinces, metropolises) and socioeconomic status, finding “modern” values to be more prominent among city dwellers, higher status workers and the more educated in both societies.  Consequently, Kahl supported Inkeles (1960) position that industrial development (or immersion in industrial society) proliferated somewhat predictable “traditional” to “modern” value transitions across diverse (both industrial and industrializing) societies.

Inkeles and Smith’s (1974) large-scale (landmark) study of individual modernization involving six different developing nations (Argentina, Chile, India, Israel, Nigeria, and Bangladesh) further supported these findings.  Using a complex (and rather comprehensive) summary measure (the OM scale) that combined twenty-four themes derived from groupings of differing analytical, topical, and behavioral perspectives on social change, Inkeles and Smith examined “modernity” as a cross-cultural psychosocial attribute.

The resulting survey data from some 6,000 industrial and non-industrial workers revealed clear patterns of characteristics which, according to Inkeles and Smith, represented a cross-cultural “syndrome” of modernity.  “Modern values,” according to their findings, included increasing individualism and openness to new experiences, stronger beliefs in the efficacy of science, increasing ambition and valuation in planning, and greater awareness and interest in civic affairs, politics, and national and international issues.  Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, Inkeles and Smith identified three modern institutions that primarily facilitated this “syndrome”: the factory, mass media, and (most strongly) secular education.  Thus, Inkeles and Smith, in line with Kahl (1968) and Inkeles (1960), found that modern institutions proliferated predictable value transformations (i.e., a shift from “traditional” to “modern” values) across diverse societies and argued that global value convergence was likely on the horizon.

In short, these findings supported the convergence model of social change, providing a strong platform for modernization theory (or the theory that societal development is linked to predictable value shifts).  Their findings (along with countless others that followed) consistently supported the notion that individual values, even among diverse nations, converge to a remarkable degree during the process of economic development, inevitably giving rise to a single “modern man.”

Modernization theory, however, was not without its critics.  Starting in the late 1970’s social theorists began contesting the convergence model, highlighting the weaknesses and failures of the modernization approach.  Dependency-oriented scholars and world systems theorists dismissed modernization theory as ideological.  Wallerstein (1976) went so far as to pronounce it dead.  Even Portes (1979), a modernization theorist, while supporting the meaningfulness of the internal structure of “modernity” (i.e., subjacent set of sub-dimensions), criticized the model’s assumption that modern orientations were positively linked to societal development (as did Delacroix & Ragin, 1984).

Consequently, the convergence model came to be viewed by many at best as too simplistic while at worst as convoluted, idealist and self-serving.  The concept of an emerging universal “industrial” or “modern” man became heavily criticized as researchers began pointing to customs and beliefs that continued to differentiate societies rather than to new value sets that seemed to connect them.  Edward Shils (1981), in his book titled Tradition, devoted some 300 pages solely to defining and describing the resounding influence of tradition (and immutability of traditions) over time.  Later Hamilton, an economic theorist (among many others), argued that modern values were incapable of replacing culture:

“The organizational structure of rationalism and capitalism is deeply imbedded in Western life.  Their diffusion to another civilization arena, even by force, is not to transmit the whole, but only the effects of that life, the artifacts, so to speak.  Rationalism, as a mode of scientific thinking, and capitalism, as a way of doing business, enter other civilizations as inventions, albeit very important ones.  They enter as alien fragments into a complete way of life that has no holes, no institutional niches left unoccupied.  For this reason… a complete replacement of one worldview by another is impossible” (1994: 197).

Thus, the persistence paradigm (refuting value convergence) had taken shape.

Samuel Huntington’s (1993, 1996) “clash of civilizations” thesis, which projected dismal global relations, represented one of the most profound (and controversial) works supporting the persistence model.  His “clash” thesis reminded readers that contemporary values in different societies (which he grouped into eight major civilizations or “cultural zones”) reflect long-standing cultural legacies relating to national history, language, customs, and (most importantly) religion.  Further, citing a series of conflicts between Western and Islamic civilizations (among others), he proclaimed that these distinct cultural differences, specifically related to political values, would become the major source of conflict in the modern world.

Thus, in Huntington’s mind the pervasive impact of tradition and religion in different “civilizations” (and the persistence of these traditions) had led and would continue to lead to serious “ethno-religious clashes” in the increasingly globalized world.  In his eyes (and many other persistence-oriented theorists’) peoples of the world would remain culturally distinct for better or for worse.

Despite such widespread skepticism, modernization theory seems to withstand the test of time, at least in some form.  Contemporary theorists continue to offer new evidence and insights regarding universal rationalization of attitudes and behaviors (Ritzer’s (2000) McDonaldlization argument is one such example).  Thus, the debate between cultural convergence and cultural persistence continues. 

Tradition vs. Modernization (and Post Modernization)

To this author’s knowledge, Ronald Inglehart and Wayne Baker’s recent publication, Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values (2000), based on data from the World Value Surveys, is the first major empirical attempt to compare the two change paradigms.^[2]In their study, Inglehart and Baker tested modernization theory’s main premise  (that economic development is linked with systematic changes in basic values) by comparing value orientations/tendencies between countries at different levels of development.  Furthermore, to incorporate the persistence perspective, Inglehart and Baker employed Huntington’s (1993, 1996) “cultural zone” premise by dividing the nations into eight “civilizations” (or groups) according to their prominent religious traditions, said to be the preeminent source of values that persist despite modernizing forces (according to the persistence model).^[3]

Their measure of traditional vs. modern values was derived from Inglehart’s prior assessment of transforming values and beliefs (1997, also using WVS data) in which he identified two global systematic change patterns (based on factor scores of 22 WVS variables).  The first of these was said to reflect the cross-national polarization between traditional and modern (secular-rational) orientations towards authority (more specifically the differing belief structures of pre-industrial and industrial societies).  The second was thought to capture the newly emerging shift towards postmodern values linked to economic security (i.e., materialistic survival values to post-materialistic self-expression values) evident in advanced industrialized societies.^[4]

Although Inglehart and Baker’s (2000) findings supported the theory of systematic change (massive systematic cultural change was readily apparent on both dimensional scales), they also suggested that historical cultural traditions (the “zones”) maintained a significant, independent influence on values.  Thus, Inglehart and Baker deemed cultural change to be path dependent (in line with the persistence model), and offered a series of revisions to modernization theory (including the argument that modernization is probabilistic rather than deterministic).

Exploring Social Change in the Developing World

One weakness of Inglehart and Baker’s (2000) study (and the WVS data thus far) is that the least developed nations, particularly African nations, are underrepresented.  Although Inglehart and Baker’s dimensions of change (both modernization and post modernization) appeared valid across most nations (particularly advanced nations), their African zone included only three nations.  Further, the “culture” of these nations seemed to be an anomaly to their cultural-influence (i.e., persistence) perspective (see Table 4 pg. 33 in Inglehart & Baker 2000).  Thus the relationship between modernizing institutions, tradition, and social change in these nations, which due to years of Western colonization are perhaps the world’s most traditional and underdeveloped societies, remains somewhat unclear.

This paper reports the results of a case study that retests and evaluates Inglehart and Baker’s (2000) perspectives on social change (both their general conclusions and their two-dimensional model) by focusing at the individual level on a city in Africa.  One critical methodological issue in testing the persistence model is whether units of analysis can be defined by modern, nation-state boundaries.  Traditions may persist within boundaries and, in some cases, across boundaries, which is particularly likely in Africa, especially West Africa.  The Northern region of Nigeria has a recorded continuous cultural tradition dating back to the 15th century and, at the same time, is a central player in the modern economy of the nation.  It is, therefore, an appropriate site for examining these two theories in that arbitrary national boundaries should not bias the findings.

A past study focusing on the region, which used the earliest wave of the data used here, provided some support for the convergence model, specifically noting a strong relationship between modern secular education and modern value orientations (Armer & Youtz 1971).  Using two new waves of data, this study takes a second look at the modernizing power of secular education across time on young people.  In addition, to simultaneously evaluate the validity of the persistence model, the current study investigates the effect of traditional Islamic schooling on values.  The Qur’anic teachings in these schools exemplify a sustaining traditional force in society.

The main hypotheses of this project are:

• H1: Modern (secular-rational) values will increase, and traditional values will decrease, over time.
• H2: Postmodern (self-expression) values will increase, and materialistic (survival) values will decrease, over time.
• H3: Increasing modern and postmodern values will be largely explained by increasing secular education.
• H4: Higher levels of traditional Islamic schooling will be associated with more traditional and survival-oriented values.

Method

 Setting

The current study draws on data collected in the city of Kano, Nigeria.  Although industry has grown over the last century (textile manufacturing and petroleum-based industry in particular) and public employment is relatively high (e.g., all teachers are government employees), Nigeria is a distinctly traditional, developing society.  Agriculture is still a dominant economic sector, accounting for more than half the Nigerian labor force, and craftsmen, traders, and religious leaders (or mallams) all maintain significant roles both in the economy and the community (Harmon 2001; Morgan & Morgan 1998; Morgan & Morgan 2004).

Kano is a particularly appropriate setting for research regarding the juxtaposition of traditional and modern forces not only because it is one of the oldest cities in West Africa (with predominantly traditional/religious leadership dating from the 1400’s until 1967), but also because it represents the dominant urban economic center of Northern Nigeria today.  Kano is one of the few societies in Africa to “maintain an unbroken organizational tie with its past throughout the colonial period” (Armer & Youtz 1971:606).  Thus, religious authority and pride in cultural (predominantly Hausa-Fulani) heritage remain high among citizens while modern secular education systems remain somewhat underdeveloped (e.g., still noncompulsory).^[5]

As a major national city, Kano also embraces the predominant cultural patterns of Nigeria.  Data from the 1990-93 World Value Survey, which compares basic beliefs and values among the peoples of more than 40 societies (representing some 70 percent of the world’s population,) further supports the notion that Nigeria is a remarkably traditional nation.  Religion and family continue to be of utmost importance in Nigerians’ lives.  For example, among all the nations surveyed, Nigeria had the highest percentage of people (85%) that answered “very important” to the question “How important is religion in your life?” (As a point of reference the percent answering “very important” to this question in South Africa was 66% [ranked 2nd] and 61% in Turkey [ranked 3rd]; while only 53% of Americas felt religion to be very important in their lives and 21% of respondents in Spain to a strikingly low 1% of respondents in China, to name only a few).  Nigeria also had the highest percentage of respondents agreeing that God was “very important” in their lives (98%) and the highest percentage of people who said that they “take some moments of prayer, mediation, or contemplation (99%) or pray to God “often” or “sometimes” outside religious services (97%).  Regarding the importance of family and community, Nigerians again ranked first in percentage citing family as “very important” in their lives (94% of respondents) and last (only 16%) in viewing independence as an especially important quality (Inglehart, Basanez & Moreno 1998). 

Sample

 The current analysis is based on data from the Kano Youth Survey (KYS).  The KYS is a continuing longitudinal survey of 17-year-old boys in Kano, Nigeria.  The first cohort was surveyed in 1965, the second in 1979, and the third in 2007.  An identical random area sampling design was used for each cohort that yielded 591 respondents in 1965, 632 in 1979, and 507 in 2007, for a total sample size of 1,730 boys.^[6]  The surveys were conducted with permission and support from local authorities.  Indigenous Hausa speakers conducted all interviews.

 Measures

 Dependent Variables

 The study design, which draws heavily on Inglehart and Baker’s (2000) study of societal modernization using World Value Survey data, is a deliberate attempt to replicate their study on an individual level in a populous, developing, traditional Muslim society that was shaped by decades of colonial rule.^[7]  The applicability of their two-dimensional development theory is tested using two indexes designed to mirror the two unique dimensional scales they identified.^[8]

Scale 1

The first scale, said to measure the “polarization between traditional versus secular-rational orientations toward authority” is an index of 16 indicators selected to parallel Inglehart and Baker’s (common) conception (and operationalization) of traditional versus modern values/culture (Inglehart & Baker 2000: 23, emphasis in original).  Selected indicators included five (5) attitudinal questions regarding religion, five (5) questions about the importance of family and traditional/parental authority, and six (6) questions regarding conformity and/or propensity to adopt or accept “European (Western) ways,” and/or value individualism, science and change.^[9] (For a full list of the indicators see Appendix A).  All indicators were coded/recoded so that higher scores represented more secular or rational values.

Initially individual responses were totaled to compute overall level of traditionalism or “secular-rationalism” (i.e., modernity), but this method dropped some 500 respondents due to listwise deletion.  Thus, the final index term used was computed by first creating a count variable for the scale (a variable denoting the number of questions each respondent answered) and then dividing each respondent’s “score” on the index by their count.  This method, based on average scores, retained the full sample of 1,730 boys.  Average scores ranged from 1.19 to 2.93, with a mean of 1.836 for the full sample.

Overall, specific care was taken to produce a scale that would be comparable to Inglehart and Baker’s measure (on an individual level).  Their scale was intended to reflect the contrast between societies where religion and family are central (the supposed value structure of pre-industrial societies) and those in which they are not (more advanced nations [thus seemingly a measure of modernity]).  By selecting questions that were asked each survey year (16 vs. 5 in Inglehart and Baker (2000)), which were similar to theirs, the multifaceted dimension of change they presented and tested across 65 nations is fully reflect.^[10] 

Cronbach’s alpha indicated an overall scale reliability of .362 for the full sample, admittedly modest but fairly consistent with prior analyses using these data.^[11]  By cohort, the alphas were as follows: .449 in 1965, .404 for 1979 and, .244 for 2007.  (Appendix A also includes results of exploratory factor analysis of the scale variables, assessing possible sub-dimensions.)

 Scale 2

Similar to scale one, scale two’s construction draws on Inglehart and Baker (2000) (and Inglehart (1997)).  As noted earlier, Inglehart and Baker’s (2000) analysis is based on the premise that social development is not linear, but reflective of two dimensions, the first representing the transition from a traditional to modern society (see scale one) and the second roughly representing the shift from a modern to postmodern society.  Accordingly, scale two is a measure of the (second) transition from survival values to self-expression (or quality of life) values.

The alleged “central component” of this dimension “involves the polarization between materialist and post-materialist values” (Inglehart & Baker 2000: 26).  Inglehart and Baker further explained this second phase of social change to be representative of “the syndrome of trust, tolerance, subjective well-being, political activism, and self-expression that emerges in postindustrial society with high levels of security” (2000: 25).  Thus, sixteen attitudinal indicators were selected (representing all the relevant questions, found in the KYS survey that were asked of each cohort, less one^[12])  regarding openness and awareness (3), women’s equality (2), ethnic tolerance (4), interpersonal trust (3), and/or focusing on survival vs. security outlooks/mindsets in a broad or specific sense (4).^[13]  (See Appendix B for the full list of questions).  All the indicators were then coded so that higher values represented more self-expressive (or post-materialistic) values.

Finally, as with scale one, respondent scores were added (and divided by a count term) to establish the final index indicator.  The full sample size was again 1,730, with average scores ranging from 1.40 to 3.56 with a mean of 2.54.  Cronbach’s alpha indicated a modest scale reliability of .395 for the full sample (.377 for 1965, .391 for 1979, and .481 for 2007)^[14].                  

Explanatory Variables

Focusing on change over time, the main independent variable was survey year operationalized as two dummy variables with the first survey year (1965) as the reference category.  Both Western and Islamic schooling were also included, because education was the other major explanatory variable (while years of Islamic schooling also served as a measure of sustaining tradition).  Western schooling was included as number of years of modern secular education, while Islamic, or Qur’anic, instruction was measured by number of years spent studying either in makarantar allo (i.e., elementary Islamic education) and/or makarantar ilmi (i.e., advanced Islamic education, which includes reading commentaries and other materials).  (Years of each form of Qur’anic instruction were totaled with the maximum set at twelve years and missing values coded as zero.)  Interaction terms were also created to assess any unique effects of secular schooling by survey year (yrs. secular ed. x survey year) because modern schooling became more widespread with the passage of time.^[15]

Demographic controls included three (3) dummy variables for residential district (with the northern-most Arwea district as the reference group), since the districts originally defined distinctive occupational sectors (and associated cultures), and a dummy for employment status (where working in any field=1 and reporting no occupation or “student” as an occupation =0) since some occupations have been seen to influence values.^[16]  Father’s modern schooling and father’s estimated income were also included as measures of social status.^[17]  Father’s schooling was an ordinal measure with 1=some primary school, 2=completed primary school, 3=some secondary, teacher-training, etc., 4=completed secondary, teacher training, etc., 5=beyond secondary (university, etc.), and “don’t knows” and “other” coded as missing.  The scale for father’s income varied by survey year (to compensate for annual monetary value changes) but was also an ordinal measure (reverse) coded 1 to 5 so that higher scores consistently represented larger annual earnings (in naira), with “don’t know” and “other” again coded as missing.  Interaction terms for father’s schooling and income by survey year were also tested.

Last, a measure of respondent’s attitude towards Western secular education was created and explored as a possible theoretical interpretive aid and/or mediating factor.  Attitudes were measured using an index of five terms probing beliefs of the positive and/or negative effects of Western schooling and the desirability of different levels and aspects of modern education.  The items were recoded (where necessary) so that a higher score represented a more favorable attitude.  The final term represented respondent’s total score. (See Appendix C for indicator list.)

Analysis

 Hierarchical multiple ordinary least square (OLS) regressions were used for the total analysis to assess the independent and mediating effects of education (both traditional and modern) and other background characteristics on modern and postmodern values.^[18]  Traditional to secular-rational value transitions [scale 1] were tested separately from survival to self-expression value shifts [scale 2] in accordance with the two-dimensional (or two stage) societal development (modernization/post modernization) process proposed by Inglehart (1997) and Inglehart and Baker (2000).  Six models are presented for each analysis, increasing in complexity and strength; all R2 changes (by model, for both dimensions) were statistically significant, thus, all the models are discussed.

For both scales the first model looked solely at change over time (survey year), while the second (Model 2) did so controlling for education (the other major explanatory variable).  Interaction terms and demographic/social status controls were added in the remaining models (Models 3 thru 5) hoping to expose area of residence, and/or other background characteristics (by cohort) as mechanisms (or inhibitors) of value change.  Respondents’ attitudes toward Western schooling were controlled for in the final model (Model 6 for both scales).^[19]

RESULTS

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample by cohort.  As hypothesized, modern (secular-rational) values increased over time.  Average scores on the traditional vs. rational-secular value index (scale 1) increased from 1.796 in 1965 to 1.841 in 1979 to 1.876 in 2007 (with standard deviations slightly decreasing over time), which indicates a shift towards more modern values over the last four decades.  The trend towards increasing self-expression (or postmodern) values over time was less clear.  Although the average score (for scale 2) was highest (2.565) in 2007, average scores were lowest in 1979 (2.521), rather than 1965 (2.539), suggesting an increase in survival tendencies (or materialistic values), rather than self-expression (or post materialistic) values, from 1965 to 1979 in Kano.

Table 1 also shows that education levels (both Western secular and Qur’anic) increased over time in this developing society.  Seventeen-year-old boys averaged only 2.8 years of modern schooling in 1965 versus 6.2 years in 1979 and 8.6 years in 2007 (this is not surprising as Western secular schooling became increasingly available over this period).  Islamic schooling, more prominent in all cohorts than secular schooling, also consistently increased by survey year from an average of 5 years in 1965 to nearly 9 years in 2007.

As for the other demographic indicators, employment levels were seen to be somewhat inconsistent, with nearly half the boys surveyed in 1965 indicating they were currently working while only 24.4% in 1979 and 30% in 2007 reporting they were (this overall decline is probably associated with increases in modern schooling as seen above).  Father’s modern schooling, not surprisingly, was low overall (the mean of 1.2 for the full sample indicates only “some primary schooling” as average), but both level of education and father’s income were seen to have increased over time.  Last, Table 1 indicates that favorable attitudes towards Western schooling increased from 1965 to 1979 (with average attitudinal scores increasing from 15.0 to 15.7) but decreased between 1979 and 2007 to the overall lowest average score of 14.6.

*Standard deviation not applicable for proportions

**Reported N is for full sample (591 boys were surveyed in 1965, 632 in 1979, and 507 in 2007)

Traditional vs. Secular-Rational Values

The results from Model 1 in Table 2 further support the principal hypothesis that secular-rational (or modern) values increased over time.  Boys’ average scores on Scale 1 were .035 points higher in 1979 and .054 points higher in 2007 than 1965.  Both increases are statistically significant.  But survey year alone had limited predictive power with an R2 of only .007.  Model 2 (adding education into the model) indicated that years of secular education had a highly significant (p<.001) positive effect on increasing secular-rational values (as hypothesized), with average scores increasing by .021 for each additional year of Western schooling.  Islamic schooling, on the other hand, had no effect on secular-rational values, which indicates that traditional schooling and sustaining religious beliefs do not pose a major barrier to individual modernity (i.e., increasingly secular-rational beliefs).

Although significantly more variance was explained by including education levels into the model (R2 jumped to .090), passage of time was now seen to be negatively associated with modern values.  Average scores for Scale 1 were significantly lower in 2007 compared to 1965 (indicating an overall increase in traditional values over time).  This effect was explored in Model 3 by adding two interaction terms crossing years of modern schooling by survey year.  Both were highly significant and together significantly improved the predictive power of the equation (R2 increased to .104).  Furthermore, survey year was again seen to be positively related to increasingly secular-rational values as in Model 1.  Average scores (for Scale 1) were seen to be slightly (but not significantly) higher in 1979 compared to 1965 and significantly (p<.05) higher in 2007 (with an average score increase of .094).  Perhaps even more importantly, this model also revealed a more complex relationship between education and time.  Although modern schooling continued to have a highly significant positive affect on modern value scores (p<.01), the effect appeared to decrease over time (the average increase in scores for each additional year of modern secular schooling was .031 in 1965, but only .017 in 1979, down to .007 in 2007).

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

a 1965 is omitted reference year.

b Arewa is omitted reference district.

c Survey year x father’s education interaction terms were found non-significant and dropped from the final model

A similar trend appeared in Model 4 when demographic and social status controls were added to the equation.  The coefficient for 1979 was still non-significant (indicating no real value change from 1965 to 1979), while the coefficient for 2007 increased slightly (remaining significant (p<.05)).  The effects of modern schooling changed little, remaining consistent with Model 3, and years of Islamic schooling continued to be non-significant.  Somewhat surprisingly, work status, father’s education and father’s income were also found to be unrelated to individual traditional or modern (secular-rational) beliefs (i.e., non-significant).  District in which respondent resided did appear to play a role, although not as expected.  The results indicated that boys from Kudu averaged significantly higher scores (p<.05) on Scale 1 compared to the Northernmost district Arewa, traditionally considered more economically active.

To further probe the connection between social status and traditional vs. secular-rational values, interaction terms crossing father’s income (and father’s education) by survey year were added in Model 5.^[20]  This practice improved the predictive power of the equation significantly (R2 increased to .124) and brought the effect of father’s earnings to light.  Father’s income in 1965 was negatively related to Scale 1 scores (significant at p<.05), which indicates that higher economic status was somewhat of an inhibitor to modern values in this year (or a force for sustaining traditional values), while father’s earnings was positively related to secular-rational value scores in 1979 (significant at p<.05) and 2007 (p<.001), showing socioeconomic status to be positively associated with more modern values in the two later years.  Father’s income also appeared to explain away the effect of time, as both dummies for survey year were now seen to be non-significant.  Nevertheless, the influence of modern secular education persisted, showing highly significant (p<.001) trends consistent with the previous models.

The final model (Model 6) assessed the effect of attitudes towards Western schooling on modern values.  Although the full model explained the most variance in value scores (R2=.145), and more favorable attitudes were seen to be associated with higher scores (significant at p<.001), little changed in regard to the effects of the other independent variables.  Respondent’s years of modern secular schooling remained highly significant across cohorts, with the strongest association being seen in 1965 (where each additional year of modern schooling equated to and average score increase of .029).  Years of Islamic instruction appeared to be unrelated to traditional/secular-rational value scores in all cohorts.  Finally, the effect of father’s income continued to vary by year (while father’s education remained non-significant) and boys from Kudu averaged higher scores than boys living in other districts.

Survival vs. Self-Expression Values

Table 3 presents results assessing the effect of survey year, education, and social status on self-expression (or post-materialistic) values.  Models 1 and 2 indicated trends inconsistent with the hypothesis that postmodern values emerge, and increase, over time.  According to Model 2 (which included survey year and education levels), boy’s average score on the survival vs. self-expression index was negatively related to survey year, thus indicating a decrease in self-expression values over time (average score for Scale 2 was .123 points lower in 1979 and .103 points lower in 2007, compared to 1965 [significant at p<.001]).

The modern education hypothesis was again supported (in Model 2), with every additional year of modern secular schooling representing an average increase of .021 on Scale 2 scores (p<.001; strikingly similar to the secular-rational value scale).  Furthermore, consistent with the traditional vs. modern value index (Scale 1), Model 2 indicated that years of Islamic schooling did not influence (positively or negatively) postmodern (or self-expression) value scores.

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

a 1965 is omitted reference year.

b Arewa is omitted reference district.

c Survey year x father’s education interaction terms were found non-significant and dropped from the final model.

Models 3 and 4 elaborated these findings by adding interaction terms for secular schooling by cohort (1979xYrs.sec.ed. and 2007xYrs.sec.ed) as well as other social status indicators.  Again, a more complex relationship between modern schooling and values was revealed; much like Scale 1, the results indicated that modern education had a declining effect on fueling postmodern values over time (adding these terms also seemed to explain away the general effect of time as survey year lost significance).  Model 4 also showed that having a job and/or having a father who achieved a higher level of education significantly increased postmodern value scores.  Finally, Model 4 indicated that boys living in the Yamma district held the most survival-oriented values.

Similar to the analysis of Scale 1, Model 5 teased out the effect of father’s education and income on values by adding interaction terms.  Father’s modern schooling remained highly significant (p<.001), with increasing schooling seen to be associated with higher (more “postmodern”) Scale 2 scores.  Father’s income was now seen to be a significant predictor of survival values, but only in 1979, with average scores in this cohort significantly decreasing as father’s income increased (p<.05).  Overall the other independent variable effects remained fairly consistent, although the declining impact of secular education on self-expression values was now seen to shift (i.e., become negative) in 2007, with each additional year of education showing an average .002 decrease in post-materialistic scores (or .002 increase in average survival-oriented values) in this year (p<.001).

Finally, in Model 6 the influence of respondent’s attitude towards Western secular education was assessed.  Respondent’s attitude towards secular education was seen to be highly significant, with more favorable attitudes towards Western schooling relating to higher average Scale 2 scores (p<.001).  However, adding the attitude term had little impact on the other coefficients (although it did significantly improve the predictive power of the equation, with the full model explaining over 15% of the variance in Scale 2 scores).  Thus, the overall trend remained clear: Years of modern secular education (both the respondent’s and the respondent’s father’s) significantly influenced survival vs. self-expression value scores across cohorts (while father’s income did so only in 1979).  Father’s level of schooling was consistently positively related to increasingly postmodern beliefs over time while the effect of respondent’s years of secular schooling decreased (and eventually reversed) over time.  Furthermore, traditional Qur’anic instruction was revealed to be neither a barrier or a facilitator of postmodern values.

DISCUSSION

The current study aimed to shed light on the relationship between social change and culture in the developing world.  In particular, the applicability of two alternative models of socioeconomic development were weighed.  The first paradigm, emphasizing a convergence model, presupposes replacement of traditional beliefs and values with more “modern” (i.e., rational) values through the forces of modern institutions, most specifically modern work environments and modern secular schooling.  Alternatively, the second paradigm, which emphasizes so-called persistence, allows for a possible relationship between (or the coexistence of) traditional and modern values, and argues that traditional beliefs have a pervasive and persistent impact on culture and values during socioeconomic development.

Inglehart and Baker (2000) used World Value Survey data to test empirically these perspectives on a societal level and concluded that traditional values maintain an independent influence on cultural change.  Further, in line with Inglehart (1997), they suggested/argued that social change happens in two phases (or on two dimensions) linked to level of industry and economic security.  The first dimension is said to encapsulate the shift away from traditional authority towards more secular and rational orientations, while the second cites a shift from materialistic survival-oriented values to post materialistic self-expression (i.e., quality of life) values (the latter of which is believed to symbolize the emergence of postmodernism).

The current study compared these theories and conclusions on an individual level using data from Kano, Nigeria to test four hypotheses generated from them.  The resulting multiple findings are only partially consistent with the theories.  First and foremost, in line with Inglehart and Baker (2000), the convergence model proved to be too simplistic.  Although there was some evidence that secular-rational values increased over time, and they appeared to be mediated predominately by years of secular education (consistent with Inkeles & Smith (1974), Kahl (1968), and Means (1989)), the parallel, consistent increase in traditional Islamic schooling suggested that traditional beliefs persist in some form regardless of individual modernization.  This finding is supported by Al-Haj (1995) who found traditional extended family kinship structures among the Arab population in Israel to be remarkably flexible and adaptive rather than submissive to individual modernization.

However, the current findings regarding traditional education confounded both perspectives of social change.  The fact that traditional Islamic schooling was seen to have no significant influence on values (yet became more widespread) did not fit particularly well with the convergence perspective or the “persistence” model.  (The convergence perspective predicts replacement of traditional beliefs while the persistence perspective claims that traditional values maintain an ongoing independent influence on culture.)  In line with both paradigms, it was originally hypothesized that sustaining tradition, in this case persistent Qur’anic teachings guided by traditional religious authorities (mallams), would come to be viewed as somewhat of a barrier to modern (or secular-rational) orientations.  Surprisingly, the level of Islamic education was seen neither to retard or promote modern or postmodern beliefs.

This suggests that neither model is adequate to explain patterns of change in this developing nation.  Findings by Morgan and Armer (1988), who also used these data, seem to support this notion. In studying the pattern of determinants for years of Western and Islamic schooling they identified a structural convergence, or accommodation, between the two systems, rather than convergence towards modern Western ideals (as predicted under modernization theory) or a distinct parallel continuity.

Inglehart (1997) and Inglehart and Baker’s (2000) two-dimensional development model (expanding on persistence theory) also did not appear to apply to Kano.  Although industry grew immensely in Nigeria from 1965 to 2007, survey year proved to be an insufficient predictor of value shifts (both modern and postmodern).  Furthermore, there was some evidence that Kano actually regressed on the survival vs. self-expression dimension (transitioning towards a more survival-related rather than a self-expressive orientation) after its most prosperous decade (the 1970’s petroleum boom).

This finding suggests either that Inglehart and Baker’s (2000) two-dimensional change theory is ill-fitted to traditional developing nations or, alternatively, that Nigeria has not yet reached the so-called “inflection point” (i.e., the appropriate level of economic security) at which this trend fully materializes.  Kotze and Lombard (2003) seem to support somewhat of a composite of these two interpretations in their study of the validity of the materialist vs. post-materialist (survival vs. self-expression) dimension in South Africa, when they conclude that Inglehart’s hypothesis is “uncorroborated” but show that South Africa would fit a pre-materialist vs. materialist model better.  In short, more research (or perhaps more time) is needed to confer or deny this dimension’s applicability in the developing world.

Additional findings further suggest the need for a new, more accommodating perspective on social change.  The modernizing power of secular education was perhaps this studies most consistent finding, yet even this relationship proved to be complex.  Although modern secular education was seen to have a highly significant positive effect on secular-rational values (in all three cohorts), its influence also appeared to have waned in recent years.  This was also true for the survival vs. self-expression index, although in that case the modernizing influence of secular education not only decreased over time but was seen to have reversed by 2007 (i.e., the association was negative).

These findings are difficult to explain, especially within the current frameworks of change.  One possibility is that education simply played a more dominant role in harboring modern (or postmodern) values in 1965 than in the following decades in this West African city.  It is also possible that the members of the 1965 cohort who received higher levels of education were somehow different from members of the subsequent cohorts.  The latter seems more likely as secular education was more widely available in Kano in 1979 and 2007.

On the other hand, Eisenstadt’s (2001) civilizational perspective of modernization offers a much different interpretation.  Eisenstadt claims that “multiple modernities” exist, in the sense that individual societies develop their own distinct “social imaginares” (or culturally unique world interpretations) over time to promote their own so-called “programme of modernity” (in response to observations of Western “programme” of modernization).  Thus, perhaps Nigeria has (since 1965) effectively established its own “social imaginare” capable of promoting its own “programme” by way of higher education.  This model has yet to be tested empirically on a societal level.

Overall, these findings offer only some marginal support for the general persistence paradigm while the convergence paradigm (and Inglehart and Baker’s (2000) two-dimensional theory of change) appeared largely unfounded.  Consequently, these models, in their current form, are shown to be somewhat inadequate in explaining social change, at least for this traditional society.  With regards to both perspectives, this study suggests one major modification.  It seems that rather than a transition from traditional to modern systems, the two might actually merge.  Perhaps both systems of belief shift to accommodate one another rather than persisting separately or one replacing the other.  Kano’s dynamic pattern of educational expansion documented by Morgan and Armer (1991 & 1992) support this view. They found that the absence of state authority during the implementation of modern Western schooling, coupled with parental demand, permitted the entry of Qur’anic teachers into the modern school system, thereby helping to validate (and maintain) both modern and traditional instruction.

Of course, the theoretical anomalies found might also pertain to this study’s weakness.  Perhaps Kano’s unique history best explains the trends discovered, which would, in turn, void its comparability with other developing nations.  The confusing findings regarding the role of social status (in this case father’s level of education influencing only self-expression values and father’s income influencing traditional values in 1965 but more modern values in later years) are consistent with this interpretation; perhaps social prestige is assessed in some distinct way in the city of Kano and is not captured by education and income.  However, these findings may also highlight the value differences associated with “old wealth” versus “new wealth” in traditional, developing societies.  Further research is needed.  Nevertheless, these findings do contribute to the literature on modernization and social change.  Findings produced by comparable replications in other developing societies may warrant the suggested adjustments to theories.

REFERENCES

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Delacroix, Jacques and Charles Ragin.  1978.  “Modernizing Institutions, Mobilization, and Third World Development: A Cross-National Study.”  The American Journal of Sociology 84(1): 123-150.

Eisenstadt, Shmuel N.  2001.  “The Civilizational Dimension of Modernity: Modernity as a Distinct Civilization.”  International Sociology 16(3): 320-340.

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Huntington, Samuel P.  1993.  “The Clash of Civilizations?”  Foreign Affairs 72(3): 22-49.

—  1996.  The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order.  New York: Simon and Schuster.

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Inkeles, Alex and David Horton Smith.  1974.  Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Kahl, Joseph A.  1968.  A Measurement of Modernism: A Study of Values in Brazil and Mexico.  Austin; London: The University of Texas Press.

Kotze, Hennie and Karin Lombard.  2003.  “Revising the Value Shift Hypothesis: A Descriptive Analysis of South Africa’s Value Priorities between 1990 and 2001.”  Pp. 183-207 in Human Values and Social Change: Findings from the Values  Surveys, edited by R. Inglehart.  Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill.

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Morgan, William R. and J. Michael Armer.  1988.  “Islamic and Western Educational Accommodation in a West African Society: A Cohort-Comparison Analysis.”   American Sociological Review 53(4): 634-639.    

—  1991.  “Structural Accommodation and Cultural Duality: The Northern Nigerian Education System.”  International Education 21: 41-48.

—  1992.  “Western versus Islamic Schooling: Conflict and Accommodation in Nigeria.”  Pp. 75-88 in The Political Construction of Education: The State, School Expansion, and Economic Change, edited by Fuller, B. and R. Robinson.  New York: Praeger.

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—  2004.  “Educational Pathways into the Evolving Labour Market of West Africa.”  Research in Sociology of Education 14: 225-245.

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Wallerstein, Immanuel.  1976.  “Modernization: Requiescat in Pace.”  Pp. 131-135 in The Uses of Controversy in Sociology, edited by Coser, L. A. and O. N. Larsen.  New York: The Free Press

See Footnotes

APPENDIX A

Scale 1: Traditional vs. Secular-Rational Values

Religion

V87  Do you think a boy can be truly good without having any religion at all?

• No/Yes

V85  One boy says, “Religious men and sacred books contain all truth.  We must do whatever they tell us to do.” Another boy says, “Religious men and sacred books may be true, but we must do what our conscience tells us.” Do you think that boys should

• Always follow what religious men and sacred books tell them to do
• Mostly follow what religious men and sacred books tell them to do
• Mostly follow what their conscience tells them to do
• Always follow what their conscience tells them to do

V117*  Some boys pray at home and some boys go to the mosque (or church) to pray. How often do you go to the mosque (or church)?

• Every day/A few times a week/Once a week/Once or twice a month/Rarely

V118  Compared to most boys your age, would you say you were

• Much more concerned about religion
• Slightly more concerned about religion
• Slightly less concerned about religion
• Much less concerned about religion

V161  Do you think people should be

• More concerned about religion than they are today, or
• Less concerned about religion than they are today

Family/Obedience

RV15  If a man has a chance to hire an assistant in his work, do you think it is better to hire a relative than a stranger even if the relative is less qualified than the stranger?

• No/Yes

V16  Do you feel a man should depend on his family to make

• All major decisions for him
• Most major decisions for him
• Only a few major decisions for him or
• No major decisions for him

V214  When it will be time for your son to marry, do you think that

• You and your wife will select the mate by yourselves
• You and your wife will select the mate but will get your son’s consent to the girl you select.
• You and your wife will let your son select who he would like to marry, and then give or not give your consent.
• You and your wife will let your son select his mate entirely by himself.

V97  When looking for a place of one’s own family to live, a man ought to find a place located in the same quarters as his parents, even if that means losing a better place elsewhere

• Strongly Agree/Agree slightly/Disagree Slightly/Strongly Disagree

RV218  Two men were talking.

One man says, “The happiest home is one in which the husband and wife both decide what shall be done.”

The other says, “The happiest home is one in which the husband decides what shall be done, and the wife carries out the husband’s wishes.”

Which of these men do you agree with the most?

• The first man/The second man

Pro-West

RV139  Some boys have adopted many of the new ways of the Europeans and some boys have stuck fast to the traditional ways of our forefathers.  In thinking about your own feelings, beliefs, and behavior, would you say that you have

• Adopted very much from the new ways of Europeans
• Adopted quite a bit (some) from the new ways of the Europeans
• Adopted only a little from the new ways of the Europeans, or
• Stuck fast to the traditional ways of our forefathers.

RV163  Some say that boys who adhere mainly to the traditional ways of our forefathers have the most discontent and unhappiness.  Others say that boys who adhere mainly to the new ways of the Europeans have the most discontent and unhappiness.  Yet others say that boys who mix traditional and European ways of life have most discontent and unhappiness.  Which boys do you think have the most discontent and unhappiness?

• Those who adhere mainly to traditional ways
• Those who adhere mainly to European ways
• Those who mix equally traditional and European ways.

RV43  Suppose a man has a young son about to begin school.  The man is too poor to

keep his son in school for more than a few years.  Here are some subjects the boy might

study in school.  Which subject do you think it is more important for the boy to learn?

• To learn to read and write English very well
• To read the Koran and learn other religious activities
• To learn some useful trade, like how to repair modern machines.

Science/Independence/Change

RV144  Scientists in the universities are studying such things as what determines whether a baby is a boy or a girl and how it is that a seed turns into a plant.  Some people say that such study

• Will benefit man greatly.  Others say that
• Man should not ask about such things because they are the work of God.

Which opinion do you agree with more?

V59  People do not admire a young man who displays much individual initiative and self-reliance.

• Strongly Agree/Agree slightly/Disagree Slightly/Strongly Disagree

V91  If you start trying to change things very much, you usually make them worse.

• Strongly Agree/Agree slightly/Disagree Slightly/Strongly Disagree

APPENDIX B

Scale 2: Survival vs. Self-Expression Values

Openness/Awareness

RV81  Do you think a person should be allowed to express ideas you and many other people do not accept?

• Always/Sometimes/Rarely/Never

RV90  It is best to look for new and different experiences rather than to stick with what is familiar.

• Strongly Agree/Agree slightly/Disagree Slightly/Strongly Disagree

RV219*  How often do you listen to news on the radio?

• Everyday/Few times a week/Rarely/Never

Women’s Equality

RV100  Girls should have the same opportunity to obtain an education as boys.

• Strongly Agree/Agree slightly/Disagree Slightly/Strongly Disagree

RV158  Do you think the freedom of girls to do things like going to school should be

• Increased rapidly/Increased slowly/Not changed at all

Tolerance

V143  Do you think foreigners bring to this country

• Much more harm than good
• A little more harm than good
• A little more good than harm
• Much more good than harm.

V98  A boy should be taught to protect the welfare of his own people and let other tribal groups look out for themselves.

• Strongly Agree/Agree slightly/Disagree Slightly/Strongly Disagree

V99  Playing sports and making friends with boys of other tribal groups are risky, if not impossible.

• Strongly Agree/Agree slightly/Disagree Slightly/Strongly Disagree

RV188  Do you greatly prefer, slightly prefer, or dislike work that involves meeting and mixing with people of other tribes.

Trust

V65  Most people are honest chiefly through fear of being caught.

• Strongly Agree/Agree slightly/Disagree Slightly/Strongly Disagree

V82  Which of the following statements do you agree with?

• All people are deceptive and dishonest
• Most people are deceptive and dishonest
• Some people are deceptive and dishonest
• Only a few people are deceptive and dishonest

RV84  One boy says, “If you trust and show respect for people, they will treat you fairly.” A second boy says “Even if you trust and show respect for people they will take advantage of you.” Do you agree

• Strongly with the first boy
• Slightly with the first boy
• Slightly with the second boy
• Strongly with the second boy

Security vs. Quality/Outlook

V184  Do you greatly prefer, slightly prefer, or dislike work that is easy

RV189  Do you greatly prefer, slightly prefer, or dislike work that demands a lot of thinking

RV60  Life is easier now than five years ago, and it is getting easier every year.

• Strongly Agree/Agree slightly/Disagree Slightly/Strongly Disagree

V57  There is really little or no purpose and meaning in life

• Strongly Agree/Agree slightly/Disagree Slightly/Strongly Disagree

APPENDIX C

Attitude towards Western Secular Education, 5-item index

V42  If schooling was freely available and there were no obstacles, what level of western education do you think the ideal among people like yourself should have?

• None/Primary/secondary, teacher-training, etc./University or higher

V49  Do you think western education in this country produces

• Much more harm than good
• A little more harm than good
• A little more good than harm
• Much more good than harm

V50  As a second language, schoolboys should be taught Arabic rather than English.

• Strongly Agree/Slightly Agree/Slightly Disagree/Strongly Disagree

V52  Boys who go to school frequently lose respect for their own culture and religion

• Strongly Agree/Slightly Agree/Slightly Disagree/Strongly Disagree

RV53  A Naira spent for education is repaid many fold wealth and happiness

• Strongly Agree/Slightly Agree/Slightly Disagree/Strongly Disagree

FOOTNOTES