Section 9: Shame

Shame should not be described as a virtue. For it is more like a feeling than a state of character. _[10] Shame is defined, at any rate, as a kind of fear of dishonor, and produces an effect similar to that produced by fear of danger. For people who feel ashamed blush, and those who fear death turn pale. Both, therefore, seem to be in a sense bodily conditions, which is thought to be characteristic of feeling rather than of a state of character. _[15]

The feeling is not fitting to people of every age, but only to youth. For we think young people should be prone to the feeling of shame because they live by feeling and therefore commit many errors, but are restrained by shame. And we praise young people who are prone to this feeling. But an older person no one would praise for being prone to shame, since we think he should not _[20] do anything that causes shame.

For the sense of shame is not characteristic of a good person, since it follows upon bad actions. For such actions should not be done. And if some actions are shameful in very truth and others only according to common opinion, this makes no difference, since neither class of actions should be done, so that no shame should be felt. And it is a mark of a bad person to be such as to do shameful actions. To be so constituted as to feel shame if one does such an action, and for this reason to think oneself good, is absurd. For it is for voluntary actions that shame is felt, and the good person will never voluntarily do bad actions.

But shame may be said to be a good thing conditionally. If a good person does bad actions, he will feel shame. But virtues are not subject to _[30] such a qualification. And if shamelessness–not to be ashamed of doing base actions–is bad, that does not make it good to be ashamed of doing such actions. Self-control is also not virtue, but a mixed sort of state, as will be shown later [see Book VII, sections 1-10]. Now, however, let us discuss justice. _[35]