Section 12: Discussion of the view that pleasure is not something good

It is clear from the following considerations that it does not follow from these arguments that pleasure is not something good, or even that it is not _[25] the highest good.

(Against 1a) First, since that which is good may be so in either of two ways–one thing good simply and another good for a particular person–the good natures and states of character will be correspondingly divisible, as will be the goods of their movements and processes. Of those pleasures which are thought to be bad, some will be bad if taken without qualification but not bad for a particular person, but worthy of his choice. And some will not be worthy of choice even for a particular person, but only at a particular time and _[30] for a short period, though not without qualification. Others are not even pleasures, but seem to be so, namely, all those which involve pain and whose goal is to cure; for example, the processes that go on in sick persons.

(Against 1a) Further, one kind of good being an activity and another kind of good being a state of character, the processes that restore us to our natural state are only incidentally pleasant. For that matter the activity at work in the desire for pleasures that belongs to the residual _[35] state of character and nature as has remained unimpaired. For there are actually pleasures that involve no pain or desire–for example, those of contemplation. The nature in such a case is not defective at all. _[1153a1] That the others are incidental is indicated by the fact that people do not enjoy the same pleasant objects when their nature is in its settled condition as they do when it is being replenished. But in the former case they enjoy the things that are pleasant without qualification, in the latter the contraries of these as well. For then they enjoy even sharp and bitter things, none of which is pleasant either by nature _[5] or without qualification. The pleasures they produce, therefore, are not pleasures naturally or without qualification. For as pleasant things differ, so do the pleasures arising from them.

(Against 1a and 3) Again, it is not necessary that there should be something else better than pleasure, as some say the goal is better than the process. For pleasures are not processes nor do they all involve process–they are activities and goals. Nor do they arise when we are becoming something, _[10] but when we are exercising some ability. And not all pleasures have a goal different from themselves, but only the pleasures leading to the completion of our nature. This is why it is not right to say that pleasure is a perceptible process, but it should rather be called activity of the natural disposition, and instead of “perceptible” it should be called “unimpeded.” It is thought by some people to be a process _[15] because they think it is in the strict sense good, since they think that activity is process, which it is not.

(Against 2b) The view that pleasures are bad because some pleasant things are unhealthy is like the view that says healthy things are bad because some healthy things are bad for money-making. Both are bad in the respect mentioned. Yet because of that they are not bad simply speaking. Indeed, thinking itself is sometimes injurious to health. _[20]

(Against 1d) Neither practical wisdom nor any disposition is impeded by the pleasure arising from it. It is foreign pleasures that impede. For the pleasures arising from thinking and learning will make us think and learn all the more.

(Against 1e) The fact that no pleasure is the product of any skill arises naturally enough. There is no skill of any other activity either, but only of the corresponding ability. _[25] Nevertheless, the skills of the perfumer and the cook are thought to be skills of producing pleasure.

(Against 1b, 1c, and 1f) The arguments that the temperate person avoids pleasure and that the prudent person pursues a painless life, and that children and the wild animals pursue pleasure, are all refuted by the same consideration. We have pointed out in what sense pleasures are good without qualification and in what sense some are not good. Now both the animals and children _[30] pursue pleasures of the latter kind. Likewise, the prudent person pursues tranquil freedom from that kind of pleasure, namely, the pleasures that imply appetite and pain–the bodily pleasures (since these that are of this nature) and their excesses of them, regarding which the intemperate person is intemperate. This is why the temperate person avoids these pleasures, since even the temperate person has pleasures of his own. _[35]