Section 6: Argument against the philosophical view that there is a Form of the Good

Translator’s note: In this section, Aristotle argues against the philosophical theory of the Form of the Good that Platonist philosophers who he knew at his time had posited. It is a highly technical discussion and requires some background in the philosophical theories that existed at Aristotle’s time. If you’re new to philosophy, it might be better to skip this section for now, and go to section 7, where he turns back to the question of happiness.

Perhaps we should consider the universal good and discuss thoroughly what is meant by it. But such an inquiry has been made difficult by the fact that some of our own friends who are philosophers have introduced what they call “the Forms.” Yet it would perhaps be thought better, indeed be our duty, to destroy what touches us closely for the sake of maintaining the truth, especially since we are philosophers or lovers of wisdom. _[15] While both our friends and the truth are dear to us, piety requires us to honor truth above our friends.

The people who introduced the theory of Forms did not posit Forms among things they recognized as prior and posterior (which is why they did not maintain the existence of a Form embracing all numbers). But the term “good” is used both in the category of substance and in that of quality and in that of relation, and _[20] that which is per se, i.e. substance, is prior in nature to the relative (for the latter is like an off shoot and accident of being); so that there could not be a common Form set over all these goods.

Further, since “good” has as many senses as “being” (for it is predicated both in the category of substance, as of God and of understanding, and in quality, i.e. of the virtues, and in quantity, i.e. of that which is moderate, _[25] and in relation, i.e. of the useful, and in time, i.e. of the right opportunity, and in place, i.e. of the right locality and the like), clearly it cannot be something universally present in all cases and single; for then it could not have been predicated in all the categories but in one only.

Further, since of the things answering to one Idea there is one science, there would have been one science of all the goods; _[30] but as it is there are many sciences even of the things that fall under one category, e.g. of opportunity, for opportunity in war is studied by strategics and in disease by medicine, and the moderate in food is studied by medicine and in exercise by the science of gymnastics. And one might ask the question, what in the world they mean by “a thing itself”? In the case of the “human itself” _[35] and in a particular human the account _[1096b1] of what it is to be human is one and the same. For insofar as the “human itself” and a “particular human” are human, they will in no respect differ. And if this is so, neither will the “good itself” and particular goods differ, insofar as they are good. And further, the “good itself” will not be good any the more because it is eternal, since that which lasts longer is no whiter than that which perishes in a day. The Pythagoreans seem to give a more plausible account _[5] of the good, when they place the One in the column of goods; and it is they that Speusippus seems to have followed this view. But let us discuss these matters elsewhere.

An objection to what we have said, however, may be discerned in the fact that the Platonists have not been speaking about all goods, and that the goods that are pursued and loved _[10] for themselves are called good by reference to a single Form, while those which tend to produce or to preserve these somehow or to prevent their contraries are called so by reference to these, and in a secondary sense. Clearly, then, goods must be spoken of in two ways, and some must be good in themselves, the others by reason of these. Let us separate, then, things good in themselves from things useful, and consider whether _[15] the former are called good by reference to a single Form. What sort of goods would one call good in themselves? Is it those that are pursued even when isolated from others, such as intelligence, sight, and certain pleasures and honors? Certainly, if we pursue these also for the sake of something else, yet one would place them among things good in themselves. Or is nothing other than the Form of good good in itself? In that case the Form will be empty. _[20] But if the things we have named are also things good in themselves, the account of the good will have to appear as something identical in them all, as that of whiteness is identical in snow and in white lead. But the accounts of good reputation, wisdom, and pleasure are distinct and diverse in respect of their goodness. The good, therefore, is not some common element answering to one _[25] Form.

But what then do we mean by the good? It is surely not like the things that only happen to have the same name. Are goods one, then, by being derived from one good or by all contributing to one good, or are they rather one by analogy? Certainly as sight is in the body, so is reason in the soul, and so on in other cases. But perhaps these subjects had better be dismissed for the present. For complete precision about them would be more appropriate to another branch of philosophy.

_[30] And similarly with regard to the Form; even if there is some one good which is universally predicable of goods or is capable of separate and independent being, clearly it could not be achieved or attained by man; but we are now seeking something attainable.

Perhaps, however, someone might think it worthwhile to recognize _[35] this with a view to the goods that are attainable and achievable; _[1097a1] for having this as a sort of pattern we shall know better the goods that are good for us, and if we know them can attain them. This argument has some plausibility, but seems to clash with the procedure of various disciplines. For all disciplines, though they aim at some good and seek to supply the deficiency of it, _[5] leave on one side the knowledge of the good. Yet that all the exponents of the various crafts should be ignorant of, and should not even seek, so great an aid as knowledge of the Form of the Good would be is improbable. It is hard, too, to see how a weaver or a carpenter will be benefited in regard to his own craft by knowing this “good itself,” or how someone who has viewed the Form itself will be a better doctor or a better general thereby. _[10] For a doctor seems not even to study health in this way. Instead, the doctor studies human health, or perhaps rather the health of a particular human, since it is individuals that the doctor is healing. But enough of these topics.