Book 3: Voluntary Action and Choice, and an Examination of Courage and Temperance

Section 6: Courage is concerned with feelings of fear and confidence in battle

Translator’s note: Aristotle’s discussions of particular virtues focus on how they appear within the context of an ancient Greek city-state. This might not always exactly match how we might think of these virtues in our own social context. For example, Aristotle argues below that courage in the strict sense is confidence in when facing the possibility of death in battle. Do you think that still applies in our society? Are those who are courageous in the strict sense only those who are fearless in battle? Or do we view courage more broadly? 

We can begin by speaking of the virtue of courage. [5] That courage is a mean with regard to feelings of fear and confidence has already been made clear. And plainly the things we fear are fearful things. And fearful things are, to speak without qualification, bad things. That’s why people even define fear as an expectation of evil.

Now we fear all bad things: for example, disgrace, poverty, [10] disease, friendlessness, death. But the brave person is not thought to be concerned with all of them. For to fear some things is even right and noble, and it is shameful not to fear them. For instance, it is shameful not to fear disgrace. He who fears disgrace is good and has a sense of shame. And he who does not fear disgrace is shameless. Such a person is, however, called “brave” by some people who give the word a new meaning. For such a person has in him something which is like [15] the courageous person, since the courageous person also is a fearless person.

Perhaps we shouldn’t fear poverty and disease either, nor in general the things that do not proceed from vice and are not due to a person’s choices. But not even the person who doesn’t fear these is “courageous.” Yet we apply the word to him also because of a similarity. For some people when faced with the dangers of war are cowards, but are generous [20] and confident when they face of the loss of money. Nor is someone a coward if he fears an insult to his wife and children, or fears envy or anything of the kind. Nor is he “courageous” if he is confident when he is about to be flogged.

With what sort of fearful things, then, is the courageous man concerned? Surely with the greatest. For no one is more likely than he to stand his ground against [25] terrible things. Now death is the most terrible of all things. For it is the end, and nothing is thought to be any longer either good or bad for the dead. But the courageous man would not seem to be concerned even with death in all circumstances. For instance, he is not concerned with death at sea or from disease. In what circumstances, then, is the sort of death with which the courageous man is concerned? Certainly in the noblest. Now the noblest deaths are those in battle. For these take place in the greatest [30] and noblest danger. And these are correspondingly honored in city-states and at the courts of monarchs.

Properly speaking, then, he will be called “courageous” who is fearless in face of a noble death, and of all immanent threats of death. And the emergencies of war are in the highest degree of this kind. Yet at sea also, and in disease, the courageous man is fearless. But not in the same way as the experienced sailors are. [1115b1] For the courageous man has given up hope of safety, and does not like the thought of death in this shape; while the experienced sailors are hopeful because of their experience. At the same time, we show courage in situations where there is the opportunity of showing prowess or where death is noble. But in the case of death at sea or from disease, neither of these conditions is fulfilled. [5]

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