Section 12: What is the use of philosophical wisdom and prudence? Puzzles and some solutions

Puzzles might be raised when it comes to the usefulness of philosophical wisdom and prudence. For (1) philosophical wisdom will contemplate none of the things that will make a person happy, since it is not concerned with any coming into being. And although prudence _[20] has this merit, for what purpose do we need it? Prudence is the virtue concerned with things just, noble, and good for human beings. But these are the things that it is the mark of a good person to do, and we are none the more able to act for knowing them if the virtues are states of character, just as we are none the better able to act for knowing the things that are healthy and sound, _[25] in the sense not of producing but of issuing from the state of health. For we are no more able to act for knowing the science of medicine or of physical training.

But (2) if we are to say that someone should have prudence not for the sake of knowing moral truths but for the sake of becoming good, prudence will be of no use to those who are good. Again it is of no use to those who don’t have virtue. For it will make no difference whether they have prudence themselves _[30] or obey others who have it. And it would be enough for us to do what we do in the case of health–we wish to become healthy, yet we do not ourselves study medical science to do so.

(3) Besides this, it would be thought strange if prudence, being inferior to philosophical wisdom, is to be put in authority over it, as seems to be implied by the fact that the skill that produces anything rules and issues commands about that thing.

These, _[35] then, are the topics we must discuss. So far we have only stated the difficulties.

(1) Now first let us say that in themselves prudence and philosophical wisdom must be worthy of choice _[1144a1] because they are the virtues of the two parts of the soul respectively, even if neither of them produce anything.

(2) Secondly, they do produce something, not as the medical science produces health, however, but as health produces health. That’s how philosophical wisdom produces happiness. For, being a part of virtue as a whole, _[5] by being possessed and by actualizing itself it makes a person happy.

(3) Again, the function of a human being is achieved only in accordance with prudence as well as with moral virtue. For virtue makes us aim at the right target, and prudence makes us do what leads to the target. (Of the fourth part of the soul–the nutritive–there is no such virtue, since there is nothing which it is in its power to do _[10] or not to do.)

(4) With regard to our being none the more able to do because of our prudence what is noble and just, let us begin a little further back, starting with the following principle. As we say that some people who do just actions are not necessarily just, that is, those who do the actions ordered by the laws either unwillingly _[15] or owing to ignorance or for some other reason and not for the sake of the actions themselves (although, to be sure, they do what they should and all the things that the good person ought to), so is it, it seems, that in order to be good one must be in a certain state when one does the actions–one must do them as a result of choice and for the sake of the actions themselves.

Now virtue makes the choice right, _[20] but the question of the things which should naturally be done to carry out our choice belongs not to virtue but to another capacity. We must devote our attention to these matters and give a clearer statement about them. There is a capacity which is called cleverness. And this is such as to be able to do the things that tend towards the target we have set for ourselves, and to hit it. _[25] Now if the target is noble, the cleverness is praiseworthy. But if the target is bad, the cleverness is ruthless. Hence we call both prudent people and ruthless people clever. Yet prudence is not the capacity of cleverness, although it does not exist without this capacity.

And this eye of the soul acquires its formed state not without the aid of virtue, as _[30] has been said and is clear. For the syllogisms that deal with acts to be done are things that involve a starting-point, namely “since the goal–what is best–is of such and such a nature,” whatever it may be (let it for the sake of argument be what we please). And this is not evident except to the good person. For wickedness distorts us and causes us to be deceived about the starting-points of action. _[35] Therefore, it is evident that it is impossible to be prudent without being good.