Section 7: Natural and legal justice

Of political justice, one part is natural justice and another part legal justice. Natural justice is that which everywhere has the same force and does not exist by people’s thinking this or that. Legal justice is that which is originally _[20] indifferent, but when it has been laid down is not indifferent anymore; for example, that a prisoner’s ransom will be a mina, or that a goat and not two sheep will be sacrificed; and again all the laws that are passed for particular cases, such as that sacrifice will be made in honor of Brasidas, and the provisions of decrees.

Now some think that all justice is of this legal sort, because that which is by nature is unchangeable and has _[25] everywhere the same force–as fire burns both here and in Persia–while they see change in the things recognized as just [depending on the time and culture]. This, however, is not true in this unqualified way, but is true in a sense. Or rather, with the gods it is perhaps not true at all, while with us there is something that is just even by nature, yet all of it is changeable. But still some is by nature, some not by nature. _[30] Among things capable of being otherwise, it is clear which sort is natural and which is not natural but is legal and conventional, assuming that both are equally changeable. And in all other things the same distinction will apply. The right hand is naturally stronger, yet it is possible for everyone to become ambidextrous.

The things that are just because of convention and expediency _[35] are like measures. For wine and corn measures are not the same everywhere, _[1135a1] but larger in wholesale and smaller in retail markets. Similarly, the things that are just not by nature but by human enactment are not the same everywhere, since constitutions also are not the same, although there is but one that is everywhere by nature the best. _[5]

Of things just and lawful each is related as the universal to its particulars, since the things that are done are many, but of them each is one, since it is universal. There is a difference between an unjust action and what is unjust, and between a just action and what is just. For a thing is unjust by nature or by convention. And this very thing, when it has been done, _[10] is an unjust action. But before it is done is not yet an unjust action but rather something unjust. So, too, with a just action (although the general term is “just action,” “act of justice” is applied to the correction of the act of injustice).

Each of these must later be examined separately with regard to the nature and number of its species and the nature of the things with which it is concerned.