Book 6: The Intellectual Virtues

Section 9: Deliberation

There is a difference between inquiry and deliberation, since deliberation is a particular sort of inquiry. We must grasp the nature of excellence in deliberation as well whether it is a form of systematic knowledge, of opinion, of skill in conjecture, or of some other kind of thing.

It is not systematic knowledge it is not, since people do not inquire about the things they know about. But good deliberation is a kind of deliberation [since there can be bad deliberation too]. And [1142b1] someone who deliberates inquires and reasons. Nor is it guesswork. For this both involves no reasoning and is something that is quick in its operation, while people deliberate for a long time. People they say that one should carry out quickly what one concludes in one’s deliberation, but that one should deliberate slowly.

Again, readiness of mind is different from [5] excellence in deliberation. It is a sort of being good at guesswork.

Nor is excellence in deliberation opinion of any sort. But since someone who deliberates badly makes a mistake, while he who deliberates well does so correctly, excellence in deliberation is clearly a kind of correctness. But it’s not the correctness of knowledge nor of opinion. For there is no such thing as correctness of knowledge, since there is no such thing as error in knowledge. [10] And correctness of opinion is truth. And at the same time everything that is an object of opinion is already determined. But again excellence in deliberation involves reasoning.

The remaining alternative, then, is that it is correctness of thinking. For this is not yet assertion, since, while opinion is not even inquiry but has reached the stage of assertion, someone who is deliberating, whether he does so well or badly, is searching for something and reasoning. [15]

But excellence in deliberation is a certain correctness of deliberation. Hence we must first inquire what deliberation is and what it is about. And, there being more than one kind of correctness, plainly excellence in deliberation is not any and every kind. For the person who lacks self-control and the bad person, if he is clever, will reach as a result of his calculation what he sets before himself, so that he will have deliberated correctly. But such a person will have attained for himself a great evil. Yet to have deliberated well [20] is thought to be a good thing. For it is this kind of correctness of deliberation that is excellence in deliberation, namely, that which tends to attain what is good.

But it is possible to attain even good by a false syllogism, and to attain what one ought to do but not by the right means, the middle term being false. This too–this state by which one attains what one ought but not by the right means–is not [25] excellence in deliberation.

Further, it is possible to attain a decision by long deliberation while someone else attains it quickly. Therefore, in the former case we have not yet got excellence in deliberation, which is rightness with regard to the expedient–rightness in respect of the goal, the manner, and the time.

Further, it is possible to have deliberated well either in the unqualified sense or with reference to a particular goal. Excellence in deliberation in the unqualified sense, then, is that which succeeds with reference to what is the goal of life in the unqualified sense, whereas excellence in deliberation in a particular sense is that which succeeds relative to [30] a particular goal. If, then, it is characteristic of those who are prudent to have deliberated well, excellence in deliberation will be correctness with regard to what conduces to the goal of which prudence is the true apprehension.

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