Section 10: Discernment

Discernment–and discerning well, due to which people are said to have discernment or to discern well–is also neither on the whole the same as opinion _[1143a1] nor systematic knowledge. For if it were the same as opinion, everyone would have discernment. Nor is discernment one of the particular disciplines, such as medicine, the science of things connected with health, or geometry, the science of spatial magnitudes. For discernment is neither about things that are always and unchangeable, nor about anything that comes into being. _[5] Rather, discernment has to do with things that one might question and deliberate about. Hence it is about the same objects as prudence. But discernment and prudence are not the same. For prudence issues commands, since its goal is what should be done or not to be done, while discernment only judges. (Discernment is identical with discerning well, _[10] a person with discernment with someone who discerns well.)

Now discernment is neither having nor the acquiring prudence. But just as learning is called “discernment” when one is exercising systematic knowledge, so “discernment” is applicable to using opinion for the purpose of judging–and judging rightly–what someone else says about matters with which prudence is concerned. For _[15] “well” (eu) and “rightly” (kalôs) are the same thing. And from this has come the use of the name “discernment” (sunesis) by which people are said to be people who can “discern well” (eunsunetoi)–from the application of the word to the discernment involved in learning. For we often call such learning “discernment.”