Section 4: Lack of self-control in the strict and extended senses

We must next discuss whether there is anyone who lacks self-control without qualification, or whether everyone who lacks self-control does so in a particular sense. _[20] And if there is anyone who lacks self-control without qualification, we must discuss with what sort of things he is concerned. It is evident that self-controlled and resilient people are concerned with pleasures and pains, as are also people who lack self-control and are soft.

Now of the things that produce pleasure, some are necessary, while others are worthy of choice in themselves but admit of excess. The necessary pleasures are bodily, _[25] by which I mean those concerned with food and those concerned with sexual intercourse–that is, the bodily pleasures by which we defined temperance and intemperance as being about. There are other pleasures, in contrast, that are not necessary but worthy of choice in themselves–for example, victory, honor, wealth, and good and _[30] pleasant things of this sort. This being so, those who go to excess with reference to the unnecessary pleasures and contrary to right reason that is in them, are not said to lack self-control simply, but rather to lack self-control with the qualification “in respect of money, gain, honor, or anger”–not simply lacking self-control, because they are different from people who lack self-control, and are said to lack self-control by reason of a resemblance. (Compare the case of the man named “Human” _[35] who won a contest at the Olympic games; in his case the general definition of human differed little from the definition peculiar to him, _[1148a1] but yet it was different.) This is shown by the fact that lacking self-control either without qualification or in respect of some particular bodily pleasure is blamed not only as a fault but as a kind of vice. Yet none of the people who lack self-control in these other respects—namely with respect to money, gain, honor, or anger—is blamed as vicious.

But of the people who lack self-control with respect to bodily enjoyments– the ones with which we say _[5] the temperate and the intemperate person are concerned–those who pursue the excesses of pleasant things, and shun painful things (hunger, thirst, being hot, being cold, and all the objects of touch and taste), not by choice but contrary to his choice and his judgement, is said to lack self-control, not with the qualification “in respect of this or that” _[10] (for example, in respect of anger), but simply.

This is confirmed by the fact that people are called “soft” with regard to these pleasures, but not with regard to any of the others. And for this reason we group together the person who lacks self-control and the intemperate person, and the self-controlled person and the temperate person. But we don’t group together any of these other types–because they are concerned somehow with the same pleasures and pains. _[15] But though these are concerned with the same things, they are not similarly related to them, but some of them make a deliberate choice while the others do not.

This is why we would rather describe someone as intemperate who without appetite or with only a slight appetite pursues the excesses of pleasure and avoids moderate pains, as opposed to someone who does so because of his strong appetites. For what would the former do, if he had in addition a vigorous appetite, _[20] and a violent pain at the lack of necessary pleasures?

Now of appetites and pleasures some belong to the class of things generically noble and good–for some pleasant things are by nature worthy of choice, while others are contrary to these, and others are intermediate, to adopt our previous distinction; for example, wealth, _[25] money, victory, honor. And with reference to all things, whether of this or of the intermediate kind, people are not blamed for being affected by them, or for desiring and loving them, but only for doing so in a certain way–namely, for going to excess.

This is why all those who contrary to reason either are mastered by or pursue one of the things that are naturally noble and good–for example, those who busy themselves more than they ought _[30] about honor or about children and parents–are not wicked. For these too are good, and those who busy themselves about them are praised. Yet there is an excess even in these cases–if like Niobe one were to fight even against the gods, or were to be as much devoted to one’s father as Satyrus nicknamed “the filial,” who was thought to be very _[1148b1] silly on this point. There is no wickedness, then, with regard to these things, for the reason named–because each of them is by nature a thing worthy of choice for its own sake. Yet excesses in respect of them are bad and to be avoided.

Similarly, there is no lack of self-control with regard to them. For lack of self-control is not only to be avoided but _[5] is also a thing worthy of blame. But owing to a similarity in the state of feeling, people apply the name “lack of self-control” or “weakness of will,” adding in each case what it is in respect of, as we do when we say a bad doctor or a bad actor–whom we would not call “bad” simply speaking. As, then, in this case we do not apply the term without qualification because each of these conditions is no badness but only analogous conditions to it, so it is clear that _[10] in the other case also that alone must be taken to be self-control and the lack of self-control that is concerned with the same pleasures and pains as temperance and intemperance. But we apply the term to anger by virtue of a resemblance. And this is why we say with a qualification “lacking self-control in respect of anger” as we say “lacking self-control in respect of honor, or of money.”