Section 7: Reciprocity within friendships

But there is another kind of friendship, namely, that which involves an inequality between the parties; for example, that of father to son and in general of elder to younger, that of husband to wife and in general that of ruler to ruled. And these friendships differ also from each other. For it is not the same that exists between parents and children and between rulers and ruled, _[15] nor is even that of father to son the same as that of son to father, nor that of husband to wife the same as that of wife to husband. For the virtue and ths3ezds`e function of each of these is different, and so are the reasons for which they love. The love and the friendship are therefore also different.

Each person, then, neither gets the same from the other, _[20] nor ought to seek it. But when children render to parents what they ought to render to those who brought them into the world, and parents render what they should to their children, the friendship of such persons will be abiding and excellent. In all friendships implying inequality the love also should be proportional. The better should be more loved than he loves, _[25] and so should the more useful, and similarly in each of the other cases. For when the love is in proportion to the merit of the people involved, then a kind of equality arises, which is certainly held to be characteristic of friendship.

But equality does not seem to take the same form in acts of justice and in friendship. For in acts of justice what is equal _[30] in the primary sense is what is in proportion to merit, while quantitative equality is secondary. But in friendship quantitative equality is primary and proportion to merit secondary. This becomes clear if there is a great interval in respect of virtue or vice or wealth or anything else between the people involved. For then they are no longer friends, and do not even expect to be so. And this is most manifest in the case of the gods. _[35] For they surpass us most decisively in all good things. But it is also clear in the case of kings. For with them, likewise, people who are very much their inferiors _[1159a1] do not expect to be friends with them. Nor do worthless people expect to be friends with the best or wisest people. In such cases it is not possible to define exactly up to what point friends can remain friends. For much can be taken away and friendship remain, but when one person is removed to a great distance, as a god is, the possibility of friendship ceases.

This is in fact _[5] the origin of the question whether friends really wish for their friends the greatest goods–for example, that of being gods–since in that case their friends will no longer be friends to them, and therefore will not be good for them (for friends are good to have). The answer is that if we were right in saying that a friend wishes good to friend for his sake, his friend must remain the sort of being he is, whatever that may be. Therefore, a friend only will wish the greatest goods for his friend as long as his friend remains human. _[10] But perhaps not all the greatest goods. For it is for himself most of all that each person wishes what is good.