Section 11: Corresponding forms of friendship and justice

Each kind of political regime may be seen to involve friendship _[10] just in so far as it involves justice. The friendship between a king and his subjects depends on his greatness as a benefactor. If a king is good, he confers benefits on his subjects and cares for them with a view to their well-being, as a shepherd does for his sheep. Hence Homer called Agamemnon “shepherd of the people.”

The friendship of a father to his children is also like this. _[15] Yet the father’s friendship exceeds the kingly one in the greatness of the benefits conferred. For the father is responsible for the very existence of his children, which is thought the greatest good, and for their nurture and upbringing.

These things are ascribed to ancestors as well. Further, by nature a father tends to rule over his sons, ancestors over descendants, a king over his subjects. These friendships imply superiority of one person over the other–[the father, ancestors, or king over the children, descendants, or subjects]. This is why ancestors are honored. _[20] The justice, therefore, that exists between people related in this way is not the same on both sides but is in every case proportionate to merit, since that is true of the friendship as well.

The friendship of husband and wife is the same that is found in an aristocracy. For the better gets more of what is good, and each gets what is fitting to him or her, in accordance with virtue. The same applies to justice in these relationships.

The friendship of brothers is like that of companions. _[25] For they are equal and of a similar age, and such people are for the most part similar in their feelings and their character. The friendship appropriate to timocratic government is also like this. For in such a regime the ideal is for the citizens to be equal and fair. Therefore, rule is taken in turn, and on equal terms. And the friendship appropriate here will correspond.

But in the deviations of these forms, wherein justice hardly exists, _[30] in like manner friendship hardly exists. Friendship exists least of all in the worst form, since in tyranny there is little or no friendship. For where there is nothing in common between ruler and ruled, there is not friendship either, since there is not justice. For instance, there is no friendship between craftsman and tool, soul and body, master and slave. The latter in each case is benefited _[35] by that which uses it, but there is no friendship _[1161b1] nor justice towards lifeless things. Neither is there friendship towards a horse or an ox, nor toward a slave simply considered as a slave. For in these cases there is nothing common between the two parties. The slave is a living tool and the tool a lifeless slave. Simply considered as a slave, then, one cannot be friends with him. _[5] But if one considers the slave as a human being, one can be friends with him. For there seems to be some justice between any human being and any other who can share in a system of law or be a party to an agreement. Therefore, there can also be friendship with a slave insofar as he is human. Thus, while in tyrannies friendship and justice hardly exist, in democracies they exist more fully, since where the citizens are equal, they have much in common. _[10]