Section 8: Our definition of a happy life confirmed by common opinions

We must inquire into our subject, however, not only in the light our own conclusion and premises, but also in light of what is commonly said _[10] about it. For all the facts harmonize with a true view, but truths soon clash with a false view.

Now goods have been divided into three classes: (1) some are described as external goods, (2) others as goods relating to the soul, and (3) others as good relating to the body. We call those that relate to soul most properly and truly goods, and actions or activities of the soul we take to be _[15] goods relating to soul. Thus, according to this view, which is long standing and agreed on by philosophers, confirms what we have said about happiness so far.

What we have said about a happy life is also correct in that we identify the goal of human life with certain actions and activities. For in this way the goal is among the goods of the soul and not among external goods.

Another belief that harmonizes with our account is that the happy person _[20] lives well and does well, because we have basically defined happiness as a sort of good life and good action. The characteristics that are looked for in a happy life also all seem to belong to what we have defined a happy life to be. For some people identify a happy life with virtue, some with prudence, others with some kind of wisdom, while others identify a happy life with these, or one of these, accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure. _[25] Other people also include external prosperity. Now some of these views have been held by many and are long-standing, others have been held by a few well-respected people. And it is not probable that either of these should be entirely mistaken, but rather that they should be right in at least some way or even in most ways.

With those who identify happiness with virtue or some particular virtue our account is in harmony, _[30] because an activity in accordance with virtue is an activity of virtue. But perhaps it makes no small difference whether we claim the highest good consists in the possession of virtue or in the use of virtue, which is to say, in virtue as a habit or in virtue as an activity. For virtue as a habit can exist without accomplishing anything good, as in the case of a person who is asleep _[1099a1] or in some other way quite unable to act. Virtue as an activity, however, cannot exist without accomplishing something good, since someone doing an activity will of necessity be accomplishing something, and accomplishing something well.

And as in the Olympic Games it is not the most beautiful and the strongest that are crowned but those who compete (for it is some of these that are victorious), _[5] so those who act rightly win the noble and good things in life.

Their life is also in itself pleasant. For pleasure is a state of soul, and to each person, whatever he is said to be a lover of is pleasant; for example, not only is a horse pleasant to the lover of horses, and a spectacle to the lover of sights, but also in the same way just actions are pleasant to the lover of justice _[10] and in general virtuous actions to the lover of virtue.

Now for most people their pleasures are in conflict with one another, because the things they find pleasant are not by nature pleasant. But the lovers of what is noble find pleasure in the things that are by nature pleasant; and virtuous actions are by nature pleasant. Thus, virtuous actions are pleasant to virtuous people and are also pleasant in their own nature.

The virtuous life, therefore, has no further need of pleasure as a sort of appendage, _[15] but has its pleasure in itself. For, besides what we have said, the person who does not rejoice in noble actions is not even good; since no one would call someone just who did not enjoy acting justly, nor anyone generous who did not enjoy generous actions, and similarly in all other cases. _[20] If this is so, virtuous actions must be in themselves pleasant.

But virtuous actions are also good and noble, and have each of these attributes in the highest degree. Since the good man judges well about these attributes; his judgement is such as we have described.

A happy life, then, is the best, noblest, and most pleasant. And these attributes are not separated the way they are in the inscription at Delos:

The most noble thing is what is most just, and best thing is health;
But most pleasant thing is it to get what we love.

For all these attributes belong to the best activities. And we say that a happy life consists of these best activities, or of the best one of them. _[30]

Yet clearly, as we said, a happy life needs external goods as well. For it is impossible, or not easy, to do noble actions without the proper implements. In many actions we use friends, riches, and social or political power _[1099b1] as our implements. Likewise, the deprivation of certain external goods–such as good birth, good children, good looks–can infect our happiness. For a person who is very ugly in appearance, ill-born, or solitary and childless is not very likely to have a happy life, and perhaps a person would be even less likely if he had thoroughly bad children or friends, _[5] or had lost good children or friends by death.

As we said, then, a happy life seems to need some external prosperity in addition to virtue, which is why some people identify happiness with good fortune, while others still identify it with virtue.