Section 13: Different aspects of the soul and the distinction between intellectual and moral virtue

Why we should consider more fully the nature of virtue.

Since a happy life is an activity of soul in accordance with _[5] complete virtue, we must consider the nature of virtue, for perhaps we will in that way better see the nature of a happy life.

The true student of political wisdom, too, is thought to have studied virtue above all things. For he wishes to make his fellow citizens good and obedient to the laws. As an example of this we have the lawgivers of the Cretans _[10] and the Spartans, and any others that might have been like them. And if this inquiry belongs to political wisdom, clearly the pursuit of it will be in accordance with our original plan.

Understanding human virtue and happiness requires some understanding of the human soul

But clearly the virtue we must study is human virtue. For the good we were seeking is the human good and the happiness we are seeking human happiness. _[15] By “human virtue” we don’t mean the virtue of the human body but that of the human soul. And a happy life we also call an activity of soul.

But if this is so, clearly the student of political wisdom must know in some way what’s true of the soul, just as the person who is to heal the eyes or the body as a whole must know about the eyes or the body. Indeed, this is more important, inasmuch as politics is more prized _[20] and more important than healthcare. But even among doctors the best educated put a lot of effort into acquiring knowledge of the body. The student of political wisdom, then, must study the soul, and must study it with virtue and happiness in view, and do so to the extent sufficient for the questions we are discussing. For further precision is perhaps harder work than _[25] our purposes require.

An outline of three different aspects of the human soul: reason, desires, and the nutritive ability

Some things are said about soul even in discussions outside our school that are adequately enough. We should adopt these: for example, that one aspect of the soul is nonrational and another aspect has reason. It makes no difference for our present purposes whether these aspects of the soul are distinguished as if they were parts, like parts of the body or of anything else divisible, or whether they should instead be thought of as distinct in definition but in nature inseparable (like _[30] convex and concave in the circumference of a circle).

Of the nonrational aspect of the soul, one ability seems to be widely shared and vegetative in its nature, I mean the ability of the soul to cause nutrition and growth. For it is this kind of ability of the soul that one must assign to all nurslings and to embryos, as well as _[1102b1] to full grown animals. It is more reasonable to say that all share this same kind of ability of the soul than to assign some different ability to them.

Now the virtue or excellence of this nutritive aspect of the soul seems to be common to all species and not specifically human. For this ability seems to function most of all in sleep, while goodness and badness are least manifest during _[5] sleep (whence comes the saying that the happy are not better off than the wretched for half their lives; and this happens naturally enough, since sleep is an inactivity of the soul in that respect in which it is called good or bad), unless perhaps to a small extent some of the movements of the nutritive aspect of the soul actually penetrate to the whole soul, and in this way the dreams of good men are better than _[10] those of ordinary people. Enough of this subject, however. Let us leave the nutritive ability of the soul alone, since it has by its nature no share in human virtue.

There seems to be also another nonrational aspect of the soul, although it in a way shares in reason. For we praise the reason–meaning the rational aspect of the soul–of both the self-controlled person and the person that lacks self-control and is weak-willed, since their reason _[15] urges them correctly to do what is best. Yet not only is reason found in self-controlled people and people who lack self-control, but there is also in them by nature another aspect of the soul besides reason, which fights against and resists reason.

[The difference between self-controlled people and those who are weak-willed and lack self-control is that in self-controlled people, the rational aspect of their soul wins out against the urgings of the nonrational aspect, whereas in those who lack self-control, the nonrational aspect wins out against the urgings of the rational aspect.] For just as with paralyzed limbs, when we intend to move them to the right turn on the contrary to the left, so is it with the soul, _[20] since the impulses of people who lack self-control move in contrary directions. But in the case of the body, we see the part that moves the wrong way, while in the case of the soul we do not.

No doubt we must nonetheless suppose that in the soul too there is something contrary to reason, resisting and opposing it. In what sense it is distinct from the other aspects of the soul does not concern us. But this nonrational _[25] aspect seems to have a share in reason, like we said. At any rate, in the self-controlled person this nonrational aspect obeys the rational aspect, and presumably in the temperate and brave person it is even more obedient, since in such people it speaks on all matters with the same voice as reason.

Therefore, the nonrational aspect of the soul appears to be twofold. For the vegetative or nutritive aspect in no way shares in reason, but the appetitive aspect, and in general the whole desiring element, _[30] shares in reason in a way, namely, insofar as it listens to and obeys reason. (It shares in reason, therefore, in the sense in which we speak of “taking account” of what our fathers or our friends tell us to do, but it does not share in reason in the sense of engaging in something like mathematics.) That this nonrational aspect is in some sense persuaded by reason is also revealed by the fact that we warn people, and by admonishing and exhorting people.

But if we instead wanted to say that this aspect of the soul also has reason, _[1103a1] instead of being nonrational, then that would make the rational part of the soul into something twofold, one portion of the rational aspect having reason fully and in itself and another portion having a tendency to obey reason as one obeys one’s father.

The distinction between intellectual virtue and moral virtue

Virtue too is distinguished into kinds in accord with the difference in the soul between the aspect that is rational and the aspect that obeys reason. For we say that some of the virtues are intellectual and others are moral. Philosophical wisdom, comprehension, _[5] and prudence are intellectual virtues, while generosity and temperance are moral virtues. For in speaking about a person’s character, we do not say that he is wise or has good comprehension, but rather that he is mild-mannered or temperate. Yet we praise the wise person also with respect to his state of mind; and of states of mind, we call those which merit praise virtues or excellences. _[10]