Section 8: The two vicious extremes are opposed to one another and to the intermediate virtue

There are three kinds of disposition, then, two of them vices (one involving excess and the other deficiency) and one a virtue, namely, the mean. Each of these three dispositions is in a sense opposed to the other two, since the extreme states are contrary both to the intermediate state and to each other, and the intermediate state is contrary to the extremes.

Just as the equal is greater relative to the less, and _[15] less relative to the greater, so the middle states are excessive relative to the deficiencies, and deficient relative to the excesses, in both emotions and actions. For the courageous person appears overconfident compared to the coward, and cowardly compared to the overconfident person. Likewise, the temperate person _[20] appears intemperate compared to the insensible person, and insensible compared to the intemperate person. Further, the generous person appears wasteful compared to the stingy person, and stingy compared to the wasteful person. Hence also the people at the extremes push the intermediate person each over to the other, and the cowardly person will call the courageous person “overconfident,” while the overconfident person will call the courageous person a “coward,” _[25] and likewise in the other cases.

These states of character being opposed to one another in this way, the greatest opposition is that of the extremes to each other, rather than to the intermediate. For the extremes are further from each other than from the intermediate, as the great is further from the small and the small from the great than both are from the equal.

Again, compared to the intermediate _[30] some extremes show a certain likeness, as that of overconfidence to courage and that of wastefulness to generosity. But the extremes show the greatest unlikeness to each other. Now contraries are defined as the things that are furthest from each other, so that things that are further apart are more contrary.

In some cases, _[35] the deficiency is more opposed to the mean, _[1109a1] while in other cases the excess is more opposed. For example, cowardice (the deficiency) is more opposed to courage than overconfidence (the excess). But intemperance (the excess) is more opposed to temperance than insensibility (the deficiency).

This happens from two reasons. One reason _[5] is drawn from the thing itself: because one extreme is nearer and more similar to the intermediate, we oppose not this but rather its contrary to the intermediate. For instance, since overconfidence is thought to be more similar and nearer to courage, and cowardice more dissimilar, we oppose cowardice to courage. For things _[10] further from the intermediate are thought more contrary to it. This, then, is reason, drawn from the thing itself.

The other reason is drawn from ourselves. For the things to which we ourselves more naturally tend seem more contrary to the intermediate. For instance, we ourselves tend more naturally to liking pleasures, and hence are more easily carried away towards _[15] intemperance than towards moderation. Thus, we describe the direction to which we are more attached as more contrary to the mean. Therefore, intemperance, which is an excess, is the more contrary to temperance.