Section 1: What it means for an act to be voluntary

Since virtue is concerned with emotions and actions, _[30] and since voluntary emotions and actions praised and blamed, whereas those that are involuntary are pardoned, and sometimes even pitied, to distinguish the voluntary and the involuntary is presumably necessary for studying the nature of virtue. And it is also useful for legislators with a view to the assigning both of honors and of punishments.

Things are considered involuntary if they happen by force _[35] or due to ignorance.

What it means for an action to be “forced”

An action or emotion is forced when the starting-point of the motion is external, _[1110a1] that is, when the person acting or being affected contributes nothing. An example of being forced is if someone is carried somewhere by the wind or by people who have him in their power.

When it comes to actions done from fear of worse things happening or for some noble end, it is debatable whether such actions are involuntary or voluntary. For example, if a tyrant having a person’s parents or children in his power, _[5] were to order that person to do something shameful, threatening that otherwise they would be put to death, but if he did the shameful action they would be spared.

Something similar happens in the case of throwing of goods overboard from a ship during a storm. For in the abstract, no one throws goods away voluntarily. But when doing so secures the safety of oneself and one’s crew, _[10] any sensible person would throw the goods overboard.

Actions like these are mixed. But they are more like voluntary actions, because they are choice worthy at the time when they are done, and the end of an action is relative to the occasion. Thus, both the terms “voluntary” and “involuntary” must be used with reference to the moment when the action is done. The person does these sorts of actions voluntarily, since the starting-point for the motion of _[15] the instrumental parts of his body is in him, and the things of which the moving principle is in the person himself are in his power to do or not to do. Such actions, therefore, are voluntary. But perhaps in the abstract they are involuntary, since no one would choose these sorts of actions in themselves.

People are sometimes even praised _[20] for enduring something shameful or painful for the sake of what is great and noble. But in the opposite case they are blamed, since to endure what is greatly shameful without some noble reason or for something that doesn’t matter much is the mark of an inferior person. In cases where a person does something bad under pressure, which strains human nature and that no _[25] one could endure, we don’t praise the person, but we are sympathetic and forgiving.

Yet perhaps with some actions there is no being compelled to do them. Instead, one should face death after suffering the most terrible things rather than do them. For the things that ‘forced’ the character Alcmaeon in Euripides’ play to kill his own mother seem ridiculous. [Alcmaeon’s father threatened to put a curse on Alcmaeon unless he murdered her. But it would have been better for Alcmaeon to be cursed or suffer worse things than to murder his own mother.]

It is sometimes difficult to determine what should be chosen and at what cost, and what should be endured and for what reason. And it’s _[30] even more difficult to stand firm in our decisions. For usually we expect to suffer something painful or to be forced to do something shameful. This is what leads people to praise or blame someone based on whether or not he was forced.

What sort of actions, then, should we call “forced”? We answer that without qualification actions should be called “forced” when the cause is in the external circumstances and the person doing the action contributes nothing. But when it comes to actions that in themselves are involuntary, [like throwing goods overboard,] but that are now and in return for these gains worthy of choice, and when the starting-point of motion is in the person doing the action, then, although these actions are in themselves involuntary, now and in return for these gains they are voluntary. _[5] They are more like voluntary actions, because actions belong in class of particulars, and these particular actions are voluntary. What sort of things are to be chosen, and in return for what, it is not easy to say. For there are many differences in particular cases.

If someone were to say that pleasant and noble things force us to act in a certain way, since they are external and have a compelling power, then all actions would be _[10] forced and none would be voluntary. For everyone does everything they do for the sake of what is pleasurable or for the sake of what is noble. Furthermore, people who are forced to do an action or who act unwillingly find the action painful. But those who do actions for their pleasantness and nobility find pleasure in the actions. It is ridiculous to make external circumstances responsible, instead of oneself, being easily ensnared by such attractions. And it’s ridiculous to make oneself responsible for the noble actions one does, but to make pleasure responsible for the shameful actions one does.

Actions that are forced, then, seem _[15] to be those whose starting-point of motion is external and to which the person contributes nothing.

What it means for an action to be “due to ignorance”

Everything that is done because of ignorance is not voluntary. But an action is only involuntary when it involves pain and regret. For the person who has done something because of ignorance, but feels no repulsion at his action, has not acted voluntarily, _[20] since he does not know what he was doing. Yet he hasn’t thereby acted involuntarily, since he is not pained by what he did. Thus, of people who act because of ignorance, the one who is sorry is considered an involuntary agent. But the one who feels no remorse can be called a “not voluntary” agent, since he is different and should have a name of his own.

Acting because of ignorance also seems to be different from acting in ignorance. _[25] For someone who is drunk or in a rage doesn’t seem to act because of ignorance, but instead because of being drunk or being angry, even though he does not act knowingly but in ignorance.

Now every wicked person is ignorant of what he should and should not do, and it is due to this kind of error that people become unjust and bad in general. But the term “involuntary” doesn’t apply if a person is ignorant of what is to his advantage. For it is not mistaken purpose that causes involuntary action. Rather, mistaken purpose leads to wickedness. Nor does ignorance of the universal cause involuntary action. For we blame people who are ignorant of the universal. [The “universal” here means a general rule that any reasonable person should know. For example, we would blame someone for stealing even if they said they didn’t know that stealing was wrong, since we expect people to know that.]

The cause of an involuntary action is ignorance of the particulars of the circumstances of the action and of what the action is concerned with. For it is on the basis of this sort of ignorance that pity and _[1111a1] pardon depend, since the person who is ignorant of the particulars acts involuntarily.

It wouldn’t hurt to make some clarifications about what sorts of things these particulars are. What a person does an action, we can ask (1) who he is, (2) what he is doing, (3) concerning who or what or in reference to who or what he is doing the action, and sometimes also (4) what he is doing the action with (for example, with what tool he is doing the action), and (5) for what reason he is doing the action (for example, to save someone), and (6) how he is doing it _[5] (for example, whether gently or intensely).

Now someone could not be ignorant of all these things unless he were out of his mind. Also, someone doing an action evidently couldn’t be ignorant of (1) who he is, since that would mean he was ignorant that he was himself. But someone can be ignorant of (2) what he is doing, as for instance when someone accidently says something and afterwards claims “it slipped out of my mouth while I was speaking,” or “I didn’t know it was a secret,’ as Aeschylus said of the mysteries. Or someone who accidently shot off a catapult might say he “let it go off when he just wanted to show how it worked.” _[10] To continue the examples, a person might think (3) his son was an enemy, as Merope did, or (4) that a spear had a guard on its point, or that the stone was pumice stone. Or someone might (5) give a person a drink of medicine to save him, but it might end up killing him. Or someone, when sparing, (6) might want to give someone a light tap, but may end up really injuring him.

Ignorance, then, may relate to any of these things _[15] and circumstances. And it seems a person who was ignorant of any of these acted involuntarily, and especially if he was ignorant on the most relevant, which seem to the circumstances of the action and the reason why it is done. Furthermore, an action that is called “involuntary” because of this sort of ignorance must cause the person who did it pain and regret. _[20]

Final Reflections

Since what is involuntary is what is done by of force or because of ignorance, it seems that an action is voluntary when the starting-point of the motion is in the one doing the action and when the one doing the action is aware of the particular circumstances of the action.

Presumably actions done because of anger or desire are not rightly called “involuntary.” For in the first place, _[25] if they were involuntary, none of the animals other than humans would act voluntarily, and neither would children. [But in fact, many non-human animals and also children often do actions voluntarily.] Secondly, if someone says that actions done because of anger or desire are involuntary, does the person claiming this mean that we do not voluntarily do any of the actions that are due to anger or desire? Or does that person mean that we do only the noble actions voluntarily and the shameful actions involuntarily? Wouldn’t this be ridiculous, when one and the same thing–namely, anger or desire, can be the cause of both noble actions and shameful actions? But it would surely be odd to describe desiring the things one ought to desire as involuntary. And we should both to be angry _[30] at certain things and to have a desire for certain things. For example, we should have a desire for health and for learning. Also, what is involuntary is thought to be painful, but what is in accordance with one’s desires is thought to be pleasant.

Further, what is the difference between involuntariness in the case of actions done because of errors in rational calculation and in the case of actions done because of anger? Both are to be avoided, but the non-rational feelings we experience are considered no less human than reason is. Therefore, _[1111b1] actions done from anger or desire are human actions. It would be odd, then, to treat them as involuntary.