Section 7.2: The Function Argument

Presumably, however, to say that a happy life is the highest good seems a platitude, and we still desire a clearer account of what it is.

This might perhaps be given, if we could first grasp the function of a human being. For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or _[25] any craftsman, and, in general, all things that have a function or activity, the good and the ‘well-done’ is thought to reside in the function, the same would seem to hold for a human being, if humans have a function.

Do the carpenter, then, and the shoemaker have certain functions or activities, while the human has none? Is a human by nature inactive? Or may we say that just as the eye, _[30] hand, foot, and each part generally has a function, so the human as a whole also has a function beyond these parts?

If so, what can this function be? Life seems to be a function we share even with plants. But we are seeking what is special to humans. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. _[1098a1] Next there would be the life of perception. But that life is clearly shared with the horse, the ox, and every animal.

There remains, then, the life of actions that involve reason or speech (logos). Now one way in which something can involve reason or speech is by being persuaded by or obedient to reason or speech. Another way something can involve it is by possessing it, namely, by engaging in thinking. Given these two ways in which the life of actions can be said to involve reason or speech, _[5] we must posit the one more in accord with activity, because this seems to be more authoritative.

Now if the function of a human being is an activity of soul in accord with reason or speech, or not without it, and if we say the function of a sort of thing is the same in kind as the function of an excellent thing of that sort (for example, the function of a lyre player is the same as the function of an excellent lyre player), and if this is simply true in all cases when we add to the function _[10] the preeminence that is in accord with virtue (for the function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of an excellent lyre-player is to play it well)–if all this is true, and we say that the function of a human being is a certain kind of life, and this life is the activity or actions of the soul with reason or speech, and if the function of an excellent man is the good and noble performance of these actions, and if any action is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the virtue that belongs to it _[15]–if all this is true, the human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are many virtues, in accordance with the best and most complete virtue.

But we must add ‘in a complete life.’ For one swallow does not make a spring, nor does one day. Likewise, one day or a short time does not make a blessed and happy person.