Section 3: Choice is deliberate desire of things in our power

Do we deliberate about everything, and is everything a proper subject of deliberation, or is deliberation impossible about some things? We should presumably call “a proper subject of deliberation” not what a fool or a madman would deliberate about, _[20] but what a person with understanding would deliberate about.

Now no one deliberates about eternal things. For instance, no one deliberates about the universe or the incommensurability of the diagonal and the side of a square. But we also do not deliberate about things that always change in the same way, whether they change of necessity, by nature, or from any other cause; for example, the solstices and the risings of the stars. _[25] Nor do we deliberate about things that happen sometimes in one way and sometimes in another; for instance, droughts and rains. Nor do we deliberate about chance events, like discovering a treasure. And we do not even deliberate about all human affairs. For instance, no Spartan deliberates about the best constitution for the Scythians. The reason is that none of these things can be brought about by our own efforts.

We deliberate about _[30] things that are in our power and can be done, and these are in fact what is left. For nature, necessity, and chance are thought to be causes, and so are understanding and everything that depends on humans. But among humans, each group deliberates about the things that can be done by their own efforts.

_[1112b1] Further, there is no deliberation in the case of exact and self-contained sciences and disciplines; for example, there is no deliberation about the letters of the alphabet (for we have no doubt how they should be written). What we deliberate about are things that are brought about by our own efforts, but not always in the same way; for instance, questions of medical treatment or of money-making. And we deliberate more about how to navigate a ship than about athletic training, inasmuch as _[5] ship navigation has been less exactly worked out. And we deliberate in the same way about other things: more in the case of skills or arts than in in the case of sciences or precise disciplines. For we have more doubt about skills and arts.

Deliberation, then, is concerned with things that happen in a certain way for the most part, but where how things will turn out is obscure and there’s some indefinability. We call in others to aid us in deliberation on important questions, distrusting _[10] ourselves as not being adequate to deciding.

We deliberate not about ends but about how to achieve ends. For a doctor does not deliberate about whether he should heal someone, nor an orator about whether he should persuade, nor a statesman about whether he should produce good government, nor does anyone else deliberate about his end or final goal. Instead, everyone assumes the end and considers how and in what way _[15] it will be attained.

And if it seems that it can be attained in several ways, people consider in which way it is most easily and best brought about, while if it is achieved in only one way, they consider how it will be achieved by this and by what means this will be achieved, until they come to the first cause or ultimate goal, which in the order of discovery is last. For the person who deliberates seems to investigate and analyze _[20] in the way described as though he were analyzing a geometrical construction (not all investigation appears to be deliberation–for instance mathematical investigations aren’t deliberations–but all deliberation is investigation), and what is last in the order of analysis seems to be first in the order of becoming.

When deliberating, if we come to an impossibility we give up the search; for example, if we need money but _[25] can’t get it. But if a thing appears to be possible, we try to do it. By ‘possible’ things I mean things that might be brought about by our own efforts; and these in a sense include things that can be brought about by the efforts of our friends, since the moving principle is in ourselves.

Sometimes we inquire about instruments, sometimes about how to use them, and similarly in the other cases–sometimes through which, _[30] sometimes in what way or through what.

It seems, then, as has been said, that a human being is a moving principle of actions. Now deliberation is about the actions to be done by the person, and actions are for the sake of things other than themselves. For what deliberation is about cannot be the end, but only about what conduces to the end. Nor indeed can deliberation be about particular facts–for example, about whether this is bread or has been baked as it should–for these are matters of perception. _[1113a1] If we are to be always deliberating, we will have to go on without limit.

The same thing is deliberated about and is chosen, except that the object of choice is already determinate, since the object of choice is what has been decided upon as a result of deliberation. For everyone stops inquiring about how he is to act when _[5] he has brought the moving principle back to himself and to the ruling part of himself, for this is what chooses. This is plain also from the ancient constitutions, which Homer represented. For the kings announced their choices to the people.

Since the object of choice is something in our own power that is desired after deliberation, _[10] choice will be deliberate desire of things in our own power. For when we have decided as a result of deliberation, we desire in accordance with our deliberation.

We may take it, then, that we have described choice in outline, and stated the nature of its objects and the fact that it is concerned with what brings about ends. _[15]