Section 8: Contemplation and human life

How the happiness of contemplation is separate from but includes moral virtue

But in a secondary way the life in accord with moral virtue is happiest, since human activities are in accord with this kind of virtue. Just and courageous actions (and other virtuous actions) that we do in relation to each other, observing our respective duties with regard to contracts, services, and all kinds of actions and passions–all of these seem to be typically human. Some of them seem even to arise from the body, and virtue of character is in many ways bound up with our feelings and emotions.

Prudence is also linked to virtue of character. And virtue of character is also linked to prudence, since the principles of prudence are in accordance with the moral virtues, and right morals are in accordance with prudence.

The moral virtues also belong to our composite nature because they are connected with our feelings. And the virtues of our composite nature are human. Therefore, the life and the happiness that correspond to the moral virtues are also human.

The happiness that belongs to understanding, however, is separate. We must be content to say this much about it, for to describe it precisely is a task greater than our purpose requires.

The happiness that belongs to understanding seems not to need as many external things, or at least less than moral virtue does. Let’s grant both equally need the necessities of life, even if the citizen’s or statesman’s work is the more concerned with the body and things of that sort–in terms of what external things someone needs to have philosophical wisdom and what external things someone needs to have political wisdom, there won’t be much difference. But when it comes to what they need to actually engage in their activities, there will be a big difference. The generous person will need money in order to do generous deeds, and the just person will need money for repaying debts (for wishes are hard to discern, and even people who are not just pretend to wish to act justly). Likewise, the courageous person will need ability if he is to accomplish any of the actions that correspond to his virtue, and the temperate person will need resources. For how else will it be clear that a person is actually virtuous? [Moral virtue must be manifest in actions.]

It is also debated whether the choice to do the virtuous thing or doing the actual virtuous action more essential to virtue. But virtue is assumed to involve both choice and action. And certainly it’s clear that both are involved if moral virtue is to be complete. But many things are needed to do actions, and more things are needed the greater and nobler the actions are.

But the person who is contemplating needs no such things, at least when it comes to actually engaging in the activity of contemplation. Indeed, one might say that external things are even hindrances to contemplation. But insofar as someone is human and lives with people, he chooses to do virtuous actions. A person living a happy life will therefore need the things that are helpful for living a fully human life.

Happiness in human life, divine life, and animal life

From the following consideration it also appears that a completely happy life consists in some kind of activity of contemplation. We assume the gods are blessed and happy above all other beings. But what sort of actions must we assign to the gods? Acts of justice? Will not the gods seem absurd if they make contracts, return deposits, and so on? Acts of courage, confronting dangers, and running risks because it is noble to do so? Or generous acts? To whom will they give? It would be strange if they were really to have money or anything of the kind. And what would their temperate actions be? Is not such praise tasteless, since the gods have no bad desires? If we were to run through them all, the circumstances of action would be found trivial and unworthy of gods. Still, everyone supposes that the gods live and therefore that they are active; we cannot suppose them to sleep like Endymion. Now if you take away action from a living being, and also take away production and making things, what is left except for contemplation? Therefore, the activity of divinity, which surpasses all other activities in blessedness, must be contemplative. And of human activities, therefore, that which is most akin to this must be most of the nature of happiness.

This is also indicated by the fact that the other animals don’t share in genuine happiness, since they are completely deprived of the activity of contemplation. [They can experience pleasure and pain, and can live a life that is healthy or unhealthy, but they can’t contemplate their life as a whole and see it as happy or unhappy.]

Hence, the whole life of the gods is happy. The life of humans is happy too insofar as some likeness of the contemplative activity belongs to it. But none of the other animals have happy lives, [or unhappy lives,] since they in no way share in contemplation. Happiness extends, then, just so far as contemplation does, and those to whom contemplation more fully belongs are more truly happy, not as a mere coincidence but because of the contemplation. For contemplation is valuable in itself.

Contemplation and external prosperity

A happy life, therefore, must be some form of contemplation. But a human being will also need external prosperity. For our nature is not self-sufficient for the purpose of contemplation, but our body also must be healthy and must have food and other things. Still, we must not think that the person who is living a happy life will need many things or great things, merely because he cannot be supremely happy without external goods. For self-sufficiency and action do not involve excess, and we can do noble acts without ruling earth and sea, since even with moderate advantages one can act virtuously. This is clear enough, for private persons are thought to do worthy actions no less than rulers–indeed even more so. And it is enough that we should have as much external prosperity and possessions as are needed for noble and worthy deeds. For the life of someone who is active in accordance with virtue will be happy.

The great statesman and wise man Solon was perhaps sketching well the happy person when he described him as moderately furnished with external possessions but as having done (as Solon thought) the noblest actions and lived temperately. For one can do what one ought with only moderate possessions. Anaxagoras also seems to have supposed that the happy person was neither rich nor a despot, when he said that he would not be surprised if the happy person were to seem to most people strange. For most people judge by externals, since these are all they perceive.

Conclusion of the study of a happy life

The opinions of the wise, then, seem to harmonize with our arguments. But while such things carry some conviction, the truth in practical matters is discerned from life experience, since this is the decisive factor. We must therefore look over what we have already said, bringing it to the test of our life experience, and if it harmonizes with our life experience, we must accept what we’ve said, but if it clashes, we must suppose what we’ve said to be mere words.

Now he who exercises understanding and cultivates it seems to be both in the best condition and most dear to the gods. For if the gods have any care for human affairs, as they are thought to have, it would be reasonable both that they should delight in that which was best and most akin to them–namely, understanding–and that they should reward those who love and honor this most, as caring for the things that are dear to them and acting both rightly and nobly. And that all these attributes belong most of all to the wise person is manifest. The wise person, therefore, is the dearest to the gods. And he who is like this will also live the happiest life, with the result that the wise person will more than any other live a happy life.