Part 11. Middle East in the 1970s and 80s

The 1970s and 80s were a critical time period in the history of the modern Middle East.  In addition to significant developments in Egypt (discussed earlier) and in Israel/Palestine (discussed in the section entitled “The Israeli-Palestinian conflict”), major changes happened in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and the Gulf States.

The Lebanese Civil War

Because of the nature of French rule in Lebanon, the country has always been politically divided along sectarian lines.  In the National Pact of 1943, rule was divided among the Christian, Sunni and Shi’ite populations along sectarian lines.  The Maronite Christians, as the largest Christian group, controlled the government, with the agreement stipulating that the president of Lebanon and the commander of the armed forces would always be a Maronite Christian, while the prime minister would be a Sunni Muslim and the speaker of Parliament would be a Shi’ite Muslim.

With divided interests, Lebanon was frequently drawn into regional conflicts.  For instance, in 1958, at the height of regional enthusiasm for Arab nationalism following the merger of the governments of Egypt and Syria (United Arab Republic or UAR) and the overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq, Lebanon endured a civil war over the issue of where the country stood on the question of Arab nationalism.  The war came to an end when the United States sent in 14,000 soldiers to stabilize the Lebanese government, which it considered to be an ally in the fight against communism.  Lebanon was divided between those who supported Arab unity and wanted to join the UAR (mostly Muslims) and those who wanted stronger ties with the West (mostly Christians)

The 1960s were a prosperous decade for Lebanon.  Beirut became known as the “jewel of the Eastern Mediterranean,” serving as a regional banking center, haven of free expression, center of intellectual exchange, and a home of luxury hotels and flashy nightclubs.  Lebanon seemed to be the success story of sectarian pluralism.  However, tensions began to arise in the country as demographic change (rising Shi’ite population, loss of Christian majority) were not reflected in a change of the power division through the sectarian Lebanese political system.

By the 1970s, it had become clear that the Shi’ites were actually the largest sect within Lebanon, and yet they were drastically underrepresented in the political system.  In addition, the move into Lebanon by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1970 and the inability of the Lebanese government to restrict PLO activities in southern Lebanon served to exacerbate tensions between Muslim and Christian communities.  Finally, the outbreak of civil war in the mid 1970s led to the direct involvement in Lebanese affairs by the militaries of two neighbors – Syria and Israel – resulting in further conflict within the country.  By the late 1970s, Lebanon had shattered into competing political factions like a plate glass window struck by a hammer. 

Different sectarian groups had formed militias in the late 60s and early 70s, and they armed themselves for conflict.  Fighting broke out in 1975 between the different militias.  Meditation by the Arab League led to a cease fire that was soon broken.  As the civil war spiraled out of control and the country became divided between regions controlled by different sectarian militias, outside powers began to get actively involved in the conflict, hoping to shore up their allies.  The Syrian army entered Lebanon in the late 70s, while Israel invaded in 1978 and 1982, trying to eliminate PLO terrorist attacks launched from southern Lebanon.

The latter invasion resulted in the expulsion of PLO leadership from Lebanon, and their relocation in Tunis, after Israel bombed Beirut throughout the summer of 1982.  Following the PLO evacuation, Phalange (Maronite) troops, under Israeli supervision, committed massacres in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila, outside Beirut.  The massacre was widely denounced in the international press, and the Israeli military (and specifically Defense Minister Ariel Sharon) was found to be responsible for this atrocity by both the independent MacBride commission and the Israeli Kahan commission.

By the 1980s, the Lebanese conflict had deteriorated into mutual attacks, kidnappings, massacres and murders.  The UN sent in U.S. peacekeepers in 1983, who withdrew after a suicide bombing of marine barracks killed 299 American and French servicemen in October 1983.  Although Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the bombings, some analysts believe that Hezbollah and Iran were involved.  The war dragged on for several more years until the Taif Agreement of 1989, which was finally implemented in 1991, eventually ended the conflict.  The sectarian system was largely left in place, with a slight adjustment that distributed power within Parliament evenly between Christians and Muslims.  The agreement also required the disarmament of all national and non-national militias and set a timetable for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon (which finally happened in 2005).  Hezbollah, however, managed to stay armed, with the excuse that it served as a resistance force against Israel, which still maintained troops in southern Lebanon.

Ba`athist Dictatorships in Iraq and Syria

The Ba’ath (Resurrection) party was founded in Syria in 1947 by Michel Aflaq (an Arab Christian) and Salah al-Din al-Bitar (a Sunni Muslim).  Aflaq later had a falling out with Syrian Ba`athists and became an honored (if powerless) figure among Iraqi Ba`athists until his death in 1989.  Ba’athist principles were similar to those of Nasser: socialism, land reform, Arab unity, and resistance to Israel and Western colonialism.

Ba`athists pushed for Syrian political union with Egypt in 1958.  However, the reality of the union turned out to be Egyptian dominance over the Syrian government, with top Ba`ath officials working desk jobs in Cairo while Nasser appointees ran Syria.  As a result, the union fell apart in 1961 but the Syrian government remained close allies with Nasser.  Iraqi Ba`athists likewise pushed for union with the UAR after obtaining power in a 1963 coup, but it never came to pass because of the popularity of Iraqi nationalism among key political leaders.

By 1970, Ba`athists were in power in both Syria and Iraq.  However, the two parties did not get along, and their countries competed for regional leadership throughout this period.  In both Syria and Iraq, Ba`athist leaders used the comprehensive nature of the party to exercise totalitarian control over their countries.  The animosity between the two countries can be seen in the fact that Syria was the only Arab state to back Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, and also sided with the United States (for the only time) to oppose Iraq during the Gulf War.  Iraq, on the other hand, recruited Ba`athist founder Michel Aflaq after he had a falling out with the Syrian Ba`ath, to claim that the Iraqi Ba`athists were more loyal to the original party vision than the Syrians.

The Ba`thist leader of Syria, Hafiz al-Asad was both pragmatic, cautious and ruthless in his style of rule.  As a member of the minority Alawite sect, he initially omitted the requirement for the president to be a Muslim from the constitution.  When protests broke out in response to this, he pressured a prominent Shi`a religious scholar to declare that Alawis are Muslims.  Under Asad’s rule, Alawis achieved significant political power, even though they represent approximately 10% of the population of Syria.

Asad’s main concerns were to secure his own political power and that of his family, and to expand Syrian influence in the region.  He pursued both aims by strengthening the military.  The bases of his power were his control of the Ba`ath party and the loyalty of the military.  Asad also sought to achieve military parity with Israel and to exert influence in Lebanon through the presence of Syrian troops.  The Syrian military entered Lebanon in 1976, with the excuse of bringing stability in the midst of the civil war.  It remained in Lebanon until 2005.

The military was also used to maintain Ba`athist power within Syria.  When the Islamic Front launched a rebellion in 1980, Asad mercilessly bombarded their base in the city of Hama.  The city was demolished and some 10,000 Syrians were slaughtered in the attack.  There was not another significant Islamist rebellion during Asad’s rule.

The Ba`ath party first gained power in Iraq in the 1963 coup.  However, power was still contested until Hasan al-Bakr and his deputy Saddam Husayn took over in 1968.  Whereas the Ba`ath leaders in Syria were connected with a religious minority (the Alawis), in Iraq the top officials came from the same region – the town of Takrit.

The Ba`athists nationalized the oil industry in Iraq in 1972.  As a result of the oil embargo in the following year, substantial wealth poured into the government coffers.  This allowed the Iraqi government to make greater strides toward implementing a socialist state than Syria had done.  The Iraqi economy prospered in the 1970s, with better living conditions, higher income levels, and improved literacy for the general population.  Iraqi prosperity in the 70s only came to an end as a result of Saddam’s military adventures in the 1980s.

Saddam rose to power through association with his relative, Hassan al-Bakr, who became president of Iraq in 1968.  Originally from a poor rural background, he worked behind the scenes to centralize power in his hands, turning the Ba’ath party into a organ of personal power.  In 1979, Husayn pushed al-Bakr aside and became president in his own name.  He was a paranoid but brilliant individual, who used fear and divide and conquer techniques to cement his power.  However, he did not have a military background, and this lack of military knowledge would cause problems in his later military adventures.

Like preceding Iraqi rulers, Saddam persecuted the Shi’ites and repressed the Kurds, using a scorched earth policy in Kurdish lands.  He used oil to develop the Iraqi state, which was fairly prosperous during the 1970s, providing extensive social services, health care and education.

Saddam’s concern to maintain power in his secular state, coupled with a belief that he could take advantage of Iranian weakness following the 1979 Iranian Islamic revolution, led to a devastating eight year war between the two countries in the 1980s.  Saddam’s excuse for invading Iran was his claim that the Iranians had violated a treaty between the two countries that had been established in 1975.  His real goal seems to have been to knock off a regional competitor presumed to be unstable following its revolution, and to crush the threat that the Iranian revolution would inspire revolt among the Iraqi Shiite majority.  He saw himself as carrying the banner for Sunni Arabs as opposed to Persian Shiites.

In response to Iraq’s invasion, Ayatollah Khomeini sent thousands of untrained Iranian youth to the battlefield, after inspiring them by touting the glories of martyrdom.  They mostly proved to be cannon fodder for the Iraqi military, but they cleared a path for the regular Iranian army to counter attack Iraqi held positions.

In the long war, Iraq had the advantages of superior armaments and military, a willingness to use chemical weapons, and the fact that Iraqi Shiites did not revolt during the war.  On the other hand, Iran’s advantages included a larger population that was motivated by religious rhetoric of fighting against a godless Arab ruler, and the willingness to pursue a policy of total war against Iraq.  The U.S. supported Iraq, but sold weapons to Iran through the Iran-Contra program.  The USSR, France, and the Arab states (except Syria) also supported Iraq.  Close to 500,000 died during the war, almost twice as many Iranians as Iraqis due to Iran’s policies in pursuing the war.  Iraq ended the war in debt to the Gulf states.  However, the Islamic regime was consolidated in Iran due to wartime developments, and the elimination of rivals within Iranian society, who could be labeled as traitors during the course of the war.  Iran finally agreed to a cease fire on July 20, 1988.

The Arab Gulf States and Jordan

The presence of petroleum resources allowed Gulf countries to achieve unprecedented wealth and global influence during the 1970s and 80s.  The Oil Embargo that launched by Saudi king Faysal following the 1973 war between Israel and Egypt would result in substantially increased petroleum revenues and regional influence for Saudi Arabia.  Some of these increased proceeds were utilized in promoting Wahhabi ideology throughout the Muslim world.

However, at home, King Faysal sought to decrease the power of the ulama, forcing critical clerics out of their positions.  He used his security forces to harshly repress dissent, while defending his policies in Islamic terms.  He resisted calls for a constitution by claiming “our constitution is the Qur’an.”  King Faysal was assassinated by his nephew, Faysal bin Musaid on March 25, 1975.  It is thought that the nephew sought to avenge the death of his brother, Khalid, who was killed while attacking a television station in 1966, in protest of the introduction of TV in Saudi Arabia.

Other Gulf states were not as expansive in using their oil wealth, but they invested heavily in their own economies.  Kuwait created a cradle-to-grave welfare system for Kuwaiti citizens (not foreign workers, who make up more than 60% of the country’s population).  In Oman, the royal family undertook significant infrastructure development, raising the national standard of living.

Seven small emirates agreed to form the United Arab Emirates in 1971, a union that has proven immensely successful economically and in terms of increasing their regional influence.  As with the other Gulf states, the majority of residents in the UAE and Qatar are foreign laborers, who do not receive the same benefits as citizens.  All of the states are similar in that they are monarchies, with few opportunities for public participation in government.  Kuwait has the only representative assembly of the Gulf States.

In contrast to the Nasserites and Ba`thists, the Gulf States continued to be governed by monarchies.  Saudi Arabia viewed Arab Nationalism as a threat to the monarchies, opposed Nasser, allied with United States, and supported monarchies in the Yemenese civil war and in Bahrain.  The Saudis also gave support to the great-grandson of their former Hashemite rival, King Husayn in Jordan.

King Husayn found himself in the middle of what became known as the Arab Cold War.  He faced the challenges of guiding a country with few natural resources and a large Palestinian minority.  Jordan was drawn into the debate over Arab Nationalism, and faced pressure from the UAR and Nasser.  In light of these pressures and growing Palestinian unrest, Husayn turned back to the West and an alliance with the US.  This alliance was further cemented after the Iraqi revolution of 1958.  Jordan’s politics stabilized after that, and its economy improved, bolstered by American aid.  Still, King Husayn could not afford to just ignore Nasser and the UAR.  Under substantial pressure from Egypt and Syria, Jordan joined an alliance against Israel in 1967, and later suffered a crushing defeat in the Six Days War.  However, Husayn’s political astuteness, and strong support from the army, allowed him to stay in power until his death in 1999.