Part 9. The Post-Colonial Era in the Middle East: Iran and Turkey

1950s and 60s in Turkey and Iran

The end of World War II ushered in yet another new period in the modern history of the Middle East.  This war finally accomplished what World War I had not brought about: the end of the age of imperialism throughout the region.  In the years following the conclusion of WWII, all of the Middle Eastern states achieved political independence from the European powers.  But, as we will see, this doesn’t mean that their problems with Western meddling were at an end. With the beginning of the Cold War, the Middle East would become a site of competition between the two major superpowers, whose struggle for influence in this important region would have a profound effect upon the governments that would arise and the policies that they would pursue during this tense era.

National Development in Turkey and Iran

Although Turkey had not been viewed as a strategically important country during the Interwar period, thus allowing Ataturk considerable freedom to develop the nation as he saw fit without much outside meddling from Western powers, this situation would change with the conclusion of WWII.  This was due to the fact that the Cold War against the Soviet Union became the over-riding priority in the foreign policy of the Western nations (particularly the United States and Great Britain) following the war, and Turkey was one of the Middle Eastern countries that bordered the Soviet Union.  Iran also shared a border with the Soviets, increasing the strategic importance of that country in addition to the importance that it already had due to its oil reserves.  These two countries are similar in that they are both non-Arab countries and they were also both front-line states in the Cold War competition with the Soviet Union in the Middle East.

Apart from these two similarities, there were significant differences in developments within these states during this period.  For example, “In Turkey the authoritarian single-party rule of the Republican People’s Party (RPP) gave way to a multi-party system in which elections were openly contested and voters eagerly participated . . . In Iran, in contrast, Muhammad Reza Shah . . . consolidated an authoritarian monarchy in which political activity was severely restricted” (Cleveland and Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East Sixth Edition, 261).  Thus, in many ways, the two countries moved in different directions, even though both established solid alliances with the United States during this period.

In some ways, Turkey’s move in the direction of democracy was somewhat surprising, given the authoritarian nature of the Ataturk regime.  In other ways, however, it is not that surprising, especially when one considers that the leader of the move towards democracy was Ataturk’s right hand man, Ismet Inönü, who sought to faithfully implement the policies of the great leader.  In fact, Ataturk had expressed admiration for Western democracies during his lifetime, and, although he had felt that post-independence Turkey was not immediately ready for the rocky transition to democracy, he seems to have believed that democracy would ultimately be the best system of government for the Turkish Republic.  As president of the country, Ataturk made no efforts to establish a personal family dynasty (unlike what happened in other Middle Eastern countries such as Iraq and Syria).  Thus, it was natural that Inönü would move the country towards democracy following Ataturk’s death.

Although the multiparty system was introduced in Turkey in 1946, the first true test of the system came in 1950, when the upstart Democratic Party outpolled the ruling RPP.  Following the election, Inönü demonstrated his true commitment to democracy by peacefully handing over power to the Democrats and joining the opposition, a transition that has been very hard to make in many developing countries.  Cleveland and Bunton rightly praise the government of Turkey for this smooth transition of power made “only four years after the founding of an opposition party” (Cleveland and Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East Sixth Edition, 264).  However, Turkey’s transition to democracy was not without its bumps along the way.  When the ruling Democratic Party moved towards radicalism in the late 1950s, the military became concerned.  In May, 1960, the armed forces engineered a coup that ousted (and later executed) Prime Minister Adnan Menderes.

However, the coup did not lead to a military government as was happening in other Middle Eastern countries at the time.  Instead “the intervention of 1960 . . . was carried out for the purpose of preserving the principles of Kemalism from which the government of Menderes had strayed, in the opinion of the military” (Cleveland and Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East Sixth Edition, 266).  After banning the Democratic Party, revising the constitution and reorganizing the government, the military allowed new elections and handed over the government to civilians once again.  A similar process took place in 1971 and 1980, as the military continued to remove governments that it saw as being unfaithful to the principles of Ataturk and to tweak the political system in an attempt to make it function more effectively.  Despite its imperfections, the government of Turkey continued along this path towards controlled liberalization and maintained its alliances with Western powers throughout the 1980s.

Iran also pursued a close alliance with the Western powers, in particular the United States, although its governmental structure was different from that of Turkey.  WWII ended with the young Muhammad Reza Shah in power, during a time that Cleveland and Bunton describe as one “of domestic unrest and foreign pressure” (Cleveland and Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East Sixth Edition, 273).  The authors describe the Shah as being out of touch with the desires of the Iranian people and the Shah’s weak position following the war meant that he “was forced to share power with other institutions” (Cleveland and Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East Sixth Edition, 273).  All of this came to a head with the oil nationalization crisis of 1951-1953.  During this time a charismatic leader by the name of Muhammad Mosaddiq was elected to the position of Prime Minister in the Iranian government.

Determined to obtain true freedom for Iran to pursue its own interests, Mossadiq decided to take on the British over the matter of oil revenues.  Iran was still saddled with an unfavorable deal established in 1901 which awarded the vast majority of the country’s oil wealth to the British, who oversaw the extraction and production of the precious resource.  Neither Pahlavi shah had been successful in re-negotiating the deal with the British, and there was widespread resentment throughout Iran over the injustice of the British becoming wealthy through the sale of Iranian oil, whereas Iran itself only derived small benefits from the deal.  In a dramatic series of events, Mosaddiq nationalized the oil industry in 1951 but was eventually brought down by a coup organized by military conspirators with support from CIA agents sent by the United States.  The fall of Mossadiq led to the return of the Shah, who had fled the country in 1953 in fear of Mosaddiq’s growing power.

For the next twenty five years, the Shah ruled Iran as a dictator with strong support from the United States, who viewed his regime as a bulwark against communism in the Middle East.  In addition to exercising his royal power, the Shah fancied himself as a reformer, implementing a major reform program dubbed “The White Revolution” that was geared to “transforming Iran along Western lines” (Cleveland and Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East Sixth Edition, 280).  However, despite the rapid Westernization of the country that took place in the 1960s and 1970s, the Shah continued to keep all political power within his own control.  Eventually this would lead to conflict between the Shah and “the large portion of the Iranian population who wished to see the political system opened up and freedom of expression permitted” (Cleveland and Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East Sixth Edition, 295).